# REPORT: Taiwan on a war footing — 5 days of exercises to learn to survive China's attack

> On June 22, 2026, at dawn, columns of tanks and armored vehicles from Taiwan's 269th Infantry Brigade began patrolling National Highway 31, in the Taoyuan region — just a few kilometers from Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the island's largest. This was not a parade. It was

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-24
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-taiwan-en-etat-de-guerre-5-jours-d-exercices-pour-apprendre-a-survivre-a-l-attaque-de-la-c

## Introduction: The island rehearsing its own survival

### Five days to learn to shift to wartime

On **June 22, 2026**, at dawn, columns of tanks and armored vehicles from Taiwan's **269th Infantry Brigade** began patrolling National Highway **31**, in the **Taoyuan** region — just a few kilometers from Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the island's largest. This was not a parade. It was the start of the **"Immediate Combat Readiness Exercises"** — a series of maneuvers running from June **22** to **June 26, 2026**, five consecutive days during which Taiwan's military trained for a single purpose: transitioning from peacetime to wartime as quickly as possible.

These exercises are not a planning fiction. They respond to a reality documented by Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense and publicly confirmed on **June 24, 2026** by Defense Minister Wellington Koo: **"the warning time for any Chinese attack is shortening."** This statement, made to the **Straits Times**, is as precise as it is sober. It means that Taiwan's military planners estimate that the window between the start of a Chinese military operation and the moment the first assault forces would reach the island's shores is shrinking — driven by the accelerated modernization of the **People's Liberation Army**'s amphibious, **missile**, and **drone** capabilities.

### The Taoyuan brigade and the symbol it protects

The decision to deploy the **269th Brigade** in the **Taoyuan** region is not random. Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport is the island's most strategically vital infrastructure: it is the main entry and exit point for the country, the primary resupply hub in a conflict, and one of the first targets that any rational **PLAN** invasion plan would seek to neutralize or capture. Protecting this airport and its surroundings — including Highway **31** leading to it — means protecting Taiwan's capacity to receive reinforcements, ammunition, and international aid in the opening hours of a potential conflict.

Images distributed by **AP News** show columns of **M113** armored personnel carriers and **M60A3** tanks patrolling the highway in civilian traffic. These images serve a dual function: demonstrating the **operational responsiveness** of Taiwan's army to its own population, and sending a visible message to outside observers — including Chinese satellites — about the rapid mobilization capacity of defensive forces. It is photographic deterrence as much as military training.

*Tanks in Taoyuan's civilian traffic. Soldiers in combat gear a few kilometers from the island's busiest airport. There is something deeply moving about these images — an entire society rehearsing survival, practicing the transition from ordinary daily life to existential emergency. This is not paranoia. It is preparation. And in 2026, in the Taiwan Strait, the difference between the two is a matter of minutes.*

## The immediate context — 23 aircraft and 12 vessels in three days

### Chinese military presence in the days before the exercises

Taiwan's exercises do not unfold in a vacuum. In the days before they began, **23 Chinese military aircraft** and **7 PLA warships**, accompanied by **5 government vessels**, had been detected in the waters and airspace around Taiwan over the weekend of **June 21 and 22**, according to data from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense cited by **AP News**. These figures fall in the upper range of the routine surveillance and military pressure the **PLAN** regularly exerts around the island.

The logic behind this presence is threefold. First, the **PLA**'s continuous exercises around Taiwan serve to **normalize military presence** in the zone, making it difficult for observers to distinguish routine maneuvers from a pre-conflict operational deployment. Second, they test Taiwanese detection and response systems — each Chinese sortie is intelligence collection on reaction times, radio frequencies used, and deployment patterns of Taiwan's **F-16V fighter jets**. Third, they exercise constant **psychological pressure** on the civilian population and Taiwanese decision-makers, forcing them to live in a state of permanent alert that can erode long-term resilience.

### Taiwan's exercises as a direct response

The decision to conduct **5 consecutive days** of exercises in early summer **2026** is a direct response to this pressure. Taiwan's Ministry of Defense confirmed that the exercises were centered on practicing the **peacetime-to-wartime transition** — a concept that may sound abstract but covers vital and concrete procedures: activating reserve commands, deploying pre-positioned forces, securing critical infrastructure (airports, ports, power plants, water reservoirs), and maintaining communications between units in an environment of intensive electronic warfare. The **Japan Times** reported on June **21, 2026** that this emphasis on the peacetime-to-wartime transition represented a significant evolution from previous exercises, which had been more focused on conventional combat scenarios.

The innovation of **2026** is the insistence on **decentralized regional command**. The exercises tested the ability of brigade and battalion commanders to operate autonomously, without continuous communication with central command, on the assumption that command lines would be disrupted or destroyed in the opening hours of a conflict. This decentralized command doctrine — relying on the individual initiative of junior officers rather than continuous hierarchical orders — is a direct lesson drawn from the fighting in **Ukraine**, where the ability to function without reliable communications is often the difference between a unit's survival and its destruction.

*The decentralized command doctrine, learned in Ukraine, taught in Taiwan. Tomorrow's war transmits in real time from one theater of operations to another. It is one of the rare pieces of good news of our era: democracies learn quickly when they choose to look at what is happening.*

## Minister Koo and the strategic admission — "the warning time is shortening"

### A public statement of unusual candor

Defense Minister **Wellington Koo**'s statement to the **Straits Times** on June **24, 2026** deserves precise analysis. Saying publicly that **"the warning time for any Chinese attack is shortening"** is an unusually candid declaration. Military officials generally tend to reassure rather than alarm — to avoid triggering civilian panic, to avoid revealing the limits of detection capabilities, and to maintain a posture of confidence that discourages adversary attack.

The fact that Koo made this statement publicly, to a leading international media outlet, suggests a deliberate intent to **signal urgency** — to **Washington** first, but also to Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra. It is a diplomatic way of saying: we need more support, more weapons, more political commitment, and the time to deliver them is shrinking along with ours. It is geopolitical lobbying in the form of a military statement.

### What "shortened warning time" means in practice

The reduction in **warning time** between a Chinese decision to attack and the moment the first **missiles** or assault forces reach Taiwan is a critical factor conditioning all of Taiwan's defense doctrine. In the 1990s and 2000s, analysts estimated that the preparations for a major **PLAN** amphibious operation — mobilizing ships, preparing embarkation zones, deploying air cover — would be detectable several weeks in advance, giving **Washington** time to deploy forces to the region and Taipei time to mobilize reserves.

This window has narrowed for several reasons: the **PLA**'s **regular exercises** around Taiwan normalize troop and vessel movements, making it harder to distinguish exercises from preparation for a real offensive; **ballistic missiles** such as the DF-11 and DF-15 can reach Taiwan within minutes from Fujian bases; and the doctrine of **rapid joint operations** that the PLA is developing is designed precisely to reduce the lag between decision and action. If warning time shrinks from weeks to hours, Taiwan's entire mobilization logistics and American deployment planning must be rethought.

*A few hours of warning. That is what Minister Koo's declaration concretely means. A few hours to mobilize reserves, secure infrastructure, deploy coastal defenses, and decide whether the United States enters the fight. In that scenario, everything not already in place before the attack may never be in time. This is why the June 2026 exercises are not theater — they are an absolute necessity.*

## The doctrine of defense in depth — learning from Kyiv's mistakes

### Ukrainian lessons adapted to an island context

Taiwan's military has carefully studied the first weeks of the war in Ukraine, drawing lessons specific to its island geography. The main lesson: a frontal conventional defense designed to stop a massive assault force at the gates of the capital is less effective than a **decentralized defense in depth** that wears down the attacker, forces costly urban combat, and maintains resistance capabilities in all regions of the island even if the coastlines are breached. This doctrine is sometimes called the **"porcupine strategy"** in Western analyses: making Taiwanese territory so costly to conquer that the attack is not worth it.

The June 2026 exercises specifically tested elements of this strategy: the ability to deploy **rapid opposition forces** in the island's interior zones, securing critical logistical hubs such as Taoyuan airport against airborne commandos or special forces operations, and activating **civilian resistance networks** capable of maintaining essential functions under wartime conditions. These elements of the defense doctrine are discreet, less visible than tanks on highways, but probably more decisive for the long-term resilience of Taiwan's defense.

### Military service reform and social resilience

In January 2024, Taiwan extended mandatory military service from **4 months to 1 year** for men born after 2005 — a politically difficult decision, but one reflecting a realistic assessment of the gap between the growing threat and available defense capabilities. This reform progressively broadens the base of trained reservists. According to Ministry of National Defense data cited by the **Japan Times**, Taiwan aims to train **26,000 additional reservists per year** through this reform, significantly increasing the total force available for the island's defense in a general mobilization situation.

The June 2026 exercises included components involving these new reservist units — a test of their integration into active brigades, their communications, and their ability to hold defensive positions over extended periods without central resupply. **Social resilience** — a society's ability to maintain cohesion and the will to resist in the face of aggression — may be the hardest variable to measure and the most important for the outcome of a conflict. Public exercises like those of June 2026 contribute to this resilience by making military preparation visible and normal to the civilian population.

*One year of military service instead of four months. Tanks on the highway on a Monday morning. A society collectively deciding to prepare for the unthinkable. I find that both courageous and heartbreaking. Courageous because it is the right decision. Heartbreaking because no society should have to make these decisions in 2026.*

## Taoyuan Airport — central infrastructure in any conflict scenario

### Why Taoyuan is the first objective of any invasion

**Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport** is the island's most strategically vital and also one of its most vulnerable pieces of infrastructure. With two long runways and a pre-disruption transit capacity of **80 million passengers per year**, it is the primary entry point for any Western military reinforcement — C-17, C-130, and A400M transport aircraft — and for resupply of ammunition, fuel, and equipment. If the PLAN can neutralize this airport in the opening hours of a conflict — through missile strikes, special forces operations, or helicopter assault — Taiwan's capacity to receive outside assistance is dramatically reduced.

The **269th Infantry Brigade** whose exercises covered the Taoyuan area was tasked in these maneuvers with practicing precisely the airport's defense against scenarios of rapid assault: neutralizing helicopter-borne commandos in terminal areas, protecting runways against sabotage, and maintaining a secure corridor between the airport and coastal defensive positions. These scenarios, drawn from analysis of the PLA's airborne assault doctrines and the lessons of the first hours of the **Russo-Ukrainian War** (where the capture of Hostomel airport by Russian helicopter-borne forces nearly succeeded), are at the heart of Taiwanese defensive planning.

### Air defense systems around Taoyuan

Defense of Taoyuan airport relies on several layers of air defense systems. **Patriot PAC-3 missile** batteries deployed in the Taoyuan region constitute the defense against medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles. Taiwanese-made **Sky Bow III** (Tien Kung III) systems cover longer-range threats. And **F-16V fighter jets** based at Chingchuankang Air Base — less than 100 km away — constitute the defensive layer against attack aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles.

But air defense has a fundamental limit in the context of a massive attack: it can be **saturated**. If the PLA simultaneously launches dozens of DF-11 and DF-15 ballistic missiles against Taiwan — which is within its current capability according to all available analyses — Patriot batteries can only intercept a limited number of missiles simultaneously before exhausting their interceptor stocks. This is precisely why the June 2026 exercises emphasized the resilience of physical infrastructure — hardening critical buildings, redundancy in communications systems, operational continuity plans that function even if key infrastructure is struck.

*Patriots can be saturated. Bunkers can be destroyed. Highway 31 can be cratered by a missile. Taiwan knows this. That is why the resistance doctrine does not rest on the invulnerability of infrastructure — it rests on the ability to keep fighting when that infrastructure is destroyed. It is a hard military philosophy to hear, but an honest one.*

## The American alliance — real support and deliberate ambiguity

### The policy of strategic ambiguity and its limits

Official American policy toward a Chinese attack on Taiwan formally remains one of **strategic ambiguity**: the United States does not explicitly commit to defending Taiwan militarily, but does not rule it out either. This position, maintained since the Nixon era, aims to deter Beijing from attacking (by maintaining uncertainty about the American response) while deterring Taiwan from declaring formal independence (by not providing a military blank check). It is a delicate diplomatic construction that has kept the peace in the strait for several decades.

However, this ambiguity is progressively eroding. President Biden had declared on multiple occasions in 2021 and 2022 that the United States would defend Taiwan — statements that the White House subsequently "clarified" as not representing a policy change. The adoption of the **Taiwan Policy Act** and various US defense budget provisions increasing arms deliveries to Taiwan signal a move toward a more explicit support policy without formal abandonment of ambiguity. For the June 2026 exercises, this ambiguity translates practically: American forces do not participate directly in Taiwanese maneuvers, but American military advisers present on the island contributed to their design and assessment.

### Arms deliveries — what Taipei has received and what it still awaits

American military aid to Taiwan reached record levels between 2022 and 2026. Recent deliveries include the **400 Harpoon missiles** mentioned previously, as well as **HIMARS** missiles, coastal defense systems, precision munitions for F-16Vs, and secure communications equipment. Pending orders include submarines (**Hai Kun**, the first submarine built in Taiwan in 70 years, delivered in 2023) and additional **HIMARS** systems.

What **Taiwan** is still requesting and what **Washington** has not yet delivered — or has only partially delivered — includes **mass drone defense systems**, **enhanced electronic warfare capabilities**, and potentially **long-range missiles** capable of striking invasion departure bases before they reach Taiwan's coastlines. This last category is **politically sensitive**: it would give Taiwan a **deep-strike capability** against mainland Chinese territory, something Washington hesitates to provide to avoid triggering escalation.

*American strategic ambiguity maintained peace in the strait for fifty years. But in a world where warning time is shrinking, where missiles arrive in minutes, and where a decision to defend Taiwan must be made before the attack is confirmed — is ambiguity still a policy or has it become an obstacle? I ask the question without certainty of the answer.*

## The 5 days of exercises — structure and objectives

### Days 1 to 3: activation and deployment

The first three days of exercises, from June 22 to 24, 2026, centered on activation and deployment procedures. The **269th Infantry Brigade** practiced transitioning from its barracks to its pre-assigned combat positions under real civilian traffic conditions — a significant constraint that purely military exercises on isolated training grounds do not replicate. The presence of armored columns on **Highway 31** was designed to test civilian traffic management plans, coordination with local authorities to clear lanes for military forces, and actual deployment times in urban and peri-urban environments.

**Decentralized command** was also tested from these first days: each battalion had to be able to receive its activation orders, deploy to its operational zone, and establish its own communications without depending on continuously available central command. Exercises simulating electronic communications disruption — **cellular network outages**, **radio jamming** — tested the resilience of alternative command links: **encrypted military radio links**, physical couriers, and command protocols following a pre-established schedule memorized without digital support.

### Days 4 and 5: resistance and continuity

The final two days, June 25 to 26, focused on resistance and operational continuity exercises. These scenarios involved situations where certain defensive positions were presumed struck or neutralized, forcing surviving units to redeploy and maintain the defense of their key objectives with reduced resources. **Combat logistics exercises** — resupply of ammunition and fuel in an environment of constant aerial threat — tested the ability to keep forces in action without normal logistics convoys.

The ultimate objective of these five days was not operational perfection. It was the identification of gaps — procedures that do not work well, overly long timelines, communications that fail, units that get lost in coordination. These gaps, documented and analyzed after the exercises, will feed the doctrinal revisions and equipment adjustments that must be made before the next series of exercises. This is the iterative logic of **serious military preparation** — not pretending to perfection, but systematically learning from each simulation.

*The most honest military leaders are those who tell you what did not work after an exercise. Armies that learn are those that document their failures as carefully as their successes. I don't know to what extent Taiwan's army is in that category — but these 5-day exercises at least have the honesty to confront the reality of a plausible attack, and that is already significant.*

## International reactions — Tokyo, Washington, Seoul are watching

### Japan: attentive observer and increasingly involved actor

The Japanese government followed Taiwan's June 2026 exercises with particular attention. Japan's **Sakishima Islands**, including **Yonaguni** less than 110 km from Taiwan's coastlines, would be the first allied territories affected by any conflict in the strait. Tokyo has intensified deployments to these islands in recent years, including Type 12 anti-ship missile batteries and surveillance radars. Japanese liaison officers regularly participate in analyses of Taiwanese exercises — not in the field, but in post-exercise information-sharing meetings.

Japan's growing involvement in Taiwan's defense — without formal commitment — fits within the "immediate **neighborhood security**" doctrine that Tokyo has progressively developed under the leadership of Prime Minister Kishida and his successors. Japan has clearly signaled that Taiwan's security is linked to its own **national security** — a position that would have been unthinkable ten years ago. The June 2026 exercises reinforce this signal by showing a Taiwanese military that takes its own preparation seriously, reducing the likelihood that Japan would be left alone to ensure regional defense in the absence of credible Taiwanese resistance.

### Washington: material support and political pressure

The **Pentagon** followed the Taiwanese exercises through its military advisers permanently stationed in Taiwan following the National Defense Authorization Act that officialized their presence. The American assessment of the exercises — their strengths and gaps — will feed decisions on upcoming arms deliveries and training provided by **US special forces** to Taiwanese troops. Training, as important as armaments, is at the heart of the American support program: it is not enough to deliver HIMARS or Harpoons — Taiwanese operators must know how to use them effectively in high-intensity conflict conditions.

An **unannounced visit** to Taipei by a bipartisan American congressional delegation during the exercises week — a practice that has become common since 2022 — underlined American political commitment in a visible way. These visits carry real symbolic value: they signal to Beijing that American interest in Taiwan transcends alternations between Democratic and Republican administrations, and that an attack on the island would trigger a bipartisan American political response that would not be easily circumvented.

*American lawmakers cycling through Taipei, Japanese military officials sharing exercise data, Harpoon and HIMARS deliveries — all of this forms a visible support net. But is it robust enough to deter Xi Jinping if he decides one morning that the moment has come? I hope so. I do not assert it. Nobody honestly can.*

## The civilian population — between apparent normality and quiet preparation

### Civil defense exercises: a growing program

Alongside military exercises, Taiwan has progressively developed a **civil defense and resilience** program involving the non-combatant population. Air raid alert simulations — the first in decades — were reintroduced in certain Taiwanese cities in 2023 and 2024. Official guides on behaviors to adopt in a conflict were distributed to households. **Community food stockpiling** initiatives and shelter identification were launched in several municipalities.

These measures serve a dual function. Practically, they increase the real resilience of the civilian population against the disruptions a conflict would cause — food shortages, water and electricity outages, communications breakdowns. Psychologically, they normalize thinking about war preparedness, reducing the shock and disorientation that a sudden attack would cause to an unprepared population. This normalization of preparedness is an essential element of the **social resilience** that Taiwan's defense analysts consider as important as military preparation in the strict sense.

### Opinion polls on defense: a notable evolution

Taiwanese public opinion polls on national defense issues show a notable evolution in recent years. According to data compiled by the **Election Study Center at National Chengchi University**, the proportion of Taiwanese declaring willingness to fight to defend the island in the event of attack has increased significantly — rising from approximately **40% in the 2010s to more than 60% in 2025**. This evolution reflects both a heightened awareness of the real Chinese threat and a reinforcement of a **Taiwanese identity** distinct from Chinese identity.

**Taiwanese identity** — the proportion of island residents defining themselves as **"Taiwanese"** rather than "Chinese" or "both" — has also reached record levels according to the same polls. This **demographic and identity shift** may be the most decisive variable for **Taiwan's long-term resilience**: a population that feels Taiwanese and distinct will have greater will to resist an annexation presented to them as **"reunification."** Beijing, aware of this dynamic, does everything to reverse it — including through **information programs and economic pressure**. It appears, so far, to be failing.

***60% of Taiwanese** ready to fight. That is a figure often cited but whose depth is not always appreciated. This is not bravado — these are ordinary people, students, teachers, shopkeepers, who have decided their island is worth defending. Against them, no intimidation strategy will work durably. And Beijing should know that.*

## Strategic gaps — what the exercises revealed

### Logistics: the persistent Achilles heel

Military observers analyzing the June 2026 exercises through available information identified several **persistent gaps** in Taiwan's preparation. The primary one is logistics: the ability to sustain high-intensity military operations for several weeks, with ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and food, in an environment where supply convoys would be under constant aerial threat. Taiwan's ammunition stocks — the exact level of which is classified — are judged insufficient by some analysts for a **prolonged war of attrition**.

**Precision munitions** — Harpoon missiles, HIMARS-guided munitions, AIM-120 air-to-air missiles — are particularly critical and particularly depleted rapidly in a high-intensity conflict. Ukraine demonstrated that missile stocks empty at a staggering rate in modern conflict. Taiwan, with its maritime supply chains potentially cut by a Chinese naval blockade, must possess at the start of any conflict stocks sufficient to fight alone for the first days or weeks — the time for reinforcements or resupply to be routed in, if they ever can be.

### Electronic warfare and cyber defense: capabilities under construction

The **PLA** possesses sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities that would be used intensively in the opening hours of a conflict: GPS jamming, disruption of military communications, neutralization of coastal radar systems. Taiwan has invested in electronic warfare and cyber defense capabilities, but the gap with Chinese capabilities remains substantial. The June 2026 exercises included simulations of electronic communications degradation — an honest way of acknowledging the vulnerability and practicing alternative procedures.

**Cyber defense** is a particularly critical dimension for Taiwan, whose economy and military infrastructure depend heavily on digital networks. **TSMC** — Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — and its production chains for advanced chips, on which the global economy depends, constitute a prime target for Chinese cyberattacks aimed at disrupting the Taiwanese economy in the lead-up to a conflict or paralyzing its production during one. Protecting these critical industrial infrastructures is a national security issue that goes far beyond military defense in the strict sense.

***TSMC** and its ability to produce 2- and 3-nanometer chips — that is the economic heart of Taiwan and perhaps the most important variable in the regional security dynamic. If Beijing seizes those factories intact, it dominates the global advanced semiconductor supply chain. If they are destroyed in a conflict, the global economy absorbs a shock whose depth nobody can predict. That may be Taiwan's most effective deterrent: its own economic importance to a world that depends on its chips.*

## TSMC as a strategic variable — economics inside geopolitics

### The "silicon shield" — protection or vulnerability

The idea that **TSMC** constitutes a **"silicon shield"** for Taiwan — China would not attack the island because it needs its chips — is appealing but contested. On one side, the argument is real: China depends on Taiwanese chips for its technology industry, its weapons systems, and its economy broadly. Destroying these facilities would deprive China of an industrial infrastructure crucial to its own military and economic modernization. On the other, if Beijing develops domestic alternatives to Taiwanese chips — an explicit objective of its "Made in China 2025" program — the value of the silicon shield progressively diminishes.

China's massive investments in its own semiconductor foundries — notably **SMIC** (Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation) — aim precisely at reducing this dependence. Progress is real but limited: in 2026, China can produce 7nm chips via equipment circumventing American restrictions on SMIC, but remains far from TSMC's 3- or 2-nm manufacturing capabilities. Reducing this dependence is a 10-to-20-year process, not a 2-to-3-year one. The silicon shield therefore remains a real protection, but one of limited duration.

### TSMC relocation plans — deterrence through the threat of economic destruction

A plan whose existence has been officially confirmed, but whose details remain confidential, provides that **TSMC** and the company's key engineers have **evacuation and equipment destabilization protocols** in the event an invasion appears imminent. The idea is that if an invasion seems imminent, Taiwan can threaten to render TSMC's facilities inoperable — by evacuating indispensable engineers and deliberately damaging critical equipment impossible to quickly replace. This credible threat is a form of economic deterrence: it guarantees that even a "successful" invasion of Taiwan would leave Beijing with empty factories it could not operate.

The credibility of this economic deterrence rests on Taiwan's willingness to follow through on this threat — which means accepting the destruction of the island's most precious economic infrastructure. It is a psychologically and politically difficult decision requiring precisely the kind of **moral and institutional preparation** that the June 2026 exercises seek to develop: the ability to make difficult decisions under extreme circumstances, quickly, and to execute them in a coordinated fashion even amid the chaos of a conflict's opening hours.

*Deterrence through the economic destruction of one's most precious infrastructure — that is a decision few societies could make. And yet it may be the variable that keeps the Taiwan conflict equation favorable to peace. Destroying TSMC to prevent Beijing from seizing it — that is the strategic equivalent of burning Moscow in 1812. And it worked.*

## Scenarios for the future — between escalation and the status quo

### The degraded status quo scenario

The most probable scenario in the short term — 3 to 5 years — is one of a **degraded status quo**: tensions remain high, military exercises on both sides intensify, arms deliveries to Taiwan continue, and no direct military confrontation erupts. In this scenario, Taiwan continues to strengthen its defensive capabilities, American diplomacy maintains a visible presence in the region, and Beijing continues to exert maximum pressure without crossing the threshold of open conflict. It is the scenario of the **costly deterrence balance** — psychologically wearing for Taiwan, economically costly for allies maintaining their presence, but militarily preferable to any real conflict.

The **June 2026 exercises** fit within this degraded status quo scenario. They reinforce **deterrence** by demonstrating serious preparation, they increase the **real resilience of Taiwan's military**, and they signal to allies that Taiwan merits and usefully uses the military support provided to it. It is a **political message** as much as a military exercise, and both dimensions are equally important.

### What the long term requires

Over the longer term — 10 to 20 years — the balance of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait will depend on several variables whose evolution is uncertain. **China's economic trajectory** — if China enters a prolonged economic stagnation, the temptation of a nationalist conflict to divert domestic attention increases; conversely, an economically stable China has less need for this type of diversion. The **success of China's technological autonomy** — if China succeeds in freeing itself from dependence on Taiwanese chips, the silicon shield disappears. And the **consistency of American support** — if Washington signals to Beijing that its commitment to Taiwan is conditional or declining, China's strategic calculation changes radically.

The **June 2026 exercises** are a response to the uncertainty of these variables. What they say is simple: whatever the evolution of these factors, **Taiwan will be ready**. This **military preparation** is the island's best life insurance. It is not sufficient on its own — but without it, nothing else is either.

*Taiwan preparing for its own survival while the world looks elsewhere — that is an image I cannot find normal. A democracy of 23 million people, manufacturing the chips that run our phones and computers, that must train to resist an invasion because its 1.4-billion-person neighbor refuses to recognize its right to exist. There is a fundamental injustice in that which rational geopolitics tends to mask.*

## International media coverage — between interest and occlusion

### The contrast between coverage of Taiwan and that of Ukraine

Taiwan's June 2026 military exercises received modest international media coverage compared to the attention paid to Ukrainian military movements. This contrast reflects several dynamics. First, geographic distance and the language barrier make Taiwan less immediately relatable for European and North American audiences than Ukraine, whose culture and history are more familiar. Second, the absence of an ongoing conflict — exercises are training, not combat — makes them less "dramatic" by the standards of immediate news cycles. Third, a certain **geopolitical fatigue** in newsrooms, after four years of intensive Ukraine coverage, contributes to reducing the editorial space available for other security crises.

This undercoverage is a real political problem. Decisions on supporting Taiwan — **arms deliveries, diplomatic commitments, defense budgets** — are made by elected officials and governments that respond, in part, to public opinions informed by media. A public that **underestimates the threat in the Taiwan Strait**, because media do not cover it with the intensity it deserves, will be less likely to support the economic and diplomatic sacrifices that supporting Taiwan requires. It is a **vicious cycle** that feeds ignorance by perpetuating it.

### The role of specialized media in documenting the threat

In the absence of sufficient mainstream media coverage, it is specialized journalism — **AP News, Straits Times, Japan Times, Asia Cable** — that documents developments in the Taiwan Strait with the greatest rigor. These publications, less subject to the imperatives of spectacle and buzz, can cover military exercises with the technical depth they deserve, analyze Wellington Koo's statements in their real strategic context, and maintain continuous attention on a crisis that develops over years rather than hours.

This role of specialized media is both valuable and insufficient. Valuable because it keeps factual documentation available for anyone who wants to be informed. Insufficient because it only reaches an already-informed audience — experts, military professionals, policy decision-makers — and does not penetrate the broader public debate that determines policy orientations in democracies. The gap between the reality documented by specialized media and public perception of the threat in the Taiwan Strait is one of the most serious informational challenges our democracies must confront.

*A columnist writing about Taiwan in an English-language publication is often exactly this: bridging a gap. Explaining that the June 22 exercises in Taoyuan are not trivial. That the 23 PLA aircraft that flew around the island that weekend are not a minor news item. That Wellington Koo's statement deserves to be read as carefully as a NATO communiqué. That may be the most useful thing one can do: refusing to let the important be ignored because it is far away.*

## International support — what the democratic community owes Taiwan

### Beyond arms deliveries: durable political commitment

Support for Taiwan cannot be reduced to arms deliveries. These deliveries are necessary and must continue — the **Harpoons, HIMARS, Patriot PAC-3s** and future counter-drone systems — but they represent only the material component of a support that must also be **political, economic, and symbolic**. The next time a congressional delegation from **Washington, Tokyo, or Ottawa** visits Taipei, it must not be a courtesy visit. It must be a clear signal that Taiwanese democracy is a priority, not a bargaining chip to be traded in other files with Beijing.

Taiwan's participation in international organizations — even under provisional formats or alternative names, as is the case with **APEC and the WHO** for certain matters — must be actively supported by its democratic allies. Taiwan's exclusion from international forums is a continuous symbolic victory for Beijing that reinforces the idea that the island is a rebel province rather than a sovereign democracy. Every space of international participation opened to Taiwan is a brick in the recognition of its **right to self-determination**.

### Training and doctrine sharing — what allies can concretely do

Beyond armaments, Taiwan's allies can contribute by sharing doctrinal expertise and combat experience. Taiwan's military needs the lessons drawn from **Ukraine** — not merely the abstract lessons already integrated into its doctrine, but the concrete lessons from units that fought with **HIMARS, M777, and Patriot** systems under maximum-intensity conditions. Training exchanges between Taiwanese officers and their American, British, Australian, and Japanese counterparts would accelerate the integration of these lessons into exercises like those of June 2026.

**Electronic warfare** and **cyber defense** are the domains where this skills transfer would be most valuable. Taiwan faces daily Chinese cyberattacks — its government networks, critical infrastructure, and military systems are constantly tested. Ukraine's experience in **cyber resilience** — maintaining government and military functions despite massive Russian attacks — is directly applicable to Taiwan's context. This know-how transfer requires the political will and information-sharing framework that the governments concerned must formalize urgently.

*Taiwan deserves better than going alone, city by city and capital by capital, to seek the support it needs to defend itself. It is time for liberal democracies to institutionalize this support — with clear commitments, predictable deliveries, systematic training, and a firm refusal to sacrifice Taiwan on the altar of any other geopolitical file. That would be the modern version of the pledge made to free peoples after 1945: never alone again.*

## Conclusion: The island that rehearses its survival so it never needs to use it

### 5 days in June, a rehearsal for eternity

These five days of exercises in June 2026 — tanks on Highway 31, commanders practicing command without communications, soldiers repeating wartime transition procedures — are not remarkable for their operational perfection. They are remarkable for what they mean: a democracy of **23 million people**, threatened by the world's largest army, that refuses to resign itself and that chooses every day to prepare rather than submit. This quiet resistance, repeated in barracks and on highways, is a form of political courage that would be indecent not to acknowledge.

Minister **Wellington Koo** said the warning time is shortening. He is right. But every exercise Taiwan conducts, every Harpoon delivered, every soldier trained, every bunker reinforced — all of this increases the cost of an invasion in the eyes of PLAN planners. Deterrence is not an absolute guarantee. It is an **improved probability**. And in twenty-first-century geopolitics, improving the odds of survival is the best work a democracy under threat can do every morning when it gets up.

### What we owe Taiwan

Taiwan manufactures the chips that power our phones, cars, hospitals, and defense systems. Taiwan is a multi-party democracy, with a free press, a dynamic civil society, and regular elections since the 1990s. Taiwan has never attacked anyone. And Taiwan exists under the **permanent threat of annexation** by an authoritarian regime that denies its identity and its right to self-determination. If the values the West claims to defend — **democracy, freedom, self-determination** — mean anything, they mean that Taiwan's security is not merely a geostrategic question. It is a **moral obligation**. And the June 2026 exercises remind us — watching from afar — that Taiwan alone fulfills the greater part of that obligation, every day, for decades.

*23 million people. An island. Tanks on the highway. And the conviction that it is worth fighting for. I am not a soldier. I have never carried a rifle. But when I read these reports on those five days of exercises in Taoyuan, I wonder whether we in the West would have the same clarity, the same resolution, if it were our turn. I hope so. I am not certain. And that uncertainty should keep us humble before those who, unlike us, do not have the luxury of doubt.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [AP News — Taiwan hosts military drills as it prepares for combat readiness amid China tensions — June 23, 2026](https://apnews.com/article/taiwan-hosts-military-drills-readiness-china-1e1228dcd54f8a2fdde9bf05beb8ce88)

- [The Straits Times — Taiwan says warning time for any China attack is shortening, defence minister says — June 24, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/taiwan-says-warning-time-for-any-china-attack-is-shortening)

- [The Japan Times — Taiwan kicks off combat readiness drills amid China pressure — June 21, 2026](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/06/21/asia-pacific/taiwan-combat-readiness-drills/)

### Secondary sources

- [The Asia Cable — Taiwan's June 2026 Drills: Reading Between the Lines — June 22, 2026](https://theasiacable.com/taiwan-drills-june-2026-combat-readiness/)

- Military Times — Taiwan pushes combat readiness amid China threats — June 2026

- Foreign Policy — Taiwan Is Getting Serious About Defense. Is It Enough? — June 2026

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-taiwan-en-etat-de-guerre-5-jours-d-exercices-pour-apprendre-a-survivre-a-l-attaque-de-la-c