# REPORT: RIMPAC and Valiant Shield: as the Pacific bristles with warships in China's shadow

> Since June 22, 2026, two of the world's most important military exercises have been unfolding simultaneously in the Pacific. RIMPAC 2026 — acronym for Rim of the Pacific — officially began on June 24, bringing together 31 nations, approximately 40 warships, and nearly 25,000 military personnel in Hawaiian waters and beyond. Simultaneously, exercise Valiant Shield 2026, launched

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-28
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-rimpac-et-valiant-shield-quand-le-pacifique-se-herisse-de-navires-face

## Introduction: An ocean transformed into a rehearsal room for the coming war

### The Indo-Pacific under extreme military tension

Since **June 22, 2026**, two of the world's most important military exercises have been unfolding simultaneously in the Pacific. **RIMPAC 2026** — acronym for Rim of the Pacific — officially began on **June 24**, bringing together **31 nations**, **approximately 40 warships**, and nearly **25,000 military personnel** in Hawaiian waters and beyond. Simultaneously, exercise **Valiant Shield 2026**, launched on **June 22**, mobilizes American forces and their allies in high-intensity scenarios across the Indo-Pacific. The confluence of these two exercises is not a scheduling coincidence — it is a geopolitical message of the highest importance, addressed directly to **Beijing**.

Analysts at **ThinkChina** noted on **June 25, 2026** that naval density in the western Pacific is reaching levels unseen since the Cold War. To understand what this accumulation of force means, one must look simultaneously toward **Taiwan** — where tanks have been patrolling the streets since **June 22** — and toward the strategy rooms in **Washington**, **Tokyo**, **Canberra** and **Brussels**. Something is being prepared in the Pacific. Something that very strongly resembles a rehearsal for a war that everyone still hopes to avoid.

### The context: why now, why together

These exercises occur in a context of Sino-American tensions without precedent in decades. The **People's Liberation Army** (PLA) conducted its own exercises around the **Taiwan** Strait, explicitly designated as **"real-war rehearsals"**. **Beijing** responded to the expansion of the American 1260H designation list with commercial countermeasures and export controls. And the bloc of Indo-Pacific democracies — with the growing support of European powers — chooses this precise moment to demonstrate its collective power projection capabilities.

This simultaneous orchestration is deliberate. The coincidence of dates between Chinese maneuvers around **Taiwan**, Taiwan's five-day ground exercises, and the large allied naval exercises RIMPAC/Valiant Shield signals a strategic coordination that goes beyond a mere routine calendar. **The West and its regional partners are collectively demonstrating that they can project power, coordinate their operations, and operate together in the maritime spaces that China considers its exclusive sphere of influence.**

*There is something profoundly symbolic in the simultaneity of all this: Taiwanese tanks in the streets of Taipei, 40 allied warships in the Pacific, and the PLA rehearsing its own invasion scenarios. The Pacific has become the stage of a giant military ballet where every movement sends a message. And if that message is not clearly heard at Zhongnanhai, it is because no one there wants to hear it.*

## RIMPAC 2026: the world's largest naval coalition in action

### Thirty-one nations, one unified message

**RIMPAC** is the world's largest multinational naval exercise, organized every two years by the **US Navy** since the 1970s. The **2026** edition, running from **June 24 to July 31**, marks a new participation record with **31 nations** involved. This figure is in itself a strong political signal. It demonstrates that the coalition of democracies and allied countries is not fragmenting — contrary to the narrative **Beijing** likes to project — but on the contrary broadening and consolidating.

Participants include the United States' traditional allies — **Japan**, **Australia**, **Canada**, **United Kingdom**, **France** — but also nations whose participation testifies to a growing awareness of Indo-Pacific stakes: countries from **Southeast Asia**, partners from the **South Pacific**, and European allies deploying naval assets thousands of kilometers from their own shores. This geography of participation speaks as much as the exercises themselves: **Indo-Pacific security has become a global concern.**

### The scenarios practiced: beyond the show of force

Beyond the spectacle of **40 warships** sailing together, RIMPAC 2026 practices precise operational scenarios that have real military value. **Integrated missile defense** exercises — coordinating the detection and destruction of ballistic missiles between naval platforms of several different nations — represent a considerable technical and tactical challenge. The ability to carry them out smoothly with **31 partners** is a concrete operational advantage, not merely a photo opportunity.

Australian Collins-class submarines and their Japanese counterparts practice **anti-submarine warfare** maneuvers in complex waters, in coordination with surface and air forces. **Coordinated strike** exercises against fictional targets simulate the conditions of a high-intensity conflict. **At-sea replenishment** simulations test the logistics of a prolonged operation in an extended operational area — precisely the kind of operation that would be necessary if a conflict around **Taiwan** required a sustained naval presence.

*What fascinates me about RIMPAC is that the exercise forces 31 different navies to learn to communicate, to use common protocols, to trust their partners in simulated stress situations. That is interoperability — a bureaucratic word to describe something vital: the ability to fight together when it truly counts. China, for its part, trains with Russia. But comparing these two coalitions is comparing a network of willing partners to an alliance of necessity between authoritarian regimes.*

## Valiant Shield 2026: rehearsing a high-intensity conflict

### An exercise designed for war against a rival power

If RIMPAC is the grand multilateral demonstration, **Valiant Shield 2026** — launched on **June 22** — is the American high-intensity exercise designed specifically for confrontation scenarios with a rival power possessing comparable military capabilities. The name itself — **"Valiant Shield"** — suggests a defensive posture, but the scenarios practiced include coordinated offensive strikes, access and area-denial operations, and simulations of prolonged carrier strike combat.

Valiant Shield notably mobilizes American aircraft carriers, their carrier strike groups, B-52 and B-2 bombers based in **Guam**, and nuclear-powered submarine forces. These assets are exactly those that would be deployed in case of conflict in the **Taiwan** Strait. By making them operate together in conditions close to the reality of high-intensity combat, the exercise prepares crews, tests command chains, and identifies capability gaps before they become fatal in an actual conflict.

### Ukraine's lessons applied to the Pacific

American military planners have drawn valuable lessons from the Ukrainian conflict. The war in **Ukraine** demonstrated that **air superiority** is not established as easily as expected, that modern surface-to-air defenses can neutralize even significant air forces, and that drones are fundamentally changing the nature of ground and naval combat. These lessons are directly infusing the scenarios of **Valiant Shield 2026**.

The exercises integrate simulations of defense against drone swarms, intense electronic warfare scenarios, and degraded command protocols — that is, the ability to operate effectively when communications are disrupted by adversarial actions. These are precisely the conditions the **PLA** would seek to create in the first hours of a conflict: saturate, blind, disorganize. **Valiant Shield trains American and allied forces to operate despite these disruptions — that is the capability that will make the difference.**

*The Ukrainian lesson I hope has been correctly integrated into Valiant Shield is that of decentralized missile defense. In Ukraine, Patriot systems proved their value, but their fixed-point deployment sometimes made them vulnerable. Mobility, dispersion, redundancy — these are the principles that allowed Ukraine to hold. A conflict in the Pacific, with immense distances and dependence on island bases, makes these lessons even more critical.*

## Beijing's response: counter-exercises and countermeasures

### The PLA orchestrates its own show of force

Faced with this accumulation of allied warships in the Pacific and Taiwan's ground exercises, **Beijing** did not remain passive. The **PLA** conducted its own exercises in the **Taiwan** Strait and in the **South China Sea**, those same ones explicitly designated as **"real-war rehearsals"**. This martial rhetoric, deliberately provocative, constitutes a break with **Beijing**'s traditional diplomatic language and signals a willingness for calculated escalation of pressure on **Taiwan**.

Simultaneously, as the **ISW** reveals in its update of **June 26, 2026**, **Beijing** responded to the expansion of the American 1260H list with targeted commercial measures: **export controls** on strategic components and a prohibition on Chinese government entities dealing with designated American companies. This technological and commercial escalation is the logical extension of military tensions — **Beijing** is fighting on all fronts simultaneously: military, economic, technological, informational.

### The limits of China's demonstration

The numerical superiority of the **PLA** in waters immediately adjacent to **China** is real — it has an obvious proximity advantage over allies operating thousands of kilometers from their bases. But RIMPAC and Valiant Shield demonstrate precisely that this proximity advantage is not absolute. The **United States** and its allies have the ability to project massive naval power into the region, maintain logistical operations over long distances, and coordinate forces from multiple nations in complex operations.

Moreover, the allied exercises reveal a qualitative asymmetry that raw numbers do not fully capture: decades of joint exercises have created an **operational interoperability** between American, Japanese, Australian and other forces that no authoritarian regime can replicate in a few years. **The alliance, when it is genuine and regularly exercised, is a force multiplier that Beijing can hardly counter.**

*What Beijing does not understand — or refuses to understand — is that RIMPAC is not an exercise of war against China. It is an exercise of peace through deterrence. If China did not want to see 40 allied warships in its neighborhood, it would only need to stop threatening its neighbors. Deterrence is a response, not a provocation. But I admit that from Beijing, the reading frame is radically different — and that is precisely why strategic communication matters as much as military capabilities.*

## Japan's role: a transformed ally that changes the equation

### Tokyo assumes its new military posture

**Japan**'s participation in RIMPAC 2026 takes on particular significance in the context of the major strategic transformation the country has been undergoing since **2022**. **Tokyo** decided to double its defense spending to reach **2% of GDP** by 2027 — a spectacular break with decades of constitutional pacifism. It has acquired long-range missiles giving it an offensive strike capability against mainland targets. It has militarily reinforced the **Ryūkyū** Islands, located less than **100 kilometers** from **Taiwan**.

Within RIMPAC's framework, Japanese forces practice anti-submarine warfare scenarios, missile defense, and coordination with American carrier strike groups in high-intensity operations. This is no longer the **Japan** of "constitutional pacifism" participating in these exercises as a polite observer — it is a fully operational military ally that deeply integrates its forces into the planning of a potential regional conflict. **This transformation may be the most important strategic change in the Indo-Pacific since the signing of the postwar security treaties.**

### The Ryūkyū Archipelago: the geographic bridge to Taiwan

The **Ryūkyū** island chain, stretching from **Kyūshū** down to **Taiwan**, represents a strategic position of extraordinary importance. Japan's military reinforcement of these islands — notably **Ishigaki** and **Miyako-jima**, less than 300 kilometers from **Taiwan** — creates a defensive chain that fundamentally changes the geography of a potential conflict. Anti-ship missiles deployed on these islands could threaten Chinese naval forces seeking to circumnavigate **Taiwan** to the north.

This geographical reality explains why coordination between Japanese forces and those exercising within RIMPAC's framework is so vital. In case of conflict, **Japan** would not be a spectator — it would be a central actor, with bases located at the heart of the potential combat zone. Current exercises prepare precisely this operational coordination between allies who would operate on the same waters, under the same skies. **Japanese-American interoperability is the backbone of Taiwan's defense.**

*Japan's military awakening is one of the most significant developments of the past three years, and it is largely under-covered by Western media. A Japan capable of striking mainland targets, deploying missiles in the Ryūkyū Islands, coordinating complex naval operations with the United States — that is a considerable deterrence factor. I remain fascinated by the transformation of this country, which has turned a pacifist Constitution into a reinterpreted existential shield. Necessity is the mother of all strategic adaptations.*

## Australia and AUKUS: the submarine as a symbol of commitment

### The AUKUS partnership reconfigures underwater geopolitics

**Australia**'s participation in RIMPAC 2026 falls within the framework of the trilateral **AUKUS** partnership (**Australia**-**United Kingdom**-**United States**), whose flagship agreement is the delivery to Canberra of American and British conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). This agreement, announced in **2021**, triggered a diplomatic crisis with **France** — whose conventional submarine contract was cancelled — and a furious reaction from **Beijing**, which saw in it the creation of a "hostile Cold War alliance."

**Australia**'s presence at RIMPAC with its current naval forces — pending the nuclear submarines — represents a concrete operational commitment to Indo-Pacific security. **Canberra** has clearly identified **China** as its primary security concern in its official defense documents. Participation in RIMPAC is not symbolic — it is a progressive integration into a regional alliance system that will be the key to a collective response to any aggressive action in the western Pacific.

### Long-range support logistics

**Australia** brings to RIMPAC a crucial logistical capability: deep-water bases, refueling infrastructure, and a geographical position that enables support for operations in the **Coral Sea**, the **Timor Sea**, and into waters near **Taiwan**. In a prolonged high-intensity conflict, logistics are often the determining factor — nations that can sustain their operations over time defeat those that rapidly exhaust their reserves.

At-sea replenishment exercises between Australian and American ships test precisely this logistical capability. An American carrier strike group operating thousands of kilometers from its Hawaiian or Japanese bases depends on these inter-allied support capabilities. **RIMPAC is not just a combat exercise — it is a test of the entire logistical chain of a coalition, from ammunition to fuel to maintenance.**

*What touches me about Australia's commitment is its assumed irreversibility. The AUKUS agreement burned bridges with France, triggered Beijing's fury, committed Canberra to a strategic trajectory that admits no turning back. It is a long-term bet — the conviction that Australia's security is tied to that of Taiwan and the western Pacific. I think it is a sound bet. And I respect the political courage it took to assume it.*

## The Philippines in the equation: the ambiguous ally in the island arc

### Manila between Washington and Beijing

The **Philippines** occupy an extraordinarily strategic geographical position — the archipelago forms the southern flank of the island arc that partially encircles **China**. **Manila**'s position in any conflict in the western Pacific would be determinative. That is why the defense agreements signed in recent years between the **United States** and the **Philippines** — permitting access to additional bases in the archipelago — are strategically vital.

Yet the **Philippines** permanently navigate between attraction and repulsion toward **China**. **Manila**'s economic dependence on **Beijing** — investments, development aid, trade — creates permanent internal tensions over foreign policy. The current Philippine president has hardened the posture against **China** in the **South China Sea**, where incidents between coast guards of the two countries have multiplied tensions in **2024-2026**. But the consistency of this commitment over the long term remains to be proven.

### The South China Sea: terrain of gradual confrontation

In the **South China Sea**, incidents between Philippine and Chinese vessels intensified in the months preceding RIMPAC. Chinese coast guard vessels used water cannons and military lasers against Philippine boats seeking to resupply their positions in the **Spratly Islands**. These actions — deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold of an act of war — constitute precisely the type of **grey-zone warfare** that **China** has mastered to perfection.

The American response — regular naval patrols, joint exercises with the Philippine navy — is visible within RIMPAC's framework. But the question remains: if **Beijing** decides to cross a higher threshold in the **South China Sea** or the **Taiwan** Strait, will the **Philippines** be up to their mutual defense commitments? **That is the Philippine unknown — and in geopolitics, unknowns are paid for in lives.**

*The Philippines' situation oddly reminds me of certain Central European countries before 2022 — nations that knew what they were facing but hoped that economics and diplomacy would be enough to maintain peace. Ukraine changed that calculation for Europe. It remains to be seen whether incidents in the South China Sea will change Manila's calculation the same way — before it is too late.*

## French and European presence in the Pacific

### France, an Indo-Pacific power regardless

**France** is, by far, the leading European naval power in the Indo-Pacific. With its overseas collectivities in **French Polynesia**, **New Caledonia** and **Réunion**, **Paris** holds an exclusive economic zone of several million square kilometers in the Indo-Pacific. Its regular participation in RIMPAC, its patrols through the **Taiwan** Strait, its joint exercises with Asian navies — all of this makes it a real, not merely symbolic, actor in regional security.

In **2026**, **France** has maintained its **"freedom of navigation"** policy in contested waters, regularly sending frigates through the **Taiwan** Strait and the **South China Sea**, notwithstanding Chinese protests. In the context of the rare European warning about the Chinese threat against **Taiwan** — reported on **June 24, 2026** — this French naval presence gives a minimum of military credibility to European political declarations.

### Germany and the United Kingdom: symbolic presences or real capabilities?

Other European powers have signaled interest in the Indo-Pacific. The **German frigate** that transited the **Taiwan** Strait in **2024** — the first in decades — triggered a formal protest from **Beijing**. The **United Kingdom** deployed its aircraft carrier **HMS Queen Elizabeth** to the Indo-Pacific in **2021** and maintains a naval presence policy in the region. These deployments are real, but their operational reach remains limited compared to American or Japanese capabilities.

What matters nonetheless is the direction of movement. In **2015**, no European navy regularly ventured through the **Taiwan** Strait. In **2026**, several do so routinely. This evolution, however gradual, sends a lasting signal to **Beijing**: the legitimacy of **freedom of navigation** in these waters is defended not only by the **United States**, but by a growing ensemble of democracies. **The geography of support for Taiwan is expanding — slowly, but irreversibly.**

*I would like to be enthusiastic about European presence in the Indo-Pacific — and in a sense, I am. But let us be honest: without a substantial increase in European naval defense budgets, without ambitious naval construction programs, without a clear doctrine of engagement in case of conflict, these patrols remain more symbolic than operational. Europe can participate in RIMPAC with one frigate. It cannot project a carrier strike group capable of changing the course of a Pacific conflict. That capability gap is the one that remains to be closed.*

## The figure that says it all: 25,000 military personnel exercising simultaneously

### Human mass as a geopolitical signal

Twenty-five thousand military personnel within RIMPAC alone. To which are added the Valiant Shield personnel, the forces exercising in **Taiwan**, the ships of the **US 7th Fleet** that patrol the region permanently. The human mass mobilized in these simultaneous exercises exceeds what the majority of the world's countries can field with their entire armed forces. This is deliberate: the aim is to demonstrate not only quality, but also the **quantity** of allied power available.

For **Beijing**'s strategists, this figure enters their deterrence calculations. A **Taiwan** invasion would not be an operation against the island alone — it would face a potential coalition of **31 nations**, representing tens of thousands of military personnel trained together, capable of operating in a coordinated manner, possessing interoperability developed over decades of joint exercises. **That is not a calculation that argues in favor of military adventurism.**

### The limits of exercise as a substitute for real commitment

But exercises have their limits. **25,000 military personnel** training together do not constitute a guarantee of intervention in a real crisis. Military engagement decisions are political before they are military — parliaments must vote, coalitions must hold, public opinions must support. RIMPAC demonstrates capabilities; it does not politically bind governments.

That is the fundamental difference between exercise and binding alliance. **NATO**'s Article 5 legally commits its members to mutual defense — no legal equivalent exists for **Taiwan**. The **United States** have the **Taiwan Relations Act** which commits them to sell defensive weapons to the island, but not to defend it militarily. This legal ambiguity is the crack in the deterrence edifice — and **Beijing** knows it perfectly. **RIMPAC is the symbol of a collective will — but a will without formal commitment remains an option, not a certainty.**

*This is the fundamental paradox of Taiwan's deterrence. The capabilities are real, the will exists, but the formal commitment is absent. Beijing may be betting on this legal void. And if Beijing is right? If, at the crucial moment, democracies calculate that intervening is not in their immediate interest? That is the question no one can honestly answer in advance — and it is precisely why American strategic ambiguity is both its strength and its weakness.*

## Beijing, RIMPAC and the rhetoric of "military provocations"

### How China reads — and reframes — allied exercises

Every edition of RIMPAC generates an official Chinese reaction denouncing **"military provocations"**, a **"Cold War mentality"**, and the creation of a **"hostile militarized alliance"**. This refrain is predictable, ritualized, and reveals as much about the regime's psychological state as about its communication strategy. **Beijing** cannot prevent these exercises — so it recodes them in a victimization narrative for its domestic audience.

This framing has an internal political utility in **China**: it reinforces the narrative that **China** is a peaceful power surrounded by malevolent enemies orchestrated by the **United States**. But externally, this narrative struggles to convince nations that have seen their own neighbors or waters threatened by unilateral Chinese actions. **"Freedom of navigation"** in international waters is not a provocation — except for the one seeking to close those waters. **And that is precisely Beijing's project in the South China Sea.**

### The escalation of Chinese exercises as a reflexive response

**Beijing**'s operational response to RIMPAC and Valiant Shield is predictable: reinforced PLA exercises in the **Taiwan** Strait and naval maneuvers in the **East China Sea**. This symmetrical escalation is partly reflexive — showing that **China** is not intimidated — but it also contributes to feeding the escalation spiral that both sides claim to want to avoid.

The dynamic is classic but dangerous: every allied exercise triggers Chinese counter-exercises, which justify new allied exercises, which again intensify Chinese counter-exercises. In this spiral, the risk of an involuntary military incident — an aircraft approaching too closely, a ship failing to respect safety distances, an officer giving the wrong order — increases with each turn. **Great wars have often begun with minor incidents on tense seas. History taught us that — but are we in the process of forgetting it?**

*I sometimes think about those sailors and pilots operating a few hundred meters from each other in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. Human beings, under pressure, with complex rules of engagement, in sometimes difficult conditions. A lapse of judgment, a technical failure at the wrong moment, a misinterpreted order — and suddenly political decision-makers find themselves managing a crisis they never wanted. That is the real risk of all this exercise escalation. Geopolitics is sometimes made in airplane cockpits.*

## Financing deterrence: who pays for Taiwan's security

### The American defense budget under pressure

RIMPAC and Valiant Shield are expensive. Military exercises of this scale mobilize considerable resources: naval fuel, training ammunition, flight hours, equipment maintenance. For the **United States**, financing these exercises falls within a defense budget under constant pressure, torn between needs in **Europe** (Ukraine support, NATO presence), commitments in the **Indo-Pacific**, and domestic modernization investments.

The **Trump** administration has maintained high levels of defense spending, but the stated priority for the **Pacific** — at the expense of **Europe** — creates tensions within alliances. Defense Secretary **Hegseth** is conducting a six-month review of American presence in **Europe**, with threats of reducing contributions — a pressure that forces Europeans to increase their own budgets and potentially frees resources for the Pacific. **The geopolitics of defense is also a question of resources — and resources are finite.**

### Burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific coalition

The question of financial burden-sharing in the Indo-Pacific coalition is a permanent tension. The **United States** bears the vast majority of operational costs — the aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, strategic bombers that form the backbone of deterrence. **Japan**, **Australia** and other allies contribute, but in lesser proportions.

The **NATO** summit in **Ankara** — scheduled for **July 7-8, 2026** — will address precisely the question of defense spending with the objective of **5% of GDP**. If European allies meet this target, they free American resources for the Pacific. If both the **Indo-Pacific** and **Europe** must simultaneously absorb massive spending increases, the question of budgetary sustainability becomes critical — even for the world's largest economy. **Deterrence has a price, and that price must be shared.**

*The financing question is the one strategists prefer to avoid in grandiloquent speeches about defending democracy. But it is fundamental. RIMPAC costs hundreds of millions of dollars. Maintaining a permanent naval presence in the western Pacific costs billions annually. If democracies want this deterrence to be credible, they must accept paying for it. It is not glamorous, but it is the reality of collective security.*

## Valiant Shield 2026: rehearsing high-intensity warfare

### A scenario focused on high-intensity conflict

**Valiant Shield 2026**, launched on **June 22**, is distinct from **RIMPAC** by its nature: where RIMPAC is a multilateral coalition with varied objectives, **Valiant Shield** is a targeted American exercise designed to practice **high-intensity conflict** scenarios in the Indo-Pacific. It involves aircraft carriers, submarines, long-range bombers and integrated missile systems in engagement simulations against a peer competitor — a barely veiled euphemism for Chinese military capabilities. Every maneuver of **Valiant Shield** is designed to test engagement procedures that American commanders have not had to use since the Cold War.

What makes **Valiant Shield 2026** particularly significant is its simultaneity with **RIMPAC** and Taiwan's ground exercises. American forces are not practicing the two exercises separately — they coordinate their efforts, share lessons in real time, and develop **interoperability procedures** that would allow different national forces to operate together under enemy fire. This operational integration is precisely what **Beijing** would fear most in case of conflict. **A coalition that has trained together will fight better together.**

### The capabilities tested and their implications for Taiwan

**Valiant Shield** exercises include scenarios for **suppression of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses** — exactly the systems that **China** has developed to prevent American forces from penetrating maritime zones close to **Taiwan**. The **DF-21D** and **DF-26** anti-ship ballistic missiles, dubbed "carrier killers," are the centerpiece of China's A2/AD doctrine. Valiant Shield models responses to these threats: alternative approach trajectories, decoy systems, missile interception, emergency deployments from dispersed bases.

For **Taiwan**, these exercises represent a concrete operational assurance. If American forces have practiced procedures for penetrating into an A2/AD zone, they will arrive at combat with proven reflexes rather than untested theories. The difference can save lives — and victories. **Intensive training transforms doctrine into instinct, and instinct survives the chaos of a conflict's first hours.**

*What strikes me about Valiant Shield is that it is not a symbolic solidarity exercise — it is training to win an actual war against an actual adversary. The American military does not spend hundreds of millions of dollars to conduct foreign policy through naval maneuvers. It prepares its soldiers to survive and prevail. That distinction is essential. And it should reassure Taiwan more than any political declaration.*

## The information war: Beijing attempts to portray allied exercises as provocation

### The "destabilization" narrative orchestrated by Beijing

As **RIMPAC** and **Valiant Shield** unfolded across the Pacific, China's official communication channels — **Xinhua**, **Global Times**, Foreign Ministry spokespersons — systematically presented these exercises as **"deliberate military provocations"** designed to destabilize the region. This rhetoric is a calculated strategy: by inverting the symbolic burden of provocation, **Beijing** attempts to position its own "real-war" exercises around **Taiwan** as mere defensive responses to Western aggression.

This **information war** targets several audiences simultaneously. Inside **China**, it fuels nationalism and legitimizes growing military spending. Internationally, it seeks to sow doubt in non-aligned countries about the true intentions of the **United States** and its allies. And in European capitals still hesitant about their Indo-Pacific engagement, it maintains a moral equivalence between aggressor and defenders that directly serves **Beijing**'s interests. **The autocrat who presents himself as a victim is a technique as old as autocracy itself.**

### Democracies' response to Chinese disinformation

Democracies' response to this information war remains insufficient. Allied governments document their exercises, publish factual press releases, and sometimes invite observers. But the **Chinese disinformation** machine, endowed with unlimited resources and centralized message discipline, operates at a tempo that free democracies — with their internal debates and independent media — struggle to counter. Every allied exercise becomes an opportunity for **Beijing** to populate global social networks with content that blurs responsibilities.

That is why the informational dimension of deterrence has become as important as the military dimension. **RIMPAC** must not only be conducted, but narrated — with clarity, transparency and precision — so that the global public understands the fundamental difference between defensive exercises in international waters and invasion maneuvers around a democratic island. **Truth is a weapon — provided it is wielded with the same determination as the others.**

*Chinese disinformation about allied exercises deeply exasperates me — not because it convinces informed people, but because it works on the undecided. When Global Times and Xinhua describe RIMPAC as a "threat to peace," they are not trying to convince Tokyo or Washington. They are targeting Seoul, Jakarta, Pretoria, Brasília — the capitals whose support or neutrality matters in an eventual conflict. That is where the narrative battle must be won. And there, frankly, democracies are behind.*

## Long-term financing of deterrence: sustainability and political will

### The real cost of a credible military presence in the Pacific

Maintaining a deterrent military presence in the western Pacific costs tens of billions of dollars annually. The aircraft carriers participating in **RIMPAC** and **Valiant Shield** each represent investments of **13 billion dollars** in construction alone — not counting operating and crewing costs running into hundreds of millions per year. Military bases in the **Philippines**, **Japan** and **Guam** mobilize thousands of personnel and infrastructure that three decades of post-Cold War **peace dividend** allowed to age. The wake-up call is brutal and costly.

Indo-Pacific allies have begun increasing their defense budgets: **Japan** targets **2% of GDP** by **2027**, **Australia** launched its **AUKUS** submarine program estimated at more than **200 billion Australian dollars**, **Taiwan** maintains a defense budget of approximately **2.5% of its GDP**. But these investments take time to materialize into operational capabilities. The vulnerability window — between the decision to invest and actual capabilities — is precisely where risk is highest.

### The political sustainability of allied engagement

The challenge is not merely financial — it is political. Credible deterrence demands a **sustained commitment over decades**, not cyclical responses to **Beijing**'s provocations. Every election in an allied country creates uncertainty about the continuity of commitment. The **Trump** administration has maintained pressure on **China**, but its successor may reassess priorities. European governments face their own budgetary pressures. And in all these democracies, isolationist political forces exploit every mishap or visible cost to question the necessity of military presence in the Pacific.

That is precisely why **RIMPAC**, with its **31 participating nations**, is strategically valuable beyond its immediate operational worth. It creates institutional ties, habits of cooperation, documented common interests that transcend short-term political variations. A navy that has exercised with its allies for ten years will be more difficult to withdraw than one sent there for the first time. **Deterrence is built over time — and RIMPAC is its annual cement.**

*The sustainability of allied engagement in the Pacific is the variable I observe with the most anxiety. You can buy aircraft carriers. You can sign treaties. But maintaining the political will to honor these commitments in the face of economic pressure, electoral cycles and public opinion fatigue — that is infinitely more difficult. Beijing knows it. And that is why Xi Jinping's strategic patience, often misunderstood in the West, is precisely calibrated to wait for the moment when that will wavers.*

## Conclusion: 40 warships and a collective promise

### Deterrence in action

Forty warships, **25,000 military personnel**, **31 nations** — RIMPAC 2026, combined with Valiant Shield and Taiwan's ground exercises, composes the most eloquent possible demonstration of democracies' collective resolve in the Indo-Pacific. It is not an absolute guarantee — no military demonstration is. But it is a signal that **Beijing** cannot ignore, one that enters its strategic calculations, and ideally deters.

Security in the western Pacific is not the exclusive problem of **Taiwan** or the **United States**. It is that of every democracy dependent on free maritime routes, secure supply chains, and an international order in which force does not systematically override law. The **40 ships of RIMPAC** sail for all these principles — and for the **23 million Taiwanese** who live under the permanent threat of seeing them trampled.

### What the world must do now

Exercises are not enough. Credible deterrence requires firm political commitments, defense investments maintained over time, and diplomatic coordination that transforms military exercises into genuine alliances. The rare European warning on **Taiwan**, the increases in defense spending, the negotiations at the **NATO Ankara summit** — all of this must translate into real capabilities, not statements of intent.

The Pacific is not bristling with warships by whim. It is bristling because an authoritarian power has signaled its willingness to modify by force a regional order that decades of cooperation built. **RIMPAC and Valiant Shield are the response — collective, determined, and profoundly necessary.**

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*These forty warships in the Pacific represent something greater than their arithmetic sum. They represent a collective choice — imperfect, costly, politically difficult — to say that the rules-based international order is worth defending. I am not naive: deterrence can fail, alliances can falter, calculations can go wrong. But the alternative — abandoning Taiwan to Beijing, signaling that force overrides law — would send a signal the world would take decades to recover from. These ships are worth every dollar spent.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ThinkChina — Why the Pacific is filling with warships: RIMPAC and the new military contest — June 25, 2026](https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/why-pacific-filling-warships-china-rimpac-and-new-military-contest)

- [Institute for the Study of War (ISW) — China-Taiwan Update: June 26, 2026 — June 26, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-june-26-2026/)

- [Washington Post — Taiwan launches a 5-day combat readiness exercise — June 22, 2026](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/22/taiwan-hosts-military-drills-readiness-china/0c4d53a2-6e13-11f1-8730-e7fd0e2a6404_story.html)

- [Bloomberg — Taiwan maritime quarantine simulation exercise — June 25, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-25/taiwan-tabletop-drill-simulates-maritime-quarantine-by-chinese-forces)

### Secondary sources

- [Yahoo News — European powers: rare warning on Taiwan — June 24, 2026](https://www.yahoo.com/news/world/articles/european-powers-issue-rare-warning-115803855.html)

- [The Guardian — NATO concerns about American reliability — June 27, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2026/jun/27/nato-leaders-fear-they-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-help-if-russia-attacks-trump-eastern-europe)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-rimpac-et-valiant-shield-quand-le-pacifique-se-herisse-de-navires-face