# REPORT: Russian spies hack the messaging apps of Ukrainian officers and officials

> On June 25, 2026, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), in collaboration with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, revealed a systematic campaign of Russian cyberattacks targeting the messaging applications used by government officials, military personnel, politicians and activists in Ukraine, across Europe and in the United States. These digital espionage operations are par

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-les-espions-russes-piratent-les-messageries-des-officiers-et-fonctionn

## Introduction: The digital war strikes at the heart of Ukrainian communications

### A systematic cyberespionage campaign revealed on June 25

On **June 25, 2026**, the **Ukrainian Security Service** (**SBU**), in collaboration with the **US Federal Bureau of Investigation**, revealed a systematic campaign of **Russian cyberattacks** targeting the messaging applications used by government officials, military personnel, politicians and activists in **Ukraine**, across **Europe** and in the **United States**. These digital espionage operations are part of a documented intensification of Russian cyber operations against **Ukraine** and its Western allies throughout **June 2026**.

The methods employed reveal the growing sophistication of Russian cyber groups: **SMS phishing messages** posing as "customer support," **imitation of official bots**, and **psychological pressure** delivered through mass messages sent in the morning when users are less alert. The goal: access confidential military, political and economic communications — and compromise entire networks starting from a single account.

### The strategic dimension of a parallel war

Russian cyberespionage is not a peripheral or opportunistic activity. It is a central pillar of **Moscow**'s war strategy, running parallel to kinetic operations on the battlefield. Compromising the communications of a military commander or a government official can be worth as much as an artillery strike in terms of operational advantage. And unlike missiles, cyber operations carry no ammunition cost.

For **Ukraine**, securing communications is a matter of national survival. Any leak in messaging systems can betray positions, operational plans, sensitive foreign contacts or vulnerabilities in the state apparatus. The public disclosure of this campaign by the **SBU** and the **FBI** is itself a strategic act: alerting potential targets, forcing Russian groups to adapt their exposed methods, and signaling to Western allies the intensity of the threat.

*The war in Ukraine has been fought on two simultaneous fronts since 2022: the kinetic front, with its trenches, missiles and drones, and the cyber front, with its phishing, malware and unauthorized access. The second front is less visible but potentially just as decisive. And it directly concerns our European allies, not only the Ukrainians.*

## Attack methods: phishing, impersonation and psychological pressure

### SMS phishing: a mass vector of entry

One of the main methods documented in this campaign is **SMS phishing**. Victims receive messages claiming to come from the "customer support" of their messaging application — a convincing message at first glance, especially for mobile users under pressure who quickly glance at their notifications. These messages contain links or "account verification" requests designed to steal access credentials.

The psychology behind these attacks is carefully calculated. Messages are often sent early in the morning, when targets have just woken up and are less focused. They create false urgency — "your account will be suspended," "a suspicious connection was detected" — which pushes victims to act quickly without checking the authenticity of the request. It is work in psychological precision, not just technical precision.

### Impersonation of official bots and government services

A second documented method involves creating **bots that imitate official services** on messaging applications. In the Ukrainian context, where the state has widely integrated messaging applications into its official communications — government notifications, military alerts, administrative exchanges — distinguishing between an official bot and a malicious one can be very difficult for an ordinary user.

These fraudulent bots can request identification information, collect metadata about contacts, map communication networks and even, in some cases, take control of an account to monitor future exchanges. Once one account is compromised within a network of officers or officials, the attacker can progressively access the entire network through the compromised account's contacts.

*What strikes me about these methods is their economic efficiency. A mass phishing SMS can cost a few cents. Compromising a senior official's account can yield information worth millions — or human lives on the front. That is the fundamental asymmetry of cyber warfare that Western states still too often underestimate.*

## The targets: beyond Ukraine's borders

### Identified targets across Europe and the United States

A crucial element revealed by the **SBU** and the **FBI** is that this campaign does not only target Ukrainians. **European officials**, **military personnel**, **politicians** and **activists** in the **United States** and across **Europe** are among the identified targets. This is confirmation that Russia's cyber war against the **West** is global, coordinated and targets the entire ecosystem of **Ukraine**'s allies.

This transatlantic dimension explains the **FBI**'s participation in the joint disclosure. American intelligence services have a direct interest in exposing these operations, some of which targeted American officials or US government assets in contact with their Ukrainian counterparts.

### Ordinary accounts as a vector for intelligence collection

The **SBU** also reported that the campaign is not limited to high-level targets. Accounts belonging to **ordinary Ukrainians** were also targeted, potentially as part of a broader **data collection scheme**. These accounts can be used as entry points into more sensitive networks — a simple citizen may be in contact with a friend who is an officer, or a neighbor who works for a government agency.

This strategy of infiltration through peripheral connections, known as the "value chain approach," is a well-documented method in state cyber operations. Rather than attacking a well-protected target directly, you start by compromising its least-secure contacts, then progressively work your way up the chain of trust.

*The uncomfortable truth is that each of us — as a citizen of a country allied with Ukraine — can be a link in the Russian infiltration chain. Our contacts with Ukrainians, diplomats, officers or journalists make us potential peripheral targets. The cyber war has no clearly defined front lines.*

## The context: an intensification of cyber operations in June 2026

### A documented escalation since the start of the year

The disclosure of this campaign fits within a context of notable intensification of Russian cyber operations in **2026**. As early as **February 2026**, **CERT-EU** had documented a sophisticated phishing campaign targeting the **Signal** application, aimed at high-level figures across **Europe** — politicians, military personnel, journalists. The attack, suspected to be **APT28** (the Russian group linked to the **GRU**), impersonated **Signal**'s support bot to prompt victims to re-enter their **PIN** or re-register their devices.

These operations are not new. The group **APT28** — also known as **Fancy Bear** or **Sofacy** — has been active since at least **2007** and has been responsible for some of the most high-profile cyber operations of the past decade: the hacking of the American **Democratic National Committee** in **2016**, attacks on the German **Bundestag**, and the compromise of government networks in the Baltic states. In **Ukraine**, its activity has never ceased since **2014**.

### The French cyber defense regiment: learning from Ukraine

It is in this context that information revealed on **June 24, 2026** by **Intelligence Online** takes on full significance: the **French army's cyber defense regiment** is sending specialists to **Ukraine** to acquire direct operational field experience. **Ukraine** has become the world's living laboratory for cyber warfare — and allied armies are seeking to draw lessons from this laboratory in real time.

This French initiative illustrates a reality that military professionals understand better than politicians: Ukraine's experience in cyber warfare is irreplaceable. No training exercise, no simulation, can reproduce the reality of a high-intensity conflict in which cyber and kinetic operations are conducted simultaneously by both belligerents at full scale.

*The fact that France is sending its cyber soldiers to learn in Ukraine is one of the most candid admissions NATO has ever made about the state of its cyber readiness. It implies: we are not ready at that level, and Ukraine is more so. That is both admirably lucid and slightly alarming regarding our collective vulnerabilities.*

## The tools of Russian cyber warfare: a sophisticated toolkit

### APT28, Sandworm and the GRU and FSB cyber groups

**Russia** has several elite cyber groups linked to its intelligence agencies. **APT28** and **Sandworm** are associated with the **GRU** (military intelligence). The **Turla** group is linked to the **FSB**. **APT29** (Cozy Bear) is generally attributed to the **SVR** (foreign intelligence). Each of these groups has distinct specializations: **APT28** targets governments and political parties in particular, **Sandworm** critical infrastructure, **Turla** foreign intelligence services.

The **June 2026** campaign targeting Ukrainian messaging apps bears the signatures of several of these groups, according to threat analysts. The convergence of operations from multiple Russian intelligence agencies against the same targets is characteristic of a high-level intelligence priority defined at the apex of Russian power.

### The most common attack vectors in 2026

Beyond SMS phishing and bot impersonation, Russian cyber operations against **Ukraine** use a range of tools and vectors: **malware** concealed in apparently official documents, **zero-day vulnerability exploitation** in popular applications, **software supply chain attacks** targeting updates of legitimate software used by targets, and sophisticated **social engineering** exploiting crisis contexts to deceive users under pressure.

**CERT-EU** documented in **2026** the exploitation by the group **APT28** of a critical vulnerability (**CVE-2026-21509**) in **Microsoft Office RTF** files, enabling the installation of **email-stealing malware and backdoors** in targeted systems in **Ukraine**, **Slovakia** and **Romania**.

*There is something absurd and alarming about the fact that government officials are still opening unverified RTF files sent by strangers in 2026. Cybersecurity training for administrations remains the weak link in Western cyber defense — including in Ukraine. But I also understand that in a war context, under constant operational pressure, security reflexes are the first things to give way.*

## The Ukrainian response: the SBU on the front line

### An organization that has reinvented itself under pressure

The **SBU** (Ukrainian Security Service) has profoundly transformed its cyber capabilities since the start of the war. Its cyber defense teams operate continuously to detect, counter and document Russian attacks — often working with partners like the **FBI**, **CERT-EU**, and private cybersecurity companies like **ESET** and **Mandiant**.

The decision to make this **June 2026** campaign public is itself a defensive strategy: by exposing the attackers' methods, the **SBU** forces Russian groups to adapt their tools and methods — a process costly in time and resources for the adversary. It is a form of defense through transparency, with the additional advantage of alerting potential targets in allied countries.

### SBU-FBI cooperation: a model cyber alliance

The cooperation between the **SBU** and the **FBI** in documenting and exposing these cyber campaigns illustrates a bilateral cooperation model that has deepened since **2022**. The **United States** has provided **Ukraine** not only with weapons and intelligence, but also with substantial cyber cooperation — training, threat intelligence sharing, and incident response assistance.

This cooperation has a strategic character for both parties. For **Ukraine**, it provides access to the **FBI**'s analytical capabilities and databases to identify and document threat actors. For the **United States**, **Ukraine** is a unique observation window into the tactics, techniques and procedures of Russian cyber groups — knowledge directly applicable to the defense of American systems.

*SBU-FBI cooperation is one of the least covered but most important dimensions of the American-Ukrainian partnership. While people talk about F-16s and Patriot missiles, American and Ukrainian cyber analysts work together to dismantle Russian operations. That may be the most enduring cooperation, because its lessons will remain useful long after the conflict ends.*

## The threat to Western allies: the Ukrainian lesson

### What Ukraine is teaching the West about cyber warfare

**Ukraine**'s experience in cyber warfare since **2022** — and even since **2014** — offers lessons of incalculable value for allied armies and governments. **Ukraine** has been the testing ground for all forms of state cyber attacks: attacks against energy infrastructure (the **NotPetya attack** of **2017**, **Industroyer**), coordinated disinformation operations, compromise of military command chains, disruption of critical communications.

These experiences have transformed **Ukraine** into an exceptionally cyber-resilient country — and its experts into strategic resources of interest to allies. This is precisely why the French cyber defense regiment is sending its specialists to **Ukraine**: to learn at first hand from practitioners who have been fighting these threats in real conditions for more than a decade.

### The vulnerabilities of Western states facing a similar offensive

The question raised by the intensification of Russian cyber attacks against **Ukraine** is directly applicable to **Western Europe**: would we be capable of withstanding a similar campaign targeting our own officials, military personnel and communications infrastructure? The honest answer is: perhaps not, or not as effectively as **Ukraine**.

European administrations often remain inadequately trained in cyber risks, messaging security protocols are rarely applied with the required rigor, and the culture of operational security (**OPSEC**) is still too rare in civilian and political circles. **Ukraine**, under the pressure of war, was forced to develop this culture at forced march. Its allies have not yet faced the same constraint.

*I sometimes wonder whether our European leaders truly realize that their personal messaging apps are probably targets for Russian services. Not just protected official channels — their consumer messaging apps, their personal phones, their secondary email accounts. The boundary between professional and personal life is the preferred entry point for cyber spies.*

## Signal and encrypted messaging apps: the prime target

### Why messaging apps are priority targets

Messaging apps like **Signal**, **Telegram** and **WhatsApp** have become trusted communication channels for many Ukrainian officials and military personnel — precisely because they offer **end-to-end encryption**. But that encryption only protects transmission: if the attacker takes control of the sender's or receiver's account, the encryption is worthless.

That is where the Russian attack concentrates: not attempting to break the encryption (technically extremely difficult), but compromising account access through phishing and impersonation techniques. By stealing the access credentials to a **Signal** account, an attacker can read all messages not yet deleted, monitor future exchanges and map the victim's contact network.

### Recommended protective measures and their limits

The **SBU** and the **FBI** have issued protective recommendations: activate **two-factor authentication**, never click on links received by SMS or messaging without prior verification, be suspicious of any message requesting identification information, use dedicated phone numbers for security applications. These recommendations are reasonable but insufficient against sufficiently sophisticated and persistent adversaries.

The reality of the Ukrainian cyber field is that users under constant operational pressure cannot maintain the necessary level of vigilance indefinitely. A front-line officer receiving dozens of messages per hour will statistically be susceptible, at some point, to clicking on a malicious link. Operational cybersecurity cannot rest solely on human vigilance — it must be architecturally reinforced by technical systems.

*Two-factor authentication is the baseline. But in an army on operations, insistence on cumbersome procedures can itself become a risk factor if it pushes users to seek informal workarounds. Perfect security is often the enemy of practical security — and the Russians count precisely on that tension.*

## The implications for NATO cyber doctrine

### A call to integrate Ukrainian lessons into allied doctrine

The intensification of Russian cyber operations against **Ukraine** and its allies in **June 2026** arrives precisely as **NATO** prepares for its **Ankara summit** on **July 7-8**, which should see major announcements on allied defensive capabilities. The cyber dimension of the **Alliance**'s collective security will inevitably be at the heart of discussions.

The French initiative to send specialists to **Ukraine** should be extended to all **NATO** allies. The **Alliance**'s cyber doctrine would benefit from revision in the light of Ukrainian lessons — not in 5 years, after several cycles of bureaucratic revision, but now, while the experience is being acquired.

### Cyberwarfare as a conflict domain in its own right

Since **2016**, **NATO** has officially recognized **cyberspace** as a conflict domain on par with land, sea, air and space. But the translation of this doctrinal recognition into concrete capabilities remains uneven across **Alliance** members. The most advanced countries — **United States**, **United Kingdom**, **Estonia** — have robust cyber commands. Other members remain vulnerable.

The creation in **2022** of **NATO**'s **Cyber Coordination Center** in **Brussels** and the scaling up of **NATO**'s **Cyber Centre of Excellence** in **Tallinn** are steps in the right direction. But the war in **Ukraine** shows that the pace of adaptation of allied institutions remains too slow relative to the rapid evolution of threats.

*Estonia understood in 2007 — after the massive Russian cyberattack that paralyzed its institutions — that cyber warfare is as real and as dangerous as conventional warfare. NATO officially recognized it in 2016. It is now 2026 and some members still have cyber responses worthy of the 1990s. That capability gap is one Russia actively exploits.*

## The information war and the cyber war: linked instruments

### Cyber espionage and disinformation: two sides of the same offensive

The Russian cyber espionage operations documented in **June 2026** must not be understood in isolation from the disinformation and influence operations **Russia** conducts simultaneously. These two dimensions are linked: data collected through cyberespionage feeds disinformation campaigns — stolen information can be selected, manipulated and disseminated to create compromising narratives, sow discord or discredit Ukrainian or allied officials.

This cyber-information integration is at the heart of what Russian strategists call "hybrid war" — a doctrine that refuses the distinction between war and peace, between military and civilian domains, and which seeks to defeat adversaries through attrition rather than battlefield victory.

### The stakes for democracy and institutions

Ultimately, it is confidence in democratic institutions that is targeted by these combined operations. If officials can be compromised, if confidential communications can be stolen and disseminated, if manufactured rumors about the behavior of senior officials can circulate on social networks, the democratic space and the capacity of governments to govern are directly threatened.

**Ukraine** has been facing this for years and has developed remarkable resilience. But its Western allies, who have not yet experienced this information war at full intensity on their own soil, potentially remain more vulnerable. The protection of our cyber systems is not just a matter of national security — it is a matter of democratic health.

*Russia's cyber war against democracies is not just a war against armies or governments. It is a war against trust itself — trust in institutions, in elected officials, in media, in facts. And it may be the most dangerous war of all, because it can be won from the inside.*

## Perspectives: toward strengthened collective cyber defense

### Available technical and doctrinal solutions

Concrete responses to the threat documented in **June 2026** exist. On the technical side: generalization of **physical security keys** (hardware tokens) for authentication of government and military accounts, strict compartmentalization of communications by sensitivity level, use of sovereign and certified messaging systems for the most sensitive exchanges. On the operational side: ongoing training, regular phishing exercises, a culture of incident reporting.

Several **NATO** countries have already deployed these measures for their most sensitive communications. The question is extending these protections more broadly into administrations, down to the intermediate levels that remain entry vectors for attackers seeking to work their way toward higher-value targets.

### The challenge of large-scale training

The most difficult challenge remains large-scale training. A country can deploy the best cybersecurity technologies in the world — if its users don't understand the risks or don't follow protocols, those technologies will be bypassed. Training hundreds of thousands of officials, military personnel and elected representatives in good cyber reflexes is an organizational, budgetary and cultural challenge that takes years.

**Ukraine** was forced to accelerate this training under the pressure of war. The rest of the **West** must undertake this effort proactively, without waiting to be forced into it by a crisis. Ukraine's experience shows that the question is not whether our governments' messaging systems will be attacked by Russian or Chinese cyber groups — but when.

*Ukraine is offering us something precious and painful at once: a real-time example of what it means to defend against a hostile state cyber power. We would be wrong to watch this from a distance. This experience concerns us directly, and our preparedness or negligence today will determine our vulnerability tomorrow.*

## NATO and the Ankara summit: cyber capabilities at the heart of discussions

### Expected announcements on common defensive capabilities

The **NATO** summit in **Ankara** on **July 7-8, 2026** should be the occasion for major announcements on collective defensive capabilities — including cyber capabilities. **Secretary General Mark Rutte** announced that new defense contracts for "tens of billions of dollars" would be signed, covering autonomous systems and long-range strike. The cyber dimension of these capabilities has not yet been detailed publicly, but it is at the heart of preparatory discussions.

For **Ukraine**, participation in these **Ankara** discussions is strategically important. The country wants to ensure that the lessons of its cyber war are integrated into the **Alliance**'s collective doctrine — and that the cyber support of allies continues to intensify, not only during the war but in the perspective of a secure reconstruction and a future anchoring in Western security structures.

### Cyber capabilities in the NATO membership equation

**Ukraine** is not yet a **NATO** member. But its cyber capabilities — built through real battles against the world's top state cyber groups — already make it a potential net contributor to the **Alliance**'s security. Paradoxically, the country that has suffered the most from Russian cyberattacks has become one of those that best understands and counters them.

This reality should accelerate, rather than complicate, the process of integrating **Ukraine** into Western security structures. A country that can share operational cyber experience unmatched anywhere in the world is not a burden for the **Alliance** — it is a strategic asset.

*There is an irony in the fact that Ukraine, the most attacked country in cyber history, is also one of the best-prepared for cyber defense. Pain produced competence. Now that competence must be put at the service of the entire Alliance — before the next targeted countries have to rediscover it at their own expense.*

## The long-term implications for European security architecture

### A structural turning point in continental security relations

The developments described in this article are part of a broader transformation of **European security architecture**. The **European Union**, long perceived as an essentially normative and economic power, is acquiring a real and substantial military dimension. The instruments created since 2022 — SAFE, APF, reinforced PESCO, bilateral industrial cooperation — together constitute an **institutional foundation** for a European defense that did not exist five years ago.

This structural change is irreversible insofar as it responds to real, documented and growing security needs. As long as **Putin**'s Russia maintains an aggressive posture and the democracies on Europe's eastern periphery are threatened, the movement toward a **more robust European defense** will continue. Debates over national sovereignty, cost-sharing and national priorities will remain — but they will not reverse the underlying trend. Collective security requires collective structures. And Europe is building them.

### What this evolution means for Ukraine

For **Ukraine**, these developments are directly linked to its immediate security and long-term future. In the short term, every billion invested in European defense, every military capability developed, every contract signed with Ukrainian producers strengthens its capacity to resist. Over the longer term, a **solid European defense** is the best guarantee that Western support for Ukraine will not evaporate with the next change of government in the United States or elsewhere.

Ukraine is not only a beneficiary of these developments — it is also an **essential driver** of them. Its combat experience, its growing industries, its technological innovations in drones and electronic warfare systems directly feed the investment choices and operational doctrines of the allies. **Europe learns from Ukraine** as much as it provides to it. And that mutual learning partnership is one of the most enduring legacies this war will leave to the continent's collective security.

*In this conflict, every detail matters. Every figure, every decision, every tactical or diplomatic development is a piece of a mosaic that, assembled, outlines the final outcome. Observing that mosaic with rigor and honesty — that is the columnist's role. And in this particular war, it is also an act of resistance against the disinformation seeking to blur the lines between the aggressor and the aggressed.*

## The international response and the support of the Atlantic community

### Allies facing the evolving situation

Ukraine's **Western partners** have followed recent developments with close attention. European chancelleries, NATO general staffs and allied intelligence services have integrated this information into their analyses and planning. The decisions described in this article are not made in a strategic vacuum — they are part of a **permanent dialogue** between Kyiv and its partners, a technical, political and military dialogue conducted through dozens of formal and informal channels.

That dialogue has produced concrete results visible in weapons deliveries, soldier training programs, intelligence sharing and coordinated diplomatic decisions. The **institutional framework** of this support — NATO, EU, bilateral coalitions — has expanded considerably since 2022 and today operates with an effectiveness no one would have predicted at the start of the conflict. Ukraine is no longer alone. And that reality fundamentally changes the strategic equation vis-à-vis Russia.

### Future commitments: durability and depth

The durability of Western support is a legitimate question Ukraine raises regularly. **Political changes** in allied democracies — elections, changes of government, popular pressure on budgets — can cause fluctuations in the level of engagement. This is why Ukraine seeks to **institutionalize support** through bilateral treaties, multi-year industrial contracts and financing mechanisms with long-term commitments that transcend electoral cycles.

*In this conflict, every detail matters. Every figure, every decision, every tactical or diplomatic development is a piece of a mosaic that, assembled, outlines the final outcome. Observing that mosaic with rigor and honesty — that is the columnist's role. And in this particular war, it is also an act of resistance against the disinformation seeking to blur the lines between the aggressor and the aggressed.*

Investment in the Ukrainian defense industry, pilot training on Gripens, 45-year SAFE financing guarantees — all these decisions pursue exactly this objective: creating **irreversible commitments** that can only be undone by a costly and deliberate political decision. That is conscious institutional strategy. And it reflects the maturity that Ukrainian decision-makers and their partners have acquired since the start of the conflict.

## Conclusion: The invisible war that shapes the visible battles

### Cyber as a force multiplier in the Ukrainian war

The **Russian cyberattacks** against the messaging apps of Ukrainian officials and military personnel revealed in **June 2026** are not an isolated incident. They are a permanent, systematic and growing dimension of a war being fought across all domains simultaneously. **Russia**'s ability to penetrate Ukrainian communications is directly linked to its ability to anticipate Ukrainian movements on the battlefield — and therefore to the effectiveness of kinetic operations.

Ukrainian resilience on this cyber front, supported by its allies and developed in the heat of action, is one of the conditions for **Ukraine**'s military resistance. Investing in Ukrainian cyber defense means investing in **Ukraine**'s capacity to hold — and to win. Training programs, technological tools provided by allies, cooperation with the **SBU**: all of this has a direct impact on the war.

### The cyber legacy of the Ukrainian war for the West

When this war ends — however that happens — the **West** will have access to the full documented record of Ukrainian experience in cyber warfare. That is an archive of considerable strategic value: years of real-condition operations against first-rank state adversaries, with all the lessons of successes and failures. Allied armies and governments that know how to integrate these lessons will be structurally better prepared for the next generation of cyber conflicts.

The war in **Ukraine** has permanently changed our understanding of what security means in the **21st century**. The invisible front of compromised messaging apps, hacked accounts and infiltrated networks is as crucial as the visible front of trench lines and missile strikes. Ignore one and you lose the other.

*This war has no easy or quick ending. It will end when one side has exhausted its will to fight or its capacity to do so. For Ukraine, the will is intact. Capacity depends on Western support. For Russia, Putin's will is strong, but industrial and economic capacity is slowly eroding under the combined weight of sanctions, Ukrainian strikes, and the human cost of the war. Continuing to document, analyze and understand that evolution is also, in its own way, a contribution to the victory of truth.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [UA.News — Russian intelligence agencies attacked the messaging apps used by Ukrainian officials and military — 2026-06-25](https://ua.news/en/ukraine/rosiiski-spetssluzhbi-atakuvali-mesendzheri-posadovtsiv-i-viiskovikh-v-ukrayini)

- [Intelligence Online — French cyber defence regiment sending specialists to learn in Ukraine — 2026-06-24](https://www.intelligenceonline.com/europe-russia/2026/06/24/french-cyber-defence-regiment-sending-specialists-to-learn-in-ukraine,110818271-art)

### Secondary sources

- [CERT-EU — Cyber Brief 26-03, February 2026: APT28 phishing Signal, Operation Neusploit — 2026-02-03](https://cert.europa.eu/publications/threat-intelligence/cb26-03/)

- [Cyber Warrior 76 — Strategic Cyber Threat Intelligence Briefing, Russian cyber operations targeting NATO — 2026-06-27](https://cyberwarrior76.substack.com/p/strategic-cyber-threat-intelligence-e4b)

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine's SBU to wage 40-day pressure campaign against Russia — 2026-06-26](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-sbu-to-wage-40-day-pressure-campaign-against-russia-zelensky-says/)

- [The Guardian — Russia preparing possible 'provocation' in Baltic states or Poland — 2026-06-26](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/russia-provocation-baltic-states-poland)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-les-espions-russes-piratent-les-messageries-des-officiers-et-fonctionn