# REPORT: Lavrov, the G7 and the Question Moscow Asks Trump: Have You Really Changed Sides? > On June 24, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke in Moscow with a question that summed up the entire diplomatic uncertainty of the moment: "Regarding Ukraine, we are seeking to understand what happened at Évian." That was not naivety. It was the carefully calibrated formulation of a deep Russian anxiety: after the G7 summit at Évian-les-Bains, France, held June 16 - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Reportage - Published: 2026-06-29 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-lavrov-le-g7-et-la-question-que-moscou-pose-a-trump-as-tu-vraiment-cha ## Introduction: Évian changed something — but what exactly? ### Lavrov facing the G7 mystery On **June 24, 2026**, Russian Foreign Minister **Sergei Lavrov** spoke in Moscow with a question that summed up the entire diplomatic uncertainty of the moment: "Regarding Ukraine, we are seeking to understand what happened at Évian." That was not naivety. It was the carefully calibrated formulation of a **deep Russian anxiety**: after the **G7 summit at Évian-les-Bains, France**, held June 16–18, 2026, Russia no longer knew with certainty whether **Donald Trump** had genuinely shifted his position on the war in Ukraine — or whether the summit's declarations were merely a temporary episode of façade diplomacy. What happened at Évian was, by the accounts of participants themselves, significant. French President **Emmanuel Macron**, who presided over the summit, declared that Trump had acknowledged during discussions that Russia was not interested in peace in Ukraine — calling it a **"very deep change"** in the American approach. **Trump** himself had called on Russia to negotiate peace with Ukraine after what he described as a **"very good dialogue"** with President Zelensky. G7 leaders departed with **cautious optimism**. **Moscow** departed with questions. *Lavrov says "we are seeking to understand what happened at Évian." That is a diplomatic phrase that says everything. Russia, which believed it had Trump locked in with the "spirit of Anchorage," now faces a Trump who appears to have spent a few days on the Ukrainian side. For Moscow, that is an unpleasant surprise. Not a catastrophe. But an unpleasant surprise. And unpleasant surprises make Lavrov verbose.* ## The spirit of Anchorage: what Moscow thought it had obtained ### The August 2025 summit and its ambiguities To understand Russian anxiety after the G7, one must return to the **Anchorage, Alaska summit in August 2025**. On **August 15, 2025**, Trump and Putin met at an American military base in Alaska — the first direct meeting between the two presidents since Trump's presidency began. The summit ended **without a formal agreement, without a joint declaration, without an announced ceasefire**. Yet Russia had extracted from it a very precise interpretation, which **Russian officials** would call the **"Spirit of Anchorage"** — a term that, according to analysts, represents Moscow's reading of an informal deal: Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of the **Donbas** in exchange for a freeze of the front elsewhere. This "Spirit of Anchorage" did not exist in official documents. It existed in Russian declarations. And for months, Moscow had used it as a diplomatic reference — implying that **Trump had implicitly accepted Russian conditions** on the Donbas. The **Ukrainian response** had been unambiguous: Foreign Minister **Andrii Sybiha** declared that "if the 'spirit of Anchorage' ever existed, it is certainly **dead now**." **Zelensky** for his part **repeated** that he would not cede any territory to Russia without resistance. *The "spirit of Anchorage" is one of the most audacious — or most cynical, depending on your point of view — diplomatic constructions of this war. Moscow took a summit without an agreement and turned it into a negotiating reference. That is clever. But it only works if Trump plays along. And since Évian, Trump is no longer playing quite the same game.* ### Macron and the "death" of the Anchorage accords at Évian ### What Macron told Lavrov according to Lavrov himself The central point of **Lavrov's June 24, 2026** declarations concerned information that Macron had allegedly conveyed during the Évian discussions: the Anchorage accords had been **"buried"** at the summit. This information — reported by Lavrov, not by Macron directly — is explosive in the Russian diplomatic context. If the **"Anchorage accords" are buried**, Russia's entire negotiating strategy collapses: the reference to Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbas, the argument that Trump had implicitly validated Russian positions, **the diplomatic lever Moscow had been using since August 2025**. Lavrov had attempted to soften the impact of this information by saying he did not "even want to suppose" that the Anchorage summit had been "a tactic to buy time to rearm the Kyiv regime" — while formulating exactly that hypothesis. That is the rhetoric of performative denial: saying you do not think something while manifestly thinking it. **Ryabkov**, Deputy Foreign Minister, went further, accusing Washington of drifting away from the **"fundamental understandings"** reached at Anchorage and toward a **"rapprochement with the most rabid anti-Russian policy"** of the United Kingdom and France. Ryabkov accusing Washington of aligning with **"the most rabid anti-Russian policy"** of France and the United Kingdom. That hyperbolical language says everything about the Kremlin's state of mind when faced with a West that refuses to bend. If defending a sovereign country under aggression means being "rabid," then the West fully owns that label. ## Rubio settles it: there was no agreement at Anchorage ### The **Manama** declaration that clarifies everything From the Bahraini capital **Manama**, US Secretary of State **Marco Rubio** settled the matter on June 25, 2026, with remarkable clarity: **"There was no agreement in Alaska. There was a proposal in Alaska. But in Alaska, there was no agreement. If an agreement had been reached [at Anchorage], the war would have ended."** That declaration demolishes in a few words the entire construction of the "spirit of Anchorage" that Moscow had cultivated for months. **Rubio is not saying Trump changed sides**. He is saying Russia had built a **diplomatic fiction** out of a summit with no agreement. Rubio's declaration also reveals something important about the American position: the United States was not on the Russian side in August 2025, and they are no more so in June 2026. What Trump had sought at Anchorage was a **diplomatic opening** — **"proposals"** discussed, not **"agreements"** concluded. Russia had interpreted these proposals as conceded American positions. Rubio corrects that reading with a lawyer's precision. And for Moscow, that is painful. **Putin himself said at Anchorage: "I take responsibility, I support your proposals. That was already a compromise**." But a verbal compromise without a signed document is smoke. *Rubio says: "There was no agreement." Putin had said: "That was already a compromise." The difference between those two sentences says everything about how Russia has conducted diplomacy since 2022: turning conversations into commitments, proposals into agreements, nuances into surrenders. And when the other side refuses to play along with that fiction, accusing Washington of bad faith. That is the playbook from the start.* ## Trump at Évian: the shifting side ### The G7 that surprised Moscow What happened at Évian in June 2026 was partly predictable, partly surprising. Predictable: the G7 would reaffirm its **support for Ukraine**. Surprising: **Trump stayed for the entire summit** — unlike the previous year when he left early — and **signed the final communiqué** including references to the **war in Ukraine**. G7 leaders agreed to increase deliveries of air defense equipment to Ukraine, to **"strengthen sanctions against the Russian war economy"** including on fossil fuel revenues, and to grant licenses to **Ukrainian companies** to produce long-range missiles and air defense systems on Ukrainian soil. Macron, presiding over the summit, described a **"very deep change in the American approach"** toward Ukraine. German Chancellor **Friedrich Merz** called the final communiqué "a success." Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan — all emphasized the **G7's unexpected unity** on Ukraine. Trump himself had said at Évian that Russia **"must make a deal, Russia has lost tremendous numbers of people, as has Ukraine."** He added: "I will do everything in my power." Those formulations are not those of a neutral mediator. They are those of a **partner who is beginning to lose patience with Moscow**. *Trump signing the G7 communiqué on Ukraine. Trump saying "Russia must make a deal." Trump staying for the entire summit. These are individually weak signals. Together they sketch something Moscow cannot ignore: a growing American impatience with a Russia that keeps bombing civilians while claiming to want to negotiate. Even Trump has limits. He likes to win. And wasting time with a Putin who will not budge is starting to look like a loss.* ## Witkoff and Kushner: the negotiators expected in Moscow ### A dialogue on hold Despite the post-G7 tensions, Lavrov had insisted on June 24 that Moscow maintained its desire for dialogue with Washington and was awaiting the conclusions of the planned visit of **Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner** to Moscow. Kremlin spokesman **Dmitry Peskov** confirmed the same day that Witkoff and Kushner were "occupied with other matters" — namely the Iran negotiations — but that Russia was counting on resuming contact **"once they are available."** That mixture of irritation and diplomatic civility is characteristic of Russian diplomacy toward Washington in 2026: publicly criticizing Anchorage "failures" while keeping channels open. Witkoff and Kushner had already made several visits to Moscow — Witkoff was on his sixth trip in ten months according to January 2026 reports. They had spoken with Zelensky by phone on June 8, 2026, a conversation the Ukrainian president had described as **"very positive."** But they had **still not visited Kyiv in person** — a point Zelensky noted publicly as "not very respectful." That asymmetry — multiple visits to Moscow, zero to Kyiv — says something about American diplomatic priorities before Évian. The G7 may have begun to change that. *Six trips to Moscow for Witkoff, zero to Kyiv. I do not need to add much to that. The facts speak. And Zelensky, who noticed the asymmetry and flagged it publicly, is not complaining. He is documenting. So that when the history books are written, it will be clear that Ukraine had asked to be treated as an equal partner. Not as a problem to be managed.* ## Russia's irreducible demands ### What Putin wants — and what Ukraine refuses Behind Lavrov's diplomatic rhetoric about the "spirit of Anchorage" and the post-G7 confusion, Russian demands remain the same as on day one. Rubio had stated them bluntly: **"Russia wants, among other things, all of the Donbas** transferred to it." Added to that: permanent exclusion of Ukraine from NATO, reduction of Ukraine's military size, recognition of Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — in other words, **capitulation dressed up as peace**. These demands reflect **unchanged strategic goals**. These demands have not evolved since 2022. What Russia is testing is solely the West's ability to sustain its resistance to those demands over time. Ukraine's response is equally constant: **Zelensky will not cede any territory to Russia**. That **position is absolute**. He said so at Anchorage (Trump relayed to Zelensky that Putin wanted Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbas — Zelensky refused). He said so at the G7. He said so in his open letter to Putin on June 4, 2026, a bilateral meeting proposal Putin rejected saying he **"saw no point in meeting Zelensky."** Meanwhile Putin posed four conditions for negotiations with Kyiv — including the "Anchorage modalities" and the **"realities on the ground"** (that is, Russian territorial conquests as the starting point). Those are conditions for capitulation, not for negotiation. *Putin refuses to meet Zelensky but agrees to meet Witkoff and Kushner six times. Putin says he wants peace but bombs seven civilians in a single day in Sumy, Kherson and Dnipro. Putin says he wants to negotiate but sets as a precondition Ukrainian withdrawal from its own territory. Reading these facts together yields exactly one thing: a regime that wants the West to surrender, not a regime that wants peace.* ## Ukraine as an unexpected lever ### Ukrainian drones impressing Trump A report published by **Semafor** on **June 23, 2026** sheds interesting light on the diplomatic dynamic: Trump is reportedly **"impressed by Ukrainian drone strikes"** deep into Russian territory, and "appreciates winners" — adding that "**Ukrainian battlefield victories** have given him new leverage." **Ukrainian drone experts are advising the Pentagon**, and Ukrainian military technology is "highly sought after." That portrait of a Trump influenced by Ukrainian military performance is consistent with what happened at Évian. The Ukraine of 2026 is no longer the Ukraine of 2022 that was asking everyone for help. It is a country that has developed a significant defense industry, that produces drones capable of striking Moscow and fuel depots deep inside Russia, that is conducting a **sophisticated logistical campaign** against Russian supply lines, and whose military specialists have become sought-after advisers. **That Ukrainian rise in power changes the diplomatic calculus.** A Trump who "likes winners" and who sees Ukraine performing militarily is not the same Trump who in January 2025 wanted a quick deal at any cost. ***Ukraine** advising the **Pentagon** on drones. That is the most remarkable reversal of this war. The country that was given forty-eight hours before falling at the start of the invasion is now the United States' supplier of drone military doctrine. If that does not say something about Ukrainian resilience and innovation under pressure, I do not know what would.* ## What the G7 actually decided ### The 27 conclusions of the Évian summit Beyond the rhetoric, the G7 at Évian produced concrete decisions on Ukraine. Leaders agreed to increase deliveries of air defense missiles, to grant **long-range missile production licenses** and air defense systems to Ukrainian companies. They agreed on a **"winter support package"** — an anticipation of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure heading into winter 2026–2027, given the 96 strikes on Naftogaz documented since January 2026. They agreed to **"strengthen sanctions on the Russian war economy,"** targeting specifically fossil fuel revenues — the main source of funding for Putin's war effort. These decisions are not **spectacular on paper**. But their context is: they were taken with **Trump's active support**, in a communiqué **Trump signed**, at a summit Trump did not leave early. If the **Évian G7** genuinely represents "a very deep change in the American approach" toward Ukraine as Macron says, then its decisions carry a different weight than those of previous summits. **Credible American support changes the deterrence equation against Russia.** And that is exactly what worries Lavrov. *Missile production licenses for Ukraine. That may be the most significant G7 decision for Ukraine's long-term future: not delivering weapons, but allowing Ukraine to manufacture them itself. That is the difference between giving fish and teaching to fish. It is also, diplomatically, a message to Moscow: Ukraine will no longer depend on external deliveries. It will produce its own missiles. And that is something Putin cannot get around with sanctions or intimidation.* ## Conclusion: The Trump-Zelensky-Putin triangle remains the knot of the war ### The real test ahead Russian post-G7 diplomatic anxiety is real and understandable. Lavrov, Ryabkov and other Moscow officials had built their **negotiating strategy** on a precise reading of American behavior: Trump is looking for a quick exit, Trump is willing to sacrifice Ukrainian positions for a deal, Trump will always prefer the deal to confrontation. That reading was partially challenged at Évian. **Not totally, not definitively — but partially.** And that is enough to generate uncertainty in the Kremlin's corridors. The question Lavrov asks — "Have we understood what happened at Évian?" — is the right question. But the answer will not be diplomatic. It will be military. **Russia continues to strike Ukraine while claiming to negotiate**. Ukraine continues to destroy Russian logistics while saying it wants peace. Trump continues to tweet formulas about the need for a deal while leaving envoys Witkoff and Kushner occupied with Iran. And **Zelensky** continues to request missiles while his cities burn. **That is the reality of Évian in June 2026: many contradictory signals, and one single certainty — the war continues**. *Lavrov asks "What happened at Évian?" The real answer is simple: Ukraine kept fighting, innovating, resisting. And the world took notice, including Trump. It is not a permanent change of sides — Trump is too unpredictable for that. But it is a lesson: when you hold on long enough, even lukewarm allies eventually choose their side. Ukraine has held on since 2022. The G7 finally acknowledged that clearly.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [US News / Reuters — Russia Wants to Know if Trump Has Shifted His Stance on Ukraine War After G7, Lavrov Says — June 24, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-24/russia-wants-to-know-if-trump-has-shifted-his-stance-on-ukraine-war-after-g7-lavrov-says) - [EADaily — The end of the Anchorage spirit: Rubio said that there was no agreement between Putin and Trump on Ukraine — June 25, 2026](https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/06/25/the-end-of-the-anchorage-spirit-rubio-said-that-there-was-no-agreement-between-putin-and-trump-on-ukraine) - [Semafor — US' pro-Ukraine tone unnerves Moscow — June 23, 2026](https://www.semafor.com/article/06/23/2026/us-pro-ukraine-tone-unnerves-moscow) ### Secondary sources - [Inquirer/AFP — G7 leaders welcome Trump 'change' on Ukraine — June 18, 2026](https://globalnation.inquirer.net/327747/g7-leaders-welcome-trump-change-on-ukraine) - [Ukrainska Pravda — Lavrov: I don't want to assume Anchorage summit was designed to buy time for Kyiv — June 23, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/23/8040725/) - [Kyiv Independent — Zelensky discusses Moscow's intentions, peace efforts in 'positive call' with US envoys — June 8, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-discusses-moscows-intentions-peace-efforts-in-positive-call-with-us-envoys/) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-lavrov-le-g7-et-la-question-que-moscou-pose-a-trump-as-tu-vraiment-cha