# REPORT: The Iran-US agreement in 14 points — Hormuz reopened, $300 billion and 60 days for the nuclear file

> This is one of those moments where diplomacy accomplishes what missiles never could. Whether the agreement holds or crumbles in the weeks ahead, the mere existence of this memorandum means both sides

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-l-accord-iran-etats-unis-en-14-points-ormuz-rouvert-300-milliards-et-6

## Introduction: The world holds its breath at the signing of the Islamabad memorandum

### An agreement that came from nowhere, or nearly so

On **June 26, 2026**, copies of the memorandum of understanding signed in **Islamabad** between the **United States** and **Iran** began circulating through diplomatic corridors. The agreement — which some are already calling the **Versailles Accord**, in reference to the ambition of its framework rather than its signing venue — provides for an **extendable 60-day ceasefire**, the immediate reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz**, and a partial lifting of sanctions allowing **Tehran** to sell its oil freely. It is the first diplomatic breakthrough of this magnitude between Washington and Tehran in decades.

The memorandum's **14 points** cover a broad spectrum: cessation of hostilities, maritime navigation, **IAEA** access, economic reconstruction, and the opening of a **nuclear negotiation window**. Details leaked before the official signing ceremony scheduled in **Switzerland**, sparking a race between supporters and opponents of the deal to control its narrative.

### The Strait as the central lever

The **Strait of Hormuz**, through which approximately **20% of the world's oil supply** flows, had been closed since the early weeks of the Iran-US conflict. Its reopening represents a diplomatic victory that **Donald Trump** had no hesitation labeling a "**historic deal**." The agreement stipulates that **Iran** will "**immediately take measures**" to reopen the passage and that traffic will return to pre-war levels within **30 days**.

The memorandum also lifts the **blockade** on Iranian ports and guarantees the **lifting of oil sanctions** upon implementation of the provisional agreement. Global markets that had priced in a record **geopolitical risk premium** reacted within hours. But the central question — the nuclear program — remains suspended on sixty days of technical negotiations.

## The 14 points dissected: what the agreement actually says

### A conditional 60-day ceasefire

The agreement provides for a **60-day ceasefire**, extendable if both parties judge negotiations to be making progress. This timeline is not arbitrary: it corresponds precisely to the time negotiators estimate is needed to define the parameters of a definitive nuclear agreement. The **Trump administration** presented this calendar as maximum pressure on **Tehran** to move quickly. On the Iranian side, officials insisted on the **provisional and conditional** nature of their commitments.

The memorandum also includes a clause on ending the fighting between **Israel** and **Hezbollah** in **Lebanon**, making it one of the most sweeping diplomatic documents signed in the region since the **Oslo Accords**. The **gradual lifting of sanctions** and the **release of frozen assets** are tied to progress in nuclear negotiations — giving **Washington** considerable leverage to maintain pressure.

### The $300 billion reconstruction package

The figure that circulated first, and that rattled financial markets, is the **$300 billion** promised to **Iran** for post-conflict reconstruction. The memorandum "envisions" this amount — the word matters — without specifying financing mechanisms, timelines, or disbursement conditions. This is not a signed check, but a political commitment whose concrete translation will depend on subsequent negotiations.

For comparison, the reconstruction of **Iraq** after 2003 cost hundreds of billions without ever meeting its stated objectives. The precedent is not reassuring. But for an **Iran** whose economy has been ravaged by years of sanctions and a recent war against its energy infrastructure, even the prospect of such financing represents a radical change of trajectory.

## The nuclear file: 60 days to settle the essentials

### The IAEA at the heart of the verification mechanism

The **IAEA**, under Director General **Rafael Grossi**, has been entrusted with a central role in overseeing the nuclear dimension of the agreement. Grossi stated publicly that the memorandum stipulates the nuclear component "**will be supervised by the IAEA**" and that "to supervise, we must inspect." He added that "**technical work has begun**." This public declaration on **June 26** constitutes the most direct confirmation yet of Iran's commitment to international oversight.

However, **Tehran** immediately qualified the scope of those commitments. Iranian authorities stated that **bombed sites** targeted during American and Israeli strikes remain "**off-limits**" for inspectors. This divergence reveals the fundamental fragility of the agreement: **Trump** declared that **Iran** had "**fully accepted**" inspections, while **Tehran** draws a precise red line around its most sensitive installations.

### Enriched uranium and the nuclear clock

The **IAEA** had estimated before the conflict that **Iran** possessed sufficient **highly enriched uranium** to build **several atomic bombs** if it chose to. This technical reality does not disappear with the signing of a memorandum. The **60 days of nuclear negotiation** provided under the agreement must therefore produce a framework that addresses this fundamental threat — otherwise the provisional agreement risks becoming a diplomatic cover behind which **Iran** continues consolidating its capabilities.

Non-proliferation experts stress that a sound nuclear agreement requires **invasive verification mechanisms**, **precise timelines** for reducing enriched uranium stockpiles, and **automatic consequences** for violations. Nothing in the current memorandum guarantees all three elements. That will be the subject of negotiations in the weeks ahead — the true test of this agreement.

## Trump: the deal-maker who changed the Middle East

### The Trump method applied to Iran

**Donald Trump** has always framed his foreign policy as a matter of **deals** — transactions between powers where strength trumps principle. The Iran-US agreement of June 2026 follows this template: first the American and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, then maximum economic pressure through sanctions, then the opening of a conditional exit ramp. The sequence is brutal, but so far it has produced a signature.

This result contrasts sharply with the failure of the "**maximum pressure**" strategy of Trump's first term, which led **Iran** to accelerate its uranium enrichment rather than negotiate. The difference in 2026 is military reality: the strikes destroyed a significant portion of Iranian facilities, making a continuation of armed confrontation unsustainable for **Tehran**. **Trump** achieved by force what he had failed to achieve by economic pressure alone.

### Allies divided by the method

Washington's European allies regard this agreement with a mixture of pragmatic admiration and deep unease. **Trump** publicly rebuked European countries for not allowing the **US Air Force** to bomb **Iran** from bases on their soil. This friction reveals a doctrinal fault line between a **Europe** that privileges the diplomatic path and a **Trumpian America** that views military force as a legitimate negotiating instrument.

The American **Secretary of State** and European diplomats nonetheless welcomed the signing of the memorandum, acknowledging that the outcome — however fragile — is preferable to the continuation of hostilities. The question now dividing Western capitals is straightforward: will the agreement hold through its **60-day** term? And if so, what will the nuclear negotiation phase produce?

## Global reactions: from Moscow to Beijing, no one is indifferent

### Russia and China see their regional ally weakened

The Iran-US agreement represents a strategic defeat for **Moscow** and **Beijing**, which had bet on **Iran**'s ability to sustain pressure on the United States in the **Middle East** while supplying **drones and munitions** for the war in **Ukraine**. An **Iran** under a memorandum with **Washington** will be compelled, at least provisionally, to reduce its military cooperation with **Moscow** — which could affect deliveries of **Shahed** drones to **Russia**.

**Beijing**, which had patiently built its economic ties with **Tehran** despite American sanctions, sees in this agreement a reintegration of **Iran** into the Western economic orbit — a process that, if completed, would reduce Iranian dependence on **China**. The Chinese government reacted with notable restraint, calling for "**more dialogue**" without explicitly condemning or endorsing the deal.

### Oil markets and the global economy

The mere announcement of the reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz** was enough to ease oil markets. Iran's return as a free exporter on world markets represents a potential **2 to 3 million additional barrels per day** — a significant supply shock in a context where oil prices had reached record highs following the strait's closure. Importing countries, particularly those in **Asia**, welcome the agreement with relief.

**OPEC** members, and **Saudi Arabia** in particular, are watching warily, however. An **Iran** that can export freely again is a direct regional competitor. Production quota adjustments scheduled for upcoming **OPEC+** meetings will have to incorporate this new reality — an added layer of complexity in an already fragile global energy architecture.

## The unknowns that could derail the agreement

### The red line of the bombed sites

The main friction point identified in the first hours after the signing concerns the **bombed nuclear sites**. **Tehran** explicitly stated that these facilities — which would likely be the top priority targets for **IAEA** inspectors — will remain inaccessible. This position is directly incompatible with what **Trump** presented as a "**complete**" agreement on inspections.

This contradiction is not rhetorical. It is structural. If the **United States** accepts the Iranian interpretation, the agreement on nuclear inspections becomes hollow. If they insist on full access, the memorandum risks collapsing before the **60 days** are up. Negotiators will have to navigate between the political symbolism required by both governments and the technical reality demanded by nuclear non-proliferation.

### Iran's internal factions

The agreement was signed by representatives of the Iranian government, but **real power** in **Iran** is shared among several centers — the government, **Supreme Leader** Ali Khamenei, and the **Revolutionary Guards**. The **Guards**, whose economic and military power is considerable, have a vested interest in maintaining a closed economy that benefits them. They represent the most likely internal obstacle to sincere implementation of the memorandum.

Observers of Iranian politics note that the **Supreme Leader** has not yet made a public statement explicitly validating the agreement. His calculated silence leaves open the possibility of a subsequent retreat or renegotiation. In the diplomatic history of dealings with **Iran**, agreements signed by negotiators have sometimes been undermined by power centers not represented at the table.

## Israel: between tactical satisfaction and strategic wariness

### The strikes preceded the diplomacy

**Israel** participated in the strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities that preceded the memorandum. From **Tel Aviv**'s perspective, the operation achieved its immediate objectives: partial dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program, elimination of ballistic missile sites, and the weakening of **Lebanese Hezbollah** — whose ceasefire is also addressed in the agreement. It is a military victory paired with an unexpected diplomatic result.

But Israel's wariness toward **Iran** is structural, not situational. The **Netanyahu** government is watching closely whether the memorandum will produce a genuine limitation on Iranian nuclear capabilities or simply a temporary freeze. Israel's position has always been that **Iran** must not possess the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb — not merely refrain from using one.

### Lebanon and Hezbollah in the equation

The inclusion of a ceasefire between **Israel** and **Hezbollah** in the Iran-US memorandum is one of the agreement's most surprising elements. It means the **United States** managed to link geographically and politically distinct theaters in a single document. If this clause is respected, it would represent the most durable peace in **Lebanon** in decades. If it is ignored, it will serve as a pretext for the collapse of the entire memorandum.

**Hezbollah**, an organization distinct from the Iranian government but structurally dependent on **Tehran**, was not a direct party to the negotiations. Its reaction to the terms of the agreement will be decisive in assessing the durability of peace in **Lebanon** — and, by extension, in evaluating the memorandum's credibility as a whole.

## Markets, OPEC, and the return of Iranian oil to the world stage

### A coming oil supply shock

Even before the official signing ceremony, financial markets anticipated Iran's return as a free oil actor. **Iranian oil**, estimated at **2 to 3 million additional exportable barrels per day**, represents a potentially significant supply shock. Asian importing countries — particularly **China**, **Japan**, and **South Korea** — have welcomed this prospect with undisguised relief. For them, the reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz** is already a concrete economic victory, independent of the outcome of the nuclear negotiations.

Iran's return simultaneously complicates **OPEC+** calculations. **Saudi Arabia**, whose production policy is calibrated to maintain prices at levels profitable for its public finances, will have to factor in a major regional competitor in its projections. The next **OPEC+** meetings promise to be particularly tense — with the fundamental question of who bears the cost of Iran's reintegration into the global oil architecture looming in the background.

### Iran's economy: the reconstruction challenge

**Iran** emerges from the conflict with a deeply wounded economy: damaged energy infrastructure, a collapsed national currency, an industrial sector weakened by years of sanctions. The **$300 billion** promised will not be available immediately, and its disbursement is conditioned on nuclear progress. In the interim, the **partial lifting of sanctions** and the resumption of oil exports already represent considerable breathing room for an economy near suffocation.

Economists who closely track **Iran** stress that the first post-agreement years will be decisive. If the necessary structural reforms are not undertaken — particularly reducing the **Revolutionary Guards**' economic stranglehold — the reconstruction billions risk entrenching a clientelist economic system rather than generating inclusive growth. That is the paradox of every post-conflict reconstruction in the **Middle East**: the money rarely reaches where it is most needed.

## Conclusion: 60 days to turn a memorandum into real peace

### The real test starts now

The June 2026 agreement between **Iran** and the **United States** is a provisional, conditional document riddled with contradictions — but infinitely better than nothing. Sixty days of nuclear negotiation represent a narrow window for resolving a crisis that has been simmering for more than **two decades**. The hope is real. The skepticism is equally legitimate.

What is certain is that the world cannot afford the failure of this memorandum. A return to hostilities in the **Persian Gulf**, the closure of the **Strait of Hormuz**, and the continuation of an unsupervised Iranian nuclear program represent scenarios whose consequences extend far beyond the region. The next **60 days** will be among the most consequential in geopolitics this decade.

### Diplomacy as the last bulwark

After the strikes, after the sanctions, after declarations of economic warfare, the only viable path remains negotiation. The **Islamabad** memorandum resolves nothing definitively — it opens a door. What matters now is ensuring that both parties have the political will, and above all the institutional capacity, to walk through it together. The **IAEA**, the **UN**, and European powers will have a crucial role to play as guarantors and facilitators in the weeks ahead.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Associated Press via KRGV — Iran will reopen the Strait of Hormuz and can sell oil freely under deal with the US, officials say — July 1, 2026](https://www.krgv.com/news/iran-will-reopen-the-strait-of-hormuz-and-can-sell-oil-freely-under-deal-with-the-us-officials-say/)

- [CNBC — IAEA confirms access to Iranian nuclear sites in provisional peace deal — June 26, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/26/us-iran-peace-deal-nuclear-access.html)

- [Al-Ahram English — US-Iran deal: Hormuz reopening and ceasefire extension — June 2026](https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/569554/World/Region/USIran-deal-to-reopen-Hormuz,-extend-day-ceasefire.aspx)

### Secondary sources

- [The Straits Times — Iran deal grants access to nuclear inspectors, IAEA chief says — June 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/iran-deal-grants-access-to-nuclear-inspectors-iaea-chief-says)

- [Foundation for Defense of Democracies — Overnight Brief: July 1, 2026 — July 1, 2026](https://www.fdd.org/overnight-brief/july-1-2026/)

- [Polymarket — US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal — real-time tracking](https://polymarket.com/es/event/us-iran-final-nuclear-deal-by-20260621201254412)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-l-accord-iran-etats-unis-en-14-points-ormuz-rouvert-300-milliards-et-6