# REPORT: Kostyantynivka — 53 Russian dead for every 3 Ukrainians, the numbers Putin denies

> On June 23, 2026, the deputy commander of the Ukrainian 19th Army Corps, Yuriy Madyar, delivered a figure no propaganda can erase: Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are sustaining approximately 53 casualties per day, against 3 Ukrainian casualties. A ratio of 17 to 1. Against the victory rhetoric that Vladimir Putin has been broadcasting for months — declaring on J

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-kostyantynivka-53-morts-russes-pour-3-ukrainiens-les-chiffres-que-pout

## Introduction: Behind flags raised over ruins, the reality of the numbers

### June 23, a figure that changes everything

On **June 23, 2026**, the deputy commander of the **Ukrainian 19th Army Corps**, **Yuriy Madyar**, delivered a figure no propaganda can erase: Russian forces in the **Kostyantynivka** direction are sustaining approximately **53 casualties per day**, against **3 Ukrainian casualties**. A ratio of **17 to 1**. Against the victory rhetoric that **Vladimir Putin** has been broadcasting for months — declaring on **June 23** that Russian troops were "practically reaching **Kostyantynivka**" — this figure is a stinging rebuttal. Not a political statement. Not an optimistic estimate. A precise operational accounting, provided by an officer commanding units in direct contact.

**Kostyantynivka** is the centerpiece of **Russia's** spring-summer **2026** offensive. It is the stated primary objective — the next fortress to seize in the logic of the Ukrainian **Fortress Belt** in the **Donbas**. **Moscow** had set a deadline: take the city before **May 2026**. That deadline was missed. The city holds. And the casualty ratio Madyar describes explains why this offensive is stalling in blood and rubble, with Russian columns failing to make any decisive advance.

### The geography of attrition

**Madyar** added a critical tactical detail for understanding the balance of forces: Russian soldiers must walk **20 to 30 kilometers on foot** to approach **Kostyantynivka**. Why? Because Ukrainian forces have established fire control over the logistics routes and supply lines around the city. Armored vehicles and supply trucks can no longer move freely — they are struck as soon as they appear. The result: Russian infantrymen advance on foot, exposed, exhausted, without adequate logistical support, in zones that the Ukrainian army surveys with its drones and strikes with increasing precision. It is a logistical hell that **Putin** never mentions.

*53 Russian casualties for 3 Ukrainian. That figure should be on the front page of every newspaper. It should be the answer to every triumphant declaration Putin makes about the "imminent capture" of Kostyantynivka. But in the information war, the quiet numbers of real officers struggle to dominate the flag-waving images produced by Kremlin communicators.*

## The Fortress Belt — what Moscow refuses to understand

### A defensive architecture designed to kill the Russian offensive

To grasp the stakes at **Kostyantynivka**, one must understand the concept of the **Fortress Belt** — the Ukrainian defensive architecture in central **Donbas**. **Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Slovyansk** — these four cities form an interconnected fortified ensemble, defended in depth, with positions prepared over multiple years. This is not like **Avdiivka** or **Bakhmut**, cities that **Russia** encircled and progressively suffocated. The **Fortress Belt** is designed not to be encircleable — its cities support each other, its reserves can maneuver between them, and its defenses are built so every meter of advance costs the attacker disproportionately.

The **ISW** — the **Institute for the Study of War** — precisely documented Russia's build-up in this direction since **March 2026**: multiple army corps and combined arms armies concentrated around **Kostyantynivka**, **80% of attacking units** reconstituted in men and equipment by **June 6, 2026**. **Russia** put considerable human and material resources into this offensive. And it is barely advancing. At the observed pace — less than **100 meters per day** according to Ukrainian soldiers interviewed by the **BBC** in **June 2026** — taking the entire city would take years. Years that **Putin** probably does not have, economically and demographically.

### Infiltrations — neither advance nor control

**Russia's** strategy at **Kostyantynivka** relies on **infiltrations** — the insertion of small groups of soldiers (sometimes only two or three men) inside the urban perimeter, exploiting the complexity of the built environment to slip through. The **ISW** confirmed Russian infiltrations in several city districts — north, west, south, center. Estimates placed between **93 and 153 Russian soldiers** infiltrated into the city as of **June 15, 2026**, according to brigade commander **Alexandre Bakulin**. Some Russian milblogger sources cited **250 to 300** — figures Ukrainian officers consider exaggerated.

Infiltration is not control. The **ISW** was precise on this point in its repeated assessments: the presence of Russian soldiers in buildings in **Kostyantynivka** does not mean **Russia** controls those zones in the doctrinal sense. Controlling terrain means maintaining an organized device capable of repelling counterattacks, securing logistical axes, exercising authority over the population. Russian infiltrators in **Kostyantynivka** do none of this — they cling to isolated buildings, depend on drone resupply, and are regularly eliminated by Ukrainian clearing operations. **Madyar** stated it clearly: there are far more Ukrainian soldiers in the city than Russian ones.

*The distinction between infiltration and control is crucial and deliberately blurred by Russian propaganda. Infiltrating a building is visible on an image. Controlling a city is an operational reality that cannot be simulated with flag photos. The ISW maintains this distinction rigorously. Russia is betting that nobody reads it.*

## Madyar — the voice of the field against palace propaganda

### An officer who names things

**Yuriy Madyar**, deputy commander of the **19th Army Corps**, is not a communicator. He does not speak from a desk in **Kyiv**. His testimony of **June 23, 2026** carries the authority of someone as close to combat as possible. What he describes — **53 Russian casualties against 3 Ukrainian**, enemy soldiers marching dozens of kilometers on foot because they cannot use their vehicles — is the concrete result of the attrition doctrine the Ukrainian army is applying methodically since the start of the **2026** offensive.

That doctrine rests on a simple but difficult-to-execute principle: prevent **Russia** from concentrating forces and resources at the point of contact. To do this, strike in depth — not only at the front line but **20, 30, 50 kilometers** behind the front — hitting logistics depots, assembly points, resupply columns, drone launch sites. A battalion commander of unmanned systems operating in the **Kostyantynivka** direction declared on **June 5, 2026** that his units hold fire control over Russian logistics to **50 kilometers of depth**, striking every morning and evening the convoys that try to supply the combat zone.

### Russian flags on buildings — a documented lie

**Kremlin** propaganda reached a particularly cynical level in the case of **Kostyantynivka**. On **June 17, 2026**, the **Russian Ministry of Defense** published images purportedly showing Russian soldiers hoisting flags in the city. The **ISW** analyzed these images and concluded they appeared to be **artificially intelligence-altered**. This is not a trivial accusation — it is the description of a systematically falsified information campaign, using advanced technological tools to create nonexistent proof of victories that never happened.

Russian **milbloggers** themselves — who follow the war with more precision than the **Kremlin's** official sources — acknowledged on **June 28, 2026** that it is "premature" to speak of the capture of **Kostyantynivka**, as Ukrainian forces continue to operate in the central part of the city. This admission, coming from a source usually favorable to the Russian army, says everything about the gap between ground reality and **Moscow's** official narrative.

*AI-generated flags over ruins they haven't taken. That is the level Russian war propaganda has reached. It is also a sign of desperation — because you don't fabricate proof of victory when you're genuinely winning. You manufacture it when reality is against you and you still need to maintain the fiction for your own population.*

## Putin says "practically there" — what it really means

### The vocabulary of defeat redressed as victory

In a public statement on **June 23, 2026**, **Vladimir Putin** declared Russian forces were "practically reaching" **Kostyantynivka**. He acknowledged in passing that Ukrainian forces hold positions in buildings and are conducting counterattacks — a form of partial admission of reality. But the phrase "practically there" deserves to be unpacked. **Russia** has been attempting to approach **Kostyantynivka** since at least **March 2026**, when it massively intensified operations in this direction. Months of intense offensive, considerable resources, and we are at "practically there" — a phrase that commits to nothing and conceals minimal advance at maximum cost.

The **ISW** noted that Russian forces have infiltrated less than **13% of Kostyantynivka's territory** since **October 2025**, when the first infiltrations into the city began. In eight months of intense effort, deploying multiple armies and army corps, **Russia** has infiltrated only a fraction of the city — and still without exercising effective control. **Putin** saying "practically there" in **June 2026** for a city he wanted to take before **May 2026**: that is the admission of a failure that the vocabulary of victory cannot mask indefinitely.

### Encirclement claims — denied by Madyar

Russian sources have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces in **Kostyantynivka** are "encircled" or on the verge of being so. **Madyar** explicitly denied those claims on **June 23, 2026**. He also indicated that Ukrainian forces were actively clearing the southern zone of **Kostyantynivka**, with a "minimum number" of Russian soldiers left in that zone after operations. This is not the description of an army in the process of being encircled — it is the description of an army counterattacking and retaking ground.

The **ISW** documented that reports of Ukrainian presence in the southern and western sectors of the city directly contradict the claims of rapid advances broadcast by the **Russian Ministry of Defense**. Geolocated proof published shows Ukrainian soldiers operating in areas where Russian sources claimed to have "secured" positions. These contradictions are not anomalies — they are the systematic proof of a Russian information campaign deliberately disconnected from operational reality.

*Madyar denying encirclement from the field — that is what we call a fact-based counter-narrative. It is not Ukrainian propaganda. It is a military officer describing his operational situation. And his description is diametrically opposed to the Kremlin's. One of the two parties is lying. The ISW's independent geolocated data supports Madyar.*

## Russian tactics at Kostyantynivka — permanent adaptation

### Glide bombs as attrition lever

**Russia** has adapted its tactics at **Kostyantynivka** to compensate for its difficulties advancing on the ground. According to the **ISW**, Russian forces intensified the use of **guided glide bombs** — **FAB-1500 and FAB-250** — in the **Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka** zone. These weapons, launched from Russian aircraft outside the range of Ukrainian air defense systems, allow the destruction of buildings and defensive positions without exposing infantry soldiers. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported on **June 24, 2026** that glide bomb strikes against **Druzhkivka** had significantly increased over the preceding month.

These strikes are one of the most difficult problems for Ukrainian defense. Glide bombs are launched from altitudes and distances that make interception very difficult with available systems — and each successful interception consumes costly missiles. The Ukrainian response involves partly striking the carrier aircraft and their bases — a long-range strategy that has borne fruit, with several Russian aircraft destroyed on the ground or in flight since the start of **2026**. But the challenge remains acute.

### Night infiltrations and summer foliage

The **ISW** documented a seasonal Russian tactical adaptation: Russian forces are using **summer foliage** for camouflage during their infiltration movements at **Kostyantynivka**. A commander of the Russian **1194th Brigade** admitted it on **June 26, 2026**: foliage provides cover against Ukrainian drones that otherwise completely dominate the combat space. Trees, hedges, urban plantings become precious tactical resources for Russian infiltrators.

In response, Ukrainian units have adapted their techniques. A Ukrainian brigade operating at **Kostyantynivka** reported on **June 26, 2026** that it is equipping its armored vehicles with specific anti-drone protections, anticipating ambushes that Russian forces are setting up from wooded areas and bushes along roads. This is the drone war in its most concrete expression: constant adaptation, at an accelerated pace, where each tactical advantage is counter-measured within weeks of its appearance. **Ukrainians** maintain this pace. **Russians** struggle to keep up.

*What I take from these tactical adaptations is the tempo. Ukraine adapts fast. It integrates operational lessons quickly. Russia adapts too, but more slowly, with more institutional friction. In a war of attrition, this adaptation tempo may be as important as raw force.*

## Russian casualties at Kostyantynivka — the ruthless arithmetic

### More than 2,000 casualties in six days at the start of June

The figure of **53 casualties per day** in the **Kostyantynivka** direction fits into a context of overall Russian losses that staggers the mind. **Robert Brovdi**, commander of Ukraine's unmanned systems forces, reported on **June 7, 2026** that Russian forces suffered **2,096 casualties** — killed and wounded — in just the first six days of **June**. These are Ukrainian figures that cannot be independently verified, but their consistency with trends documented by varied sources, including some informal Russian sources, lends them relative credibility.

The pace of these losses is unsustainable long term. **Russia** is reconstituting its units — according to the **ISW**, **80% of units attacking Kostyantynivka** were reconstituted by **June 6** — but this reconstitution consumes men from across **Russia**, with increasingly short training and increasingly limited experience. Fresh units arriving at the front often have less than two weeks of preparation. They face a battle-hardened Ukrainian army, on terrain it knows, with drone systems giving it superior situational awareness.

### Ukraine liberates more territory than it loses

A striking fact, documented by the **ISW**, rewrites the narrative of this phase of the war: in **May 2026**, **Ukraine** liberated or eliminated Russian positions from approximately **250 square kilometers** of territory, while **Russia** only seized **130**. In **April 2026**, **Ukraine** had recovered approximately **116 square kilometers** against only **28** seized by **Russia**. These figures contradict the entire Russian narrative of inexorable advance. The cartographic reality, verified by satellite imagery and independent geolocated data, shows a territorial balance of forces in **Ukraine's** favor since the start of **2026**.

The source affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence cited by the **ISW** on **June 1, 2026** was unambiguous: Russian advances in **May 2026** were "negative" in the overall territorial balance. **Militarnyi**, drawing on Ukrainian military sources, reported on **June 6, 2026** that **Ukraine** liberated more territory in **May 2026** than **Russia** seized. This is not propaganda. This is cartography.

*250 square kilometers liberated against 130 seized — in Ukraine's favor. This territorial balance reversal is the most important news from the war in May 2026. It received a tenth of the media coverage of Putin's statements about Kostyantynivka. That is the symptom of an international press still too fascinated by Russian war declarations and not attentive enough to operational data.*

## The cognitive war around Kostyantynivka — a case study

### The Kremlin invests in perception more than in terrain

The battle of **Kostyantynivka** has become a textbook case of Russian cognitive warfare. As early as **June 13, 2026**, the **ISW** noted a behavioral shift by the Russian **Ministry of Defense**: it began publishing unusually detailed "hyper-tactical" reports on its progress at **Kostyantynivka** — number of buildings seized, street names, precise positions. This level of detail is abnormal for official **MoD** Russian communications. The **ISW** identified it as a warning signal: this level of detail is not meant to inform but to saturate the information space with specific claims that are difficult to verify or quickly refute.

This campaign of precise narratives — **"96 buildings seized June 16-17,"** **"172 buildings June 12-13"** — accompanied the publication of **AI-generated** images showing Russian flags on positions. The objective was not to convince military experts — geolocated evidence contradicted these claims almost immediately. The objective was to create a sufficient mass of numerous and detailed content so that non-specialized media, politicians, and Western public opinion would integrate a general impression of imminent Russian advance — even without believing the precise figures.

### Russian milbloggers — the second defeat signal

Within the vast ecosystem of Russian **milbloggers** — military commentators who follow the war on **Telegram** channels with hundreds of thousands of subscribers — the discourse on **Kostyantynivka** is revealing. In **June 2026**, several of them admitted difficulties the official communication refuses to acknowledge: supply problems for Russian positions in the northern part of the city, high losses, the slowness of advance. On **June 28, 2026**, one of them explicitly stated it is "premature" to speak of the capture of **Kostyantynivka**.

These milbloggers are not objective sources — they are generally pro-Kremlin and pro-Russian army. When even they temper official claims, it is because the reality is so far from the official narrative that it can no longer be entirely ignored without losing all credibility. This is an indirect but significant indicator of the actual state of the Russian offensive at **Kostyantynivka**: even the most ardent supporters are beginning to distance themselves from promises of imminent victory.

*When pro-Russian milbloggers say Putin is exaggerating, it's a sign that even inside the Russian information bubble, reality eventually breaks through. That is encouraging. But it is also a warning: an army that isn't winning in its own narratives is an army that will seek to compensate with escalation. That risk exists and must be taken seriously.*

## The 19th Corps — the unit holding the line

### A formation built for this battle

The **Ukrainian 19th Army Corps**, of which **Madyar** is the deputy commander, is the main unit responsible for defending the **Kostyantynivka** direction. This corps was specifically constituted and trained to defend this part of the **Donbas** — an organization reflecting the Ukrainian doctrine of assigning permanent units to defense sectors they learn in depth. The commanding general is **Brigadier General Alexandre Bakulin**, who has spoken publicly on several occasions about the situation in the city, providing precise figures on the number of Russian infiltrators and tactical developments.

This level of transparent communication from Ukrainian officers contrasts sharply with the silence or lies of Russian officers. **Bakulin, Madyar** and their colleagues give figures, explain their tactics, acknowledge difficulties — something no Russian officer can do in the **Kremlin's** closed information system. This transparency is both a strategic communication tool and a sign of confidence in the solidity of the defensive position. One does not speak openly about difficulties when on the verge of collapse.

### Clearing the southern sector — active counter-pressure

**Madyar** specified on **June 23**: Ukrainian forces carried out clearing operations in the southern sector of **Kostyantynivka**, leaving a "minimum number" of Russian soldiers in the zone. He also announced that operations are underway to push Russian forces back from the center and west of the city. This is not a force in passive defensive position — it is a force that is actively counterattacking, exploiting the favorable casualty ratio to maintain constant operational pressure on the infiltrators.

This active posture is consistent with the general principle documented across the Ukrainian front since the start of **2026**: **Ukraine** is no longer content to hold its lines. It counterattacks locally when opportunities arise, strikes in depth to deny Russian assembly zones, maintains intensive reconnaissance activity to identify and strike enemy forces before they concentrate sufficiently for a breakthrough. It is an active defense, costly in energy but effective in terms of casualties inflicted.

*What Bakulin and Madyar are doing at Kostyantynivka is exactly what they were trained for. Hold a fortified city against a numerically superior force, inflicting disproportionate casualties, maintaining tactical mobility. This is not luck. This is doctrine applied with competence. And it should be celebrated as such.*

## The geopolitical logic of Kostyantynivka — why it matters for Moscow

### Beyond tactical value — political symbolism

**Kostyantynivka** is not just a city. It is the symbol of the next step in **Russia's** conquest of the **Donbas** — and, in **Putin's** logic, the key to unlocking the entire **Slovyansk-Kramatorsk** agglomeration, the administrative and economic capital of the region still under Ukrainian control. Taking **Kostyantynivka** means opening the road to **Druzhkivka**, then **Kramatorsk**. Not taking it means admitting that the **2026** offensive — prepared through winter, massified in spring — has failed at its primary objectives.

This political dimension explains **Russia's** disproportionate investment in the information campaign around **Kostyantynivka**. If the army cannot win on the ground, the **Kremlin** needs the victory narrative maintained for both internal and international audiences. Internal audiences — because **Putin** needs to justify the human and economic cost of the war to a population beginning to feel the effects of sanctions. International audiences — because every week he can claim **Ukraine** is about to collapse, the diplomatic pressure for a peace deal favorable to **Russia** increases.

### The impact on hypothetical peace negotiations

The military situation at **Kostyantynivka** has direct resonance in discussions, still embryonic, about a possible peace process. **Russia** wants to negotiate from a position of perceived strength — being able to claim it is "about to take" important cities gives Russian negotiators psychological leverage. The documented reality from **Madyar** and the **ISW** — a **17 to 1** casualty ratio, zero advance for months — fundamentally contradicts that position. And that is precisely why these figures must be made public and amplified.

**Zelensky** and Ukrainian commanders understand the diplomatic dimension of military communication. By allowing officers like **Madyar** to speak publicly about enemy casualties and ground reality, they send a message to Western capitals and potential mediators: **Ukraine** is not negotiating from a desperate position. It negotiates — if it negotiates — from a position of solid defense, effective attrition, and intact operational capacity.

*Ukraine's transparent military communication is also a diplomatic tool. Every time Madyar or Bakulin publish precise figures on Russian losses, they send a signal to potential mediators: we are not losing. We are attriting the adversary. Come negotiate if you want — but know that we are holding.*

## The civilian situation — what the numbers don't say

### A city under glide bombs

Behind the military casualty figures lies a civilian reality that tactical reports do not fully capture. **Kostyantynivka** was, before the war, an industrial city of approximately **70,000 inhabitants**. Since the **2026** escalation, the vast majority of the population has been evacuated — Ukrainian authorities have conducted sustained evacuation operations throughout the central **Donbas** combat zone. But civilians remain — elderly people who refuse to leave, people who cannot leave, essential workers maintaining some minimal services.

Those civilians live under Russian glide bomb strikes. **ISW** reports document strikes on **Druzhkivka**, the neighboring city, struck regularly. White phosphorus fired on civilian neighborhoods of **Kostyantynivka** was documented on **June 3, 2026** — a weapon whose use against civilian targets is prohibited by **Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**. The humanitarian organization **Proliska** reported on **June 3, 2026** that Russian forces struck a clearly marked humanitarian evacuation vehicle with an **FPV** drone in the **Druzhkivka** direction. These are documented war crimes added to an already immense list.

### Ukrainian human attrition — the inevitable toll

The **53 to 3** ratio is favorable. It must not obscure the fact that the **3 Ukrainian casualties per day** in this one direction represent soldiers, sons, fathers, friends. Accumulated over months, they weigh on a Ukrainian society already scarred by more than four years of large-scale war. **Ukraine** holds. It holds remarkably well. But it pays a real, daily, painful human price. Acknowledging this price does not weaken support for **Ukraine** — it humanizes it. And humanizing it is necessary so that Western societies understand what they are supporting: not a geopolitical abstraction, but concrete people dying to defend their country.

That is why the **sanctions, weapons, and funding** that the **West** provides are not charity. They are the counterpart to a sacrifice that the Ukrainian people assume to defend values the **West** claims to share. If those values — democracy, national sovereignty, international law — are worth defending by Ukrainians at the cost of their lives, they are worth supporting by Western democracies at the cost of military spending and economic sanctions.

*I think of the 3 Ukrainian soldiers who die every day at Kostyantynivka. I think of their families. And I think that every European questioning the usefulness of support for Ukraine should think of those families too. This is not sentimentality — it is applied morality.*

## The lessons for the rest of the war

### Attrition as a winning strategy

The battle of **Kostyantynivka** confirms something important about Ukrainian strategy since **2026**: deliberate and targeted attrition works. Not passive attrition — holding positions and waiting to be overwhelmed. Active attrition — striking in depth to prevent concentration, denying logistical lines, imposing such a high human cost that the adversary cannot maintain the offensive tempo. This strategy demands perfect integration between drone capabilities, long-range missiles, artillery, and intelligence — integration that the Ukrainian army has developed and refined with the help of its Western partners.

It also demands time. Attrition is not spectacular. It does not produce dramatic breakthroughs. It produces casualty ratios, cartographic balances, timelines that stretch out for the adversary. This is not the kind of victory that makes headlines. But it is the kind of victory that, accumulated over months, eventually makes the adversary's offensive economically and demographically unsustainable.

### The next phase — maintaining pressure

The question is: how long can **Russia** sustain a ratio of **53 casualties per day** in the single **Kostyantynivka** direction — not counting other axes of effort — before the human and economic costs make continuing the offensive untenable? Demographers estimate **Russia** still has human reserves, but that each year of war depletes them. The generation of young Russian men of fighting age is a finite resource. Partial mobilization contracts, engagement bonuses, forced prison recruitment — all of that has limits.

**Ukraine** knows this. And that is why maintaining pressure — militarily, economically through sanctions, politically through international coordination — is the correct strategy. Every day the casualty ratio at **Kostyantynivka** remains at **17 to 1** is a day that brings **Ukraine** closer to a moment when **Russia** will either accept a just peace, or collapse under the weight of its own losses.

*17 to 1. This ratio is not an anecdote. It is proof that Ukrainian doctrine works. And this proof should definitively answer those in the West who still wonder about the possible outcome of this conflict. Ukraine is not losing. It is methodically attriting an army that advances in blood to gain almost nothing.*

## Media coverage — what is said and what is not

### The coverage bias in favor of Russian declarations

A problem of international media coverage that affects public perception of this war must be named. **Putin's** declarations about the "imminent capture" of **Kostyantynivka** or the **Russian MoD's** claims about hundreds of buildings seized often receive immediate and broad coverage in international media. The documented rebuttals from the **ISW**, the precise figures from **Madyar**, the cartographic analyses contradicting those claims receive far less attention.

This bias is not necessarily intentional — it reflects media tendency to cover official statements and dramatic events rather than detailed analyses. But it produces a systematic effect: the international public receives a narrative of the war that overrepresents Russian narratives and underrepresents the analyses that dismantle them. This imbalance has political consequences — it feeds doubts about Ukrainian capacity to hold and indirectly legitimizes pressure for a premature ceasefire.

### The role of independent analysts

In this context, the role of organizations like the **ISW** is crucial. Their daily assessments — based on geolocated data, satellite imagery, multiple sources — offer a documented alternative to the official narratives of both parties. Their methodology, transparent and regularly described, grants them credibility that even actors hostile to their conclusions must acknowledge. When the **ISW** says Russian claims about **Kostyantynivka** are false, it is not a partisan judgment — it is an analytical conclusion grounded in verifiable evidence.

International media should draw more systematically on these analyses to contextualize official statements. "Russia claims to have seized X buildings, but the ISW could not confirm these claims with geolocated evidence" — this type of journalistic rigor is possible, practiced by some media outlets, but not yet standard. Making it standard would be a significant service to truth and democracy.

*I'm not asking media to be pro-Ukrainian. I'm asking them to be rigorous. Treat statements from the Russian MoD with the same factual skepticism you would apply to any source with an obvious interest in the perception of an armed conflict. That's not bias — it's basic journalism.*

## Drone intelligence — the weapon that changes the ratio

### Permanent surveillance that denies Russian concentrations

The ratio of **53 Russian casualties to 3 Ukrainian** cannot be explained by superiority in men or equipment. It is explained largely by Ukrainian dominance in **surveillance and strike drones**. Ukrainian forces operating in the **Kostyantynivka** direction maintain a near-permanent presence of reconnaissance drones over Russian lines — identifying troop movements, supply convoys, assembly points before assaults. This real-time surveillance enables striking Russian forces before they concentrate in sufficient numbers to constitute a threat. This is the principle of the **accelerated kill chain** — from detection to strike in minutes.

The commander of an unmanned systems battalion operating in the zone declared on **June 5, 2026** that his units exercise fire control over Russian logistics to **50 kilometers of depth**, striking every morning and evening the convoys trying to move toward the combat zone. These systematic strikes on enemy logistics create the effect **Madyar** described: Russian soldiers who must walk on foot **20 to 30 kilometers** to reach their positions, without armored support, without guaranteed resupply, exhausted before even making contact.

### Targeting Russian drone launch sites

The **ISW** documented an important Ukrainian tactical change in **June 2026**: the shift from a tactic targeting Russian drone antennas to a broader tactic including launch sites, equipment, and personnel at those sites. This tactical change reflects an evolving doctrine: not just disrupting Russian drone operations after deployment, but destroying the infrastructure that makes them possible. A Russian **FPV** destroyed at its launch site with its operator is worth more strategically than ten disrupted antennas — because it will not be replaced as easily as the antenna.

This constant pressure on Russian drone operations in the **Kostyantynivka** zone contributes directly to the favorable casualty ratio for **Ukrainians**. **Russians** who lose their drones also lose their ability to survey Ukrainian defensive positions — forcing them to send human scouts instead. Those human scouts are more vulnerable, more predictable in their movements, and their loss is harder to absorb operationally. This is the attrition spiral in which the Russian army is caught at **Kostyantynivka**.

*Ukrainian drone dominance in this sector is the key to the 17 to 1 ratio. This is not magic — it's technology applied intelligently. And it's also the reason why deliveries of drone components to Ukraine are as strategically important as tanks or missiles. Drones are the weapon of this war. Whoever masters them best wins.*

## The front lines in ten years — what Kostyantynivka decides

### A city that conditions the geography of peace

The battle of **Kostyantynivka** is not only about the city itself. It conditions the geography of any future settlement in the **Donbas**. If **Kostyantynivka** falls — which is not imminent according to all available data — it opens the road to **Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk**. The loss of this industrial and administrative agglomeration would represent a strategic catastrophe for **Ukraine**, significantly reducing its negotiating position in any peace process. Holding it means maintaining a crucial territorial lever.

**Russia** understands this, of course. That is why it concentrates such considerable resources in this direction despite the casualties. For **Putin**, every advance at **Kostyantynivka** — however minimal, however costly — is an improvement to his negotiating position. For **Ukraine**, holding the city is not merely defensive — it is the exercise of a territorial sovereignty that any peace agreement will have to take into account. The map on the day peace comes will largely be determined by the front line map on the eve of that day.

### The Fortress Belt — an investment that pays off

The fortifications at **Kostyantynivka** and throughout the entire **Fortress Belt** represent years of investment in defensive works — trenches, reinforced positions, anti-tank obstacles, buried communication networks. These investments were sometimes criticized in the early phases of the war as insufficient or poorly positioned. But the **2026** experience validates their fundamental principle: defense in depth, prepared, transforms even the most determined offensive into a slow hemorrhage. **Russians** pay the price of every meter with blood, and that equation changes political calculations even in the **Kremlin**.

The example of **Kostyantynivka** should serve as a model for rebuilding Ukrainian defenses in other sectors. A post-war **Ukraine** that massively invests in a "Fortress Belt"-type defensive architecture at the scale of its new borders — whatever those may be — will be a **Ukraine** that deters any future aggression far more credibly than diplomatic promises alone.

*What Kostyantynivka teaches us about defense in depth is a lesson Ukraine pays for very dearly. But it is a lesson that will outlast this war and guide Ukrainian defense doctrine for decades. No peace treaty will be as solid as a well-positioned army on well-fortified terrain. Ukrainians now know that in their bones.*

## Conclusion: Kostyantynivka holds, and the ratio speaks for itself

### A city that defies Moscow's predictions

**Kostyantynivka** was supposed to be taken before **May 2026**. It was not. It was supposed to be "practically reached" in **June 2026** according to **Putin** — and Russian forces struggle to maintain fewer than **200 infiltrators** in a handful of buildings in a city spanning several kilometers of perimeter. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are clearing the southern sector, planning operations in the center and west, and maintaining a casualty ratio of **17 to 1** in their favor. This is not the description of a city falling. It is the description of a city holding — with intelligence, with competence, with sacrifice.

The figure of **53 to 3** that **Madyar** provided on **June 23, 2026** should be remembered. Not as a figure of Ukrainian propaganda — but as operational data consistent with all other available data on the battle: overall Russian casualties, the documented slowness of advance, even the acknowledgment of Russian milbloggers, independent geolocated evidence. When all these sources converge, they say the same thing: the Russian offensive at **Kostyantynivka** is not advancing. It is bleeding. And it is **Ukraine** that holds the knife.

### What the West must understand

The lesson of **Kostyantynivka** for **Ukraine's** Western partners is simple: continue. Continue providing the weapons enabling active defense. Continue maintaining the sanctions exhausting the Russian war machine. Continue supporting the intelligence and counter-information missions enabling the **ISW** and serious media to document reality against **Kremlin** propaganda. Do not be deceived by Russian narratives of imminent victory — and do not yield to pressure for a ceasefire that freezes military gains that **Russia** has not actually achieved.

**Ukraine** is not asking the **West** to fight in its place. It is asking for the tools to fight itself. And what it does with those tools — at **Kostyantynivka** and elsewhere — should convince even the most hesitant that this investment is worthwhile. **53 to 3**. That is Ukraine.

*53 Russian dead for 3 Ukrainians. These figures are not abstract statistics. They are lives. Soldiers dying in the streets of a city Putin promised to take for months. Holding Kostyantynivka is proof that the sacrifices have meaning. And that Ukraine, with the right tools and the right partners, can win this war.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 23, 2026 — Madyar's statements on 53/3 casualties, southern clearing operations, 20-30 km march — June 24, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 12, 2026 — 100-250 Russian infiltrators, Kostyantynivka as primary spring-summer 2026 objective — June 12, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 28, 2026 — milblogger acknowledges prematurity of capture claims — June 28, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2026/)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 20, 2026 — cartographic update, north/northwest/west infiltrations — June 20, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Over 2,000 Russian casualties in first six days of June, Madyar — June 7, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/07/over-2000-russian-casualties-in-first-six-days-of-june/)

- [ISW — Assessment June 6, 2026 — Ukraine liberates more territory than Russia seizes in May 2026 — June 6, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/)

- [ISW — Assessment June 25, 2026 — Russian cognitive war on Kostyantynivka, FAB-250/FAB-1500 glide bombs — June 26, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/)

- [ISW — Assessment June 22, 2026 — Ukrainian soldiers to BBC: serious but not catastrophic situation, less than 100 meters/day — June 23, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-kostyantynivka-53-morts-russes-pour-3-ukrainiens-les-chiffres-que-pout