# El-Obeid, the Sudanese city fearing el-Fasher's fate > Introduction: a besieged city amid indifference - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Reportage - Published: 2026-07-03 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-el-obeid-la-ville-soudanaise-qui-craint-le-sort-del-fasher ## Introduction: a besieged city amid indifference ### A tightening siege The **Rapid Support Forces** (**RSF**), the Sudanese paramilitary militia led by **Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo**, known as **Hemedti**, have intensified their attacks in recent days against **el-Obeid**, capital of **North Kordofan** state. According to **Al Jazeera's** coverage, roughly **500,000 civilians** are now trapped in this strategic city in central **Sudan**. I document here what is known about this **siege**, its origins, and why so many observers fear a repeat of the mass **atrocities** that followed the fall of **el-Fasher**. ### Why el-Obeid is strategic Unlike **el-Fasher**, isolated in western **Darfur**, **el-Obeid** sits on a central road and rail corridor linking **Khartoum** to the rest of the country. Its fall would give the **RSF** direct access to the heart of **Sudan**, a major territorial and symbolic gain in this **civil war** that has raged since April 2023. It is this pivotal position that explains the paramilitary militia's current determination to seize it before the regular army can consolidate its defenses. ## The el-Fasher precedent, an open wound ### What happened after the city fell When the **RSF** took control of **el-Fasher**, capital of **North Darfur**, last October, humanitarian organizations documented massive atrocities against **civilians**. The **Sudanese Doctors Network** reported that **20 doctors**, including four women, were detained by the militia after the city fell, with their exact fate still unknown to this day. In total, **25 medical personnel** were killed in **North Darfur** from the outbreak of the conflict on April 15, 2023, until the fall of **el-Fasher**, according to the same Sudanese medical sources. ### A damning UN report A report published by the **UN** last February warned of a risk of war crimes in **el-Fasher**, describing a "wave of intense **violence**... shocking in its scale and brutality." This document remains one of the strongest pieces of evidence establishing **RSF** responsibility for the abuses committed against the civilian population. It is precisely this documented precedent that now fuels the widespread fear in **el-Obeid**, where residents now know what awaits them should the city fall. ## The drone strikes strangling the city ### An unequal technological war The **RSF** have made massive use of **drones** to strike civilian infrastructure around **el-Obeid**, destroying, according to several accounts relayed by **Deutsche Welle**, water and fuel supply facilities. This strategy aims to break the population's resistance through exhaustion rather than an immediate frontal assault. The paramilitary militia, which has access to considerable outside funding, holds a technological superiority that the regular Sudanese army struggles to effectively counter in this region. ### Shortages of water, food, and fuel Residents of **el-Obeid** face growing shortages of essential goods. The lack of **fuel** is paralyzing hospitals, water pumps, and the few transportation options still functioning, plunging the population into a precariousness reminiscent of the worst hours of the **siege** of **el-Fasher**. These deteriorating living conditions turn every additional day of **siege** into a direct threat to the very survival of the **civilians** who remain, unable to flee. ## Who are the Rapid Support Forces ### A militia born from the repression of Darfur The **Rapid Support Forces** trace their roots to the **Janjaweed** militias, responsible for the mass killings in **Darfur** in the 2000s. Under **Hemedti's** leadership, this paramilitary force gradually transformed into a parallel army, directly rivaling the **Sudanese armed forces** led by General **Abdel Fattah al-Burhan**. This rivalry between two ambitious military leaders degenerated into open **civil war** in April 2023, plunging **Sudan** into one of the worst humanitarian crises on the planet today. ### Outside support fueling the conflict Several international reports point to logistical and financial support from abroad benefiting the **RSF**, allowing them to sustain a war effort despite the scale of the destruction and human losses. This international dimension of the Sudanese conflict complicates any prospect of a quick resolution. Without firm diplomatic pressure on the external actors involved, Sudan's **civil war** risks dragging on for a long time yet, at the cost of new besieged cities like **el-Obeid**. ## The international response, timid and late ### An emergency meeting at the Human Rights Council Faced with the worsening situation, several countries — **Germany**, **Ireland**, the **Netherlands**, **Norway**, and the **United Kingdom** — have called for an emergency meeting of the **UN Human Rights Council** in **Geneva**, specifically dedicated to the Sudanese crisis and the risk of mass atrocities in **el-Obeid**. This diplomatic initiative, while encouraging, comes after months of relative silence from the international community on Sudan's plight, overshadowed by other, more widely covered conflicts. ### The risk of being forgotten by the media **Sudan** has suffered since the start of this conflict from a glaring deficit of media and diplomatic attention compared to other international crises. This relative invisibility, according to several humanitarian organizations, makes it easier for both sides to continue their abuses without fear of immediate consequences. How much longer **el-Obeid** will remain a footnote in international news before concrete action is taken remains, at this stage, an open question. ## Civilians caught in the crossfire ### Families with no way out For the residents of **el-Obeid**, fleeing is no longer a simple option. Surrounding roads are either controlled by the **RSF** or made dangerous by sporadic fighting between the two sides. Many families thus find themselves trapped in a city where basic infrastructure is progressively collapsing. This situation tragically echoes what the residents of **el-Fasher** experienced before its fall, where the absence of secure humanitarian corridors directly contributed to the catastrophic human toll that followed. ### Medical staff, a direct target The fate of medical personnel remains particularly worrying. The detention of **20 doctors** in **el-Fasher**, with no news of their fate months later, illustrates the extreme danger faced by anyone still attempting to treat the wounded in areas controlled or threatened by the **RSF**. This reality discourages many health professionals from staying on, further worsening the health crisis already gripping the civilian population of **el-Obeid**. ## The Sudanese army, an uncertain defense ### Limited resources against the assault The **Sudanese armed forces**, already worn down by more than two years of **civil war**, struggle to mobilize enough resources to effectively defend **el-Obeid** against the **RSF** offensive. Supply lines to the center of the country remain fragile and vulnerable to drone strikes. This relative military weakness fuels fears of a repeat of the el-Fasher scenario, where government forces' resistance eventually gave way after months of prolonged **siege**. ### A war of attrition with no visible end Neither the **RSF** nor the regular army currently appears able to deliver a decisive blow capable of ending the conflict. This military stalemate indefinitely prolongs civilian suffering, with each besieged city becoming a new chapter in this devastating war of attrition. **Sudan** is thus sinking into a spiral of **violence** whose political or military exit remains, to this day, entirely uncertain. ## The ignored lessons of Darfur ### History repeating itself **Darfur** already experienced, in the 2000s, one of the worst mass **violence** campaigns of the twenty-first century, carried out notably by the **Janjaweed** militias, direct ancestors of today's **RSF**. The fact that the same power structures are once again responsible for documented atrocities today should alarm the international community far more. This historical continuity between yesterday's crimes in **Darfur** and today's siege of **el-Obeid** illustrates the persistent failure of the international mechanisms meant to prevent the repetition of such atrocities. ### Insufficient prevention mechanisms Despite the existence of international legal frameworks meant to prevent mass crimes, no binding mechanism was activated in time to prevent the fall of **el-Fasher**, nor to effectively protect **el-Obeid** today. This chronic powerlessness calls into question the very credibility of the civilian protection instruments created after **Darfur**. Without a deep reform of these mechanisms, **Sudan** will continue to serve as a tragic testing ground for impunity for war crimes. ## The ambiguous role of regional powers ### Divergent interests in the region Several regional powers in the **Middle East** and the Horn of Africa are closely watching the evolution of the Sudanese conflict, with some suspected of quietly supporting one side or the other for geopolitical and economic reasons, notably tied to control over natural resources and access routes to the Red Sea. This regional dimension of the conflict makes any international mediation considerably more complex, with each outside actor pursuing its own strategic interests at the expense of lasting peace for **Sudan**. ### The absence of unified mediation Unlike other international crises where a unified diplomatic coalition managed to emerge, **Sudan** suffers from a glaring lack of clear diplomatic leadership to carry forward a credible peace process between the regular army and the **RSF**. This diplomatic fragmentation leaves the fighting free to continue, with no clear prospect of a lasting ceasefire on the near horizon. ## The humanitarian crisis beyond el-Obeid ### An entire country in a state of emergency Beyond the single case of **el-Obeid**, it is the whole of **Sudan** that is today going through one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, with millions of people displaced within the country or seeking refuge in neighboring nations such as **Chad** and **Egypt**. This continental scale of the crisis far exceeds the capacity of humanitarian organizations on the ground, chronically underfunded to meet needs of this magnitude. ### Humanitarian funding, cruelly insufficient **United Nations** funding appeals for **Sudan** remain, year after year, largely underfunded relative to the actual needs identified on the ground. This chronic resource shortage considerably limits the ability of humanitarian agencies to assist besieged populations such as those in **el-Obeid**. This persistent underfunding illustrates, once again, the implicit hierarchy the international community seems to establish between crises deemed a priority and those relegated to the background. ## What el-Obeid's residents truly fear ### Fear of announced atrocities Testimonies gathered by several international media outlets, including **Al Jazeera**, describe a population in **el-Obeid** living in constant terror of a repeat of the el-Fasher scenario. This fear is not irrational: it rests on facts documented and corroborated by several independent organizations. Every additional day of **siege** deepens this sense of existential urgency among **civilians** who know, through direct experience or the testimony of other fallen cities, what awaits them in the event of a local military defeat. ### Waiting for an intervention that is slow to come Despite the request for an emergency meeting at the **Human Rights Council**, no concrete measure to immediately protect **civilians** has yet been implemented on the ground in **el-Obeid**. This diplomatic slowness contrasts cruelly with the vital urgency felt by the besieged population. Diplomatic time and humanitarian time almost never coincide, and it is this dissonance that costs the most, every day, to the residents trapped there. ## Comparison with other forgotten fronts ### A parallel with other neglected wars **Sudan** is not the only current **humanitarian crisis** largely under-covered by Western media, more focused on conflicts such as the one pitting **Ukraine** against **Vladimir Putin's** **Russia**, or tensions in the **Middle East**. This implicit hierarchy of international attention has direct and measurable human consequences. Without in any way minimizing the gravity of the Russian aggression against **Ukraine**, it is both possible and necessary to maintain simultaneous attention on other equally urgent crises such as that of **Sudan**. ### The duty of collective memory Ignoring **el-Obeid** today would amount to repeating the mistake made with **el-Fasher**, where insufficient international attention likely contributed to the scale of the atrocities committed after the city fell. The duty of memory demands that the lessons drawn from **el-Fasher** finally translate into concrete preventive action in **el-Obeid**, before it is too late. ## The diplomatic options still available ### Possible targeted sanctions Several international law experts are calling for targeted sanctions against **RSF** leaders and their external financing networks, a measure that could theoretically reduce the militia's operational capacity to continue its offensives against cities like **el-Obeid**. To be effective, these sanctions would nonetheless require international coordination that is currently absent, with several powers continuing to maintain economic or diplomatic ties with actors involved in the Sudanese conflict. ### The African Union's potential role The **African Union** could, in theory, play a more active mediating role in resolving the Sudanese conflict, holding a regional legitimacy that Western powers do not always possess. Its actual influence on the ground nonetheless remains limited against both sides' determination to keep fighting. Without stronger and coordinated diplomatic engagement, these options will remain largely theoretical in the face of the emergency experienced daily by the residents of **el-Obeid**. ## What Sudan is owed by Western attention ### A duty of moral consistency Forcefully defending **Ukraine's** right to resist Russian aggression while ignoring the fate of **el-Obeid** would amount to practicing a selective solidarity incompatible with the universal human rights principles the **West** claims to defend. The same **United Nations**, the same protection mechanisms, should apply with the same vigor everywhere. This consistency is not merely a matter of abstract principle: it directly determines the future credibility of any Western call to defend international law, including against **Vladimir Putin's** **Russia**. ### A closing window for action Humanitarian organizations on the ground estimate that the window to avoid a major humanitarian catastrophe in **el-Obeid** is closing rapidly, as the **RSF** siege tightens around the city and its **500,000** trapped residents. Every additional week without concrete diplomatic intervention reduces the options available to effectively protect the civilian population still present in the city. ## Conclusion: el-Obeid, a moral test for the world ### A city that symbolizes far more than itself The fate of **el-Obeid** goes well beyond the strictly Sudanese framework. It questions the international community's real capacity and willingness to prevent an announced mass atrocity, even as the el-Fasher precedent provides all the necessary evidence of what could happen. Every day that passes without concrete action potentially brings **el-Obeid** closer to the grim fate already suffered by other Sudanese cities that fell to the **RSF**. ### The urgency to act, now The emergency meeting requested at the **UN Human Rights Council** constitutes a necessary first step, but one that is insufficient on its own. Only coordinated diplomatic pressure, accompanied by concrete protection mechanisms on the ground, could truly change the tragic trajectory this city is sinking into. History will judge harshly those who, having known the documented risks, once again chose to look away. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Al Jazeera — Can Sudan's Rapid Support Forces take control of el-Obeid, July 1, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/video/inside-story/2026/7/1/can-sudans-rapid-support-forces-take-control-of-el-obeid) - [Deutsche Welle — Sudan: Warnings mount over the risk of new mass atrocities, 2026](https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-warnings-mount-over-the-risk-of-new-mass-atrocities/a-77709377) - [UN News — Report on the risks of war crimes in el-Fasher, February 2026](https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166960) ### Secondary sources - [Al Jazeera — UN Human Rights Council to hold urgent meeting on Sudan crisis, July 1, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/1/un-human-rights-council-to-hold-urgent-meeting-on-sudan-crisis) - [The Guardian International — coverage of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/international) - [Al Jazeera — full file on the Sudanese conflict, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/where/sudan/) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/reportage-el-obeid-la-ville-soudanaise-qui-craint-le-sort-del-fasher