# REPORT: Caracas asks London to release gold frozen since 2019 at the Bank of England

> On July 8, 2026, Venezuela's interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, announced on state television that she had written directly to King Charles III asking him to release roughly 30 tons of Venezuelan gold that has sat in…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/report-caracas-asks-london-to-release-gold-frozen-since-2019-at-the-bank-of-engl

## Introduction: a letter that crosses the Atlantic

### A diplomatic gesture born of disaster

On **July 8, 2026**, Venezuela's interim president, **Delcy Rodríguez**, announced on state television that she had written directly to **King Charles III** asking him to release roughly **30 tons of Venezuelan gold** that has sat in the underground vaults of the **Bank of England** for years. Her words were repeated around the world: "**This gold belongs to our people** and must be used to answer the terrible and tragic consequences of this double earthquake," she said on state television. Behind the solemnity of the gesture lies a blunter reality: a country on its knees, reaching into a London vault for money its own treasury cannot supply alone.

The move comes exactly two weeks after the **twin earthquakes** of **June 24, 2026**, two tremors of magnitude **7.2 and 7.5** that struck seconds apart near **Morón** and **La Guaira**. The human toll, already staggering at the time of the letter, would keep climbing in the following weeks past **4,300 dead**. Given that scale, it is hardly surprising that **Caracas** is trying to recover every dollar, every bar, every ounce of gold that belongs to it legally but has stayed out of reach for nearly seven years.

### Why this gold became a symbol more than a financial asset

To grasp the weight of the gesture, you need to understand what these **30 tons of precious metal** represent. This is not a trivial sum: estimates range from **1.95 billion dollars**, the value used in the earliest court proceedings, to nearly **4 billion dollars** at current gold prices, or roughly **15% of the country's external reserves**. A sum like that could, in theory, cover a meaningful share of the country's immediate rebuilding needs.

But beyond the numbers, this gold has become, over the years, a symbol of contested sovereignty. Since 2019, the **Bank of England** has refused to return the reserves because the **United Kingdom** does not formally recognize the government sitting in **Caracas**. That position did not change with the fall of **Nicolás Maduro**, captured by **American** special forces on January 3, 2026, and now held in New York. For London, a change of leader is not enough on its own to change a doctrine of diplomatic recognition.

*I still find it striking that a country can legally own gold and be unable to touch it for seven years, simply because another country refuses to recognize who runs it. That standoff says as much about international diplomacy as it does about the earthquakes themselves.*

*This gap between the symbolic value of this gold and its real weight against the scale of the damage forces me toward caution: it would be dishonest to suggest that a simple release would solve the crisis, when Venezuela's reconstruction will demand resources far beyond this one reserve.*

## The seven-year legal thread behind this dispute

### From Maduro to Guaidó, a first round lost in court

The story of this gold begins well before the **June 2026** disaster. In 2018, as **Nicolás Maduro** was already trying to recover these reserves to stabilize a collapsing Venezuelan economy, the **Bank of England** refused, on the grounds that the **United Kingdom** did not recognize his presidential legitimacy. In 2020, in the middle of the pandemic, **Maduro's** government revived a London court case, invoking the health emergency to justify releasing the funds.

That legal battle ended in defeat for **Caracas**: the **UK Supreme Court** ruled against the Venezuelan government in 2023, confirming that diplomatic recognition trumped the question of who actually controlled the country's central bank. That legal precedent remains, to this day, the central obstacle facing **Delcy Rodríguez** in her fresh attempt.

### London's persistent refusal, even after Maduro's fall

What stands out most in this case is British consistency. In January 2026, just days after **Maduro's** capture by the **American** military, British Foreign Secretary **Yvette Cooper** confirmed before the **House of Commons** that the **United Kingdom's** position had not changed. In her words, successive British governments never recognized the Venezuelan regime, and that remains the legal basis for the **Bank of England's** decision.

This administrative rigidity illustrates an unwelcome reality for **Caracas**: changing leaders, even by force and under **American** supervision, does not automatically unlock sovereign assets frozen abroad. **Delcy Rodríguez's** government will therefore have to convince London of its own legitimacy, a diplomatic exercise distinct from simply ousting her predecessor.

*British caution toward chaotic changes of power in Latin America is understandable, but there is something deeply absurd about a country ravaged by a major earthquake having to plead its political legitimacy before it can touch its own gold.*

## The scale of the disaster that makes this request urgent

### A death toll that has kept climbing

To understand the urgency behind Venezuela's request, consider the scale of the disaster itself. The **twin earthquakes** of **June 24, 2026** struck a densely populated region around **Caracas** and **La Guaira**, where nearly **80% of buildings** collapsed according to available assessments. The official toll, initially estimated at around **1,450 dead** on June 29, kept rising: **2,595 dead** by July 2, then **3,535** by July 8, before ultimately surpassing **4,300 dead** in later counts, with **16,740 injured** recorded.

That count, already staggering, does not capture the full scale of the human tragedy. Tens of thousands remain missing, a figure some citizen search platforms put at nearly **30,000** in early July, while the **United Nations** humanitarian coordinator, **Tom Fletcher**, said as early as June 27 that more than **50,000 people** were still unaccounted for.

### An economic cost that dwarfs the value of the gold being sought

This is where the appeal to **King Charles III** reveals its true symbolic rather than strictly financial weight. Estimates of the material damage vary, depending on the source, between **6.7 and 37 billion dollars**. Even in the most favorable scenario, the **30 tons of gold** held in London, valued at under **4 billion dollars**, would cover only a fraction of the real reconstruction need.

This mismatch between the scale of the catastrophe and the value of the gold being claimed takes nothing away from the legitimacy of Venezuela's request, but it underscores a truth too often forgotten: no single diplomatic gesture, however successful, will be enough to rebuild a country where tens of thousands of homes were destroyed in seconds.

*Let's say it plainly: even if London caved tomorrow morning, this gold would only cover a fraction of the disaster. This request carries as much political symbolism as it does real financial solution, and it matters not to confuse the two.*

## An interim president under public pressure

### A crisis response widely criticized

**Delcy Rodríguez's** approach to London comes amid a particularly fragile domestic political climate. According to several polls published in early July 2026, nearly **63.3%** of **Venezuelans** disapproved of the government's handling of the earthquake crisis, a figure that climbed as high as **65%** in some surveys. More than half of respondents called the official response "highly deficient."

This public anger has played out dramatically on social media, with viral videos showing citizens directly confronting government officials over the slowness of relief efforts. The most striking incident remains the filmed altercation between Interior Minister **Diosdado Cabello** and international rescuers who had been denied access to a devastated area, one of whom bluntly reminded him: "There's someone over there asking for help."

### A crisis communication strategy that has failed to convince

Facing this criticism, **Delcy Rodríguez** has chosen a defense that has done little to calm public opinion. At a press conference with foreign media, she claimed that accounts of a slow government response were "largely manipulated by coordinated disinformation campaigns," while insisting that the state had "mobilized immediately" after the quakes.

This defensive rhetoric, which shifts part of the blame onto alleged outside disinformation, illustrates the structural difficulty facing the interim government in fully owning a crisis response that a majority of the population views as inadequate. The gold request to London is also, indirectly, part of an attempt to regain political initiative in the face of an angry public.

*Blaming disinformation campaigns when citizens are filming rescuers themselves being blocked on the ground is a defense that does not hold up long against images this concrete. This crisis management looks more like retreat communication than a credible explanation.*

## The Venezuela Renace fund, a response deemed insufficient

### An initial financial gesture of 200 million dollars

Four days before her letter to **King Charles III**, on **July 4, 2026**, **Delcy Rodríguez** had announced the creation of the **Gran Misión Venezuela Renace**, an initial fund of **200 million dollars** meant for reconstruction and rehousing victims. That amount was to come, in her own words, from resources recovered through the **International Monetary Fund**.

The fund provides for monthly assistance over six months for the hardest-hit households, mortgage subsidies of up to **80%** for repairing or purchasing homes, and tax exemptions on property transactions tied to reconstruction. A ban on exporting construction materials was also decreed to preserve domestic supply.

### A glaring gap between needs and announced means

The problem, documented by several economic analyses, is the disproportion between this **200-million-dollar** fund and the scale of estimated damage, which reaches as high as **37 billion dollars** in the highest assessments. Even adding in the full value of the gold sought in London, the total would still fall far short of the real cost of reconstruction.

It is precisely this structural shortfall that explains why **Caracas** needs to pursue multiple diplomatic fronts at once: the letter to **King Charles III** for the gold, but also parallel talks with **International Monetary Fund** managing director **Kristalina Georgieva** to unlock roughly **3.568 billion dollars** in special drawing rights held by **Venezuela**.

*Two hundred million dollars against damage that could reach thirty-seven billion is not a reconstruction plan, it is a first political gesture meant to show that the government is acting. It will take far more than symbolic announcements to rehouse tens of thousands of families.*

## The American military presence, an awkward dependency

### Washington running the country's main airport

What makes Venezuela's gold request even more revealing is the context of dependency surrounding it. Since **July 1, 2026**, according to an official statement from **US Southern Command**, **American** troops have held operational control of the control tower at **Simón Bolívar International Airport**, the country's main air gateway, coordinating with civilian Venezuelan controllers.

More than **1,300 Marines** from the **Littoral Combat Force-24**, backed by the **USS Fort Lauderdale** docked at the port of **La Guaira** and the **USS Billings** cruising off Venezuelan territorial waters, are taking part in a humanitarian assistance operation of a scale unheard of for a country that, just months earlier, had appalling relations with **Washington**.

### An official denial that struggles to mask the reality on the ground

**Delcy Rodríguez's** interim government has been keen to deny any loss of institutional sovereignty. A statement from the **Miraflores** presidential palace, published in late June 2026, insisted that "there is no way that the United States or any other country controls an institution in Venezuela." But that statement directly contradicts **US Southern Command's** own communications, which describe unambiguously its takeover of control tower management and ground logistics operations.

This contradiction between Venezuela's official rhetoric and the documented operational reality illustrates the delicate position **Delcy Rodríguez** finds herself in: accepting massive **American** military aid while trying to preserve a national sovereignty narrative that, in practice, is starting to sound increasingly hollow.

*You cannot simultaneously claim that no institution is controlled by a foreign power and let American Marines run the control tower of your main airport. That public contradiction says a great deal about the real state of Venezuelan sovereignty today.*

## The Israeli delegation, another paradox openly embraced

### Unexpected cooperation after seventeen years of estrangement

Venezuela's paradox does not stop at the **American** military presence. Since late June 2026, an **Israeli** delegation of about thirty people, including members of the **Israeli military's Home Front Command** and the foreign ministry, has been operating on Venezuelan soil to assess the structural stability of damaged buildings, despite the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries since 2009.

This delegation, led by General **Elad Edri** and designated ambassador **Yoed Magen**, has mapped roughly **1,300 damaged buildings** and proposed a multi-year reconstruction plan that **Delcy Rodríguez** approved within days, an unusually short turnaround for this kind of technical dossier.

### What this double dependency reveals about the state of the country

This situation illustrates a reality that Chavista sovereigntist rhetoric struggles to hide: a **Venezuela** historically hostile to **Washington** and **Tel Aviv** now finds itself simultaneously under **American** military oversight at its main airport and host to an **Israeli** military-diplomatic mission tasked with its reconstruction. The gold request sent to London fits into this same desperate effort to multiply sources of aid, whatever ideological contradictions it entails.

This convergence of dependencies reveals, in its own way, the scale of the disaster: no national pride survives long against tens of thousands of homeless people and a country that must be rebuilt from the ground up.

*Watching Caracas simultaneously accept American military aid and an Israeli delegation, after years of anti-imperialist rhetoric, shows how quickly a natural disaster can erase decades of ideological posture. Survival comes first, and that may be the only sensible thing in this whole picture.*

## What the 2020 precedent says about the odds of success

### A health emergency already invoked without success

The 2020 precedent is worth recalling to gauge the real odds of the current effort. Back then, **Nicolás Maduro's** government had already invoked a humanitarian emergency, the Covid-19 pandemic, to try to secure the release of the gold, promising that the funds would flow through the **United Nations Development Programme** to buy medical equipment. That attempt ended in complete legal defeat.

The fact that a humanitarian emergency as severe as a global pandemic was not enough to unlock these reserves in 2020 counsels caution about the odds of success of the current request, even in the face of a natural disaster of comparable or greater scale.

### A different political context, but the same legal obstacle

What has changed today is the political context: it is no longer **Maduro**, deemed illegitimate by London, making the request, but **Delcy Rodríguez**, who came to power under circumstances that are themselves contested following the **American** intervention. Nothing suggests, at this stage, that the **United Kingdom** views her government as any more legitimate than her predecessor's.

The fundamental legal obstacle, the diplomatic-recognition doctrine established by the **UK Supreme Court** in 2023, remains fully intact. Nothing in recent British statements suggests any shift in doctrine, which casts serious doubt on the outcome of this new attempt.

*The legal history of this gold is a graveyard of failed attempts, and I see, at this stage, no concrete signal suggesting London would suddenly change doctrine simply because the name of the petitioner in Caracas has changed.*

## The hidden geopolitical stakes behind a humanitarian gesture

### A test of international legitimacy for Rodríguez

Beyond its strictly financial dimension, this request is also a political test for **Delcy Rodríguez** herself. Securing even a partial goodwill gesture from the **United Kingdom** would bolster her international legitimacy at a moment when her interim government remains fragile, contested at home, and dependent on multiple outside supports to hold the line.

Conversely, a fresh British refusal, which remains the most likely outcome given the legal precedent, could fuel a narrative of victimhood against the **West**, a rhetorical register traditionally used by Chavista power, even in its current post-**Maduro** form.

### The weight of international opinion on this case

It should also be noted that this request comes at a moment when international attention on **Venezuela** remains high, amid **Nicolás Maduro's** upcoming trial in New York, the **American** military presence, and the **Israeli** delegation. This media context could, in theory, put added pressure on **London** to justify a position perceived as excessively rigid in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe of this magnitude.

But the recent history of relations between the **United Kingdom** and **Venezuela** shows that this kind of moral pressure has rarely, in the past, been enough to move a British administration committed to a recognition doctrine it treats as a principle, not a variable to be adjusted at the whim of humanitarian emergencies.

*I do not believe international media pressure alone will be enough to shift a legal position as entrenched as London's. It will take, in my view, a far more concrete political gesture of recognition for this case to truly move forward.*

## What this case reveals about the balance of power in Latin America

### A Venezuela under multiple tutelage, without recent precedent

This frozen-gold case, seen in its broader context, illustrates a rare situation in the continent's recent history: a **Latin American** country, historically proud of its oil sovereignty and its anti-imperialist posture, finds itself simultaneously under partial **American** military oversight, hosting an **Israeli** military delegation, and pleading to recover its own gold from a **United Kingdom** that refuses to recognize its government.

This convergence of dependencies reflects a structural weakening of Venezuela's position on the world stage, a direct and logical consequence of the institutional collapse triggered by **Maduro's** capture and by the unprecedented scale of the June 2026 seismic disaster.

### A lesson for every regional power

For other countries in the region, this case sends a clear message: national sovereignty, however forcefully asserted rhetorically, remains conditioned on a state's real ability to handle its gravest emergencies on its own. When that capacity collapses, outside dependencies take over, regardless of the historical ideological preferences of the government in power.

Post-**Maduro** **Venezuela** illustrates this shift in almost textbook fashion: a Chavista power that accepts military aid from **Washington** and **Tel Aviv** while asking the British crown for its gold, revealing how humanitarian emergencies always end up dictating their own rules, well beyond ideological postures.

*This case strikes me as a striking distillation of what a government becomes when reality on the ground far outstrips its ideological capacity to handle it alone. Sovereignty, in moments like these, becomes far more a talking point than a practice.*

## The next steps expected in this case

### A British response that could take months

As of this report's writing, no official response from **Buckingham Palace** or the British government had been made public regarding **Delcy Rodríguez's** letter. Similar past cases, notably the 2020 attempt, took several months, even years, before reaching a final court ruling, which suggests this new chapter could follow an equally long timeline.

This predictable slowness clashes violently with the humanitarian urgency on the ground, where tens of thousands of families still live in temporary camps, with available data pointing to more than **87 camps** set up for earthquake survivors.

### The role international mediation could play

Some observers raise the possibility that international mediation, perhaps involving the **United Nations** or a multilateral financial body, could speed up a compromise on this case, especially if the **International Monetary Fund** manages, on its own side, to unlock the special drawing rights sought by **Caracas**. A combined gesture from several international institutions could, in theory, offer a faster way out than the sole bilateral legal path with London.

But nothing, at this stage, confirms that such mediation is actually underway or even being seriously considered by the parties involved, which calls for the greatest caution about realistic timelines for resolving this dispute.

*I prefer to remain cautious about timelines: this case's history since 2019 gives no reason to expect a quick resolution, even in the face of a humanitarian emergency as well documented as this one.*

## Why this case goes beyond Venezuela alone

### A precedent watched closely by other sanctioned countries

This dispute between **Caracas** and **London** is being followed closely by other countries facing frozen sovereign assets tied to disputes over diplomatic recognition or international sanctions. How the **United Kingdom** handles this new request, amid such a grave humanitarian context, could set a precedent, positive or negative, for other similar cases elsewhere in the world.

This international dimension explains why some financial analysts are following this case with an attention that goes well beyond the strictly bilateral interest between the two countries, seeing it as a broader test of how flexible Western financial institutions can be in the face of extreme humanitarian emergencies.

### What this means for the credibility of Western institutions

For **Western** governments, this case raises an uncomfortable question: how far should the doctrine of diplomatic non-recognition take precedence over a humanitarian emergency documented and counted in thousands of deaths? Answering that question rigidly, with no flexibility whatsoever, could feed lasting resentment toward Western financial institutions already criticized for their perceived rigidity toward crises in the **Global South**.

But giving in too easily, conversely, would weaken a principle of diplomatic recognition that the **United Kingdom** has always presented as a pillar of its foreign policy, particularly toward contested regimes elsewhere in the world. That is the delicate balance **London** will have to settle in the months ahead.

*I believe the West has every interest in finding a flexible solution in this specific case, without abandoning the principle of diplomatic recognition. There is surely a middle path between total rigidity and simply giving up a legitimate principle.*

## Gold as a mirror of post-colonial power dynamics

### A dispute that echoes other similar cases elsewhere

The Venezuelan case is not isolated in the recent history of relations between former colonial powers and Global South countries holding reserves abroad. Several Western central banks have, in the past, held onto sovereign assets belonging to governments deemed illegitimate or under sanctions, whether Afghan funds frozen in the United States or Russian reserves immobilized in Europe since the invasion of Ukraine. The Venezuelan case fits this same pattern of asset freezes conditioned on political recognition.

This parallel does not erase the obvious differences in context between these cases, but it sheds light on a structural tendency among Western financial institutions: the technical neutrality of a central bank often gives way to diplomatic and political considerations as soon as a government is deemed insufficiently legitimate by Western chancelleries.

### What this means for trust in the international financial system

This reality feeds, in several capitals of the Global South, a growing mistrust of an international financial system seen as weaponized in service of Western geopolitical interests rather than as a strictly technical, neutral framework. Venezuela's gold case, however specific, feeds this broader debate over the financial sovereignty of nations facing the great powers that control most of the world's banking infrastructure.

For defenders of the British position, this rigor remains necessary to avoid legitimizing contested seizures of power. For its critics, it instead illustrates a Western hypocrisy that invokes democratic principles when convenient, and relativizes them when it is not.

*I think this tension needs to be named without complacency: the West cannot demand blind trust in its financial system while freezing, year after year, the assets of countries going through major humanitarian crises, even when the reasons cited are legally sound.*

## The uneasy role of China and Russia in the background of this case

### Historic creditors watching the situation closely

It's worth recalling that **Venezuela**, under **Maduro**, built close financial ties with **China** and **Russia**, two major creditors that lent billions of dollars to the country in exchange for oil guarantees. This bilateral debt, contracted outside the Western financial system, further complicates the country's overall financial situation, independent of the London gold case alone.

Neither **Beijing** nor **Moscow** has, to date, taken a clear public position on the request sent to **King Charles III**, but both capitals are watching the case's evolution very closely, aware that any release of Western funds could shift the priority order of Venezuela's debt repayments to its various creditors.

### A rivalry for influence that goes beyond finance alone

This configuration illustrates just how much **Venezuela** remains a coveted arena for powers with opposing interests: on one side, a **West** trying to reassert its presence through **American** military aid and the **Israeli** delegation; on the other, historic creditors like **China** and **Russia**, hoping to keep their economic influence over an oil-rich country regardless of the internal political outcome.

In this context of competing influence, Venezuela's gold case in London becomes almost an additional symbol of this broader battle over who, between the **West** and rival powers, will best help rebuild the country and, in doing so, secure lasting influence over its economic and political future.

*I remain convinced the West has a strategic interest in being more generous and faster in this case, if only to avoid leaving an open field to creditors like China or Russia, whose intentions toward Latin America deserve far greater vigilance than the one applied to a weakened, multiply-dependent Venezuelan government.*

## Conclusion: a symbol stronger than its real value

### What this request truly reveals

At the end of this case, one thing remains certain: **Delcy Rodríguez's** request to **King Charles III** matters more for its symbolic weight than for its real ability to resolve Venezuela's humanitarian crisis. Even in the most favorable scenario of a quick release, this gold would represent only a fraction of the total reconstruction cost, estimated as high as **37 billion dollars** in the highest assessments.

This gesture nonetheless fits into a broader strategy by **Caracas**, which is pursuing multiple diplomatic fronts at once, between the **International Monetary Fund**, the foreign military delegations present on its soil, and this letter addressed directly to the British crown, in an attempt to mobilize every available resource against a disaster of exceptional magnitude.

### An uncertain resolution, a country that cannot afford to wait

The outcome of this dispute remains, to this day, deeply uncertain, given how firmly entrenched the legal obstacle of diplomatic recognition appears in British doctrine. But **Venezuela** itself cannot afford to wait several more years: tens of thousands of families still live in makeshift camps, and every additional month of delay adds a little more to the human cost of an already historic catastrophe.

This case of frozen gold in London will remain, whatever its final outcome, a striking example of how the gravest humanitarian emergencies sometimes collide with rigid diplomatic principles, without either logic simply being able to erase the other.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Official statement on US Southern Command support after the Venezuela earthquake — SOUTHCOM, July 1, 2026](https://www.southcom.mil/News/PressReleases/Article/4531552/release-update-on-southcom-support-to-venezuela-earthquake-relief-july-1/)

- [Rodríguez announces reconstruction program, receives foreign missions — Venezuelanalysis, July 8, 2026](https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/venezuela-rodriguez-announces-reconstruction-program-decorates-foreign-missions/)

- [Interim president creates the Gran Misión Venezuela Renace — MPPP, July 4, 2026](https://mppp.gob.ve/2026/07/04/presidenta-e-delcy-rodriguez-crea-la-gran-mision-venezuela-renace/)

### Secondary sources

- [Venezuela asks Britain for $1.95 billion in gold buried under London — The Rio Times, July 9, 2026](https://www.riotimesonline.com/venezuela-gold-bank-of-england-king-charles-earthquake-2026/)

- [Inside the vault: the Bank of England's £1.4 billion Venezuelan gold dilemma — The Guardian, January 6, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/jan/06/bank-of-england-venezuelan-gold-nicolas-maduro-us-uk)

- [Venezuela pleads with King Charles to release frozen gold assets to rebuild quake-shattered nation — Malay Mail, July 9, 2026](https://www.malaymail.com/news/world/2026/07/09/venezuela-pleads-with-king-charles-release-frozen-gold-assets-to-rebuild-quakeshattered-nation/226905)

- [Delcy Rodríguez to ask King Charles III to release Venezuelan gold reserves — UPI, July 9, 2026](https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2026/07/09/latam-venezuela-gold-reserves-release-request-King-Charles/2771783617938/)

- [Venezuelans want Delcy Rodríguez out, demand new elections over deficient earthquake response — El Financiero, July 3, 2026](https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/mundo/2026/07/03/venezolanos-quieren-fuera-a-delcy-rodriguez-exigen-nueva-eleccion-por-deficiente-apoyo-en-terremotos/)

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/report-caracas-asks-london-to-release-gold-frozen-since-2019-at-the-bank-of-engl