# NARRATIVE: Ukraine destroys five bridges in two days — Russian logistics bled dry > On the night of June 29, 2026, Ukrainian forces struck with devastating precision. Three bridges in the occupied territories were taken out - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Reportage - Published: 2026-07-01 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/recit-ukraine-detruit-cinq-ponts-en-deux-jours-la-logistique-russe-saignee-a-bla ## Key takeaways - On June 29, 2026, three bridges were taken out in occupied territories: a road bridge near Novoazovsk and two railway bridges in Luhansk oblast, according to the Ukrainian General Staff. - Further strikes followed on June 29-30 at Azovske, Zaporizhzhia oblast, and on a railway bridge near Ichky in occupied Crimea, along with a Russian logistics depot at Novosvitlivka. - The column describes these strikes as part of a campaign, not isolated hits, and says Ukraine also struck drone command posts and an electronic warfare post. - Strikes on July 1 hit a road bridge near Hranitne, a railway bridge near Nyzhnoteple, and a Roscosmos-linked facility in Penza oblast. - The author notes that the General Staff's figures could not always be independently verified, and that Russia denies damage. ## Introduction: when bridges fall, armies suffocate ### A methodical campaign against the arteries of war On the night of **June 29, 2026**, Ukrainian forces struck with devastating precision. Three bridges in the occupied territories were taken out of service within a few hours — a road bridge near **Novoazovsk** in **Donetsk** oblast, and two railway bridges in **Luhansk** oblast. This was no accident. It was strategy. The **Ukrainian Armed Forces** confirmed that these infrastructure targets were being used daily to transport **Russian military personnel**, weapons, ammunition and other supplies to the front lines. Cutting these arteries means starving the war machine. Every bridge destroyed is a supply delay. Every delay is a Ukrainian life potentially saved. ### The context of a sustained logistical offensive The **June 29** strike did not emerge from a vacuum. Since **April 16, 2026**, the **1st Azov Corps of the Ukrainian National Guard** had taken control of all Russian logistics routes near occupied **Donetsk**, pledging to destroy any mobile target on those axes. Since **May 29**, the **Defence Intelligence of Ukraine** had been releasing images showing the disruption of the Crimea-Donetsk land corridor. Ukraine is fighting an infrastructure war. It targets the nerves, the veins, the vertebrae of the Russian logistics system. And on **June 29**, that system absorbed five fractures in forty-eight hours. *I am no military tactician, but when I see five bridges neutralized in two days, I see something larger than destruction: I see an army that has learned to think like a surgeon. Ukraine does not bomb at random. It operates.* ## The Novoazovsk road bridge: severing the Donetsk corridor ### A critical node in the occupied east **Novoazovsk** is a port town on the Sea of Azov, in **Donetsk** oblast, occupied since **2014**. This road bridge represents an essential link in the logistics corridor connecting **annexed Crimea** to Russian positions in the **Donbas**. Its destruction deprives Russian convoys of a key crossing between the Sea of Azov and the combat zones. The **General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces** specified that the strikes aimed to **"reduce the military and economic potential of the Russian aggressor."** That is not bureaucratic language — it is a doctrine. Every destroyed piece of infrastructure forces Russians to extend their supply routes, burn more fuel, and expose their convoys for longer to drone attacks. ### Pressure on the Crimea-Donetsk land corridor Since **June 2026**, **medium-range drone units** of the **Ukrainian Special Operations Forces**, operating with the **Resistance Movement in the occupied territories**, have intensified their strikes on this corridor. The destruction of a railway bridge on the **North Crimea Canal** near the village of **Rozdolne** — confirmed in late June — illustrates this strategy of systematic fragmentation. **Moscow** had built this land corridor as a geopolitical prize after the fall of **Mariupol** in **2022**. It is crumbling bridge by bridge, depot by depot, under Ukrainian precision strikes. What Russia spent years consolidating, Ukraine is methodically dismantling. *Putin had boasted of this land corridor as a historic victory. On the maps, it may still be. On the ground, it increasingly resembles a pothole-ridden road that no one can travel without risking their life.* ## Two railway bridges in Luhansk: striking the occupied rail network ### The railway: backbone of Russian logistics The two **railway bridges** struck in occupied **Luhansk** oblast represent a strategic gain distinct from road strikes. The Russian railway network in the occupied territories carries volumes of materiel far exceeding those of road convoys — armored vehicles, heavy artillery systems, bulk fuel, and industrial quantities of ammunition. Neutralizing railway bridges forces Russia to fall back on road transport, which is slower, more vulnerable to drone ambushes, and above all more costly. It also degrades **Moscow**'s capacity to rapidly rotate troops between different front sectors. Russian operational flexibility — already under strain — is diminished further. ### The destruction of the logistics depot at Novosvitlivka Within the same strike window, Ukrainian forces destroyed a **Russian military logistics depot** near the occupied town of **Novosvitlivka** in Luhansk oblast. A depot represents weeks of supplies. It is ammunition that will never reach the front line. It is Russian artillery that will fall silent a few more days. The **General Staff** also reported the destruction of **three Russian drone command posts** — near **Huliaipole** in Zaporizhzhia, **Tyotkino** in Russia's Kursk oblast, and occupied **Bakhmut** in Donetsk. Also destroyed: an **electronic warfare command post** near **Velyka Novosilka** in Donetsk. Each destroyed command post strips Russian drone operators of real-time coordination — and that cost is paid on the ground. *A logistics depot makes no headlines. But in Russian trenches, a destroyed depot means soldiers waiting weeks for ammunition that will never come. The strikes nobody sees sometimes do the most damage.* ## The June 30 strikes: Azovske and occupied Crimea ### A road bridge in Zaporizhzhia: Azovske hit On the night of **June 29 to 30**, Ukraine pressed on with its campaign. A **road bridge at Azovske** in **Zaporizhzhia** oblast was struck. This location is strategically significant: it sits in the active front zone where Russians have been trying for months to consolidate their gains. A destroyed bridge makes an encirclement maneuver harder and slows a flank reinforcement. The **General Staff** noted that the results of these strikes were still being confirmed, but satellite imagery and open-source reporting allowed damage assessment. The Ukrainian methodology has become almost industrial: strike, confirm, document, communicate. Every strike feeds a diplomatic pressure file as much as a military one. ### The railway bridge in occupied Crimea: the peninsula isolated The most symbolically powerful strike in this sequence was against a **railway bridge in occupied Crimea**, near **Ichky**. **Crimea**, illegally annexed by Russia since **2014**, has become a logistics hub, a rear base, and a symbol of the supposed permanence of Russian conquest. Every strike on Crimea is a statement: no occupied Ukrainian territory is a sanctuary. The **Ukrainian Special Operations Forces** had already demonstrated in late June their capacity to strike the Crimean railway network, including the destruction of a railway bridge on the **North Crimea Canal** at Rozdolne. This second railway bridge confirms a continuous, methodical pressure on the peninsula. Russia must now manage its Crimean logistics routes as a network under constant threat. *Every bridge destroyed in Crimea is a slap to the myth of the impregnable Russian fortress. Putin built the Kerch Bridge as a monument to his own greatness. Ukraine, bridge by bridge, demolishes the Russian pretension to permanence. Crimea is not lost to Ukraine. It is merely still occupied.* ## July 1: Donetsk's rail network under pressure ### From Hranitne to Nyzhnoteple — the series continues On **July 1, 2026**, the **General Staff** reported new strikes during the night of **June 30 to July 1**: a **road bridge over the Malyi Kalchyk river** near **Hranitne** in Donetsk, a **railway bridge over the Tepla river** near **Nyzhnoteple** in Luhansk, and a **logistics hub** near **Novoocheretuvate** in Donetsk. The campaign did not stop with the end of June — it intensified. What distinguishes this sequence of strikes from previous campaigns is continuity. Ukraine does not strike reactively. It executes a plan. Targets are selected in advance, effects are assessed, and subsequent strikes are adjusted accordingly. This is a logistics degradation campaign governed by campaign logic, not a hit-and-run impulse. ### The scientific facility in Penza oblast During the same night of **June 30 to July 1**, the **General Staff** also reported a strike on the **Scientific Research Institute of Physical Measurements** in Russia's **Penza** oblast, a facility linked to the **Russian space agency Roscosmos**. Impacts and smoke were recorded. This strike on deep Russian territory illustrates another dimension of the Ukrainian strategy: reaching Russian industrial and technological capabilities directly on Russian soil. **Ukraine** is no longer limiting itself to occupied territories. It strikes inside **Russia**, hitting installations that feed the war machine: the defense industry, logistics hubs, communications infrastructure, research centers. What **Moscow** considered its secure rear has become a zone of risk. *Striking a Roscosmos installation deep in Penza oblast, hundreds of kilometers from the border — that is the clearest message Ukraine can send: Russian strategic depth no longer exists. And Putin, who staked everything on the invulnerability of his rear, must now come to terms with that.* ## Destroyed command posts: blinding Russia's drones ### The drone war turns against its own infrastructure The **three Russian drone command posts** destroyed on **June 29** deserve special attention. Near **Huliaipole** in Zaporizhzhia, **Tyotkino** in Russia's Kursk oblast, and occupied **Bakhmut**: three different sectors, three coordination nodes destroyed simultaneously. This simultaneity is not accidental. The drone war in Ukraine has become a war of systems. The drone alone is nothing — it is its command post that makes it formidable. Destroying these posts strips Russian operators of their capacity to coordinate swarms, analyze real-time data, and adapt tactics. It renders hundreds of drones blind and disoriented in a single blow. ### Electronic warfare also targeted The **electronic warfare command post** destroyed near **Velyka Novosilka** in Donetsk completes the picture. **Russian electronic warfare** has represented one of the major challenges for Ukraine's drone aviation — jamming communications, disrupting GPS signals, blinding guidance systems. Targeting these installations reduces that jamming capability. The destruction of a **military communications facility** and significant damage to a second, near **Minyaevo** in Russia's Moscow oblast — confirmed on **June 26** — fits this same overarching logic. Ukraine blinds, severs nerves, isolates Russian units from one another. It is a strategy of progressive disintegration of the Russian military's nervous system. *There is something profoundly modern about this way of waging war: targeting not the soldiers but the systems that make them function. Ukraine cannot field as many soldiers as Russia. But it can make those soldiers deaf, blind and isolated. And that is precisely what it is doing.* ## Communications infrastructure inside Russia: striking the brain ### The Minyaevo facility — a strong signal The **destruction of a military communications facility** near **Minyaevo** in **Moscow** oblast, with significant damage to a second installation — confirmed by analysis on **June 26, 2026** — deserves to be placed in a broader context. **Moscow** oblast is not the front. It is the heart of the Russian war machine. This strike at **800 kilometers or more from the Ukrainian front** demonstrates that Ukraine has achieved a long-range power projection capability that alarms **Moscow**. Military communications installations in Moscow oblast manage critical information flows for the conduct of operations. Disrupting them, even partially, introduces dysfunction where Russia believes itself safe. ### Ukraine's doctrine of strategic depth denial What all these strikes — bridges, depots, command posts, communications facilities — reveal together is a coherent doctrine: **strategic depth denial**. Ukraine refuses Russia the comfort of a secure rear. Every kilometer of Russian or occupied territory can potentially be reached. Every piece of infrastructure can be targeted. The **General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces** was explicit: **"Ukraine's Defence Forces will continue to systematically disrupt the Russian aggressor's command system, military logistics and support infrastructure."** That is not a declaration. It is a program. And it is being executed. *No one in 2022 would have bet that by 2026 Ukraine would be capable of striking military installations in Moscow oblast. No one would have believed five bridges could fall in forty-eight hours in the occupied territories. Zelensky built an army that improvises at a speed Putin never anticipated. And it is that speed that changes everything.* ## Moscow's impossible response ### Repairing under fire: Russia's logistics dilemma **Russia** faces an insoluble problem: to repair a destroyed bridge in the occupied territories, it must bring in materials, personnel, and heavy equipment. All of that moves by road — roads that can also be struck. And the repair crews themselves become potential targets, visible to Ukrainian surveillance drones. The Russian military has developed mobile pontoon bridges to work around certain destructions. But they are slow to deploy, limited in load capacity, and — above all — well documented by Ukrainian military sources. **Militarnyi.com** reported in early July the construction of a **Russian embankment bridge** near **Henichesk** toward Crimea: proof that Russia is trying to compensate for its infrastructure losses, but with makeshift solutions under constant pressure. ### Logistical pressure as an operational factor Military analysts have extensively documented that Russian advances in several front sectors during **2024–2025** were directly linked to their superiority in artillery ammunition. That superiority rests on efficient supply chains. If those chains degrade — if bridges fall, if depots burn, if roads are cut — the Russian artillery rate drops, and the tactical balance can shift. That is precisely what Ukraine is trying to provoke: not a large offensive that would cost too many lives, but a **progressive and asymmetric degradation** of Russia's ability to sustain its own operations. Five bridges in two days. It is a message. And the message reads: we will not let you resupply in peace. *The great lesson of this war is that logistics determines the difference between holding and collapsing. Putin had an army equipped for invasion. Ukraine built an army equipped for systematic degradation. And over time, systematic degradation wins.* ## The role of the Special Operations Forces ### The Resistance Movement in the occupied territories Several of these strikes were carried out by the **Ukrainian Special Operations Forces** in coordination with the **Resistance Movement in the occupied territories**. This cooperation between regular units and clandestine networks in Russian-controlled zones is a dimension of the war that is often underestimated. The **Resistance Movement** provides real-time targeting intelligence, identifies logistics nodes, and confirms strike effects. It transforms the war behind enemy lines into a collective exercise where every resistant Ukrainian resident becomes an element of the defense system. It is a people's war, even if it looks nothing like the people's wars history has documented. ### The medium-range drone units The strikes on Crimean railway bridges were carried out by **medium-range drone units** of the Special Operations Forces. This capability — drones capable of reaching Crimea from Ukrainian-controlled territory — represents an investment in Ukrainian technological sovereignty that is paying off. **Ukraine** has committed considerable resources since **2023** to developing and producing long-range domestic drones. These investments now translate into real operational capability: bridges destroyed in Crimea, depots burning in Novosvitlivka, command posts silenced in Kursk. Ukrainian technology is no longer a hope — it is a field fact. *There is a bitter irony in this war: Russia, the supposedly invincible military giant, is being progressively dismantled by an army that barely existed in its current form in 2022. What Zelensky built — a force that improvises, innovates and strikes with precision — should embarrass everyone who predicted the fall of Kyiv in three days.* ## The international echo of the strikes ### What the allies are watching Ukraine's Western partners follow these strike campaigns with documented interest. Every destroyed bridge confirms the effectiveness of delivered missile systems — **HIMARS**, **ATACMS**, **Storm Shadow/SCALP** missiles. Every burning depot retroactively justifies the politically difficult decisions to deliver weapons. For governments still debating whether to provide this or that capability to Ukraine, these results are concrete arguments. Ukraine does not waste Western military aid. It converts it into measurable, documented, published military effects. This is strategic communication as much as it is a military operation. ### Pressure on negotiations These strikes come at a moment when peace negotiations are being discussed at various levels. **Moscow**, which still demands Ukrainian withdrawal from **Donetsk** and **Luhansk**, finds its negotiating position complicated every time a key piece of infrastructure disappears. A Russia unable to resupply its troops is a Russia whose balance of power on the ground is deteriorating — even if the maps do not move quickly. Ukraine understood long ago that the negotiating table mirrors the battlefield. The better it holds and strikes, the stronger its position when the moment for talks arrives. These five bridges in two days are also diplomacy. Diplomacy by facts. *Peace negotiations are not won in conference rooms. They are prepared on the ground. And what Ukraine has been doing for months — methodically destroying Russian capabilities, point by point — is exactly that: preparing the table at which it intends to sit from a position of strength.* ## The General Staff report: Ukraine's strategic communication ### Operational transparency and psychological pressure Every Ukrainian strike on bridges or infrastructure is immediately communicated by the **General Staff**, often via **Facebook** or **Telegram**, with target details, locations, and estimated effects. This communication is not merely information — it is psychological pressure on Russian forces and a capability demonstration for allies. Russian soldiers in the occupied zones read these communiqués. They know the bridge they cross every day may be the next target. This uncertainty degrades morale, complicates planning, and slows movements. The information war that **Kyiv** wages is inseparable from the drone and missile war. ### Independent verification remains limited The **Kyiv Independent** acknowledges this explicitly: it cannot independently verify the full extent of damage for every declared strike. The Ukrainian General Staff reports estimated results, often later confirmed by satellite imagery or OSINT sources, but the nature of war imposes limits on immediate verification. This epistemic honesty matters. One can say with certainty that strikes took place — official Ukrainian sources, available images, and cross-referencing confirm it. One can say with certainty that bridges were hit. What cannot always be said with precision is the exact degree of destruction or the repair timeline. But the overall direction is clear: Russian logistics are under severe pressure. *I appreciate that the Kyiv Independent admits its verification limits. In the fog of war, honesty about what one knows and does not know is a form of rigor. Too many outlets present military claims as certainties. Nuance is not weakness — it is journalism.* ## The forty-eight-hour toll: an operational accounting ### Five bridges, three command posts, one depot Operational summary for **June 29–30, 2026**: **five bridges** put out of service (one road bridge at **Novoazovsk**, two railway bridges in **Luhansk**, one road bridge at **Azovske**, one railway bridge in **Crimea** near Ichky); one **military logistics depot** destroyed at **Novosvitlivka**; three **drone command posts** at **Huliaipole**, **Tyotkino** and **Bakhmut**; one **electronic warfare post** at **Velyka Novosilka**. Not counting the strikes on the night of **June 30–July 1** against additional bridges at **Hranitne** and **Nyzhnoteple**. These figures come from official communiqués of the **General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces**, reported and analyzed by the **Kyiv Independent** and **Ukrayinska Pravda**. They represent a forty-eight-hour window of a campaign that has continued day after day for months. ### What these strikes mean for what comes next The real test is not the number of bridges destroyed in a given month. It is **Ukraine's capacity to maintain this pressure over time** — to replenish ammunition stocks, train new drone operators, identify new targets, and adapt tactics as Russia counter-adapts. What **June 2026** demonstrated is that this capacity is real and sustained. The question is no longer whether Ukraine can hold on. The question is how long **Moscow** can absorb these losses before its logistics lines collapse. And that question, for now, is being asked in the occupied territories, one bridge at a time. *I cannot predict the outcome of this war. No one honestly can. But when I look at this forty-eight-hour toll — five bridges, one depot, three command posts — I see an army not fighting to survive. It is fighting to win. And that makes all the difference.* ## The human dimension: what the bridges conceal ### Convoys that will not pass Behind every destroyed bridge lie convoys that will not deliver their cargo. Ammunition trucks stranded on one bank or the other of a river. Troop rotations delayed by days or weeks. Russian soldiers waiting for water, food, medicine and ammunition that will not arrive on schedule. This is not an abstract question. It is a material reality that translates into degraded operational capability, damaged morale, and constrained tactical decisions. War, at its core, is also a war of supply chains. And Ukraine is methodically cutting those of its adversary. ### Civilians in the occupied territories The destruction of bridges in the occupied territories also raises a question that military doctrine cannot simply set aside: these infrastructure elements also serve **Ukrainian civilians** living under Russian occupation. They need access to healthcare, food, and family members. The logistics war has human costs that would be dishonest to minimize. The **Ukrainian General Staff** justifies these strikes on the basis of their military character — the bridges serve to transport weapons, not civilian goods. In the reality of an occupied territory, that line is sometimes blurred. This is a genuine moral tension in this war, and it deserves to be named, even if it does not call into question the overall legitimacy of the military operations. *I cannot write about destroyed bridges without thinking of the Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation who may have crossed those bridges. This war is being fought on their backs too. Their liberation is the objective — but the road to liberation carries a human cost that only those living under occupation can truly measure. I do not forget that.* ## What open sources say: OSINT and verification ### Satellite analysis confirms the strikes Ukrainian strikes on bridges in the occupied territories do not rest solely on official statements. **OSINT** — **open-source intelligence** — communities have documented damage to Russian infrastructure in near real time. Commercial satellite imagery, published by analysts such as **Brady Africk** or the teams at **Planet Labs**, allows independent confirmation of certain destructions. This layer of independent verification is valuable in a context where both sides have an interest in presenting events in the best possible light. For the railway bridges in **Luhansk** and the road bridge at **Novoazovsk**, before-and-after images have corroborated the claims of the **Ukrainian General Staff**. Satellite transparency has become a normal component of this war — and it works in favor of the truth. ### The limits of verification in occupied zones Some areas remain difficult to cover through open sources. Access to high-resolution commercial satellite imagery is limited by cloud cover, satellite pass frequency, and sometimes restrictive commercial policies in active conflict zones. For a handful of declared strikes, complete independent verification remains at this stage impossible. This is a fact to acknowledge honestly. **Ukraine** communicates its offensive results — that is normal and strategically logical. **Russia**, for its part, systematically denies any damage sustained. Between the two, **OSINT** sources and independent media such as the **Kyiv Independent** attempt to build the most accurate picture possible. Ground truth often remains partial, and that must be said. *The information war is also a war Ukraine is fighting — and fighting well. By openly communicating its strikes, inviting satellite verification, publishing images and coordinates, Kyiv understood something essential: in this conflict, credibility is a weapon. And so far, it is being wielded with remarkable effectiveness.* ## Conclusion: the geography of pressure ### A map being progressively erased **Five bridges** in two days. This is not anecdotal. It is the materialization of a coherent, patient, methodical strategy. **Ukraine** is rewriting the logistics geography of the **occupied territories** by erasing crossing points, burning depots, and blinding command networks. What **Russia** seized by force, it cannot hold under this **constant pressure** without mounting cost. The question posed by this campaign is not tactical. It is **strategic**: how long can **Russia** maintain a coherent presence in the **occupied territories** if every bridge, every depot, every command post becomes a target within range of **Ukrainian drones**? The answer belongs to the future. But the signals from **June 29, 2026** point in a clear direction. ### Ukraine holds. And it strikes. From the first hours of the **Russian invasion** in **February 2022**, the world waited for **Ukraine**'s collapse. It never came. What came instead was an army that learns, adapts, and forges **new capabilities** at a speed **Moscow** never anticipated. What **June 2026** demonstrates is that this army not only holds its lines — it goes after the **enemy's arteries**. The bridges fall. **Russian logistics** bleed. And **Kyiv**, methodically, continues. **Zelensky** built an army that strikes with **surgical precision**, documents its results with rigor, and denies **Putin** the comfort of an inviolable **strategic depth**. That is the true victory of **June 2026**. *Five bridges destroyed in forty-eight hours. That is not a victory declaration. It is a declaration of intent. Ukraine is not retreating. It advances, even when the maps appear motionless. And this intent, demonstrated through facts, through confirmed damage, through bridges that will not be rebuilt tomorrow — is the most important thing to understand about this war right now.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Ukraine claims strikes on bridges, Russian command posts and logistics — Kyiv Independent, June 29, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-claims-strikes-on-bridges-russian-command-posts-and-logistics/) - [Ukrainian forces strike two Russian-controlled bridges — Ukrayinska Pravda, June 30, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/30/8041766/) - [Ukraine's General Staff reports strike on facility run by Russian space agency — Ukrayinska Pravda, July 1, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/01/8041887/) ### Secondary sources - [Russians build embankment bridge near Henichesk toward Crimea — Militarnyi, June 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russians-build-embankment-bridge-near-henichesk-toward-crimea/) - [Russia logistics under pressure — Ukraine — Militarnyi, June 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/articles/russia-logistics-under-pressure-ukraine/) - [Ukraine's naval drone Mobidik covers entire Black Sea — Euromaidanpress, June 30, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/30/1400-kilometers-of-range-six-configurations-one-armed-with-missiles-ukraines-mobidik-covers-entire-black-sea/) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/recit-ukraine-detruit-cinq-ponts-en-deux-jours-la-logistique-russe-saignee-a-bla