# NARRATIVE: Colonel Koziura — The SBU Traitor Sentenced to Life After a Ghost Operation

> On June 25, 2026, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv delivered its verdict in one of the most serious espionage cases of the war: Colonel Dmytro Koziura, former head of the counter-terrorism department at the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), sentenced to life in prison for treason. Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko himself announced the conviction, declaring: "Anyo

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/recit-le-colonel-koziura-traitre-du-sbu-condamne-a-perpetuite-apres-une-operatio

## Key takeaways

- He was recruited in 2018 and became an active agent in 2022, passing data on critical infrastructure, air defenses, SBU unit locations, and personal information on Ukraine's military and political leadership.
- The SBU ran a covert operation codenamed "Rat," keeping him under surveillance and using his channel to feed the FSB disinformation before he was detained in February 2025.
- The author argues the case shows the SBU's growing counter-intelligence capability, while acknowledging questions about its internal controls and the limits of its reforms.
- The life sentence was handed down under martial law treason provisions by an ordinary civil court, which the author presents as a deterrent and a sign of institutional resilience.
- The author states that the claimed casualties are a reasoned inference rather than an established fact, and notes his own pro-Ukrainian position.

## Introduction: a betrayal from within, in the depths of the war

### The man sentenced to life on June 25, 2026

On **June 25, 2026**, the **Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv** delivered its verdict in one of the most serious espionage cases of the war: **Colonel Dmytro Koziura**, former head of the counter-terrorism department at the **Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)**, sentenced to **life in prison** for treason. Prosecutor General **Ruslan Kravchenko** himself announced the conviction, declaring: **"Anyone who wore Ukrainian shoulder straps and began working for the FSB becomes an enemy of Ukraine."**

This is not the story of a desk officer who copied documents through negligence. It is the story of a senior officer recruited in **Vienna in 2018** by the **Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)**, who became an active agent in **2022**, and who passed **classified information on Ukrainian critical infrastructure**, air defenses, SBU unit locations, and personal data on Ukraine's military and political leadership for years. And who was caught by his own institution in an operation that deserves to be told.

### Operation "Rat" — a remarkably sophisticated counter-intelligence effort

The clandestine operation codenamed **"Rat"** by the **SBU** is the heart of this narrative. Rather than immediately arresting **Koziura** once his treason was detected, the **SBU** conducted a **long clandestine investigation**. During this period the double agent continued operating, unaware that he was under surveillance and that his contacts with his Russian handlers were being documented. More than that: the **SBU** used his access to the FSB to flood the Russian services with what it describes as a **"massive quantity of disinformation."** The Russians believed they were receiving valuable intelligence from their agent — they were in fact receiving carefully constructed information designed to lead them astray.

**Koziura** was finally detained in **February 2025**. **Telecommunications devices** and material evidence of his collaboration with the **FSB** were transmitted to the prosecution. The life sentence, pronounced under Ukrainian laws on treason under martial law, is the conclusion of a process that lasted years and illustrates the sophistication of Ukrainian counter-intelligence capabilities.

*Operation "Rat" is, in a certain way, more impressive than any drone strike. Identifying a traitor at the heart of the SBU, surveilling him for months, using him to disinform the FSB, then arresting him with irrefutable evidence: that is counter-intelligence of a sophistication that deserves recognition. In the shadows, Ukraine fights too.*

## The Vienna recruitment — a story of corruption under diplomatic cover

### Vienna, capital of intelligence

**Vienna** has been, since the Cold War, one of the world's spy capitals. Its Austrian neutrality, its international institutions and its diplomatic tradition have made it a prime playing field for the intelligence services of all nations. The Russian **FSB** maintains an active and sophisticated presence there. It was in this city that **Koziura** was approached and recruited in **2018**, well before the full-scale invasion of **2022**.

This recruitment in **2018** — four years before the start of total war — reveals that Russian services methodically planned their penetration of Ukrainian security structures well ahead of the invasion. **Koziura** was not an opportunist who decided to betray in the urgency of war — he had been placed as a sleeper agent in a key position, waiting for the moment when his access would become most valuable. That moment arrived in **2022**.

### The value of his information to Moscow

What exactly was **Koziura** transmitting to the **FSB**? The prosecutor general's dossier is eloquent: **data on critical infrastructure** (including the Ukrainian gas transport system), **consequences of Russian missile strikes on Kyiv** (allowing assessment of attack effectiveness and target adjustment), **SBU unit locations**, **air defense plans** for specific installations, **personal information on Ukraine's military and political leadership**.

That list is staggering. A head of the SBU counter-terrorism department has access to information that, in Russian hands, can directly cost lives — by allowing strikes to be refined, defenses to be circumvented, individuals to be targeted. The **monetary reward** he received from his Russian handlers — cited in the prosecutor's declarations — literally represents a **price tag on Ukrainian lives**.

*I read this list of transmitted information and I think of the victims of missile strikes on Kyiv. How many targets were refined thanks to Koziura's information? I cannot answer that question. But I cannot dismiss it either. Betrayal has human faces on both sides.*

## Counter-terrorism and treason — the irony of the function

### The paradox of the anti-terrorism chief turned spy

**Koziura** was not a low-ranking agent. He led the **SBU's counter-terrorism department** — the structure charged precisely with detecting and neutralizing threats from within, including foreign agents infiltrated into Ukrainian structures. In other words, he was theoretically one of the first lines of defense against exactly the type of agent he had himself become. That tragic irony illustrates a fundamental truth of intelligence: counter-espionage structures are prime targets for adversary services.

The fact that he could operate for so long without being detected — or at least without being immediately arrested — raises legitimate questions about the **SBU**'s internal control mechanisms. Those questions are not new: since **2022**, several cases of Russian agents infiltrated into the **SBU** have been made public. The organization has undertaken **internal purges and reforms** to strengthen its detection systems. Koziura's conviction is both proof that these systems eventually work and a reminder that they have their limits.

### The SBU confronting its own demons

The Ukrainian **SBU** is an heir of the **Soviet KGB** — with all that implies in institutional culture, methods and networks of connections that did not all disappear with the collapse of the **USSR**. Deprogramming that past is a long and difficult process. Since **2022**, SBU chief **Vasyl Maliuk** has undertaken a modernization of the organization, replacing figures whose loyalty was in doubt.

The **Koziura** case arrives in this context of difficult transformation. It illustrates that the work of purification is not complete — but it also demonstrates that the **SBU** is capable of conducting sophisticated counter-intelligence operations, such as Operation **"Rat,"** which turned the situation to Ukraine's advantage.

*The SBU has been building its legitimacy since 2022 under enemy fire — both literally (Russian strikes) and figuratively (its own internal traitors). That is a titanic institutional challenge. Koziura's conviction is a positive data point. I am careful not to conclude that it is a total victory.*

## Massive disinformation as a counter-measure — the genius of Operation Rat

### Using the traitor against his principal

The most remarkable decision in managing the **Koziura** case was to use his communication channel with the **FSB** to inject **massive disinformation**. This classic counter-intelligence technique — turning a detected agent into a disinformation channel before arrest — was applied successfully. The **FSB** believed it was receiving valuable intelligence from its agent embedded at the heart of the **SBU**. It was receiving carefully constructed information designed to mislead it.

The concrete impact of this disinformation on Russian operations is not publicly disclosed — and should not be. But the logic is clear: during the period when **Koziura** was transmitting disinformation, Russian forces acting on the basis of that information could make wrong decisions — sending missiles to incorrect targets, positioning forces based on a deliberately falsified picture of the Ukrainian situation.

### The Ukrainian counter-intelligence model

Operation **"Rat"** fits into a broader pattern of Ukrainian counter-intelligence sophistication. In **June 2026**, **Ukraine arrested eight people** accused of cheering on Russian strikes from inside the country and spying, according to data published by **Euromaidan Press** on **June 23**. These arrests show that surveillance and detection of Russian agents in Ukraine is an ongoing operation that produces regular results.

This internal intelligence work is essential to Ukraine's survival. A country at war must be able to protect its own institutions and leadership against enemy penetration. Koziura's conviction and the regular arrests of Russian agents demonstrate that, despite its historical challenges, the **SBU** is fulfilling this mission with increasing effectiveness.

*Eight arrests here, a traitor sentenced to life there: Ukraine is engaged in a shadow war as intense as the trench war. I have deep respect for the work of these Ukrainian counter-intelligence officers who operate without fanfare. Their contribution to their country's survival is immense and little recognized.*

## The life sentence — justice, deterrence, symbol

### The severity of the sentence as a message

The **life sentence** handed down against **Koziura** is not only an individual punishment — it is a **political and judicial message** addressed to the entire Ukrainian security services personnel. Prosecutor General **Kravchenko** said so explicitly: **"The only appropriate sentence for such individuals is the most severe."** In a Ukraine under martial law, where betrayal can directly cost lives, that severity is consistent with the legal framework and the reality of the conflict.

It is also a deterrence signal: any security services official tempted by an FSB approach must know that the sanction will be maximum and inevitable. In an environment where Russian services spend considerable resources recruiting agents in Ukrainian structures, that deterrence has real strategic value.

### Martial law and wartime justice

Koziura's conviction was pronounced under the specific provisions of treason under Ukrainian **martial law** — provisions that provide for harsher sentences than the normal framework, recognizing that in a country at war, treason has immediate and direct consequences on the lives of combatants and civilians. This exceptional jurisdiction is consistent with international practices in armed conflict.

The trial was held before the **Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv** — an ordinary civil court, not a military tribunal. That institutional choice underscores that **Ukraine** insists on maintaining the functioning of its civil judicial institutions even in wartime — an important indicator of the country's democratic resilience.

*A civil court sentencing a wartime traitor to life. That detail — the ordinary civil jurisdiction — strikes me. Ukraine maintains its institutions, even under bombs. That may be the most convincing proof that this country deserves to win this war.*

## The ghost operation: how the SBU traps its own traitors

### Infiltration techniques turned against the internal enemy

The arrest of **Colonel Koziura** following a meticulously planned **counter-intelligence operation** illustrates the growing sophistication of the **Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)** in managing internal threats. Intelligence agencies that discover a mole in their ranks face a classic dilemma: arrest immediately to limit damage, or let the operation run to trace the networks and maximize information obtained. The **SBU** chose the second option — a decision that requires nerves of steel and absolute confidence in the security of the counter-operation.

The **ghost operation** technique — feeding the mole carefully crafted false information designed to be credible while remaining traceable — is a counter-intelligence classic. But executing it successfully against an **experienced colonel** who knows perfectly the procedures and warning signs of a counter-operation is a considerable technical and psychological achievement. It involves not only controlling information shared with the target, but also managing the emotional and behavioral reactions of an entire team that must behave normally while knowing that one of their own is a traitor.

### What the Koziura case reveals about the vulnerability of intelligence services

The **Koziura** case is a reminder of an uncomfortable truth: **no intelligence service is completely impermeable to infiltration**. Successful mole recruitments — using ideology, financial lure, blackmail or emotional manipulation — are a permanent reality in the intelligence world. This is not a failure specific to the **SBU**: the most sophisticated Western agencies have experienced comparable betrayals.

What distinguishes a resilient agency from a vulnerable one is its ability to **detect the compromise** and manage it effectively once discovered. The **Koziura** case suggests that the **SBU** has developed, under the pressure of war, more robust internal detection mechanisms than before **2022**. Organizational paranoia — maintained at a functional level — is in this context an institutional virtue.

*An intelligence agency that detects its own moles, lets them operate under surveillance and traps them with false information. That is counter-intelligence at its most sophisticated. And the fact that the SBU accomplished it against a colonel from its own ranks says a great deal about the maturation of that service since 2022.*

## Treason in wartime: a crime of particular gravity

### Why life imprisonment for an intelligence officer

The **life sentence** for Colonel **Koziura** may surprise in a country whose legal system adheres to European human rights standards. But it is consistent with the specific gravity of treason in wartime. When a senior intelligence officer passes information to the enemy during an armed conflict, the consequences can be directly lethal: compromised operations, exposed agents, civilians targeted based on stolen intelligence.

**Ukrainian courts** have clearly chosen to treat this type of treason with the maximum firmness allowed by law. That firmness has a deterrent function: it sends a signal to any officer tempted by collaboration that the personal cost will be maximum and irreversible. In a context where **Russia** invests massively in recruiting sources within Ukrainian institutions — military, security, administrative — this deterrence is a component of national defense.

### The impact on institutional trust within the SBU

Every discovered mole case creates a period of **heightened institutional mistrust** — reinforced verification procedures, restricted access to sensitive information, security audits. These measures are necessary but costly in terms of operational efficiency. The internal investigations that follow a revelation like the Koziura case absorb precious resources for months.

But the cost of not reacting — allowing lax security practices to create other vulnerabilities — would be far higher. The **SBU** has chosen the painful but healthy path: handling the case with public transparency (within the limits of national security), exemplary punishment, and implementing the necessary hardening measures. That is the correct institutional response to a compromise — difficult in the short term, necessary in the long term.

*Colonel Koziura's treason cost lives and operations. The life sentence does not bring them back. But it sends a message to all those who might consider betrayal: the personal price is absolute. In a war where treason can cost hundreds of lives, that firmness is not vengeance — it is prevention.*

## The challenges of internal security in a state at war

### The systemic vulnerability of Ukrainian institutions

The **Koziura** case is not an isolated incident in the Ukrainian security landscape. Since **2022**, several officials from the **SBU**, **Defense**, the **Presidential Administration** and other institutions have been arrested and prosecuted for collaboration with Russian forces. These cases reveal the **depth of Russian penetration** into Ukrainian institutions — a legacy of decades of **FSB** and **GRU** influence in the Ukrainian state apparatus since independence.

This penetration is no surprise to intelligence specialists. Russian services invested massively in recruiting sources within Ukrainian institutions for decades, exploiting historical, cultural and economic ties between the two countries. The war has accelerated the **detection and elimination** of these networks — under the pressure of operational necessity — but has not been able to eliminate them entirely. Each arrest reveals the existence of networks but cannot guarantee their complete eradication.

### SBU reform: a permanent construction site

Since **2022**, the **SBU** has undertaken a deep reform of its internal security procedures, personnel verification practices and information compartmentalization protocols. These reforms — carried out under SBU chief **Vasyl Maliuk** since **2023** — aimed to break with Soviet-era practices and build an agency whose security culture is closer to **NATO** standards than post-Soviet practices.

That construction site is permanent and will never be entirely finished. A perfectly infiltration-proof intelligence agency does not exist. But an agency that continuously improves its practices, detects compromises more quickly, and manages betrayals more effectively — that is an achievable goal. The **Koziura** case and its resolution — the detection, the ghost operation, the trial and the conviction — suggest that the **SBU** is progressing in that direction.

*The SBU reforming itself, improving its mole detection, conducting sophisticated ghost operations. It is not the same agency as in 2022 — and that is not coincidental. Four years of war against an adversary that infiltrates you from within accelerates institutional learning in ways that peacetime would never have produced.*

## Conclusion: treason defeated, vigilance required

### A counter-intelligence victory, not the end of the threat

The conviction of **Colonel Koziura** is a significant victory for Ukrainian counter-intelligence. It closes the file on a particularly serious case of high-level penetration of the security services. But it does not end the threat. The **FSB** continues to seek to recruit agents in Ukraine — a reality the war has intensified, not diminished. Every official, every officer, every defense engineer is a potential target.

Operation **"Rat"** showed that the **SBU** is capable of detecting these agents and turning them with sophistication. But it also revealed that individuals like **Koziura** — highly placed, experienced, thoroughly familiar with the systems they are betraying — can operate for years before being neutralized. Permanent vigilance remains the only possible answer.

### The human cost of treason

Behind the trial, the decrees, the verdicts, there is a reality that legal language cannot entirely cover: Koziura's betrayal likely cost lives. The information he transmitted — on infrastructure, defenses, individuals — was used to target strikes, to identify operations to counter, to compromise individuals. Those lives lost are not named in the judgment. But they are present, in the watermark, behind every line of the indictment.

Koziura's **life sentence** is the recognition of that price. **Ruslan Kravchenko** said that **"the only appropriate sentence"** was the most severe. I share that view — not out of a desire for vengeance, but out of recognition that certain acts have consequences so vast that the judicial response must be commensurate with them.

*A ghost operation, a trapped mole, a life sentence. The Koziura case could have remained a footnote in SBU archives. Instead it illustrates how Ukraine defends itself from within — against its own traitors — with the same determination as against Russian forces from outside.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Former SBU counter-terrorism chief sentenced to life in prison for passing state secrets to Russia — June 25, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/former-sbu-counter-terrorism-chief-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-passing-state-secrets-to-russia/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukraine arrests eight people accused of cheering on Russian strikes from inside the country and spying — June 23, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/23/ukraine-arrests-eight-people-accused-of-cheering-on-russian-strikes-from-inside-the-country-and-spying/)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidan Press — Russo-Ukrainian war, day 1581 — June 24, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/24/russo-ukrainian-war-day-1581/)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — Russian attack in Zaporizhzhia: one killed, 15 injured including two children — June 28, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/28/8041471/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Russia's former soldiers may face a locked EU border — if France and Italy stop balking — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/russias-former-soldiers-may-face-a-locked-eu-border-if-france-and-italy-stop-balking/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukrainian missiles strike Volgograd arms plant making Iskander components — June 27, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/27/ukrainian-missiles-strike-volgograd-arms-plant-making-iskander-components/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/recit-le-colonel-koziura-traitre-du-sbu-condamne-a-perpetuite-apres-une-operatio