# NARRATIVE: The Night Ukraine Struck 38 Targets in Crimea — Radar, Energy, Logistics

> On the night of June 25, 2026, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces struck 38 Russian military targets on the occupied Crimean Peninsula. This is not an abstract number — it is the result of a planned operation, coordinated across multiple units, simultaneously targeting coastal radars, energy installations, fuel depots, and air defense systems. Commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi co

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/recit-la-nuit-ou-l-ukraine-a-frappe-38-cibles-en-crimee-radars-energie-logistiqu

## Introduction: The Night of June 25, 2026, in Occupied Crimea

### A Large-Scale Coordinated Operation

On the night of **June 25, 2026**, Ukraine's **Unmanned Systems Forces** struck **38 Russian military targets** on the occupied **Crimean Peninsula**. This is not an abstract number — it is the result of a planned operation, coordinated across multiple units, simultaneously targeting coastal radars, energy installations, fuel depots, and air defense systems. Commander **Robert "Madyar" Brovdi** confirmed the results.

That night, explosions were reported in the districts of **Simferopol, Pervomaiske, Krasnoperekopsk**, as well as in **Sevastopol, Yevpatoria, and Yalta**. **Widespread power outages** followed the strikes on thermal power plants. **Crimea**, which **Russia** has presented as its impregnable fortress since the illegal annexation of **2014**, once again shook under Ukrainian drones.

### The Units Involved: A Collective Strike Force

The operation involved the **1st Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces**, the **20th Separate Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces**, the **9th Kairos Battalion of the 414th Brigade "Madyar's Birds"**, the **Phoenix** unit, and the **412th Nemesis Brigade**. This distributed command architecture illustrates the operational maturity reached by Ukraine's drone forces in **2026**: not an improvised strike, but a structured multi-unit operation.

*Crimea shaking. The lights going out in Simferopol. This is not a metaphor — it is documented reality. And that reality says something essential: no territory occupied by force is permanently secured. Occupation is not possession.*

## The Coastal Radars Destroyed: MR-231, Neva-B, the Eyes of the Russian Fleet

### Striking the Black Sea Maritime Surveillance Network

Among the 38 targets that night, the coastal radars represent the most strategically significant strikes. The **MR-231 radar** in the locality of **Myrnyi** and two **Neva-B radar systems** in the localities of **Morske and Zaozerne** were hit. These systems form the maritime surveillance infrastructure enabling the Russian Black Sea Fleet to monitor coastal approaches and coordinate its naval operations.

The destruction of these coastal radars is not merely a tactical victory — it is a strategic degradation of **Russia's** ability to see what approaches the coastline. As **Ukraine** develops its own naval drone fleet in the Black Sea, the progressive blindness of Russian coastal defenses creates growing operational opportunities for subsequent maritime strikes.

### The Black Sea: A Theater That Is Turning

The context of this strike is essential: since **2022**, **Ukraine** has used naval drones in the Black Sea to strike Russian warships, forcing parts of the **Russian Black Sea Fleet** to relocate from occupied **Sevastopol** to ports further east. **Russia** began developing its own naval drones in **2024–2025**, equipped with smuggled **Starlink** terminals — the only long-range control system available after **SpaceX** blocked unauthorized access in **February 2026**. On **June 24, 2026**, the **Ukrainian Navy** and the **Defense Intelligence Directorate (HUR)** sank **three Russian naval drones** before they reached the shore.

*Russia using smuggled Starlink on its naval drones. SpaceX cutting access in February 2026. Ukraine sinking three Russian drones equipped with stolen terminals. This sequence is fascinating — it shows how civilian technology lies at the heart of modern warfare, and how digital infrastructure has become a battlefield.*

## Energy Infrastructure: Striking What Sustains the Occupation

### The Tavriyskaya Thermal Power Plant in Simferopol

The strike on the **Tavriyskaya thermal power plant in Simferopol**, capital of occupied **Crimea**, directly caused **widespread power outages** across the peninsula. A similar strike targeted a **330/220/110/35 kV electrical substation in Sevastopol** and another **330 kV Simferopolskaya substation**. These three simultaneous energy strikes aimed to paralyze the electrical systems that power not only military infrastructure, but also civilian life under occupation.

The strategy behind this approach is documented in statements by President **Zelensky** himself: Ukraine's operation on **Crimea** is **carefully calculated**, and if Western partners make the necessary decisions on arms deliveries, **Ukraine** will be able to create conditions in which **Russia** will be **forced to choose peace**. Energy strikes are part of this calculated pressure.

### Fuel Depots and Gas Compression Stations: Striking Logistics

An **oil depot in the town of Dzhankoi** and **two gas compression stations in the Zhuravlivka and Klyuchi areas** were also struck. These logistics strikes target the Russian military supply chain in **Crimea** — fuel for military vehicles, gas for base installations. Each strike on this logistical infrastructure increases the operational cost of maintaining Russian forces on the peninsula.

*Striking fuel at Dzhankoi, power at Simferopol, radar at Morske. This is not blind destruction — it is systemic surgery. Ukraine is learning to paralyze an occupation rather than simply strike it. That is an important doctrinal evolution.*

## Russian Air Defense in Crimea: The ZU-23-2 Destroyed

### An Anti-Aircraft Gun Eliminated Near Kumove

Among the 38 targets, an **anti-aircraft ZU-23-2 gun near the locality of Kumove** was destroyed. The **ZU-23-2** is a Soviet short-range air defense system widely used by **Russia** to counter low-altitude drones. Its destruction contributes to degrading local anti-drone defense, facilitating future Ukrainian operations on the peninsula.

In the weeks preceding this attack, **Ukraine's Security Service (SBU)** had already conducted strikes on the infrastructure of **Saky and Hvardiiske military airfields**, and destroyed **S-400 and Pantsir-S1** air defense systems near **Kerch**. The night of June 25 is part of a campaign of progressive, systematic degradation of Russian defenses in **Crimea**.

### The Strategy of Sustained Pressure

**Crimea** is not merely a political symbol — it is a logistical and military hub that allows **Russia** to project power toward **southern Ukraine**. Every strike on its energy, logistical, and defense infrastructure increases the cost of maintaining Russian military presence on the peninsula. This is not a strategy to retake **Crimea** tomorrow — it is a strategy to make its occupation progressively untenable.

*The illegally annexed Crimea will be remembered as Putin's foundational strategic mistake. He thought he was buying power — he bought a vulnerability. A peninsula Ukraine can strike in all its dimensions, every night, with drones that cost less than a car.*

## The Railway Bridge Over the North Crimean Canal: It No Longer Exists

### The Destruction of the Rail Logistics Corridor

On **June 23, 2026**, two days before the 38-target attack, **Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SOF)** announced that the **railway bridge over the North Crimean Canal** — located near the village of **Rozdolne** — **no longer exists**. The operation was conducted in coordination with **members of the SOF underground resistance movement** on the peninsula. The SOF published images showing the bridge attack.

This bridge was part of a transport corridor used to move **cargo, resources, and military supplies in two directions**: from **Russia** through **Crimea** to support forces operating in the southern direction, and toward **occupied territories of southern Ukraine**, in the **Kherson** region and along the **Azov Sea** coast. Occupation authorities immediately suspended all passenger train services within **Crimea**.

### Rail: The Backbone of Russian Military Logistics

Ukraine's SOF described rail as **the crucial backbone of Russian military logistics**. The destruction of the **Rozdolne** bridge — described as **the first railway bridge eliminated in Crimea** — significantly complicates the rail movement of troops, ammunition, and fuel. The movement of goods and personnel toward **central and western Crimea** and toward the land corridor leading to **occupied southern Ukraine** becomes, according to the SOF, **considerably more complicated**.

*The first railway bridge in Crimea that no longer exists. I remember images of the Kerch bridge struck in 2022. Every bridge that falls is a symbol and an operational reality. Crimea is being isolated, centimeter by centimeter, strike after strike.*

## 60 Targets: The Context of the Broader Campaign

### 38 Targets in One Night, 60 in a Few Days

The operation of **June 25, 2026** on 38 targets fits into a broader framework. According to Ukraine's Special Operations Forces, their operations during the **June 2026** period struck **60 Russian targets in temporarily occupied territories, including Crimea**. These targets include, beyond the 38 already mentioned, **oil storage tanks at the Kerch thermal power plant** and a **"Western Crimea" electrical substation** in the village of **Kariyerne**.

This accumulation of strikes on **Crimea** in June is not random. It is part of a deliberate strategy of maximum pressure on the peninsula's military infrastructure, at the very moment when **Ukraine** is in a phase of increasing its long-range strike capability. **June 2026** represented approximately **35% of all successful strikes on Russian territory** for the entire year.

### The Internal Resistance Operation

The mention of **coordination with the SOF underground resistance movement** for the destruction of the **Rozdolne** bridge is significant. It indicates the existence of an active resistance network on the occupied peninsula, capable of providing intelligence, identifying targets, and facilitating special operations. This human intelligence dimension in **Crimea** is a Ukrainian asset that purely military analyses tend to underestimate.

*A resistance movement operating inside a Crimea under occupation since 2014. These people risk their lives under a regime that criminalizes any Ukrainian expression. Their existence, twelve years after the illegal annexation, is itself a form of silent and enduring victory.*

## Power Outages: When the War Enters the Homes of Crimeans

### An Inevitable Civilian Impact Under Occupation

The widespread power outages that followed the strikes on **Crimean** thermal power plants affected the civilian population of the peninsula. This is a war reality that **Ukraine** acknowledges without evasion: striking military energy infrastructure entails consequences for civilians living under occupation. Ukrainian doctrine seeks to minimize these effects, but cannot eliminate them entirely.

The ethical question is real and deserves to be asked plainly. **Ukraine** strikes infrastructure that serves both military and civilian purposes — that is the nature of power plants and railways. These strikes are legally defensible in the context of a military occupation, but they carry a human cost for Crimeans who are not combatants. That cost must be acknowledged, even by those who support Ukrainian operations.

### The Psychological Pressure on Populations Under Occupation

Beyond the material effects, repeated strikes on **Crimea** have a documented psychological effect on populations under occupation. They signal that **Russian occupation does not provide protection** — that essential infrastructure can be struck, that life under occupation is not the stability promised by the **Kremlin**. For those who have doubts about the occupation regime, these strikes constitute a powerful political signal.

*I do not minimize the human cost of power outages for Crimeans. But I ask the question: who is responsible for their situation? Russia, which illegally annexed their territory in 2014. Ukraine is striking military targets on a land that legally belongs to it. Primary responsibility lies in Moscow.*

## The Black Sea Fleet Cornered: From Sevastopol to Eastern Ports

### A Naval Retreat Forced by Drones

The progressive destruction of naval and defense infrastructure in **Crimea** has already produced a major strategic effect: **significant parts of the Russian Black Sea Fleet** have been forced to relocate from occupied **Sevastopol** to ports further east — in **Russia** proper. This movement represents a Ukrainian strategic victory: the Russian fleet has lost its main Black Sea base, reduced its footprint in **Crimea**, and now operates under considerable logistical constraints.

**Ukraine** achieved this naval retreat without a conventional navy — solely with naval drones and missiles. This is a demonstration of asymmetric power that surprised military analysts. **Russia** is trying to replicate this capability with its own naval drones, but faces the communications problem: it must use smuggled **Starlink** terminals, which **SpaceX** cut off in **February 2026** at **Kyiv's** request.

### Three Russian Naval Drones Sunk Before Reaching the Shore

On **June 24, 2026**, the **Ukrainian Navy** and the **Defense Intelligence Directorate (HUR)** destroyed **three Russian naval drones** before they reached the Ukrainian coast. These drones had been detected near the **Kinburn Spit**, south of **Ochakiv**, along the **Mykolaiv-Kherson** coastline. They were equipped with **Starlink** terminals obtained through third-party supply chains, despite the official block on service in **Russia**.

*Three Russian drones that wanted to strike Ukrainian shores, sunk before getting there. The Black Sea is no longer the Russian lake it was supposed to become. It is now a battlefield where Ukraine has seized the initiative — and has no intention of yielding it.*

## Madyar and the "Madyar's Birds": The Human Face of Ukraine's Drone War

### Robert Brovdi, "Madyar": The Commander Who Confirms Results

The confirmation of 38 targets struck came from **Robert "Madyar" Brovdi**, a commander whose units — **"Madyar's Birds"** — are among the most widely covered in Ukraine's drone war. His brigade, the **414th**, is known for its innovative operations that have been documented and analyzed by military experts worldwide. His public communication of operational results is an integral part of Ukraine's strategy of selective transparency.

Ukrainian military communication on strike results — with precise place names, types of systems destroyed, units involved — stands in sharp contrast to Russian opacity. This selective transparency serves multiple purposes: sustaining domestic morale, informing partners, and signaling to **Russia** that its losses are documented and known. This is an informational dimension of the war that **Ukraine** handles better than its adversary.

### The 412th Nemesis Brigade: The Other Force in the Shadows

The **412th Nemesis Brigade**, also involved in the June 25 operation, is less widely covered but just as operationally active. Its participation in a multi-target strike operation on **Crimea** illustrates the depth of Ukraine's drone force — not one or two elite units, but an ecosystem of specialized brigades, each with their own tactics and capabilities, able to operate in coordination.

*These brigades carry names — Madyar's Birds, Nemesis, Phoenix. These are not marketing labels. They are military communities that have built their identity, their tactics, and their reputation in the fire of this war. They are the human faces of Ukraine's drone revolution.*

## Zelensky's Signal: Crimea as a Lever for Peace

### If the West Delivers the Weapons, Russia Will Be Forced to Choose

President **Zelensky's** statement about operations in **Crimea** is remarkable for its strategic content. He did not speak of immediately retaking the peninsula — he said that if Western partners make the **necessary decisions on arms deliveries**, **Ukraine** will be able to create conditions in which **Russia** will be **forced to choose peace**. This formulation is calculated.

It means that **Zelensky** is using **Crimea** not as an objective for immediate reconquest, but as a negotiating lever. By making the occupation progressively more costly, more difficult, more untenable, he is creating conditions for pressure that could force **Moscow** to a negotiating table with revised positions. This is a strategy of graduated coercion — documented and coherent.

### Crimea in Ukraine's Strategic Horizon

**Crimea** remains **Ukraine's** ultimate strategic objective. Its return under Ukrainian sovereignty is a non-negotiable requirement of international law — the peninsula was illegally annexed in **2014** in violation of the **United Nations Charter**. Ukrainian strikes do not seek to destroy the peninsula — they seek to make its occupation so costly that **Moscow** eventually calculates the real price.

*12 years after the illegal annexation. Crimea is still Ukrainian in law. And it is increasingly Ukrainian in fact, strike after strike. Zelensky does not speak of immediate victory — he speaks of making the status quo untenable. That is long, hard, and just strategy.*

## The Russian Narrative of an Impregnable Crimea: Progressive Collapse

### A Kerch Bridge That Has Already Burned, Defenses That Crumble

**Russia** had presented **Crimea** as an impregnable fortress since **2014**: the Black Sea fleet, **S-400** systems deployed across the peninsula, the **Kerch** bridge as a symbol of irreversible integration. That narrative has collapsed in stages. The **Kerch** bridge has already been struck. The **S-400 and Pantsir-S1** were destroyed by the **SBU**. The fleet has retreated. And now, the first railway bridge in **Crimea** **no longer exists**.

Each element of this supposedly impregnable fortress crumbles under Ukraine's repeated blows. **Kremlin** propaganda can dispute the figures, minimize the effects, refute the images. But the power outages in **Simferopol**, the suspended trains, the fuel depots burning in **Dzhankoi** are experienced by the inhabitants of the peninsula, who know what their own eyes show them.

### The Legal Dimension: An Illegal Occupation Under Constant Pressure

The legal framework bears restating: **Crimea** is internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, illegally occupied since **2014**. **Ukraine** is conducting military operations on its own territory against an occupying power. International humanitarian law applies, but within the framework of an illegal occupation that the international community — with the exception of a few authoritarian regimes — has condemned.

*I want to state this clearly: striking Crimea means striking a part of Ukrainian territory illegally occupied. This is not aggression — it is a claim. International law is not an academic abstraction. It is what separates legitimate war from barbarism. Ukraine is on the right side of that line.*

## The Impact on the Black Sea and the Maritime Logistics Corridor

### Dzhankoi: The Logistical Hub at the Heart of the Peninsula

The strike on the **oil depot in Dzhankoi** is strategically significant. **Dzhankoi** is a key rail and logistics hub in **northern Crimea** — it is through this city that fuel and equipment supplies from **Russia** via the **Kerch** bridge pass. Strike on its oil depot, strike on the **Rozdolne** railway bridge nearby, strikes on gas compression stations — this is coherent logistical pressure on the northern corridor of the peninsula.

The **gas compression stations at Zhuravlivka and Klyuchi** feed the peninsula's gas networks, including certain military installations. Their temporary or permanent disruption reduces the capacity of Russian military bases to maintain normal operations. This is, again, systemic pressure — not spectacular, but cumulatively effective.

### The Black Sea as a Threatened Lifeline

The **Black Sea** is the maritime supply route alternative for **Crimea**, alongside the land route via the **Kerch** bridge. The pressure **Ukraine** simultaneously exerts on rail, road, and port infrastructure of the peninsula creates a situation of progressive siege. **Crimea** remains connected to **Russia**, but its supply lines are increasingly vulnerable, increasingly costly to maintain.

*A progressive siege, without trench lines. This is a form of warfare few military theorists had predicted. Striking radar, bridges, fuel, power — not in a single offensive, but in continuous pressure over months. Ukraine is inventing something new.*

## What June 2026 Reveals About Ukraine's Strategy

### The Doctrinal Coherence Behind the Strikes

Taken in isolation, each strike on **Crimea** may appear tactical. Taken together — the **Rozdolne** bridge on the 23rd, the 38 targets on the 25th, 60 targets over the entire period — they reveal a **coherent doctrine of progressive degradation**. **Ukraine** is not seeking a spectacular theatrical blow. It is seeking to **accumulate irreparable damage** on Russian defense systems and military logistics in **Crimea**, until maintaining the occupation becomes prohibitively costly.

This strategy of **graduated coercion** is documented in **Zelensky's** speeches and the communications of the **SOF and Drone Forces**. It requires strategic patience and operational continuity that **Ukraine** has managed to maintain despite the enormous pressures of simultaneous ground warfare in the **Donbas** and on other sectors of the front.

### The West Must Provide the Means for This Doctrine

This doctrine can only succeed if the **West** continues to supply the weapons and ammunition that make it possible. Ukrainian drones are manufactured in **Ukraine**, but they depend on a supply chain of electronic components, financing, and technologies that involves dozens of partners. If Western aid dries up, if deliveries slow down, the doctrine of graduated degradation loses its fuel.

*38 targets in one night. 60 in a few days. A railway bridge that no longer exists. And Crimea, fractured, under pressure, trying to survive an occupation that its own infrastructure can no longer guarantee. Ukraine strikes true. The West must provide the means to continue.*

## Conclusion: The Narrative of a Crimea Russia Can No Longer Protect

### 38 Targets, One Bridge Destroyed, and a Political Message

The night of **June 25, 2026** in **Crimea** is not merely a narrative of military strikes. It is the narrative of the progressive collapse of a myth: that of the impregnable fortress. The destroyed radars no longer see. The destroyed substations no longer power. The **Rozdolne** bridge no longer exists. And **Zelensky** says, clearly: if the **West** provides the necessary weapons, **Russia** will be forced to choose peace.

### What This Narrative Says About the War in 2026

In **June 2026**, **Ukraine** crossed a threshold in its strike capacity against **Crimea**. It is no longer striking merely to cause damage — it strikes according to a coherent doctrine, with precise strategic objectives, in coordination between specialized units, with the support of internal resistance networks. This is a different war from that of **2022**. And if the **West** understands this moment and responds to it, it could prove decisive.

*This narrative does not end on June 25, 2026. It continues every night, in every strike, in every drone launched from Ukrainian lines toward occupied Crimea. I write it from far away. They live this story in the dark, under sirens, with the conviction that their land belongs to them. That is what gives them the strength to continue.*

## Final Conclusion: Crimea Will Resist the Occupation

### The Pressure That Makes the Status Quo Untenable

**Crimea** is Ukrainian in law. It has been illegally occupied since **2014**. Every Ukrainian strike on its military infrastructure is an act of legitimate reclamation on its own territory. The accumulation of these strikes — radar, bridges, fuel, energy, air defense — creates pressure that, over the long term, will make the status quo untenable for **Russia**.

### 38 in One Night, Thousands More to Come

If **38 targets in a single night**, if a railway bridge destroyed in a matter of days, if three Russian naval drones sunk before reaching the shore — these are the results of a single week of **June 2026**, the pressure is set to intensify. **Ukraine** produces more, strikes further, coordinates better. **Crimea** is no longer impregnable. And **Moscow** knows it.

*Crimea will return to Ukraine. I don't know when. I don't know how. But the 38 targets of that June 2026 night, the Rozdolne bridge that no longer exists, the naval drones sunk before reaching the shore — all of this says that the pressure is real, constant, and will not stop. Ukraine has been waiting too long to let go.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [RBC Ukraine — Ukraine's drone forces reveal results of overnight strikes on Crimea — June 25, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine-s-drone-forces-reveal-results-of-1782405819.html)

- [Euronews — Ukraine says key Crimea railway bridge no longer exists after drone strikes — June 23, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/23/ukraine-says-key-crimea-rail-bridge-no-longer-exists-after-drone-strikes)

- [Euromaidan Press — Russia's sea drones run on smuggled Starlink, Ukraine sank three before they reached shore — June 24, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/24/russias-sea-drones-run-on-smuggled-starlink-ukraine-sank-three-before-they-reached-shore/)

### Secondary sources

- [United24 Media — Ukraine's drone swarms are overloading Russian air defense, June sets record for deep strikes — June 26, 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraines-drone-swarms-are-overloading-russian-air-defense-june-sets-record-for-deep-strikes-20199)

- [Kyiv Independent — Ongoing coverage of Ukrainian military operations — June 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/)

- [ISW — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/recit-la-nuit-ou-l-ukraine-a-frappe-38-cibles-en-crimee-radars-energie-logistiqu