# PROFILE: Oil's risk premium, the silent hostage of the Strait of Hormuz

> Some economic indicators speak more bluntly than any diplomatic statement, and the price of a barrel of Brent crude has been one of them since the start of the Strait of Hormuz crisis in July 2026.

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/profile-oil-s-risk-premium-the-silent-hostage-of-the-strait-of-hormuz

## Introduction: a number that tells a war without naming it

### The barrel as a thermometer for a regional crisis

Some economic indicators speak more bluntly than any diplomatic statement, and the price of a **barrel of Brent** crude has been one of them since the start of the **Strait of Hormuz crisis** in **July 2026**. This figure, which climbs and falls with the rhythm of closure announcements, strikes, and ceasefires, acts as a real-time portrait of **market** anxiety over the **escalation** between **Tehran**, **Washington**, and the **Gulf** monarchies.

According to **Reuters**, the price of **Brent** reached roughly **$78.80** a barrel at the height of tensions in early **July 2026**, a rise directly tied to fears of a prolonged closure of the **Strait of Hormuz**, the maritime chokepoint through which roughly a fifth of the world's oil passes each day. This is not a financial abstraction confined to trading floors: it is a number that directly affects the price of gasoline, heating, and transport for hundreds of millions of **consumers** around the world.

### A risk premium with its own history

What is called oil's **geopolitical risk premium** is not a new concept, but it has taken on particular resonance since Iran threatened, then partially carried out, a closure of the **Strait of Hormuz** in mid-**July 2026**. This premium represents the portion of the barrel price that does not reflect actual oil supply and demand, but **market** fear that a crucial **supply** line could be cut overnight by a state actor determined to make the world pay the economic price of its own geopolitical frustrations.

Understanding this premium means understanding just how much global energy stability remains hostage to a single regional actor, capable of rattling international financial **markets** with a single official statement, without even needing to fully carry out its threat.

*A regime that can drive up the price of gasoline across the entire planet with a single official statement holds a power to cause harm wildly disproportionate to its real economic weight, and it is precisely this imbalance the West must correct over the long run.*

## The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, an announced shock

### July 12, the day Tehran closed the world's chokepoint

Iran's declaration closing the **Strait of Hormuz**, which occurred on **July 12, 2026**, according to several converging sources including the **Times of Israel**, immediately sent oil prices surging across global stock exchanges. This announcement, coming the day after a wave of massive American strikes on roughly **140 targets** linked to the **IRGC**, illustrated the logic of graduated retaliation that has characterized this entire **escalation** between **Tehran** and the American-Israeli coalition.

American **CENTCOM** quickly disputed the full effectiveness of this closure, stating that maritime traffic remained possible under reinforced military escort, but this official pushback was not enough to immediately calm **market** nervousness, which continued pricing in a significant **risk premium** for several consecutive days.

### A fifth of the world's oil at stake every day

The **Strait of Hormuz** is not just any maritime passage: according to data widely cited by energy analysts, roughly a fifth of global oil consumption passes through this narrow chokepoint separating **Iran** from the Arabian Peninsula every day. Any lasting disruption of this flow would represent a supply shock of a magnitude rarely seen since the great oil crises of the twentieth century.

It is this global structural dependency on a single passage point that explains why the mere threat of closure, even partially denied by **CENTCOM**, was enough to trigger such significant price movements in futures oil **markets** within hours of the Iranian announcement.

*That the entire world remains at the mercy of a single maritime chokepoint, partly controllable by a regime as unpredictable as Tehran's, should push the West to seriously accelerate diversifying its energy supply routes.*

## The rapid deflation of the risk premium

### A market that quickly absorbed the initial shock

Despite the apparent gravity of the **crisis**, several market analyses, including one published by **Investing.com**, documented a surprising phenomenon: the **risk premium** tied to the **Strait of Hormuz** deflated relatively quickly after the initial peak, as **traders** gradually priced in the idea that a total and lasting closure of the strait remained unlikely, given the American military presence in the region and the economic risks such a closure would pose to Iran itself.

This rapid deflation illustrates a well-documented feature of modern oil **markets**: their ability to price in new information very quickly, including the conviction that the major military powers present in the **Gulf** would not let a total, prolonged closure of the strait materialize without a determined response.

### A possible return to a global supply glut

According to **Investing.com**, this deflation of the **risk premium** comes as global oil **markets** head toward what several analysts describe as a supply glut, a situation where global production exceeds real demand, which exerts structural downward pressure on prices regardless of the one-off geopolitical tensions observed in the **Gulf**.

This overlap between an acute **geopolitical crisis** and a structural downward price trend, driven by a global supply glut, explains the particular volatility observed in oil **markets** since the crisis began, oscillating between brief panic spikes and quick returns to price levels closer to long-term economic fundamentals.

*Watching markets calm down this quickly after an official closure of the Strait of Hormuz says a lot about how little credibility traders now assign to Tehran's repeated threats, a regime that may have cried wolf too often to still be taken fully seriously.*

## The US Energy Information Administration faces the crisis

### Forecasts regularly adjusted amid instability

The **Energy Information Administration** (**EIA**), the official US government statistical agency on energy matters, has published several releases detailing how its price forecasts have shifted amid persistent instability in the **Gulf**. These regular adjustments, documented on the agency's official site, reflect the very real difficulty even government experts face in confidently predicting the trajectory of a crisis as volatile as the one gripping the **Strait of Hormuz**.

This forecasting difficulty, publicly acknowledged by an agency as respected as the **EIA**, usefully reminds us that no one, not even the best government experts in the energy sector, can predict with absolute certainty how a geopolitical **crisis** as unpredictable as the one triggered by successive Iranian **provocations** in the region will unfold.

### Heightened vigilance over global strategic reserves

Facing this persistent uncertainty, several Western governments have stepped up vigilance over the level of their **strategic oil reserves**, a **energy security** mechanism designed precisely to absorb temporary **supply** shocks like the one a prolonged closure of the **Strait of Hormuz** could cause. This heightened vigilance illustrates Western awareness of the real risk, even as **markets** themselves quickly reduced their panic premium.

This duality between government institutional caution and the relative calm of financial **markets** reflects two different logics in the face of risk: governments prepare for the worst-case scenario, while **traders** bet on the most likely scenario, generally more moderate than the worst possible hypothesis.

*This Western institutional caution, even when markets appear to calm down, is exactly the right posture to take toward an Iranian regime that has repeatedly shown its ability to turn an apparently contained threat into a very real crisis overnight.*

## The direct impact on Western consumers

### The pump price, the first barometer of the crisis for the public

Beyond trading floors and expert reports, it is the price at the pump that constitutes, for the vast majority of Western citizens, the first tangible indicator of this **Gulf crisis**. Every rise in **Brent** ripples through, with a lag of a few days to a few weeks depending on national **markets**, into the price of gasoline and diesel paid by drivers in **North America** and **Europe**.

This direct pass-through turns a distant geopolitical **crisis**, which might seem abstract to many Western citizens, into a concrete and immediately perceptible economic reality, with every stop at the pump becoming a silent reminder of the fragility of global energy **supply** in the face of Iranian **provocations** in the **Strait of Hormuz**.

### An additional inflationary pressure on already fragile economies

This rise in the **price of oil** comes at a time when several Western economies are already fighting persistent **inflation** that has lasted for years, making this additional pressure particularly unwelcome for governments trying to stabilize their populations' purchasing power. A prolonged rise in energy prices could seriously complicate the disinflation efforts undertaken by several Western central banks in recent years.

This domestic economic dimension, often overshadowed by strictly geopolitical coverage of the **crisis**, deserves to be highlighted: every decision made in **Tehran** has concrete, measurable repercussions on Western household budgets, far from the **Gulf** military theater where this crisis is actually playing out.

*It is easy to forget, while following the military maps of the Strait of Hormuz, that every decision made by the Iranian regime translates concretely into a few extra or fewer dollars on an ordinary family's gas bill in North America or Europe.*

## Shipping companies face the insurance risk

### Insurance premiums soaring for vessels transiting the Gulf

Beyond the **price of oil** alone, the **Strait of Hormuz crisis** has triggered a significant rise in insurance premiums required for commercial vessels transiting this high-risk zone, an added cost that mechanically ripples through to the final cost of maritime freight transport, well beyond the **oil** sector alone. This rise in **insurance** costs directly reflects the updated war risk assessment made by **markets** specializing in marine insurance.

This **insurance** dimension, less visible to the public than the simple barrel price, is nonetheless just as telling an indicator of how seriously the **crisis** is perceived by shipping industry professionals whose job is precisely to objectively assess real operational risks in conflict zones.

### Shipowners forced to rethink their trade routes

Several major international shipping companies have had to, according to information widely reported in specialized business press, consider alternative routes partially avoiding the **Strait of Hormuz**, even accepting longer delivery times and higher transport costs. This costly, complex logistical reorganization concretely illustrates the global economic impact of a regional **crisis** that extends far beyond the **Middle East** alone.

This forced logistical adaptation demonstrates that the **Strait of Hormuz crisis** is not limited to a regional military confrontation, but is durably reshaping global **supply** chains, with economic repercussions likely to persist well after the military conflict itself is resolved.

*Every shipowner forced to route around the Strait of Hormuz is concretely paying the price of Tehran's repeated provocations, a global logistics bill that should weigh heavily in any international assessment of the real cost of Iranian aggression.*

## OPEC+'s strategic role in stabilizing prices

### Spare production capacity ready to be mobilized in a shock

Facing this persistent instability, several **OPEC+** members, notably **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates**, hold significant spare production capacity that could be quickly mobilized to offset a possible lasting disruption of Iranian exports or a prolonged closure of the **Strait of Hormuz**. This spare capacity constitutes an important safety net for global **markets** in the face of the current regional instability.

This offsetting capacity, documented for years by specialized energy analysts, partly explains why **markets** did not panic lastingly despite the apparent gravity of the **crisis**: the conviction that other **Gulf** producers could quickly fill any supply gap caused by Iranian **provocations** structurally reassures **traders** over the medium term.

### A delicate position for Iran's Arab neighbors

This offsetting capacity nonetheless places the **Gulf** monarchies in a delicate strategic position, caught between their economic interest in stabilizing global **markets** and their direct geographic **vulnerability** to Iranian retaliation, as demonstrated by the documented missile strikes against **Qatar**, **Bahrain**, and **Kuwait** in early **July 2026**.

This dual constraint, economic and security-related, illustrates the complexity of the **Gulf** monarchies' position in this **crisis**, forced to navigate between their long-standing strategic alliance with **Washington** and their direct geographic exposure to an increasingly unpredictable Iranian neighbor.

*The Gulf monarchies are today paying, on their own soil, the price of decades of regional tensions they did not always seek to provoke themselves, a geographic injustice that deserves Western solidarity rather than indifference.*

## Historical precedents of Iran-linked oil shocks

### An economic memory going back several decades

The current **crisis** is not the first time Iran has disrupted global oil **markets** through its actions or statements in the **Gulf**. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq **war** of the 1980s, the country has regularly been at the center of major oil shocks that have marked global economic history, a historical continuity that fuels the structural nervousness of markets every time **Tehran** raises the possibility of disrupting the **Strait of Hormuz**.

This historical memory, deeply embedded in the collective psychology of oil **markets**, partly explains the immediate price reactivity as soon as the first Iranian closure statements emerge, even before any real operational confirmation of that closure by independent military sources.

### Lessons markets have learned over the decades

But this same historical memory has also, over time, taught **markets** to distinguish Iranian threats truly likely to materialize lastingly from those that amount more to political rhetoric aimed at a domestic or regional audience. This more refined analytical capacity, developed over decades of experience with repeated Iranian **provocations**, explains the relatively quick deflation of the **risk premium** observed after the initial panic peak.

This analytical sophistication of modern **markets**, able to distinguish rhetoric from operational reality far more quickly than forty years ago, is itself notable progress in the collective management of geopolitical risk linked to the **Middle East**.

*That markets have learned, over forty years of repeated Iranian provocations, to tell bluff from real threat should not reassure the West, but rather worry it about how many crises it took to build this analytical sophistication.*

## Western energy diversification, a structural response

### The United States, now less vulnerable than before

Unlike the historical oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s, the **United States** is approaching the current **Strait of Hormuz crisis** with structurally reduced **vulnerability**, thanks to the growth of its own shale oil production over the past fifteen years, which has considerably reduced its historical dependence on **Middle East** imports. This American energy transformation is an important stabilizing factor in the current equation.

This reduced American dependence does not, however, mean total immunity from global oil shocks, since the price of **Brent**, the global benchmark, continues to indirectly influence the price paid by American **consumers**, even when the physical oil imported does not come directly from the Persian **Gulf**.

### Europe, still more exposed than the United States

**Europe**, by contrast, remains structurally more exposed than the **United States** to any lasting disruption of **Middle East** supplies, a **vulnerability** that already manifested painfully during the energy crisis caused by the Russian invasion of **Ukraine** in 2022. This double vulnerability, Russian and now Iranian, forces European governments to urgently consider accelerating their own **energy diversification**.

This dual European exposure, both to Russian **aggression** against **Ukraine** and now to Iranian **provocations** in the **Gulf**, illustrates just how fragmented Western **energy security** remains in the face of an axis of hostile regimes, **Russia** and **Iran**, that share a common interest in maintaining this structural Western **vulnerability**.

*Europe can no longer afford to be doubly hostage, to Putin's Russia for its gas and to Iran for its oil, this double dependency is a strategic flaw that Moscow and Tehran have each exploited in their own way for years.*

## Broader financial markets, between nervousness and resilience

### Global stock markets that absorbed the shock without major collapse

Beyond the **oil** sector alone, the world's major stock exchanges have broadly absorbed the shock of this **Gulf crisis** without major systemic collapse, a resilience that contrasts with some of the catastrophic scenarios raised by a few analysts at the most acute moment of the crisis in early **July 2026**. This relative resilience of broader financial **markets** reflects a persistent degree of confidence in the major powers' ability to contain the **escalation** before it degenerates into a full regional conflict.

This resilience should not, however, be mistaken for indifference: sectors directly exposed to **Gulf** geopolitical risk, notably shipping, insurance, and energy, continued to show markedly above-average volatility throughout the acute phase of the **crisis**.

### Defense stocks, the paradoxical big winners of this crisis

Unsurprisingly, stocks linked to the Western defense industry recorded notable performance during this period of heightened **Gulf** tension, a classic phenomenon observed during every major geopolitical **escalation** since the start of Russia's **war** in **Ukraine**. This market dynamic, however morally uncomfortable it may be to point out, simply reflects the rational logic of **markets** anticipating increased demand for Western military equipment.

This paradoxical performance of defense stocks illustrates, once again, how financial **markets** translate into purely economic terms geopolitical realities that are otherwise far more tragic for the populations directly exposed to the human consequences of these successive conflicts.

*That defense stocks rise every time Tehran or Moscow triggers a new crisis is not a scandal to denounce, it is simply the rational price markets assign to the Western need to rearm in the face of an increasingly dangerous world.*

## Comparison with Russia's war in Ukraine

### Two energy crises dangerously overlapping

The **Strait of Hormuz** oil **crisis** is not occurring in a geopolitical vacuum: it overlaps with more than four years of Russian **aggression** against **Ukraine**, a conflict that has already profoundly upended global energy **markets** since 2022, particularly in **Europe**, which was forced to rapidly turn away from the Russian gas it had massively imported before the invasion.

This overlap of two major energy crises, one tied to Russian **aggression** against **Kyiv** and the other to Iranian **provocations** in the **Gulf**, illustrates the persistent structural fragility of global **energy security** in the face of an axis of hostile authoritarian regimes that share, without necessarily coordinating directly, a common interest in keeping the West under constant economic pressure.

### A shared indirect beneficiary of both crises

It should be noted that **Moscow**, already economically weakened by years of Western **sanctions** tied to its **aggression** against **Ukraine**, draws an indirect benefit from any rise in the global price of oil caused by the Iranian **crisis**, since **Russia** itself remains a major oil exporter, despite sanctions that partially limit its traditional commercial outlets in **Europe**.

This convergence of economic interests between two regimes hostile to the West, without any direct coordination necessarily established between them, illustrates the complexity of a world order in which every regional provocation indirectly benefits the entire authoritarian axis, to the detriment of Western economies and their regional allies.

*Every extra dollar Putin's Russia earns thanks to the Iranian Gulf crisis is one more dollar available to finance its war against Ukraine, this indirect but real link should weigh more heavily in Western analysis of this oil crisis.*

## Scenarios analysts envision for coming months

### A gradual stabilization scenario favored by the majority

The majority of energy analysts consulted across specialized business press favor, at this stage of the crisis, a scenario of gradual stabilization of **oil prices**, supported by sufficient spare production capacity within **OPEC+** and by the conviction that neither **Tehran** nor **Washington** genuinely wants a total, lasting closure of the **Strait of Hormuz**, whose negative economic consequences would also hit the Iranian economy itself.

This stabilization scenario, if confirmed in the coming months, would allow a gradual return to price levels closer to structural economic fundamentals, marked by a global supply glut documented by several independent energy agencies, including the **EIA** itself.

### An alternative relapse scenario in case of new escalation

An alternative scenario, less likely but still considered by a more pessimistic minority of analysts, foresees a rapid relapse in prices to acute crisis levels in the event of a new direct military escalation between **Tehran** and the American-Israeli coalition, particularly if new strikes were to directly target Iranian oil infrastructure or commercial vessels transiting the **Strait of Hormuz**.

This persistent uncertainty between two radically different scenarios illustrates well the fundamentally unpredictable nature of this crisis, where every decision made in **Tehran**, **Washington**, or **Jerusalem** can tip global oil markets one way or the other within a matter of hours.

*Living suspended between two such radically opposed scenarios, stabilization or brutal relapse, hinging on a single unpredictable Iranian decision, shows just how much the global economy remains hostage to a regime that has never demonstrated consistent strategic rationality.*

## Structural lessons for global energy security

### A dependency that calls for a long-term response

Beyond the immediate management of this one-off oil crisis, several energy analysts are calling for broader structural lessons about the global economy's persistent dependence on a single maritime chokepoint as vulnerable to the provocations of a single regional actor as the **Strait of Hormuz**. This structural dependency, documented for decades, has nevertheless never been truly resolved through massive investment in alternative supply routes.

This lack of structural resolution, despite decades of repeated warnings about the vulnerability of the **Strait of Hormuz**, illustrates the limits of long-term energy planning in the face of short-term economic pressures that have historically favored the lowest immediate cost over long-term structural resilience.

### An opportunity to rethink Western energy resilience

This crisis could nonetheless become a positive opportunity to seriously rethink long-term Western energy resilience, by accelerating investment in renewable energy, in diversifying oil supply routes, and in strengthening national strategic reserves against increasingly frequent and unpredictable geopolitical crises.

It is this costly but necessary structural lesson that should now guide Western energy policy in the years ahead, rather than a simple return to old habits once the current **Strait of Hormuz** crisis subsides, as has unfortunately often happened after previous historical oil shocks.

*Every Gulf-linked oil crisis should, in theory, accelerate the Western energy transition, but history teaches us that these good resolutions often fade as soon as prices come back down, a collective amnesia the West can no longer afford in such an unstable world.*

## What this crisis reveals about the fragility of the global system

### One regional actor, a disproportionate global economic impact

What this oil crisis reveals, beyond the raw numbers of **Brent** and insurance premiums, is the striking disproportion between Iran's real economic weight in the global economy and its capacity for harm on global oil markets. A regime whose national economy remains weakened by decades of international sanctions nonetheless retains, thanks to its strategic geographic position on the **Strait of Hormuz**, a power to disrupt the global economy wildly disproportionate to its real economic weight.

This disproportion, documented throughout this crisis, illustrates the structural limits of a global economic order that remains, despite decades of globalization and apparent diversification, structurally vulnerable to the decisions of a small number of geographically strategic actors.

### A vulnerability that calls for permanent Western vigilance

This structural vulnerability, revealed with particular clarity by the current crisis, calls for permanent Western vigilance, not only on the military and diplomatic level, but also on the strictly economic and energy level, where persistent dependence on single maritime chokepoints continues to represent a major systemic risk to global economic stability.

It is this permanent vigilance, combining geopolitical **firmness** with structural economic **diversification**, that must now guide the Western response to this type of crisis, rather than a strictly reactive management that simply waits for the next Iranian provocation before acting.

*The world can no longer afford to live suspended on the goodwill of a single hostile regime controlling a single maritime chokepoint, this systemic fragility documented by the current Strait of Hormuz crisis must become the starting point for a genuine long-term Western strategy.*

This same logic of structural vulnerability can be observed, in a different form, in the West's continued support for **Ukraine** against Russian aggression: every dollar diverted to managing the **Gulf** crisis is a dollar potentially delayed in military financing meant for **Kyiv**, a strategic trade-off **Moscow** is watching with obvious interest.

*Every Western resource diverted to the Iranian Gulf crisis is one less resource to support Ukraine against Putin, and this is precisely the cynical calculation authoritarian regimes hope to see repeated with every new regional crisis.*

## Conclusion: a barrel price that will keep telling this story

### What the documented numbers allow us to state today

At the end of this economic profile, a precise factual finding emerges: the price of **Brent**, having reached roughly **$78.80** a barrel at the height of the crisis according to **Reuters**, quickly priced in and then partially unwound a significant risk premium tied to the announced closure of the **Strait of Hormuz** on **July 12, 2026**, against a backdrop of a global market already heading toward a structural supply glut according to several specialized analyses, including one from **Investing.com**.

This price movement, however technical it may appear, actually tells the complete human and geopolitical story of this crisis: the initial fear of a major shock, the market's quick adjustment in the face of a deterrent American military presence in the region, and the persistence of a structural global vulnerability to a single maritime chokepoint that **Tehran** continues to treat as a legitimate lever of pressure.

### A warning that extends far beyond the oil question alone

This portrait of the oil price, the silent hostage of this regional crisis, is a warning that extends far beyond energy alone: it reminds us that Western economic security remains fundamentally tied to the geopolitical stability of distant regions, partly controlled by hostile regimes whose unilateral decisions can, within a matter of hours, directly affect the wallets of hundreds of millions of Western citizens.

It is this fundamental lesson, documented figure by figure throughout this **Strait of Hormuz** crisis, that must now inform every long-term Western energy security strategy, well after the price of **Brent** stops making the daily headlines of the international business press.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Reuters, Iran targets sites in Bahrain and Kuwait after wave of US strikes — July 8, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-targets-sites-bahrain-kuwait-after-wave-us-strikes-2026-07-08/)

- [Energy Information Administration, official release on oil markets — 2026](https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases/press586.php)

- [Times of Israel, US strikes Iran again after IRGC attacks ship in Hormuz — July 12, 2026](https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-strikes-iran-again-after-irgc-attacks-ship-in-hormuz-and-declares-strait-closed-until-further-notice/amp/)

### Secondary sources

- [Investing.com, crude oil's Hormuz risk premium is unwinding into a supply glut — 2026](https://www.investing.com/analysis/crude-oils-hormuz-risk-premium-is-unwinding-into-a-supply-glut-200683251)

- [The Guardian, return to pre-crisis oil and gas supplies still months away — June 15, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/jun/15/return-pre-crisis-oil-gas-supplies-months-away-iran-strait-of-hormuz)

- [Gulf News, crude oil extends post-war slump as Iran-Israel tensions ease — 2026](https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/crude-oil-extends-post-war-slump-as-iran-israel-tensions-ease-1.2000000)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/profile-oil-s-risk-premium-the-silent-hostage-of-the-strait-of-hormuz