# PROFILE: Trump facing the midterms — a polarizing president whose polls are slipping

> In June 2026, less than five months from the November midterms, the political portrait of Donald Trump is that of a man

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-06-26
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-trump-face-aux-midterms-un-president-populaire-divise-qui-flanche-dans

## Key takeaways

- Decision Desk HQ reports Trump's approval ticked up slightly in June after the Iranian MOU, but remains in a range historically linked to significant midterm losses.
- Tucker Carlson broke with the GOP on June 22, 2026, refusing to back Republicans in the midterms, citing disappointment with the party's direction under Trump.
- According to the Boston Globe, Trump is increasingly at odds with Republican senators over the defense budget, Reconciliation 3, DOGE cuts, and judicial nominations.
- A CBO projection of a $3 trillion deficit over 10 years from the OBBA is being used heavily by Democrats in the midterm debate.
- The author cites Polymarket's "Power Balance 2026" market, where some Republican-unfavorable scenarios trade at meaningful probabilities.

## Introduction: America in June 2026 takes stock of its president

### A mixed record weighing on the ballot box

In June 2026, less than five months from the **November midterms**, the political portrait of **Donald Trump** is that of a man caught between his proclaimed successes — the Iranian MOU, pressure on China, apparent support for **Zelensky** — and a stubborn electoral reality: **his approval rating remains low**, despite fluctuations. According to **Decision Desk HQ**, his approval ticked up slightly in June, but still sits in ranges that have historically led to significant legislative losses during midterms.

This is not the portrait of a beaten man. **Trump** is resilient, inventive as a communicator, capable of political surprises. But it is the portrait of a president whose exceptional aura from 2024 — triumphant return, victory against Biden — is beginning to collide with the hard constraints of actual governance. Campaign promises are expensive to keep. Institutional realities push back. And the American electorate, in all its complexity, is starting to sort rhetoric from results.

### The midterms as a historic verdict

The **November 2026 midterms** are the next major democratic test of Trumpist America. Historically, the sitting president's party loses seats in midterms — a near-universal pattern in American political history. The real question is not whether Republicans will lose seats, but how many. **And if that "how many" is large enough to cost Republicans the House**, **Trump**'s legislative agenda — reconciliations, SAVE America Act, judicial nominations — runs into serious trouble for the final two years of his term.

Prediction markets, such as **Polymarket**, offer an interesting lens on this uncertainty. Certain scenarios — including a **Democratic Senate and a Republican House** — are being modeled and trading at prices that signal a non-negligible probability. None of this is certain. But it is serious enough that the White House is racing to advance its legislative agenda before November.

*The portrait of an 80-year-old president facing his first midterms of a second term — it is a delicate exercise. Trump is both more experienced and older than in 2016. More skilled in some domains, more predictable in his rhetorical reflexes. His approval remains low — but it often has been, and he has often defied the predictions. An honest portraitist must acknowledge that uncertainty.*

## The approval rating: between a slight uptick and a glass ceiling

### The numbers worrying the White House

Trump's electoral portrait in June 2026 is drawn by the polls — and the polls are not flattering. **Decision Desk HQ notes a slight rise in his approval** following the Iranian MOU, but specifies it remains in a range historically associated with midterm losses. Other polls cited by **Daily Kos** raise the question of "how low can Trump's approval go" — a formulation that captures the anxiety within Republican ranks.

The factors weighing on **Trump**'s popularity are multiple and well-documented: DOGE cuts hitting federal workers in Republican districts, defense spending deepening a deficit that American households are starting to feel in mortgage rates and borrowing costs, immigration policies generating difficult imagery, and a perception that **the administration is perpetually in chaos mode** rather than stable governance mode.

### The successes that should have boosted the polls

What is striking in the June 2026 analysis is that several developments which should naturally have improved **Trump**'s popularity **have not produced the expected effect on his approval numbers**. The Iranian MOU — a significant diplomatic breakthrough — generated only a temporary and limited uptick. Verbal support for **Zelensky** at the **G7** is welcomed in Western capitals but receives mixed coverage in American conservative media. Pressure on China through the BIOSECURE Act satisfies the hawks but worries business circles dependent on Chinese supply chains.

This disconnect between objective achievements and popular perception reveals a structural ceiling of Trumpist politics: **foreign policy successes do not automatically translate into electoral gains**. American voters primarily vote on the domestic economy, cost of living, employment, and everyday security. Iranian accords and **G7** summits are abstractions for most voters in Indiana or Wisconsin.

*Diplomatic successes that fail to move the polls — that is the curse of any foreign policy in a democracy. The median voter does not cast a ballot over the Iranian MOU or arms licenses for Ukraine. He votes on grocery prices, his mortgage rate, and whether his kids can find a job. And on those fronts, the Trump administration has not yet delivered the transformative results promised in 2024.*

## Tucker Carlson breaks with the GOP: a warning shot

### The fracture in the Trumpist coalition

On **June 22, 2026**, a piece of news shocked American conservative circles: **Tucker Carlson announces he is breaking with the GOP** and refuses to support Republicans in the 2026 midterms. According to **IBTimes UK**, Carlson — one of America's most influential conservative commentators and former **star anchor of Fox News** — cites his disappointment with the direction of the Republican Party under **Trump**.

This symbolic gesture is politically significant on multiple levels. First, **Tucker Carlson represents a substantial portion of the populist and isolationist electorate** that backed **Trump** in 2024. His break signals a fragmentation of the Trumpist coalition — voters who cast ballots for Trump but who may not follow every Republican candidate in the midterms. Second, his voice in alternative media is immensely powerful: if Carlson mobilizes his audiences against certain Republican candidates, the impact on competitive districts could be meaningful.

### Why Carlson broke — and what it says about the GOP

The exact reasons for Carlson's break with the GOP are complex and only partially public. He takes particular aim at the party's **military spending and interventionist positions** — a grievance that exposes the fundamental tension within the Trumpist coalition between the isolationists who wanted an America withdrawing from the world and the neoconservatives who have always wanted a dominant America on the international stage.

This tension is precisely what the **G7** at Versailles brought into the open: **Trump** supporting **Zelensky**, pressing Russia, engaging in active international diplomacy — that is exactly what Carlson and the Trumpist isolationists did not want. **The 2024 coalition contained contradictions that governance is now making visible.** And the November midterms may deliver its first electoral reckoning.

*Tucker Carlson slamming the door on the GOP — it is a sign that the Trumpist coalition was not as monolithic as it appeared in 2024. Populist isolationists and traditional Republicans voted together against Biden. Now that governing is required, the contradictions of that marriage of convenience are surfacing. And Carlson, with his finely tuned media instincts, sniffed out the crack before anyone else.*

## Trump and Republican senators: a relationship growing more strained

### The Republican Senate asserting its independence

Any portrait of **Trump** in June 2026 is incomplete without noting the **growing tension between the White House and Republican senators**. According to the **Boston Globe**, Trump is increasingly at odds with his own senators on several major files: the defense budget, Reconciliation 3, DOGE cuts to agencies whose jobs are located in Republican states, and some contested judicial nominations.

This senatorial assertion of independence is a politically significant development. Republican senators, who are watching their own re-election prospects in 2026 or 2028, are calculating that unconditional loyalty to **Trump** can become a liability in certain states. **Senators like Cornyn, Tillis, Collins, or Murkowski no longer hesitate to publicly voice reservations** about certain Trumpist policies — a notable evolution compared to the near-unanimous Republican senatorial compliance of 2025.

### The midterms and the every-man-for-himself logic

As the midterms approach, the political calculus grows more complex for Republican candidates. In strongly Trumpist districts or states, distancing from **Trump** is electoral suicide. In competitive districts or states, being too closely identified with Trump can drive away moderate voters — the proverbial "educated suburbs" that have swung in different directions across recent electoral cycles.

According to **TaxProf Blog**'s analysis, the administration's fiscal agenda — $4 trillion in debt-financed tax cuts — is particularly difficult to defend in states where lingering inflation and elevated mortgage rates are squeezing middle-class households. **Voting for tax cuts that primarily benefit the wealthy in a record-deficit context** is not the easiest position to defend before voters struggling with their own financial pressures.

*Republican senators asserting their independence from Trump — I see in it a sign of relative institutional health. Political parties that permit no internal debate, that punish any deviation from the official line, drift toward authoritarian formations, not democratic ones. A GOP that is beginning to debate again — even at the margins and behind closed doors — is a GOP that maintains some internal pluralism. It is thin, but it is something.*

## The CBO, the deficit, and electoral anxiety

### A $3 trillion deficit as a political millstone

The **CBO** report projecting a **$3 trillion deficit over 10 years** from the OBBA has become a political projectile in the midterms debate. Democrats are deploying it massively in their communications — it is the perfect argument to paint Republicans as fiscal recklessness in disguise. And unlike other complex economic arguments, the $3 trillion figure is blunt enough to land with voters who never read CBO reports.

The Republican counter-argument — that economic growth unlocked by the tax cuts will offset the deficit — struggles to persuade in a context where **lingering inflation remains persistent, interest rates elevated, and the visible cost of federal borrowing showing up in household budgets**. The trickle-down dividend is not yet visible in middle-class American wallets. And that is precisely the kind of gap between promise and reality that punishes governments in midterm elections.

### Polymarket as a political thermometer

Prediction markets — and **Polymarket** in particular — offer a complementary reading alongside traditional polls. The "**Power Balance 2026**" market models several scenarios: Republican House and **Senate**, Democratic House and Republican Senate, Republican House and Democratic Senate, or full Democratic control. In June 2026, some of the Republican-unfavorable scenarios are trading at probabilities that have attracted the attention of strategists on both sides.

Prediction markets are not infallible — they have registered significant historical errors. But **they aggregate dispersed information across the population** and constitute a complementary signal to traditional polling. When prediction markets start pricing in a Democratic House scenario at meaningful odds, it means enough participants believe those scenarios carry real probability. That is a signal the White House cannot dismiss.

*Polymarket and the midterms — I watch these markets with fascination and healthy skepticism. They fumbled 2024 in the early hours before correcting. But over several previous cycles they captured trends that traditional polling underestimated. This is not an oracle. It is one tool among many. And right now, that tool is saying Republicans have a serious problem at the House level.*

## The Trumpist base: loyal but not large enough to win everything

### The paradox of the elusive majority

One of the constants of Trumpist politics is the **extraordinary loyalty of his base**. Roughly 35 to 38 percent of Americans appear immune to bad news about **Trump** — his approval never really sinks below that floor, whatever happens. It is a solid, mobilized, passionate base. But in a democracy where elections are won with majorities, **35 percent is never enough**.

**Trump**'s victories — in 2016 and 2024 — rested on his ability to attract voters beyond his base: moderate Republicans who overlooked his excesses, disaffected Democrats who wanted change, apolitical citizens his personality brought to the polls. These additional voters are exactly those whom June 2026 polling shows to be most dissatisfied with the administration's performance — and most likely to vote Democratic or stay home in November.

### Trumpist communication: always at 100 percent

Facing these challenges, **Trump** does not change his communicational register. He keeps going on Twitter/X, at rallies, with spectacular announcements. **Communication at 100 percent** — everything is a victory, everything is tremendous, everything is the best ever seen in history — is his signature. It galvanizes the base. It leaves independents skeptical. And according to **The Express**, at a recent Pennsylvania rally, cognitive stumbles were noted by observers — moments of confusion feeding questions about his health that we addressed in column n545.

In this context, the question of the **durability of the Trump brand** for the midterms arises. The personal identification with the Republican Party — **Trump** is the GOP, the GOP is Trump — can become a double-edged sword. Trump's victories become Republican victories. But his mistakes, his scandals, his unpopular moments also become burdens that every Republican candidate must carry in every district across the country.

*Trump's 100-percent communication — it is both his strength and his ceiling. Galvanizing the troops with communicative enthusiasm is essential in modern politics. But when every speech is "the greatest speech ever given" and every result is "extraordinary," voters start recalibrating their skepticism filter. And midterms are precisely the moment when that recalibration happens.*

## Outlook: What can Democrats realistically hope for?

### The conditions for a Democratic House takeback

For Democrats to recapture the House in November 2026, several conditions must align. First, high turnout from their electorate — particularly young adults, suburban women, and minority communities. Second, solid performance in roughly twenty competitive districts concentrated in pivot states: Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, Nevada, Georgia. Finally, an economic message that resonates with independent voters' concerns about the deficit, prices, and cuts to services.

The structural conditions appear partially favorable. **Trump**'s low approval, the projected deficit, the difficult imagery from ICE policies, the DOGE cuts hitting services that Republicans themselves use — all of this is fuel for Democratic mobilization. But **Democrats have their own liabilities**: still-fuzzy economic messaging, a progressive flank too radical for independent voters, and an absence of a nationally galvanizing figure comparable to Trump in terms of media impact.

### The third-party wild card

One must not overlook the potential role of third-party actors in this picture. The break of **Tucker Carlson with the GOP**, the frustrations of various electoral segments, the emergence of independent candidates in certain districts — all of this complicates the electoral equations. In a tight race in a competitive district, a third-party candidate capturing 3 to 5 percent of the vote can decide the outcome. And in 2026, the conditions for such candidates to emerge appear particularly favorable in **November 2026**.

Senator **Kennedy** and other Republican figures pushing Reconciliation 3.0 at maximum speed are clearly aware that the midterms represent a legislative hard deadline. **"Time is running out"** — that formulation says everything about the urgency Republicans feel. An urgency that is also, in its own way, an admission that their electoral position is more fragile than the public rhetoric of confidence lets on.

## America in 2026 as a mirror: society, fractures, and challenges

### The cultural fracture that runs deeper than Trump

Behind the polls and electoral strategies lies a sociological reality that the 2026 midterms will photograph: **America is profoundly divided**, not only politically but culturally, economically, geographically. **Trump**'s approval rating reflects this division — a base that approves of him quasi-unconditionally, an opposition that disapproves just as absolutely, and a floating center that decides electoral outcomes. This floating center is not stable — it shifts with the issues of the moment.

In June 2026, this floating center appears preoccupied by concrete economic concerns: **lingering inflation** keeping prices elevated, **mortgage rates** making homeownership unattainable for young families, **healthcare costs** continuing to climb, and **record deficits** feeding anxiety about the country's financial stability. These are not ideological concerns — they are daily realities that **the Iranian G7 and judicial nominations do not erase**.

### The midterms as a test of democratic maturity

The midterms are also a test of **American democratic maturity**. To what extent are voters capable of separating the administration's real performance from the political rhetoric surrounding it? To what extent can complex policies be evaluated objectively — such as the long-term effects of tax cuts or DOGE cuts — rather than voting on images and symbols? To what extent does **disinformation and media manipulation** distort collective judgment?

These questions have no simple answers. But they are at the heart of what the 2026 midterms will reveal about the state of American democracy. **An electorate that holds accountable based on real performance rather than perceived performance** is a functioning democracy. An electorate manipulated by narratives disconnected from reality is a dysfunctional one. And between the two lies the entire range of what America in 2026 actually is.

*Lingering inflation and mortgage rates as electoral thermometers — I keep returning to this because that is where everything is decided. The voter in Indiana does not cast a ballot on the Iranian MOU. He votes on what he pays at the grocery store and the cost of refinancing his mortgage. And if Trump cannot deliver good news on those fronts before November, all his G7 diplomatic victories will not compensate for that deficit at the ballot box.**American democratic maturity — I still believe in it, even when it is tested. Americans have a long tradition of checking excessive power, calling overbearing majorities to account, correcting by vote what institutions cannot otherwise correct. The midterms are that corrective mechanism. Imperfect, loud, slow — but real. And that is why they matter, for America and for the world watching it.**This portrait of Trump at the midpoint of his second term leaves me with one dominant impression: a man who has seized important diplomatic moments, but whose domestic political base is eroding under structural forces he does not entirely control. The midterms will tell us whether that erosion is sufficient to shift the balance. In the meantime, Zelensky keeps fighting — and he is the one history will remember, whatever happens in November.*

## Conclusion: Trump halfway between geopolitical successes and electoral fragilities

### A portrait running on two different speeds

The portrait of **Trump** in June 2026 is that of a man operating on two separate tracks. **On the international stage** — the Iranian MOU, support for **Zelensky**, pressure on China — he has landed moves that would have seemed improbable six months ago. This is the dimension where his capacity to surprise, to shift positions rapidly, to close deals plays in his favor.

**On the domestic stage** — approval ratings, midterms, tensions with Republican senators, the Carlson break — he is navigating choppier waters. The hard choices of governance — between cutting taxes and cutting the deficit, between expelling immigrants and respecting the rule of law, between slashing headcounts and maintaining capabilities — are showing their political costs in the polls. And November 2026 will be the first real electoral verdict since his return to the White House.

### What the midterms will say about America

The November 2026 midterms will not be just a verdict on **Trump**. They will be a verdict on **the state of American democracy** — its capacity to function, to self-correct, to offer genuine alternation of power. If Republicans hold both chambers, Trump governs with expanded freedom for the final two years. If Democrats retake the House, it is divided government — imperfect, contentious, but functional by American constitutional standards.

For Ukraine, for **NATO**, for all the allies watching Washington, the question is the same: **what America will emerge from the 2026 midterms?** An America that continues to support Ukraine and confront Russia? An America that pivots toward domestic withdrawal? The November verdict will answer those questions — not definitively, but significantly. And that is why these midterms count beyond American borders.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Decision Desk HQ — Trump approval rating, midterms June 2026 — June 19, 2026](https://decisiondeskhq.substack.com/p/trumps-approval-rating-midterms-june-2026)

- [IBTimes UK — Tucker Carlson leaves the GOP, refuses to back Republicans in midterms — June 22, 2026](https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/tucker-carlson-leaves-gop-2026-1804381)

- [CNN — Analysis of Trump's electoral message, 2026 midterms — June 24, 2026](https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/24/politics/trump-midterm-election-message)

### Secondary sources

- [Boston Globe — Trump at odds with Republican senators, midterms — June 19, 2026](https://www.bostonglobe.com/2026/06/19/nation/trump-senate-republicans-midterms/)

- [Daily Kos — Trump approval rating sinking — June 22, 2026](https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2026/6/22/800059284/news/trump-sinking-job-approval-rating-poll)

- [TaxProf Blog — Congressional tax agenda stalls, midterms approaching — June 20, 2026](https://taxprofblog.aals.org/2026/06/20/congressional-tax-agenda-stalls-as-trump-continues-to-use-administrative-levers/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-trump-face-aux-midterms-un-president-populaire-divise-qui-flanche-dans