# PORTRAIT: the chip war intensifies between Washington and Beijing

> A legislative proposal. A targeted response. A budget that confirms priorities. This portrait traces the technological escalation between the United States and China over semiconductors, a file that on its own…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-the-chip-war-intensifies-between-washington-and-beijing

## Introduction

A **legislative proposal**. A **targeted response**. A **budget** that confirms priorities. This portrait traces the **technological escalation** between the United States and China over semiconductors, a **file** that on its own illustrates the scale of the current **Indo-Pacific strategic competition**. The United States proposed the **MATCH Act** to restrict the export of chipmaking equipment to China, according to **Reuters**, in an April 3, 2026 dispatch.

China retaliated by adding **ten American companies** to its export control list on June 22, 2026, according to **Modern Diplomacy**, in an analysis published July 12, 2026. *A bill proposed on one side, a list published on the other: the chip war is now being fought in reciprocal acts, not speeches.*

These **reciprocal measures** fit within a broader **strategic competition** in the Indo-Pacific region, according to Modern Diplomacy. China's **defense budget** for 2026, up 6.9%, also reflects a confirmed **technological priority**, according to Reuters, in a March 10, 2026 dispatch. This **portrait** documents both sides of this **confrontation**.

## The MATCH Act, an American legislative offensive

### A proposal targeting equipment, not just chips

The **MATCH Act**, proposed by American lawmakers, specifically targets the export of chipmaking equipment to China, according to Reuters, an approach that targets the **upstream** of the production chain rather than finished products alone, a strategy several analysts consider more effective at limiting **China's ability** to develop its own advanced manufacturing capabilities.

This approach targeting **manufacturing equipment** rather than the finished product reflects an evolution in American technology restriction doctrine, which has learned from the **limits of previous sanctions** focused solely on final products, more easily circumvented through **indirect trade channels** than specialized industrial equipment.

### The companies directly affected by this proposal

This legislative proposal directly concerns companies like **ASML**, the Dutch leader in **lithography equipment**, as well as several other Western suppliers specializing in semiconductor manufacturing, according to Reuters, a scope that illustrates the extent of the **international coordination** Washington is seeking for this initiative.

*Washington cannot win this war alone; it needs Amsterdam and Tokyo.* This international coordination sought by **American lawmakers** requires buy-in from key technology allies, notably the **Netherlands** and **Japan**, whose companies dominate certain critical segments of the advanced semiconductor production chain, buy-in that is not guaranteed and depends on complex **diplomatic negotiations**.

## China's June 22 response, ten companies targeted

### An export control list targeting specific American companies

China retaliated by adding **ten American companies** to its export control list on June 22, 2026, according to Modern Diplomacy, a **reciprocal measure** that illustrates China's determination not to passively absorb American restrictions without a proportionate response in the same **technological and commercial register**.

This Chinese control list, though less publicly detailed than the American proposal, is a **clear signal** of calibrated retaliation, with Beijing seeking to demonstrate its **capacity** to directly affect specific American **commercial interests** rather than responding with less targeted **general measures**.

### What this response reveals about Chinese retaliation strategy

This Chinese response reveals a **proportionate retaliation strategy**, where **Beijing** answers each American measure with a **specific countermeasure** rather than a general escalation, an approach aimed at keeping a **negotiating channel** open while demonstrating **real resolve** against **Western restrictions**.

*Beijing does not answer force with anger; it answers with calculation.* This strategy of **calibrated retaliation** fits within a broader Chinese doctrine of graduated response to Western pressure, already observed on other regional files, where Beijing systematically favors **sufficiently firm measures** without triggering a complete rupture of bilateral economic relations.

## Semiconductors, the heart of this strategic confrontation

### An industry that has become central to U.S.-China rivalry

**Semiconductors** have become, in recent years, one of the most central files in the U.S.-China rivalry, this industry directly shaping the future **military**, economic, and technological capabilities of both powers, which explains the **growing intensity** of restriction and retaliation measures observed over several consecutive years.

*A tiny chip now decides balances of power between continents.* This centrality of **semiconductors** in the strategic rivalry stems from their cross-cutting role, these components being **essential** not only to advanced military technologies, but also to the entire modern **digital economy**, which multiplies the economic and security stakes tied to this particular technological file.

### Why manufacturing equipment became the critical point

Semiconductor **manufacturing equipment** has become the critical point of this confrontation, since it is the **hardest link** to reproduce independently, a small number of **Western and Japanese companies** dominating this highly specialized technological segment, which gives this equipment a **strategic value** disproportionate to its relative market size.

This industrial concentration among a few **specialized equipment makers** explains why **American restrictions** have gradually refocused on this upstream part of the production chain, rather than on finished chips themselves, a restriction strategy harder for China to circumvent despite its **technological self-sufficiency efforts**.

## ASML and Western equipment makers, caught in the crossfire

### An uncomfortable position between the Chinese market and American pressure

**ASML** and other Western equipment makers find themselves in a particularly uncomfortable position, torn between the **commercial importance** of the Chinese market, long one of their main outlets, and the **growing pressure** exerted by the American government to restrict their exports to that same **strategically sensitive market**.

*Companies are already paying the price of a war they did not declare.* This uncomfortable position illustrates the **real economic costs** of the U.S.-China technological confrontation for Western companies themselves, who must now navigate between **commercial imperatives** and increasingly **strict** and potentially contradictory national regulatory constraints.

### The financial consequences of these restrictions for the industry

These restrictions, if fully implemented through the MATCH Act, could cause **significant financial losses** for these Western equipment makers, with the Chinese market representing a **substantial share** of their overall revenue, a loss of outlets these companies will not necessarily be able to quickly offset in other **international markets**.

This prospect of **financial losses** partly explains the resistance of some Western industrial players to restrictions deemed too strict, an **industry lobbying effort** that complicates the diplomatic negotiations needed to ensure effective **international coordination** around the MATCH Act proposed by Washington.

## China's defense budget, a confirmed technological priority

### A budget that accompanies the quest for technological self-sufficiency

China's 2026 defense budget, up **6.9%** according to Reuters, confirms the priority Beijing places on the technological modernization of its armed forces, a **priority** that fits directly within the context of the **chip war**, with China seeking to reduce its **dependence** on foreign technologies subject to growing restrictions.

*A military budget that invests in chips admits what it fears.* This **technological priority** confirmed by the Chinese defense budget illustrates the convergence between military and technological files in Beijing's overall strategy, where **self-sufficiency in semiconductors** becomes a national security issue on par with more traditional naval or air modernization.

### The budget slowdown as context for this priority

This slowdown in budget growth, the smallest since 2021 according to Reuters, has not prevented the maintenance of this **technological priority**, which suggests **Beijing** is reallocating available resources toward files deemed most strategically critical, at the potential expense of other, less prioritized **military spending lines** in the current context.

This reallocation toward **technological priorities** confirms the scale of the stakes the chip war represents for Beijing, which appears ready to accept **budget trade-offs** elsewhere to maintain its technological modernization effort against **growing American restrictions**.

## China's semiconductor self-sufficiency, a structural response

### A self-sufficiency effort documented by several analyses

China has developed a significant effort toward **technological self-sufficiency** in semiconductors, according to Modern Diplomacy, an effort aimed at structurally reducing its **dependence** on Western equipment and technologies subject to growing restrictions, notably those envisioned by the **MATCH Act** currently under discussion.

*You don't close a forty-year industrial gap in a few budget cycles.* This Chinese **technological self-sufficiency** effort, though progressing, still faces significant technical challenges, as reproducing the most advanced **manufacturing capabilities** requires decades of accumulated industrial expertise China cannot instantly replicate despite **massive investments**.

### The current limits of this quest for self-sufficiency

These current **technical limits** of Chinese self-sufficiency in semiconductors partly explain why **American restrictions** retain real effectiveness in the short and medium term, even though this effectiveness could gradually erode if **Chinese investments** in this field continue to intensify over the years.

This gradual erosion of the **Western technological advantage** is one of the central stakes of this file for American decision-makers and their allies, who must calibrate their restrictions to maximize their effectiveness before China manages to significantly close this **technological gap**.

## Historical precedents for technology wars

### Earlier technological rivalries, partly comparable

This U.S.-China technological confrontation recalls, in certain respects, other **historical technological rivalries** between great powers, where **control of critical technologies** became a major national security issue, though the specific context of modern semiconductors has no **exact equivalent** among these historical precedents.

*The history of technology embargoes rarely teaches the same lesson twice.* These **historical precedents**, despite their limits of comparability, offer a **useful framework** for anticipating the possible evolution of this chip war, notably on the question of the **durability of technological advantages** against determined catch-up efforts by the power targeted by **restrictions**.

### What these precedents suggest about the possible outcome

These precedents suggest that **technological restrictions**, however effective in the short term, historically tend to accelerate the targeted power's **self-sufficiency efforts** rather than durably discourage them, a lesson **American decision-makers** will need to factor into their future calibration of the MATCH Act and similar measures.

This historical dynamic of **accelerated catch-up** under restriction pressure calls for a **cautious assessment** of the long-term effectiveness of current American measures, whose real impact can only be fully measured over several years of **actual implementation**.

## Western allies facing this file

### Necessary but politically complex coordination

Effective implementation of the **MATCH Act** requires buy-in from key Western allies, notably the Netherlands and Japan, whose companies dominate certain critical segments of the semiconductor production chain, buy-in that involves complex and potentially costly diplomatic negotiations on the level of bilateral trade relations.

*An uncoordinated restriction is just a symbolic gesture.* This need for coordination with **Western allies** illustrates the limits of unilateral American action on this file, as Washington cannot alone impose effective restrictions without the active participation of technology partners whose companies could otherwise fill the **gap left** by an American withdrawal from the Chinese market.

### Some partners' hesitations over commercial costs

Some **Western partners** have expressed hesitations over the potential commercial costs of fully embracing the MATCH Act, with their **national technology companies** fearing they would lose significant market share in China to **competitors** less subject to American restrictions, a dilemma that complicates the international coordination Washington seeks.

This dilemma between **strategic solidarity** and national commercial interests illustrates the **complexity** of the Western coordination needed to maximize the effectiveness of technological restrictions against China, a complexity American decision-makers cannot ignore in their **calibration** of this policy.

## The targeted American companies, a deliberate choice

### A targeting choice that illustrates the precision of China's response

China's choice to precisely target **ten specific American companies**, rather than imposing general restrictions, illustrates a calibrated retaliation approach designed to maximize the **political and economic impact** of this measure while limiting **collateral damage** to the broader overall U.S.-China trade relationship.

*Ten precise names sometimes weigh more than a general list of a thousand.* This precision in **Chinese targeting** suggests prior strategic planning, with Beijing likely having identified these specific companies based on their particular **vulnerability** to export restrictions or their **symbolic importance** in the current American political debate over trade relations with China.

### What this targeting reveals about the sophistication of China's response

This sophistication in Chinese targeting reveals a **strategic maturity** in managing trade retaliation, with Beijing having learned from previous **trade confrontations** with Washington to calibrate its responses so as to maximize their **deterrent effect** without triggering an uncontrollable general escalation of bilateral tensions.

This strategic maturity in targeting **Chinese retaliation** is an important signal for American decision-makers, who must now anticipate increasingly sophisticated and targeted Chinese responses to each new technology restriction measure they might consider adopting in the future.

## What this reciprocal escalation reveals about both camps' doctrine

### An American doctrine of preventive restriction

Current American doctrine favors **preventive restriction** of critical technologies, seeking to limit Chinese access to the most advanced manufacturing capabilities before China manages to significantly close the current technological gap, an approach that reflects strategic anticipation of future risks rather than a response to an immediate threat.

*Prevention is expensive; a cure would cost more.* This American doctrine of **preventive restriction** contrasts with the Chinese doctrine of proportionate retaliation, illustrating two distinct strategic philosophies applied to the same technological file, each reflecting the specific priorities and constraints of the power that formulates it in this context of prolonged rivalry.

### A Chinese doctrine of resilience and catch-up

Chinese doctrine, conversely, favors **long-term resilience** combined with short-term calibrated retaliation, a dual approach aimed both at limiting the immediate damage of American restrictions and at structurally reducing future Chinese vulnerability to similar measures that could be adopted later.

*Resist today and rebuild tomorrow: China's dual equation.* This dual Chinese approach, combining **structural resilience** and tactical retaliation, illustrates Beijing's growing strategic sophistication in managing this technological file, a sophistication Western decision-makers will need to factor into their future strategic calculations.

## The limits of this chip war for each camp

### Economic costs for the United States and its allies

This chip war carries **real economic costs** for the United States and its technology allies, notably the loss of significant commercial outlets in the Chinese market for their semiconductor companies, costs Western decision-makers must weigh against the expected security benefits of these technology restrictions.

*Every restriction has a price; the question is exactly who will pay it.* This weighing of **economic costs** against security benefits is one of the central debates within the American government itself over the optimal calibration of the MATCH Act, with some decision-makers favoring broader restrictions, others advocating a more targeted approach limiting collateral economic damage.

### Technological costs for China itself

For China, this chip war imposes **significant technological costs**, with the sought-after self-sufficiency in semiconductors requiring massive investments whose return remains uncertain in the short term, an uncertainty Chinese authorities must manage politically against domestic public opinion that could question the effectiveness of this considerable spending.

These Chinese **technological costs** illustrate that this confrontation is not one-sided, with China also paying a significant price for its quest for self-sufficiency, a price that could grow heavier still if American and allied restrictions continue to tighten in the coming years.

## Possible scenarios for how this confrontation evolves

### A scenario of continued escalation absent any de-escalation

A first plausible **scenario** would see this technological confrontation continue to intensify, with each new American measure followed by a proportionate Chinese response, a cycle of reciprocal escalation that could eventually further fragment the global semiconductor industry into distinct, competing technological blocs.

*Global technological fragmentation ultimately benefits no one.* This scenario of **continued escalation** would carry significant risks for the global semiconductor economy, with technological fragmentation potentially slowing overall innovation in this critical sector, a collective cost neither Washington nor Beijing can fully ignore in their respective strategic calculations.

### A scenario of stabilization around mutual deterrence

A second possible **scenario** would see this confrontation stabilize around a balance of mutual deterrence, with each camp having demonstrated its ability to inflict significant costs on the other, which could eventually open the way to negotiations aimed at limiting the collateral economic damage of this prolonged technological rivalry.

This scenario of **negotiated stabilization** would nonetheless remain fragile, depending on both camps' political will to favor pragmatic management of the file over continued escalation driven by domestic political considerations or the broader geopolitical rivalry between the two powers.

## What this portrait cannot definitively settle

### Uncertainty over the real effectiveness of American restrictions

This portrait cannot determine with certainty the long-term **real effectiveness** of the American restrictions proposed under the MATCH Act, as this effectiveness depends on multiple factors, notably the degree of actual coordination with Western allies and the real pace of Chinese progress toward technological self-sufficiency.

This uncertainty over the **effectiveness of restrictions** requires constant methodological caution in any assessment of this file, whose real outcome can only be fully measured by observing concrete technological and commercial developments in the coming years.

### What only the coming years will confirm

Only the **coming years** will confirm whether this chip war leads to lasting technological fragmentation between the two powers, or whether negotiations eventually manage to limit the collateral economic damage of this prolonged confrontation for the entire global semiconductor industry.

This uncertainty over the **final outcome** of this technological confrontation is the central element this portrait cannot resolve at this stage, for lack of sufficient data on the future developments of this constantly evolving file.

## Conclusion

This portrait takes from this chip war a **calibrated confrontation** rather than an abrupt rupture: an American legislative proposal, a targeted Chinese response, and a defense budget that confirms, unsurprisingly, that semiconductors are now a national security file for both powers. Neither Washington nor Beijing appears to want a complete rupture; each instead seeks a calculated advantage.

This portrait invites Western observers to follow this file with the same rigor as a classic military file, since **semiconductors** have effectively become a central component of both powers' national security. *The chip war is not won in a quarter; it is won, or lost, over a decade of sustained investment.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Reuters — MATCH Act and export restrictions — April 3, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-targets-chinese-chipmaking-with-proposed-export-restrictions-asml-others-2026-04-03/)

- [Reuters — China's 2026 defense budget — March 10, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-lifts-military-budget-modernize-weapons-defence-technology-2026-03-10/)

### Secondary sources

- [Modern Diplomacy — China's response and technological self-sufficiency — July 12, 2026](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/12/starved-of-silicon-china-built-its-own/)

- [IDSA — Chinese military modernization — March 2026](https://idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-Military-Digest-March-2026.pdf)

- [Straits Times — Regional strategic context — June 15, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-swaps-fighter-jets-for-diplomatic-hardball-to-squeeze-taiwan)

- [Al Jazeera — Regional diplomatic tensions — June 11, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/11/china-bars-philippines-defence-chief-as-south-china-sea-spat-sails-onwards)

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-the-chip-war-intensifies-between-washington-and-beijing