# PROFILE: Putin's ghost boats — Starlink, the Black Sea, and the naval drone war

> At 4 a.m. on June 23, 2026, several Russian unmanned boats were launched toward the southwestern Ukrainian coastline in the Black Sea. These Unmanned Surface Vessels — USVs — carried explosive payloads capable of destroying port infrastructure or striking military vessels. They never reached their target. Ukrainian forces detected and destroyed them before they reached the shor

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-les-bateaux-fantomes-de-poutine-starlink-la-mer-noire-et-la-guerre-des-

## Introduction: off the Ukrainian coast, a new weapon emerges

### 4 a.m., June 23, 2026: the attack that never arrived

At **4 a.m.** on **June 23, 2026**, several Russian unmanned boats were launched toward the **southwestern Ukrainian coastline** in the **Black Sea**. These **Unmanned Surface Vessels** — **USVs** — carried explosive payloads capable of destroying port infrastructure or striking military vessels. They never reached their target. Ukrainian forces **detected and destroyed** them before they reached the shore, according to data published by the **Ukrainian Ministry of Defense** and confirmed by military adviser **Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov**.

But it was the technology propelling those boats that drew the attention of military analysts. Those **Russian USVs** operated using **Starlink** terminals — the satellite internet system of **Elon Musk's** company, **SpaceX**. In other words: **Russia** was using American satellite connectivity to guide weapons against **Ukraine**. That is a technological and geopolitical contradiction that Beskrestnov articulated without ambiguity: **"The enemy has no other systems capable of controlling them at such distances."**

### The attack completely neutralized: 100 percent of vessels destroyed

According to the official account of the **Ukrainian Ministry of Defense**, none of the **Russian unmanned boats** reached the Ukrainian coast during the **June 23, 2026** attack. All were intercepted and destroyed at sea before reaching their objective. That result was the product of **coordination between multiple Ukrainian armed forces units**, according to United 24 Media, which was covering the attack in real time. Early detection was decisive — it allowed Ukrainian forces to position their intercept assets before the vessels came too close to the shore.

It is precisely that **early detection capability** that raises questions about the methods used. Russian **USVs** are designed to be stealthy — low in the water, small radar signature. Their systematic detection suggests that **Ukraine** now has specific protocols for identifying Starlink-guided vehicles, either by detecting the satellite terminal's emissions, or via human or electronic intelligence on the bases from which the vessels were launched.

*There is something deeply absurd in that image: Russian warboats guided by American technology to attack Ukraine, a country the United States funds to defend itself. The absurdity does not reduce the gravity of the problem — it amplifies it.*

## Who is Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov: the adviser who names what others keep quiet

### An atypical profile within Ukraine's military apparatus

**Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov** is an adviser to the **Ukrainian Ministry of Defense**. He is a voice who, within Ukrainian military analysis circles, stands out for his willingness to name uncomfortable problems — including those involving Western allies or technology companies. His statement on **Starlink-equipped USVs** is not his first on this subject. Since early 2025, he has regularly warned about the use of **Starlink** terminals by Russian forces, including on **long-range Shahed drones**.

That position carries political risk. Publicly criticizing a technology on which **Ukraine** itself depends massively for its military communications — **Kyiv** uses tens of thousands of Starlink terminals at the front — is a delicate line to walk. But Beskrestnov holds it, arguing that transparency about vulnerabilities is a condition of security, not an admission of weakness. His **June 23, 2026** public statement on the **USVs** is the latest illustration of that stance.

*In a war where information is a weapon, choosing to name vulnerabilities on your own side takes courage. Beskrestnov does it with a regularity worth noting. It is not betrayal — it is operational honesty in service of defense.*

## The Russian USV: anatomy of a satellite-guided naval weapon

### Characteristics of Russian unmanned surface vessels

The **Russian USVs** used in this attack are rigid-hulled vessels designed to navigate autonomously or semi-autonomously across tens to hundreds of kilometers at sea. They can carry on-board explosives used as surface torpedoes, or be loaded with intelligence-gathering equipment. Their key attribute is **stealth**: small, low in the water, difficult to detect by radar, they can approach a coastline or a vessel without triggering traditional warning systems.

**Russia** developed its unmanned naval capabilities as a direct response to Ukrainian successes in that domain — **Ukraine** used **USVs** to attack the **Russian Black Sea Fleet** with remarkable effectiveness, sinking or damaging several major vessels since 2022. Moscow wanted to turn the weapon back. But to guide those vessels over long distances required stable satellite communication. And that is where **Starlink** enters the picture — through the back door.

*Russia copied the Ukrainian weapon and equipped it with the technology of Ukraine's ally. If that does not summarize all the contradictions of this technological conflict, I don't know what would.*

## How Russia accesses Starlink: the workaround routes

### SpaceX's whitelist and its limits

Officially, **Starlink is banned in Russia**. **SpaceX** put in place in **February 2026** a **whitelist** — a procedure that broadly blocks access to Starlink terminals not registered in areas under Ukrainian control. That measure had concrete effects: it disrupted Russian use of terminals along the front lines, forcing Russian soldiers to reconfigure their equipment or find other frequencies. But it did not eliminate the problem.

**Russia** obtains **Starlink** terminals through several documented channels: via third countries that do not apply Western sanctions, via smuggling networks through **Central Asian parallel markets**, and via the Russian **shadow fleet** of vessels that communicate by satellite to evade maritime sanctions. Those terminals are then routed to combat zones. The **Russian shadow fleet** — dozens of aging tankers transporting Russian oil in circumvention of sanctions — itself uses **Starlink** intensively for navigation and communication.

*SpaceX made a real decision with the February 2026 whitelist. But workaround networks are faster than corporate policy. That is the fundamental problem: a private technology, deployed globally, cannot be controlled the way a state weapon is.*

## The Black Sea as theater: the evolution of naval warfare since 2022

### From Russian dominance to forced retreat

Before **February 24, 2022**, the **Black Sea** was regarded as a domain where the **Russian Navy** reigned unchallenged. The **Black Sea Fleet**, based in **Sevastopol in Crimea**, was a significant power-projection force. Four years later, the reality is radically different. **Ukraine**, without a significant surface navy, has inflicted on the Russian fleet losses without precedent for a non-NATO power: the cruiser **Moskva** sunk in **April 2022**, several landing ships destroyed, warships damaged or scuttled in port.

That transformation was made possible by a combination of **Ukrainian Neptune missiles**, **improved improvised USVs**, and a naval attrition doctrine that no one had anticipated. **Russia**, forced to redeploy its fleet out of range of Ukrainian weapons, lost control of the coastal waters around **Crimea**. That context explains why Moscow is now investing in **USVs** equipped with long-range guidance systems — attempting to regain initiative in a domain where **Ukraine** has beaten it.

### Ships sunk: an unprecedented toll for a navy without a navy

The exact tally of Russian naval losses since **2022** is difficult to certify independently — **Russia** does not announce its losses and attempts to relocate vessels out of range without publicity. But confirmations are numerous enough to draw a picture. The cruiser **Moskva**, flagship of the **Black Sea Fleet**, sank in **April 2022** after being struck by two Ukrainian **Neptune** missiles. Several **landing ships** were destroyed in **Sevastopol** harbor by **Ukrainian USVs** in **2023 and 2024**. Submarines and patrol boats have been damaged or destroyed.

The most strategically significant result: the **Russian Black Sea Fleet** was forced back into its ports and largely ceded the open waters off the Ukrainian coast. Ukrainian grain corridors — economically and humanitarily vital — were able to partially reopen because **Russia** could no longer maintain an effective naval blockade. That is a **Ukrainian strategic victory** achieved without a single frigate or destroyer.

*Ukraine achieved something remarkable in the Black Sea: it denied a great naval power control of its own coastal waters, without having a navy. That is a lesson in asymmetric warfare that military academies will study for decades.*

## Shahed and Starlink: the problem expanding to aerial drones

### When killer drones integrate commercial connectivity

The **USVs** of June 23 are not an isolated case. Since early **2025**, Ukrainian analysts and officials have been reporting the integration of **Starlink terminals** into certain Russian long-range **Shahed drones**. Those drones, designed in **Iran** and produced in **Russia**, have caused considerable damage to Ukrainian infrastructure. Adding **Starlink** would allow them to improve their terminal guidance, resist GPS jamming, and maintain communication with operators over greater distances.

This is not confirmed for every **Shahed** variant — certifications are difficult to establish on destroyed vehicles. But the trend is clear: **Russia** is attempting to integrate commercial satellite communication technologies into its weapons systems, precisely because its own military communication systems are vulnerable to Ukrainian electronic countermeasures. **Starlink** is difficult to jam because it uses adaptive frequencies and a constellation of **more than 6,000 satellites**. That is its operational advantage — and exactly why **Russia** wants it.

### The Shahed: evolution of an Iranian drone into a Russian terror weapon

The **Shahed-136 drone**, originally designed by **Iran** as a low-cost precision weapon, has become since **2022** one of the most heavily used weapons by **Russia** against Ukrainian infrastructure. Its production was replicated in **Russia** under the designation **Geranium-2**, with factories established across several Russian regions. Its main characteristic: a very low unit cost — estimated between **$20,000 and $50,000** — allowing **Russia** to use them in hundreds during saturating waves.

The integration of **Starlink terminals** into certain next-generation **Shahed** drones would represent a significant improvement in their terminal guidance. Russian military **GPS** is vulnerable to Ukrainian jammers — **Starlink**, with its massive constellation and adaptive frequencies, is much harder to neutralize. If that integration is confirmed at scale, it will force **Ukraine** to develop new specific countermeasures, at additional cost in resources and time.

*An Iranian drone guided by an American satellite, built in Russia, to strike Ukraine. Every word in that sentence is a layer of geopolitical absurdity. And yet it is the documented reality of the conflict in June 2026.*

## Ukraine's response: trap, interception, and intelligence

### Russian Starlink use as a vulnerability vector

There is an operational irony in **Russia's** use of **Starlink**: it makes Russian vehicles potentially more traceable. **Starlink** terminals emit signals that can be detected by electronic intelligence systems. If **Ukraine** — or its allies — is capable of identifying the electronic signature of those terminals in Russian operational contexts, it gains an additional detection and interception capability. Beskrestnov mentioned that detection of the **June 23 USVs** enabled total interception: **none reached the coast**.

That suggests Ukrainian forces are developing detection protocols specific to commercially satellite-guided vehicles. Those protocols are classified — but their existence is revealed by the result: **100 percent interception** in that attack. That is not coincidence. It is the product of an **electronic warfare doctrine** adapting in real time to the adversary's technological changes.

*The vulnerability that Starlink creates for Russian USVs may be as large as the advantage it provides. That is the fundamental law of electronic warfare: every emission is a potential target. Russia made a technological bet that Ukraine is in the process of turning against it.*

## SpaceX, Musk, and the responsibility of the private company in wartime

### The dual-use technology dilemma

The case of **Russian USVs equipped with Starlink** raises a question that democracies have not yet resolved: what is the responsibility of a private company when its technology is used for acts of war? **SpaceX** has taken measures — the **February 2026 whitelist** is evidence of that. But those measures are reactive and partial. Workaround networks move faster than corporate policy. And **Elon Musk**, who holds publicly ambivalent positions on the war in **Ukraine**, has not always treated that problem with the urgency the situation demands.

It must be recalled that as early as **2022**, Musk had restricted the use of **Starlink** for Ukrainian **drone attacks against the Russian fleet** in **Crimea** — a decision that drew sharp criticism. The tension between **SpaceX's** commercial interests, its founder's political positions, and **Ukraine's** military needs has never been fully resolved. The use of **Starlink** by **Russia** for its **USVs** is, in that context, a symptom of a deeper structural problem.

### The 2022 decision: when Musk restricted Starlink over Crimea

In **September 2022**, **Elon Musk** refused to activate **Starlink** service over **Crimea** to allow **Ukraine** to carry out a **submarine drone attack against the Russian fleet**. That decision, revealed in a biography of **Musk** by **Walter Isaacson**, triggered major controversy. **Musk** justified the choice by saying he wanted to prevent **nuclear escalation**. His critics responded that a private company had no business unilaterally determining the limits of military aid to a sovereign state in a situation of legal self-defense.

That earlier decision contrasts sharply with the current situation: **Russia** is using **Starlink** for its own attacks, and **SpaceX** has not prevented this with the same effectiveness it demonstrated in restricting Ukrainian use. That asymmetry — more attention paid to Ukrainian actions than to Russian circumvention — is at the core of criticisms directed at **SpaceX** and **Musk** by Ukrainian officials and Western analysts since **2025**.

*I am not saying Musk is complicit. I am saying that the technology he controls is being used to kill Ukrainians, and that his access policy decisions have direct consequences on the ground. That is a responsibility no CEO can ignore — even if he would prefer to.*

## Implications for unmanned naval warfare doctrine

### The USV as the weapon of the future: what June 2026 reveals

The **June 23, 2026** incident is not a tactical footnote. It is a marker of the direction **21st-century naval warfare** is heading. **USVs** — equipped with satellite guidance systems, artificial intelligence for autonomous navigation, and explosive payloads or intelligence sensors — are becoming a standard component of maritime arsenals. **Ukraine** opened that path; **Russia** is now traveling it with its own variants.

That development carries implications for every navy in the world. Conventional surface vessels, expensive and vulnerable to **USV** swarms, will need to rethink their defense protocols. The **Black Sea** has become an open-air laboratory for tactics that will be reproduced in other theaters — the **South China Sea**, the **Persian Gulf**, the **Baltic Sea**. The lessons of this war are being absorbed not only by **NATO**, but also by **China**, **Iran**, and other actors watching with close attention.

*This conflict has become the most sophisticated test bed in modern history for unmanned military technologies. What Russia and Ukraine are learning today in the Black Sea will be replicated tomorrow in the South China Sea. Democracies would do well to take notes.*

## Ukraine and asymmetric innovation: turning necessity into doctrine

### Doing more with less: the Ukrainian strategic lesson

One of the most enduring lessons of this conflict is **Ukraine's** capacity to develop asymmetric solutions to military problems for which it lacks conventional means. Without a significant surface navy, it created a fleet of **improvised USVs** capable of routing the **Russian navy**. Without strategic bombers, it built drones capable of reaching targets **1,500 kilometers deep** into Russian territory. Without its own intelligence satellites, it developed detection networks based on open sources and partnerships.

That doctrine of **innovation under constraint** is not the product of chance. It is the result of a military engineering culture developed since **2014**, accelerated by the **2022** invasion, and partly funded by Western partners who learned to trust Ukrainian expertise. The destruction of the **Russian USVs** on **June 23** is a product of that doctrine: a fast, effective response, at zero Ukrainian losses, against a weapon the adversary believed it had perfected.

### Ground drones: a third dimension of Ukrainian innovation

Ukrainian innovation is not limited to aerial drones and naval **USVs**. Since **2024**, **Ukraine** has also deployed **Unmanned Ground Vehicles** (UGVs) for reconnaissance missions, wounded evacuation, and more recently direct attacks on enemy positions. Those vehicles, often derived from modified commercial platforms, allow reduction of risk to Ukrainian soldiers during operations in heavily mined or fire-exposed areas.

According to data published by the **Ukrainian General Staff as of June 24, 2026**, **Russia** has lost **1,726 unmanned ground vehicles** since the start of the invasion — a category that did not yet exist in casualty statistics in **2022**. That is concrete proof that the **UGV** war is already a reality on Ukrainian front lines. Each new category of unmanned vehicle developed by **Ukraine** is an innovative response to a concrete military problem — and a lesson for armies worldwide.

*Ukraine impresses me every time I look at what it does with what it has. That is not naive admiration — it is the observation of a country that has learned to fight in ways its allies did not foresee and its enemies did not anticipate.*

## The Russian shadow fleet and Starlink: a global sanctions problem

### The Russian tankers navigating under satellite protection

Beyond military **USVs**, **Russia's** use of **Starlink** extends to its **shadow fleet** of tankers — hundreds of aging vessels, often uninsured, transporting Russian oil in circumvention of Western sanctions. Those ships use **Starlink** terminals — obtained through third countries — for their navigation communications and commercial coordination. They represent a significant leak in the sanctions regime built since **2022**.

The connection between the **shadow fleet** and **military USVs** is indirect but real: the same sanctions-circumvention channels that supply **Starlink** terminals to tankers also potentially supply Russian military arsenals with communication technologies. Closing those channels would require increased cooperation between **SpaceX**, Western governments, and transit countries — cooperation that does not yet exist at the scale the problem demands.

*The Russian shadow fleet is one of the greatest sanctions-circumvention successes in modern history. And Starlink is an integral part of it. This is a problem Western governments have been unwilling to solve because the solutions are costly and politically complex. The time to address it will come.*

## What this incident reveals about the state of the conflict in June 2026

### The technological war: each side adapts in real time

The **June 23, 2026 USV** incident illustrates a fundamental dynamic of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict: it is a **war of permanent technological adaptation**. Every weapon developed by one side generates a response from the other; every exploited vulnerability produces a countermeasure. **Russia** lost control of the **Black Sea** against **Ukrainian USVs** — it is developing its own **Starlink-equipped USVs**. **Ukraine** detects and destroys them — and is already adapting its protocols for the next wave.

That adaptation dynamic has no foreseeable end. It will continue as long as the conflict lasts — and perhaps beyond, influencing military doctrines for decades to come. What is clear is that the war in **Ukraine** is not a static conflict — it is an accelerated military innovation laboratory, where development cycles that once took years in conventional armies are now measured in months, or even weeks.

*I look at this war and I see the future of all conflicts. Not with satisfaction — with concern. What is being developed in Ukraine today will equip the arsenals of tomorrow, in conflicts we cannot yet name. That is the darkest lesson of this permanent innovation.*

## Western allies facing the USV-Starlink threat: what collective response

### Closing the gaps in the technological sanctions regime

**Russia's** use of **Starlink** by its forces poses a public policy problem that Western governments have not yet solved: how to control the military use of globally deployed private commercial technology? Available options include **data-sharing agreements between SpaceX and allied governments** to identify terminals used in Russian military contexts, **expanded sanction mechanisms** targeting intermediary countries that facilitate Russian terminal acquisition, and **investments in countermeasures** specific to commercial satellite communications.

None of those options is simple. **SpaceX** is a private company not subject to the same obligations as regulated arms manufacturers. Intermediary countries — often **Central Asian** states that maintain economic relations with **Russia** — have little incentive to cooperate. And electronic countermeasures against **Starlink** risk interfering with Ukrainian systems that depend on the same infrastructure. It is a technological dilemma without a clean solution — which does not mean it should be ignored.

### Third-party countries: the weak links of the sanctions regime

**Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan** have all been identified as transit countries for sanctioned goods to **Russia**. These countries are not members of the **European Union** or **NATO**, and their legal obligations regarding sanctions are limited. Western diplomatic pressure has led them to reduce certain flows — but not to eliminate them. For **Starlink** terminals, the flow typically passes through multiple intermediaries, making traceability even more difficult.

The solution requires more sophisticated mechanisms: **information sharing between SpaceX and allied governments** on serial numbers of terminals sold in those countries, **regular audits of stocks** declared by authorized distributors, and **secondary sanctions** against companies that knowingly facilitate circumvention. Those mechanisms exist in part for other dual-use technologies — but their application to commercial **satellite telecommunications** remains embryonic. The legal and institutional framework must be adapted to the technological reality of the conflict.

*The West has built an impressive but porous arsenal of economic sanctions. For dual-use technologies — those that serve both civil and military purposes — no control regime is yet truly adequate. That gap is what this conflict reveals with brutality.*

## Conclusion: unmanned boats and a war without technological borders

### The Black Sea as a symptom of a world without clear rules

The **Russian USVs equipped with Starlink**, destroyed off the Ukrainian coast on **June 23, 2026**, are not merely a military footnote. They are a symptom of a world where the boundaries between civilian and military technology, between private company and wartime actor, between sanction and circumvention, have become extremely porous. This conflict has forced the **West** to become aware of those porosities — but awareness has not yet produced the policies equal to the problem.

### What Ukraine demonstrated on June 23

What **Ukraine** demonstrated on **June 23, 2026** is that it can detect, identify, and destroy weapons using the same technology as its own communication systems. That is remarkable sophistication. It also demonstrated that the **Black Sea** remains under constant pressure — and that victory in that theater will be determined not by fleet size, but by the speed of technological adaptation. In that domain, **Ukraine** holds an edge. It is up to its allies to ensure it keeps it.

*Putin's ghost boats sank before reaching the shore. But they will return — improved, redesigned, with new guidance solutions. That is the logic of this war: every defeat is a lesson for the next assault. Ukraine knows that better than anyone.*

## Ukraine's technological edge: can it last without continued support

### The human and industrial resources behind innovation

Ukrainian military innovation rests on a base of **engineers** and technicians trained in one of **Eastern Europe's** strongest engineering traditions. The **universities of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Lviv** have been producing electronics, computer science, and embedded systems engineers for decades. Many of these professionals, who worked in civilian technology industries before **2022**, have joined military development efforts since the invasion. That human base explains the speed of Ukrainian innovation cycles.

But that human base is under pressure. **Human losses**, displacement, brain drain toward **Western Europe** — all those factors are progressively eroding the human capital on which innovation rests. To maintain that advantage over the long term, **Ukraine** will need not only weapons and money, but also support for its industrial and technological base — training, laboratory equipment, partnerships with Western defense industries. That is the often-forgotten dimension of support for **Kyiv**.

*I want to end on this thought: Ukraine wins technological battles because it has remarkably skilled people risking their lives for their country. Their genius is not inexhaustible. It needs support — materially, financially, diplomatically — before it runs dry.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine eliminates Russian unmanned boats powered by Starlink — 2026-06-23](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-eliminates-russian-unmanned-boats-powered-by-starlink-official-says/)

- [United 24 Media — Ukraine destroys Russian unmanned attack boats equipped with Starlink — 2026-06-23](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraine-destroys-russian-unmanned-attack-boats-equipped-with-starlink-before-coastal-strike-20087)

- [Militarnyi — NATO Official: Russia's Total Casualties Reach 1.3–1.5 Million — 2026-06-23](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/nato-official-russia-casualties-war-ukraine/)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — General Staff: Russia has lost 1,395,790 troops — 2026-06-24](https://kyivindependent.com/general-staff-russia-has-lost-1-395-790-troops-in-ukraine-since-feb-24-2022/)

- [Ukrainska Pravda — EU extends economic sanctions against Russia for another year — 2026-06-25](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/25/8041148/)

- [EuroMaidan Press — Hungary stalls key EU move on Ukraine membership — 2026-06-23](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/23/hungary-again-stalls-key-eu-move-on-ukraine-and-moldova-membership-negotiations/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-les-bateaux-fantomes-de-poutine-starlink-la-mer-noire-et-la-guerre-des-