# PROFILE: The CRINK axis fractures — after the Iran-USA deal, Moscow, Beijing and Kim recalculate

> The word CRINK — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea — has entered Western strategic vocabulary to describe what some analysts call the

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-06-26
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-l-axe-crink-se-fissure-apres-l-accord-iran-usa-moscou-pekin-et-kim-reca

## Introduction: The great alliance of threats loses a pillar

### CRINK: the acronym that defines the danger

The word **CRINK** — **China, Russia, Iran, North Korea** — has entered Western strategic vocabulary to describe what some analysts call the **"grand alliance of revisionist states"**. These four powers share a deep hostility to the liberal international order, a common desire to reduce American influence, and mutual interests in degrading Western democracies. For three years, the Ukrainian conflict has welded this alliance around a simple logic: weaken the West by proxy.

On **June 15, 2026**, a Memorandum of Understanding signed at Versailles between Washington and **Tehran** upended that balance. The **US-Iran agreement** does not mean **Tehran** has become a Western ally — but it does mean it is no longer, for now, an active enemy willing to feed the Russian war machine with Shahed drones. That is a major shift in configuration.

### Four actors, four different reactions

Each CRINK member's reaction to this agreement reveals deep fissures in this alliance of convenience. **Moscow** loses its Shahed drone supplier. **Beijing** calculates how to preserve its commercial interests with Tehran. **Pyongyang** draws a nuclear lesson from it. And **Tehran** plays its own tune — neither fully inside nor fully outside. This profile of the CRINK axis in June 2026 reveals an alliance that never truly flourished and is beginning to reconfigure under the pressure of events.

The paradox is that this agreement — negotiated by an often unpredictable Trump administration — produces one of the most favorable geopolitical effects for **Ukraine** in a long time. By extracting Iran from the CRINK's direct orbit, Washington has weakened the Russian military supply chain without firing a single additional shot in Europe. The **necessary evil**, sometimes, does good.

*I am not naive about the US-Iran agreement. It is not peace in the Middle East. It is a complex American calculation involving oil, hostages, regional influence, and elections. But from Ukraine's perspective, weakening the Russian Shahed drone supply chain is a concrete, immediate gain. And that cannot be ignored.*

## Kim Jong Un: the atomic lesson of an agreement he did not sign

### "The most precise and distinctive method": Kim's nuclear vocabulary

On **June 23, 2026**, **Kim Jong Un** made a strategically troubling statement. Citing the Iran-US war as proof that nuclear weapons constitute **"the most precise and distinctive method"** of guaranteeing a regime's survival, he announced his intention to strengthen North Korea's nuclear capabilities. According to Bloomberg and RBC-**Ukraine**, he interpreted the US-Iran agreement not as a de-escalation signal, but as a **validation of his own nuclear deterrence strategy**.

Kim's reasoning is chilling but coherent: Iran, without atomic bombs, was forced to negotiate. North Korea, with its warheads, is not at the negotiating table — it is in a forced status quo position that **Washington** cannot break without direct nuclear risk. For Pyongyang, **the bomb is the best life insurance** against American intervention. The June 2026 agreement reinforces that conviction.

### June 25 tests: the Korean War anniversary as a message

On **June 25, 2026** — the anniversary of the start of the **Korean War in 1950** — North Korea conducted **missile and artillery tests**. The choice of date is deliberate: it is a message to both **Seoul and Washington**, reminding them that the Korean peninsula remains a powder keg and that the DPRK will not be forgotten in the ongoing geopolitical reconfiguration. Pyongyang does not sign agreements — it fires to assert its existence.

For the **Russia-North Korea** military supply chain, the US-Iran agreement changes nothing directly. The DPRK continues to supply **Russia** with **artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and soldiers** — this military cooperation is maintained and is not covered by US-Iran discussions. Pyongyang is **Moscow**'s most committed military partner, and it shows no sign of wanting to change that posture.

*Kim Jong Un fires missiles on June 25 to remind the world he exists. That is a foreign policy built on explosives. Tragic for his people, effective for his regime. The US-Iran agreement gave him a new lesson: the bomb works. He wants more. And we do not know how to stop him.*

## Russia loses Iran: the Shahed drone gap

### Shahed drones: a critical military dependency

Since 2022, Iranian **Shahed-136 drones** have become a central component of Russia's attrition strategy in Ukraine. Cheap — a few tens of thousands of dollars each — and mass-produced, they serve to **saturate Ukrainian air defenses**, destroy energy infrastructure, and test **Kyiv**'s response capabilities. Russia has launched thousands since 2022, to the point of beginning to produce them under license on its own territory.

If the US-Iran agreement holds and sanctions are gradually lifted, **Tehran will have less incentive to supply drones to Moscow** — especially if doing so would jeopardize the economic benefits of rapprochement with Washington. This is not certain — the Revolutionary Guards (**IRGC**) have their own agenda — but the pressure is moving in the right direction for Ukraine.

### Russia accelerates domestic drone production

Anticipating a possible reduction in Iranian deliveries, Moscow has intensified its efforts to produce **drones domestically**. Factories in the Urals and beyond have been converted or created to produce replicas and variants of the Shahed. This industrialization takes time and remains limited in quality and volume. The pressure from the US-Iran agreement may accelerate this forced adaptation, but it does not immediately close the gap.

For Ukraine, even a **partial reduction in Iranian drone deliveries** to Russia constitutes operational relief. Every Shahed not launched is Ukrainian infrastructure not destroyed, a civilian not killed, an air defense missile not consumed. The attrition battle plays out at this level of granularity.

*Russia's domestic drone production is a response to sanctions and pressure on foreign suppliers. But building an industrial-quality production line takes years, not months. Russia is chasing a capability it should never have outsourced to Iran. The US-Iran agreement puts a spotlight on that structural weakness.*

## **China**: commercial pragmatism, limited loyalty

### **Beijing** keeps Iran in its orbit, deal or no deal

**China** watched the US-Iran agreement with calculated calm. Beijing has major commercial interests in Iran — in 2025–2026 it was buying a large share of Iranian oil at discounted prices, circumventing American sanctions. A US-Iran agreement that gradually lifts sanctions does not sever Sino-Iranian ties — it reconfigures them. **China** will remain a top-tier commercial partner for Tehran, deal or no deal.

What Beijing loses is the exclusivity of that commercial relationship and preferential access to Iranian oil isolated from world markets. What Beijing gains is potentially a regional stabilization that protects its trade routes via the Strait of Hormuz. The Chinese calculation is, as always, **economic before ideological**.

### China and Russia: an asymmetric alliance that holds

The US-Iran agreement does not fundamentally alter the **Sino-Russian relationship**. China remains Russia's main economic pillar — it absorbs the Russian oil Europe refuses to buy and provides Moscow with dual-use goods that circumvent sanctions. This economic architecture will not be challenged by an agreement over Iran.

But this alliance is **profoundly asymmetric**: it is Russia that needs China, not the reverse. Xi Jinping uses this dependence to extract territorial, commercial, and symbolic concessions from Moscow. As the conflict continues, a weakened Russia is progressively becoming a **junior partner to China** — an evolution Putin probably underestimated when he launched his invasion.

*China has managed something impressive: being Russia's ally without paying the diplomatic price, using the Ukrainian conflict to test Western responses, and emerging from the US-Iran agreement in an improved commercial position. That is cold, effective foreign policy. I find it dangerous precisely because it is rational.*

## Iran's IRGC: the uncontrollable factor

### The Versailles agreement versus the Revolutionary Guards

The **June 15, 2026** US-Iran agreement was signed by the Pezeshkian government. But in Iran, power is fragmented between the government, Supreme Leader Khamenei, and the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)**. This last actor controls large swaths of Iran's war economy — including the production and export of Shahed drones.

Analysts cited in regional press note that the **IRGC can continue supplying drones to Russia** even if the Iranian government officially opposes it. This duality of Iranian power is one of the great unknowns of the agreement. President Pezeshkian affirms that **Iran keeps its enrichment rights** — suggesting the agreement covers limited perimeters, leaving much in the shadows.

### The 60-day American waiver: a test period

The **US Treasury** granted a **60-day waiver on Iranian oil and petrochemical sanctions** — a window running through **August 21, 2026**. This test period is crucial. If Iran respects its commitments — notably on the nuclear file and reduction of military supplies to Russia — sanctions could be gradually lifted. If the IRGC continues its deliveries to Moscow, the test period could end without a final agreement.

For Ukraine, the **next 60 days are therefore decisive** for assessing whether the US-Iran agreement produces a real effect on Shahed drone deliveries. **Kyiv** watches closely, hopes without illusions, and continues shooting down those drones with its air defense systems — because resilience does not rest on other countries' diplomatic agreements, but on its own capabilities.

*Sixty days to save an agreement between the United States and Iran, while Russia keeps firing on Kyiv with Iranian-made drones. There is something surreal about that timeline. But that is the world as it is: negotiations backstage while bombs fall on the front stage.*

## The impact on Ukraine: real gains, persistent risks

### A weakening of Russia's supply network

For Ukraine, the US-Iran agreement represents an **indirect but real geopolitical gain**. If Tehran reduces its drone deliveries to Moscow — even partially, even temporarily — the Ukrainian military will benefit from reduced pressure on its air defenses. Every Shahed produced in Iran and not delivered to Russia is a silent victory for Kyiv.

Furthermore, the agreement contributes to **further isolating Russia** in the concert of nations. Moscow finds itself with North Korea as its main military partner and a China that uses it without openly compromising itself. Russia, which presented itself as the leader of an alternative global bloc, finds itself with a far less solid arc of alliances than expected in 2022.

### The risks: a reconfigured, not destroyed CRINK alliance

But the danger persists. **North Korea is increasing its shell and missile deliveries**. China maintains its economic support for Moscow. The IRGC could ignore the Pezeshkian government's commitments. And if the US-Iran agreement collapses in **60 days**, Iran could return to the CRINK orbit with more bitterness and less restraint.

The CRINK is not dead. It is **reconfiguring**. Moscow may temporarily lose a drone supplier, but retains China, the DPRK, and potentially an Iran playing both sides. The West cannot treat this setback as a definitive victory — only as an opportunity to exploit by reinforcing its own cohesion and support for Ukraine.

*The CRINK axis is fracturing but not breaking. That distinction matters. The danger has not disappeared — it has reconfigured. China remains the underlying threat, Russia remains Ukraine's immediate enemy, and North Korea remains a regional destabilization factor. The US-Iran agreement is good news. Not the end of the story.*

## Kim Jong Un facing the Iranian mirror — a nuclear lesson in reverse

### North Korea's reading of the US-Iran agreement

For **Kim Jong Un**, the **June 2026 US-Iran agreement** reads not as a diplomatic success — it reads as proof that **Iran without atomic bombs** was forced to capitulate before American power. Iran, which had developed an enrichment program but never produced an operational weapon, was compelled to negotiate. **North Korea**, which possesses nuclear warheads and successfully tested intercontinental ballistic missiles, is not at the negotiating table — it is in a forced status quo that **Washington** cannot break without direct nuclear risk.

This reading is consistent with **Juche** doctrine and with the history of the Korean peninsula since **1953**. **Kim** cites the US-Iran agreement as validation of his strategy since the **2000s**: develop a credible nuclear capability to become unassailable. His **June 23, 2026** declaration that nuclear weapons are **"the most precise and distinctive method"** is a lucid strategic assessment that democracies cannot afford to ignore.

### The June 25 tests and the mechanics of armed deterrence

The choice of **June 25** for North Korean missile and artillery tests — the anniversary of the start of the **Korean War in 1950** — is a precise political message. **Kim Jong Un** reminds **Seoul**, **Washington**, and **Tokyo** that the Korean peninsula remains a powder keg, that the **DPRK** has survived **76 years** of international pressure, and that it will not be forgotten in the ongoing geopolitical reconfiguration. Every test is a reminder: *we exist, we are armed, and you cannot compel us to do anything*.

This intimidation-through-testing mechanism has been refined for decades. **North Korea** fires, the world condemns, **sanctions** tighten marginally, **Pyongyang** absorbs and repeats. This cycle is frustrating but predictable. What changes in **June 2026** is that **Kim** has a powerful new rhetorical argument to justify accelerating his nuclear program. And this argument, however perverse, is difficult to refute without directly addressing the deterrence logic he invokes.

*Kim citing the US-Iran agreement to justify more bombs — that is the logic of nuclear proliferation in all its terrible clarity. Every agreement that makes the bomb appear a legitimate protection against American power fuels demand for nuclear weapons in other states. That is the most dangerous lesson of June 2026.**The CRINK reconfiguration is a window of opportunity, not a victory. The West would be very ill-advised to relax pressure on Russia or neglect China's rising power because an agreement with Iran was signed. Geopolitics does not simplify by press release. It is managed with consistency and patience.*

## The Reconfigured CRINK's Impact on the War in Ukraine

### Russia's supply chain: weakened but not broken

The reconfiguration of the **CRINK** in **June 2026** — with the **USA-Iran** agreement potentially removing **Tehran** from the direct orbit of the axis — has direct implications for the war in **Ukraine**. The **Russia-Iran-North Korea** military supply chain is weakened, not broken. The **IRGC** is likely maintaining **Shahed** drone deliveries to Moscow despite the Pezeshkian government's agreement. The **DPRK** continues its deliveries of shells and missiles. **China** maintains its indirect economic support.

For **Ukraine**, this mixed situation means: potential short-term relief on Iranian drones, but a maintained Russian dependence on **North Korea** for artillery ammunition, and unwavering Chinese economic backing. Ukrainian resistance cannot count on the collapse of these supply chains to win the war. It must continue to fight on the ground, strike Russian infrastructure, and maintain its defensive pressure until diplomatic conditions allow a favorable negotiated peace.

### The West facing the new configuration — do not relax the pressure

The reconfiguration of the **CRINK** is good news for the **West** — but it must not be misread. It is not the end of the revisionist states' bloc. **China** remains the underlying threat to the international order. **Russia** remains the active aggressor in **Ukraine**. **North Korea** remains **Moscow**'s direct military partner. The **USA-Iran** agreement has reduced one regional tension and potentially weakened one drone supplier — that is all. It is not a global strategic victory.

The **West** must maintain its sanctions against **Russia**, continue to support **Ukraine** militarily and economically, and work toward a coherent strategy facing **China** — which has not changed its calculus with the Iranian agreement. Caution is warranted against any triumphalist interpretation of the **CRINK**'s reconfiguration. The danger has not disappeared — it has partially shifted.

## Conclusion: CRINK, an alliance of convenience under pressure

### Converging interests but no cemented alliance

This profile of the CRINK in June 2026 reveals a reality Western analysts know well: these four countries are not an alliance in the classical sense. No collective treaty, no unified command, no shared values — only **temporarily converging interests** against a common threat they call "American hegemony." As soon as this convergence weakens — as is the case with the US-Iran agreement — the fractures appear.

The **West must exploit these fractures** — not by trying to swing each of these states into its camp, which would be illusory, but by **dividing interests**, offering targeted incentives, and maintaining firm, consistent pressure on the most vulnerable members of this coalition.

### Ukraine at the center of all these reconfigurations

Through all these geopolitical reconfigurations — the Iran agreement, Chinese calculations, North Korean provocations — **Ukraine remains the center of gravity** of the global conflict. It is there that it is concretely decided whether revisionist alliances can prevail against democracies. **Zelensky** cannot control the Versailles agreements or Kim's calculations. But he can — with Western support — hold his line, strike his targets, and resist until the enemy alliances crumble of their own accord.

The **CRINK is fracturing**. That is a signal. Let the West not miss this window.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Bloomberg — Kim Jong Un wants more nuclear forces after the US-Iran war — June 23, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-23/north-korea-s-kim-wants-more-nuclear-forces-after-us-iran-war)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Kim Jong Un pushes North Korea toward nuclear buildup — June 23, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/kim-jong-un-pushes-north-korea-toward-new-1782213707.html)

### Secondary sources

- [RT — US-Iran talks in Switzerland, roadmap — June 21, 2026](https://www.rt.com/news/641945-us-iranian-talks-switzerland/)

- [EEW Magazine — US-Iran deal Switzerland, nuclear inspections, 4 working groups — June 23, 2026](https://www.eewmagazineonline.com/latest-news/2026/6/23/us-iran-deal-switzerland-nuclear-inspections-2026)

- [Chosun — Kim Jong Un strengthens North Korea's nuclear program — June 24, 2026](https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2026/06/24/Z6YSHIW7YBGPFJHQOCVT6B36IA/)

- [Straits Times — Kim says North Korea will exercise its position as a nuclear state — June 23, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/north-koreas-kim-says-country-will-exercise-its-position-as-nuclear-state-kcna-reports)

- [x] ≥90

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- [x] Signature after conclusion, before transparency box

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- [x] Pro-Ukraine / anti-Putin editorial line

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-l-axe-crink-se-fissure-apres-l-accord-iran-usa-moscou-pekin-et-kim-reca