# PROFILE: Bohdan, Oleksandr, Serhii — Three Soldiers Ukraine's Military Reform Leaves Behind

> Before discussing numbers and contractual structures, we need to name what these soldiers have been through. Four years at the front. Comrades killed beside them. Families held at a distance. They hav

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-bohdan-oleksandr-serhii-trois-soldats-que-la-reforme-militaire-ukrainie

## Introduction: The reform that arrived four years too late

### Fedorov's announcement in June 2026

In **June 2026**, Ukrainian Defense Minister **Mykhailo Fedorov** presented the **first phase of Ukraine's military reform** as a response to frustrations accumulated since the start of the large-scale invasion. New contracts, higher wages, a simplified process for soldiers in **AWOL** status — the program looked complete on paper. On the ground, among soldiers who have served since **2022** or before, the reception was very different: a fresh wave of frustration, a sense of injustice, and deep uncertainty about their future.

This reform, long overdue — the updated mobilization law had already eliminated fixed service terms in 2024 — arrives in a brutal military context. **Russia** has massed **721,300 soldiers** in Ukraine according to Ukrainian commander-in-chief **Oleksandr Syrskyi**. The front is under constant pressure. Units are desperately short of reinforcements. And yet, the soldiers who have held that front for four years and more find themselves signing **two-year contracts** just to get clarity on when their commitment might someday end.

## Bohdan Mykolaichuk: six years of service for one year's reprieve

### The portrait of a veteran trapped in the system

**Bohdan Mykolaichuk** has been in the Ukrainian army since **2022**. He served more than a year on the front line in the eastern **Donbas** region before being reassigned to a rear-area officer post. As of **June 26, 2026**, to remain in his current role and get any clarity on the end of his military commitment, he must sign a **two-year contract**. In exchange, the reform grants him roughly **one year of reprieve** — approximately one month of deferment per year of service completed through June 2026. Six years of service. One potential year of relief.

The **Ministry of Defense** insisted on the new system's fairness: all military personnel are eligible for the new contracts, wages are rising, and the mechanisms for returning from AWOL have been simplified. What the ministry does not state clearly is that the reform treats a soldier who joined in **March 2026** the same as one who has served since **2022** in terms of deferment measures. **Mykolaichuk** put it plainly: **"It is unfair to those who have served a long time. The main criterion should have been length of service and time spent in combat."**

### The question of employers and returning to civilian life

Beyond the perceived injustice in the deferment terms, **Mykolaichuk** raises a concrete problem the reform fails to address: a minimum of **six months of deferment** is not enough to rebuild a civilian life. Employers have little incentive to hire a former soldier who could be recalled to service in six months. Professional retraining takes time. Returning to family life requires stability. Promising six months is promising a parenthesis — not a life.

This question has direct economic implications for Ukrainian society. A country emerging from war needs to functionally reintegrate its fighters into the economy and social fabric. Demobilized soldiers without a safety net, without a viable reintegration plan, with a civilian window too short to be meaningful — that is a real social and economic risk that **Fedorov's** reform does not appear to have fully reckoned with.

## Oleksandr: the drone operator who sees the screws tightening

### The frustration of veterans facing new advantages for newcomers

**Oleksandr**, a drone operator who has served since 2022, told the **Kyiv Independent** what many feel without always finding the words: **"It seems more and more that those who stay in the army have the screws tightened further, and the longer they stay, the worse their conditions become compared to newcomers."** This perception — that loyalty and length of service are inversely rewarded — is toxic for morale and unit cohesion.

This is not an isolated anecdote. The **June 2026** reform introduces tangible benefits for new recruits — clear contracts, higher wages, explicit deferment prospects. It creates no compensatory mechanism for those who served through the hardest years, when those benefits did not yet exist. The difference in treatment between veterans and newcomers may not be intentional on the ministry's part, but it is real in the perception of the soldiers concerned.

### The drone system mechanics and performance-based payments

The reform introduces a **"mission control"** system for infantry and assault troops that verifies their presence at assigned positions and documents completed combat missions for bonus payments. A similar system already existed for drone operators like **Oleksandr**. In theory, this system aligns compensation with operational performance. In practice, as several soldiers interviewed by the **Kyiv Independent** explain, it requires video proof of mission completion — impossible to obtain in many combat conditions.

For infantry units in direct contact with the enemy, in conditions of fog of war, intense pressure, and degraded communications, capturing a mission confirmation video is a luxury that the reality of combat does not always permit. The result: bonuses to which soldiers are entitled on paper may elude them in practice for lack of documentation. It is a pay promise with an administrative layer that reduces its real value.

## Serhii: wounded, still serving, underpaid

### The master sergeant who can no longer serve on the front line

**Serhii**, a master sergeant in an assault regiment, was wounded in the course of his mission. He continues to serve in a rear-area role, unable to return to combat. Under the new salary structure, his monthly pay is that of rear-area personnel: **at least 30,000 hryvnias** (**$660**), a fraction of the **300,000 hryvnias** (**$6,700**) that front-line troops can earn. His argument is direct: **"You cannot evaluate someone's contribution solely based on whether they are at the front or in the rear. UAV specialists, electronic warfare operators, and communications personnel also do essential work — and deserve to be fairly compensated."**

This touches on a blind spot in the reform: the pay scale rewards physical proximity to danger, not competence or total contribution. An electronic warfare specialist based **20 kilometers from the front** who jams Russian communications may have greater strategic impact than an infantryman in direct contact — but will be paid far less under the new structure. The reform creates an implicit hierarchy of military value that the soldiers themselves contest.

### The question of personal expenses

**Oleksii**, a master sergeant in a drone unit, adds a dimension that official announcements pass over in silence: Ukrainian soldiers regularly spend their own money to perform their duties. Fuel to move along the front, rent outside barracks, supplies, repairs, equipment materials — all expenses that significantly reduce the net value of the pay received. **"If you have a family, you are cut off from social life because you do not have the resources to maintain it,"** he says.

Deputy Defense Minister **Mstyslav Banik** acknowledged at a press conference on **June 15, 2026**, that the ministry would like to increase payments but is constrained by available resources. That is a rare moment of official candor — but one that also reveals that the announcements of impressive salaries do not always reflect the economic reality experienced by soldiers on the ground.

## The reform's numbers: what they say and what they conceal

### 300,000 hryvnias per month for front-line fighters

The **Ministry of Defense** announced that front-line troops, particularly infantry and assault forces, would earn an average of **300,000 hryvnias per month** — approximately **$6,700** — with a ceiling of **460,000 hryvnias** (**$10,200**). These figures were presented as positioning Ukrainian soldiers among the **"best paid in the world."** The comparison is debatable — the cost of living in Ukraine is very different from that of Western countries whose armies are cited for comparison — but it illustrates the genuine effort made by the government under an extremely constrained budget.

The reform as a whole costs approximately **60 billion hryvnias** (**$1.3 billion**). **Fedorov** indicated these funds were secured through **internal budget optimizations and savings**, without direct recourse to additional international aid. That is a notable financial achievement for a government simultaneously managing a total war and an economy under constant pressure. But MP **Iryna Friz**, a member of parliament's defense committee, sounded a warning: the legal framework underpinning these payments remains fragile, with the new regulations designated as a **"pilot project"** not fully aligned with the military service law.

### 200,000 people in AWOL: the reintegration challenge

As of **January 14, 2026**, **Fedorov** estimated approximately **200,000** people were in AWOL status. The reform offers those who went absent for the first time an opportunity to return without criminal prosecution, with the choice of their new unit. It is a pragmatic mechanism that acknowledges that prior service conditions may have generated departures that were legally unjustifiable but humanly understandable.

However, as Sergeant **Oleksii** notes, the administrative mechanics of return remain complex and slow. Soldiers wishing to change units may wait **months** for the paperwork to be completed. The announced simplification will need to materialize concretely in actual procedures to have a real impact on the AWOL return rate. Good legislative intent and the reality of Ukrainian administrative practice do not always coincide as quickly as one would hope.

## The salary grid: what the numbers alone do not tell

### A pay gap creating inter-unit tensions

The **June 2026** reform creates a four-level salary grid based on proximity to the front. Rear-area posts receive **at least 30,000 hryvnias** (**$660**) per month. Logistics and first-echelon support roles rise to **50,000 hryvnias** (**$1,100**). Command post personnel receive **70,000 hryvnias** (**$1,540**). Combat role troops — drone operators, artillery, electronic warfare — reach a base of **120,000 hryvnias** (**$2,600**), with bonuses pushing up to **300,000 hryvnias** for infantry and assault troops. These amounts are real and represent a genuine financial effort by the Ukrainian government under an extremely tight budget.

The system nonetheless creates internal tensions. Units in the same sectors but with different classifications perceive pay disparities that breed resentment. The reform did not sufficiently account for the fact that **unit cohesion** requires a sense of equivalent fairness within the same structures. When one member of a unit earns five times more than another because their roles are classified differently, collective solidarity is not always forthcoming.

### The hidden cost of reassigned wounded soldiers

Soldiers who were wounded and can no longer serve on the front line but continue serving in rear roles — like **Serhii** — find themselves in a particularly unjust situation under the new grid. They paid the physical price of war, they continue to serve, and their salary reflects only their new posting location, not their front-line service history. No mechanism in the **June 2026** reform compensates for this pay reduction caused by a war wound.

This gap in the reform is morally difficult to defend. A soldier wounded in the service of his country should not automatically suffer a pay cut as a direct consequence of that wound. That is precisely the type of correction the second phase of the reform must incorporate if the government wants to maintain the trust of soldiers who gave everything.

## Progressive demobilization: a conditional presidential promise

### A promised presidential decree with no firm timeline

The **Ministry of Defense** indicated it would begin the **progressive demobilization** of troops who have served since **2022** or before by year's end. **Fedorov** clarified in June that the process would begin in **autumn** and that a presidential decree on the demobilization of the armed forces **"will take priority"** over previously signed contracts. This conditional language is precisely what worries the soldiers concerned: the **"will take priority"** depends on the situation at the front, which itself does not follow ministerial schedules.

For **Mykolaichuk**, the prospect of this decree remains **"elusive."** He does not know how the mechanism will work, or who will replace the demobilized soldiers. The **Ministry of Defense** has sketched a plan to open a **"recruitment market"** to foreign fighters, with the goal that foreigners make up as much as **50%** of Ukrainian infantry and assault units. This ambition — enormous in its scope — has no clearly defined timeline or operational mechanism yet.

### The paradox of demobilization in wartime

The fundamental contradiction in any demobilization policy in Ukraine in **June-July 2026** is this: **Russia** maintains **721,300 soldiers** on Ukrainian territory, with the **"thousand cuts" tactic** described by **Syrskyi**. **Fedorov** himself admitted it plainly: **"You cannot release everyone fighting since 2022 at once, or the front line would simply collapse."** That is a military truth that overrides any consideration of individual fairness.

This reality traps long-serving soldiers in an impossible position: too indispensable to be quickly demobilized, too exhausted to continue indefinitely, and too wounded in their sense of fairness to enthusiastically sign new contracts. **Yevhen**, an infantryman interviewed by the **Kyiv Independent**, says it plainly: **"If you let experienced veterans go, you can't simply replace them with new recruits."**

## The fragile legal framework: a parliament sidelined

### A pilot project circumventing existing legislation

MP **Iryna Friz**, a member of the Ukrainian parliament's national security and defense committee, expressed a fundamental concern about the reform's legal structure: the new regulations governing payments and AWOL return procedures are designated as a **"pilot project"** not fully aligned with the military service law. By circumventing parliament through experimental regulations, the ministry risks creating a situation where soldiers who sign contracts or accept the new terms cannot be certain that commitments made to them will rest on solid legal foundations.

**Friz** put it directly: **"The longer this process drags on, the harder it will be to explain — to those who will sign contracts and those who return from AWOL — how the state will continue to fulfill its obligations to them, and to what extent those obligations will be reliable and consistent."** She also noted that the Defense Ministry had been **"trying to circumvent legislative amendments through experimental regulations"** while bypassing parliamentary involvement.

### The financial sustainability question

Beyond the legal framework, **Friz** raised concerns about the reform's financial sustainability. The ministry did not present the parliamentary committee with a plan for how the spending would be funded over time. The **60 billion hryvnias** cost for the first phase is secured, according to **Fedorov**, through internal savings. But what will happen in the second phase, when the volumes of soldiers involved increase and budget pressures intensify? The question remains without a satisfactory public answer.

**Ukraine** receives an estimated **$60 billion** in international aid for 2026 according to some estimates. But this aid is conditional, distributed in tranches, subject to the political vagaries of donor countries. Building a durable military salary reform on that kind of financial flow without a solid internal legal foundation is a systemic risk that soldiers themselves, if they understand it, may be less inclined to trust.

## Conclusion: A necessary reform that must do better

### The right to be frustrated

The soldiers expressing frustration at the **June 2026** military reform are neither ungrateful nor cowardly. They are men and women who held the front for four years, who survived things few people in the West can imagine, and who are asking for one simple thing: to be treated fairly in a system that recognizes their length of service. That is a legitimate demand. **Fedorov's** reform, however well-intentioned, does not fully meet it in its first phase.

The real test of the reform will not be its June 2026 announcements, but what happens in **autumn 2026** when the first demobilization decrees must be issued, when soldiers decide whether or not to sign the new contracts, and when the 200,000 people in AWOL decide whether or not to return. Those moments of truth will tell whether the Ukrainian government has managed to build a sustainable military system — or has simply deferred the crisis to a later date.

### What these portraits reveal about the war

**Bohdan**, **Oleksandr**, **Serhii**, **Oleksii**, **Yevhen** — these faces of Ukraine's military reform are reminders of what abstract numbers always obscure: behind every soldier lies a life on hold, a family waiting, a civilian identity put in storage awaiting the day it can reclaim its rights. **Ukraine** is asking these men and women for extraordinary selflessness in defense of values that the West claims to share. The least the Ukrainian and Western governments can do is look them in the eye, acknowledge what they are living through, and build a system worthy of their sacrifice.

Ukrainian resistance is real, documented, admirable. It is also human, fragile, exhausted. Naming both is not contradictory. It is the condition for honest solidarity.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine's long-awaited military reform falls short for long-serving troops, June 26, 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-long-awaited-military-reform-falls-short-for-long-serving-troops/)

- [The Guardian — Ukraine war briefing: Zelensky, 40-day blitz, June 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/26/ukraine-war-briefing-zelenskyy-40-day-russia-blitz)

- [Kyiv Independent — Latest news from the war in Ukraine, July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-141/)

### Secondary sources

- [EuroMaidan Press — Articles on Zelensky and Ukrainian defense policy, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/tags/zelenskyy/)

- [Militarnyi — Syrskyi: Russia concentrated 721,000 soldiers in Ukraine, June 26, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/russia-concentrate-721000-troops-in-ukraine/)

- [EuroMaidan Press — Ukraine news, defense and policy category, July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/category/news-ukraine/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/portrait-bohdan-oleksandr-serhii-trois-soldats-que-la-reforme-militaire-ukrainie