# More Than 100 Russian Banks Now Under Western Sanctions > The accumulation of successive sanctions packages adopted by the European Union since 2022 has now pushed the number of Russian banks targeted - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Note - Published: 2026-07-07 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/plus-de-100-banques-russes-desormais-sous-sanctions-occidentales ## Introduction: a symbolic threshold crossed quietly ### A hundred financial institutions, a number that carries weight The accumulation of successive **sanctions packages** adopted by the **European Union** since **2022** has now pushed the number of **Russian banks** targeted by Western restrictions past **one hundred**, according to information relayed by **United24 Media** on **July 6, 2026**. This threshold, reached as the **21st sanctions package** is being prepared, represents more than half of all Russian financial institutions connected to international markets. This round number is not just a **bookkeeping symbol**: it reflects a **methodical, cumulative severing** of the Russian banking system from Western financial networks, a process built patiently, package after package, since the invasion of **Ukraine** began. What started as a handful of targeted measures against a few state-owned giants has, four years later, become a systemic architecture of exclusion touching more than half of the institutions Moscow once relied on to trade with the outside world. ### The new package adds nearly 90 banks The **21st package**, currently under negotiation, would add nearly **90 additional banks** to the existing list, a **major escalation** also accompanied by new restrictions targeting **cryptocurrencies**, **drone production** and certain **oil traders**. Negotiators in Brussels describe this package as one of the most technically complex yet, since it must also account for the workarounds Russian institutions have already built into earlier rounds of sanctions. *A hundred banks is more than a symbolic figure: it means the entire architecture of the Russian financial system is being drained dry, one blocked transaction at a time. We too often underestimate the real scope of this quiet banking war.* ## The backdrop of an alarming intelligence report ### A banking crisis described as explosive This sanctions escalation comes as an **intelligence report** from a European state, revealed by **Reuters** on **July 6, 2026**, warns that **Russia** risks a banking crisis described as **"explosive,"** a financial system that, according to the document, masks **growing structural vulnerability** behind a facade of apparent stability. The report notes, in particular, that roughly **10% of Russian corporate loans** are now considered troubled, while more than **500,000 Russians** filed for personal bankruptcy in **2025**, a roughly one-third increase from the year before. Analysts who reviewed the document say these figures point to a slow-burning erosion of household and corporate solvency that the Kremlin has so far managed largely through statistical framing rather than structural reform. ### A fragility the Russian central bank downplays The deputy governor of the **Russian central bank**, **Filipp Gabunia**, rejected this alarming diagnosis, insisting that banks' capital buffer remains at its highest level in three years, a **reassuring narrative** that stands in sharp contrast to the findings of the European intelligence report. *I find this contrast between Russia's official narrative and Western intelligence reports telling. One of the two is lying, or at least exaggerating, and recent history with Russian economic crises makes me trust data from the ground far more than the Kremlin's talking points.* ## Enforcement that has historically proven hard to guarantee ### The absence of a single central authority in Europe Despite this striking figure of more than **a hundred sanctioned banks**, **Europe** has often struggled to enforce its sanctions uniformly across its **27 member states**, lacking a single central authority able to guarantee consistent application across every national jurisdiction. This **administrative fragmentation** creates gaps that certain financial actors, Russian or third-party, exploit to keep processing transactions involving theoretically sanctioned banks, a reality that tempers the immediate effectiveness of this symbolic hundred-institution milestone. Compliance officers at several European banks have privately acknowledged that monitoring capacity varies wildly from one member state to another, leaving determined intermediaries room to maneuver. ### A challenge Brussels is trying to fix In light of this, several European officials are pushing to strengthen control and coordination mechanisms among national financial authorities, in order to close these **structural gaps** that limit the real impact of the banking sanctions already adopted. *I will remain skeptical until I see genuinely uniform enforcement of these sanctions across all twenty-seven European capitals. The headline ambition only matters as much as its concrete implementation on the banking front.* ## The cumulative effect on Russia's war economy ### Institutions cut off from international markets Sanctioned banks lose access to international payment systems dominated by Western currencies, a **constraint** that considerably complicates Russian commercial transactions with foreign partners, even with countries not aligned with Western sanctions such as **China** and **India**. This gradual exclusion is forcing **Moscow** to develop alternative payment systems, often less efficient and more costly, an **added burden** for an economy already strained by four years of war against **Ukraine**. Russian exporters increasingly report delays of several weeks in settling payments with partners abroad, a friction cost that eats directly into margins already squeezed by wartime spending. ### VTB, a warning sign from the banking sector itself **VTB**, Russia's second-largest bank, plans to increase its financial reserves to guard against potential loan losses, a **defensive move** that betrays very real unease within Russia's own banking sector, despite the reassuring narrative from official monetary authorities. *Watching an institution as central as VTB quietly brace for the worst often says more than any official statement. Russian bankers themselves don't seem fully convinced by the Kremlin's narrative of resilience.* ## The American counterpoint complicating coordination ### Washington eased certain restrictions While **Europe** tightens its banking arsenal, the **United States**, under **President Donald Trump**, eased certain economic sanctions, notably a temporary waiver that allowed the sale of Russian oil before it expired in mid-June **2026**, a **divergence** that complicates the overall coherence of Western pressure. This transatlantic asymmetry potentially hands the **Kremlin** occasional financial breathing room, precisely as **Brussels** tries to tighten the vice further on the Russian banking system. ### Consistency praised on the military front It must nonetheless be acknowledged that the **Trump** administration continues to support arms deliveries to **Ukraine**, an **essential distinction** between its sometimes lenient economic policy toward **Moscow** and its firmer stance on military support for **Kyiv**. *I refuse the easy caricature on this issue: Trump is neither an unconditional ally of Putin nor a flawless defender of Ukraine. On the economy, I criticize him firmly. On weapons delivered to Kyiv, I honestly credit him with a consistency that deserves to be acknowledged.* ## China and Asia, a lasting safety net ### A market largely ignoring Western sanctions Several economic analysts point out that **Asia** continues largely to ignore Western sanctions, with **China** remaining a major trade and financial partner for sanctioned Russian banks, a **safety net** that partially offsets the impact of European measures. As long as these Asian trade channels stay open, the effect of the hundred sanctioned banks will necessarily remain partial, even if every additional institution added to the list further narrows the **Kremlin**'s financial room to maneuver in Western markets. ### Growing dependency on Beijing This deepening dependency on **China** is gradually turning **Russia** into the junior partner of an economic axis dominated by **Beijing**, an asymmetric relationship whose geopolitical consequences reach far beyond the current banking file alone. *I say it often: China, far more than Western sanctions themselves, will determine Russia's real long-term economic resilience. It is a relationship of dependency whose strategic price Moscow does not yet seem to fully grasp.* ## What this means for Ukraine's war effort ### Pressure that must stay constant For **Ukraine** and its Western allies, crossing the symbolic threshold of **a hundred sanctioned banks** is an encouraging signal, but one that should not lead to any letup in vigilance, as long as the Russian financial system retains workarounds via **Asia** and the oil **shadow fleet**. Ukrainian officials regularly point out that every financial institution cut off from Western markets represents an added constraint on the **Kremlin**'s ability to fund its military operations against **Ukraine**. ### A quiet economic victory still to be consolidated This buildup of banking sanctions, while less dramatic than a military victory on the ground, could eventually weigh significantly on the **Kremlin**'s strategic calculations about continuing its aggression against **Ukraine**. *A war economy collapsing from within would be the quietest and most decisive victory of this conflict. It may well be in bank balance sheets, rather than on the battlefield, that part of this war's outcome will be decided.* ## The role of Western insurers and regulators ### Insurers, an often-overlooked link in deterrence Beyond banks alone, **Western insurers** play a key role in the real effectiveness of these sanctions, since most of the world's major maritime and financial insurance companies remain based in **Europe** and the **United Kingdom**, giving them considerable deterrent power over transactions involving **sanctioned Russian banks**. Strengthening coordination between **financial regulators** and **insurers** could close some of the current gaps in the system, notably by imposing stricter compliance requirements on any transaction passing, even indirectly, through a theoretically sanctioned Russian institution. ### Transatlantic cooperation still a work in progress **Transatlantic cooperation** on this file remains a work in progress, with differing approaches between **Washington** and **Brussels** sometimes complicating the consistent implementation of these financial control mechanisms worldwide, a gap Russian intermediaries have exploited with methodical consistency since the conflict began. *I think the West will eventually need to go after insurers who turn a blind eye to certain dubious transactions as well. It is often there, in the financial paperwork rather than in political announcements, that real long-term deterrence plays out.* ## Conclusion: a symbolic threshold, not a victory won ### A hundred banks, a milestone, not an endpoint Crossing the threshold of **a hundred sanctioned Russian banks** marks a significant milestone in the economic war the **West** is waging against the **Kremlin**, but it in no way represents a victory already won as long as substantial workarounds remain open via **Asia** and parallel maritime networks. ### Consistency remains the key to success Only **sustained economic pressure**, combined with **strengthened transatlantic coordination** and continued **military support** for **Ukraine**, will turn this symbolic milestone into a **genuine diplomatic lever** capable of weighing on the **Kremlin**'s decisions. *I close with deliberate caution: I firmly believe in the cumulative power of these banking sanctions, but I refuse to give in to easy euphoria over a round number. A hundred sanctioned banks alone do not guarantee the end of this war.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - Ukrainian Ministry of Defense — official statements, July 2026 - United24 Media — New EU sanctions set to cut off over half of Russia's international banks, July 6, 2026 - Army Inform — coverage of the economic war, July 2026 ### Secondary sources - Reuters — War threatens Russian banking crisis, European intelligence report says, July 6, 2026 - Foreign Policy — economic and geopolitical analysis, 2026 - The Guardian International — coverage of European sanctions, 2026 --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/plus-de-100-banques-russes-desormais-sous-sanctions-occidentales