# Beijing, stop bullying Manila and Tokyo in the South China Sea > Introduction: a letter to those who patrol other people's waters - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Open letter - Published: 2026-07-04 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/pekin-cessez-dintimider-manille-et-tokyo-en-mer-de-chine ## Introduction: a letter to those who patrol other people's waters ### What I want to say to **Beijing** today Dear government of **Beijing**, I am writing this letter because your **patrols** around **Scarborough Shoal** and your repeated warnings toward **Japan** and the **Philippines** no longer fool very many people: they look like plain **intimidation**, dressed up in international legal language (**Reuters**, June 30, **2026**). **China** stepped up its warnings in early July **2026**, calling the maritime talks between **Japan** and the **Philippines** an **"internationally illicit act,"** language that betrays more anxiety over losing the narrative than the strength of any real legal argument (**Bloomberg**, July 2, **2026**). ### Why an **open letter**, not a cold analysis I chose the **open letter** format because this file deserves a direct address, not just a pile of distant facts. The people of the **region**, **Filipino fishermen** foremost among them, live the concrete consequences of these tensions far more than any Western commentator ever will. This letter nonetheless remains rigorously sourced: every claim it contains rests on verifiable reporting from recent weeks. *I write this letter with a simple conviction: silence in the face of Chinese maritime **intimidation** protects no one, it only postpones the confrontation to a later date, under worse conditions.* ## What is really happening at **Scarborough** ### **Patrols** that keep intensifying On **June 30, 2026**, **Reuters** documented joint **patrols** by the **Southern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army** and the **Chinese coast guard** around the disputed **Scarborough Shoal**, an area the **Philippines** considers part of its **exclusive economic zone** (**Reuters**, June 30, **2026**). These patrols come after the removal of a Chinese floating barrier from the same shoal, withdrawn in June following repeated protests from **Manila**, an apparent retreat that clearly did not end the broader tensions in the area (**Philstar**, June 17, 2026). ### A cycle of **provocation** and calculated retreat This cycle of **provocation** followed by partial withdrawal, followed by fresh provocation, resembles a deliberate strategy of testing limits, where each apparent retreat mainly serves to temporarily defuse international diplomatic pressure without abandoning the underlying objective. **Manila**, for its part, already summoned the Chinese ambassador earlier this year to formally protest this repeated rhetorical **escalation**, a diplomatic gesture that clearly has not been enough to durably change **Beijing's** behavior. *This little game of provocation-retreat-provocation no longer impresses anyone in the **region**. It mostly reveals a patient strategy of territorial nibbling, one shoal at a time.* ## The **Japan**-**Philippines** summit that set it all off ### An **alliance** that worries **Beijing** The summit between Japanese prime minister **Sanae Takaichi** and Philippine president **Ferdinand Marcos** Jr announced the opening of bilateral talks on maritime borders, an initiative that immediately triggered **Beijing's** official anger (**SCMP**, May 29, 2026). This disproportionate reaction from **China** to simple bilateral talks between two sovereign democracies says a great deal about its real concern: watching a sturdier regional coordination take shape among countries that refuse its unilateral maritime claims. ### The specter of Taiwan in Chinese warnings According to **Bloomberg**, Chinese authorities also warned against any involvement of **Taiwan** in these broader maritime talks, an extension of the dispute that shows how **Beijing** systematically links every regional file to its central obsession with the democratic island (**Bloomberg**, July 2, 2026). This drive to fold every regional discussion into the **Taiwan** lens confirms, if confirmation were needed, that China's strategy in the South China Sea is never limited to a single isolated reef. *Every time **Beijing** drags the conversation back to Taiwan, even on a separate maritime file, it reveals the true scope of its regional ambition, well beyond whichever contested rocks are in the headlines at the moment.* ## What **international law** says, without ambiguity ### The **2016 arbitral ruling**, still valid The **Permanent Court of Arbitration** in The Hague had already ruled in 2016 in favor of the **Philippines** against Chinese claims over most of the South China Sea, a decision **Beijing** continues to unilaterally reject despite its binding character under **international law**. This persistent rejection of an international legal ruling by a power that otherwise claims to defend the international order is a contradiction this letter cannot ignore. ### The **Code of Conduct** negotiated for years **ASEAN** is aiming to finalize a **Code of Conduct** in the South China Sea by the end of 2026, an ambitious goal after years of laborious negotiations with **Beijing** on this file (**Philstar**, June 10, 2026). The success of these negotiations, if they truly come to fruition, will depend largely on Chinese willingness to respect multilateral rules rather than keep imposing facts on the ground through naval patrols. *It is hard to believe in **Beijing's** sincerity in these **Code of Conduct** negotiations when its coast guard simultaneously patrols the contested waters as if the matter were already settled in its favor.* ## The **Philippines**, on the front line for years ### A nation resisting with limited means The **Philippines**, despite naval resources vastly inferior to China's, keeps publicly documenting every maritime incident, a transparency strategy aimed precisely at mobilizing international opinion against a far more powerful military adversary. This asymmetry of power makes the Philippine persistence in defending its maritime rights all the more admirable, rather than simply yielding to the constant pressure exerted by its regional neighbor. ### The role of American and Japanese support Diplomatic and military support from the **United States** and now **Japan** for the **Philippines** constitutes a necessary counterweight to the power asymmetry that has characterized this regional dispute for decades. This Western and allied support must never, however, substitute for the primary **responsibility** of the **Philippines** to defend its own maritime **sovereignty**, a delicate balance Manila manages with remarkable composure. *I firmly believe the **West**, and its regional allies like **Japan**, must keep supporting the Philippines without letting up. Giving up on this file would mean validating the rule of the strongest in the middle of the South China Sea.* ## Why this file also concerns the **West** ### A vital trade route for the entire world The **South China Sea** sees trillions of dollars in international trade pass through it every year, which makes freedom of navigation there an issue that goes far beyond the sole territorial dispute between China and its immediate neighbors. Any Chinese attempt to turn this crucial maritime route into a zone under unilateral control would directly affect Western economic interests, well beyond the Asia-Pacific region alone. ### A test of **credibility** for the international order This file is also a test of **credibility** for the entire **rules-based international order**, a principle the **West** defends rhetorically but must also back concretely when powers like China actively challenge it on the ground. Letting Beijing impose facts on the ground without a firm response would send a dangerous signal to other revisionist powers watching the Western reaction to these repeated maritime provocations closely. *This is not just a distant regional dispute. It is a test of our collective will, in the **West**, to defend the international rules we claim to cherish when they are put to the concrete test.* ## What Beijing should really fear ### A regional coordination that keeps strengthening anyway Paradoxically, **Beijing's** repeated **intimidation** seems to be accelerating exactly what it is trying to prevent: tighter coordination between **Japan**, the **Philippines**, and other regional partners worried about the same maritime intimidation tactics. This counterproductive dynamic illustrates a classic strategic error: excessive pressure often ends up uniting its targets rather than dividing them, an effect diplomatic history documents abundantly. ### The reputational price of repeated threats Every new Chinese warning, every new patrol around **disputed reefs**, chips away a little more at **Beijing's** international credibility as a responsible actor in the regional order, a reputational cost that Chinese **diplomacy** seems to systematically underestimate. This reputational cost, accumulated over several years of similar tensions, could eventually outweigh the limited territorial gains China hopes to secure through this strategy of sustained pressure. *I genuinely believe Beijing is making a strategic miscalculation. Every provocation strengthens its neighbors' resolve rather than subduing them, a pattern history has repeated for decades.* ## A letter also addressed to the **West** ### Not settling for statements of principle This letter is also addressed, implicitly, to the **West** itself: statements of principle about freedom of navigation and **international law** are not enough if they are not paired with concrete, lasting support for the regional partners directly threatened. Diplomatic support must translate into regular naval presence, credible joint exercises, and help strengthening Philippine and Japanese maritime capabilities against Chinese pressure that shows no sign of letting up. ### Western **consistency**, an imperative This Western **consistency** must also apply elsewhere: one cannot firmly denounce Russian aggression in **Ukraine** while remaining timid in the face of Chinese intimidation in the **South China Sea**, on pain of a double standard that would weaken the West's overall credibility. It is this consistency, more than any one-off speech, that will determine whether the West retains its credibility as a sincere defender of the rules-based international order. *You cannot be firm with Moscow and soft on Beijing without losing all moral credibility. Consistency, not geographic selectivity, must guide the Western response to revisionist powers.* ## The human dimension behind the maritime maps ### Fishermen caught between two powers Behind the maritime maps and diplomatic statements, there are ordinary **Filipino fishermen** whose livelihoods depend directly on access to traditional fishing grounds, now contested by Chinese patrols. These coastal communities, often modest economically, pay the daily concrete price of a geopolitical dispute that far exceeds their individual capacity for action or negotiation. ### A reality too often forgotten in geopolitical analysis It is easy, from a Western desk, to coldly discuss exclusive economic zones and international maritime law. It is harder to remember that these abstract discussions concretely determine whether a Filipino fishing family eats properly this month. This human dimension deserves to be recalled regularly, at the risk of otherwise turning a daily-life issue into a mere intellectual geopolitical exercise, disconnected from the ground. *I often think of these Filipino fishermen I have never personally met, whose fate depends directly on decisions made in Beijing, Manila, and Washington. They deserve never to be forgotten in these analyses.* ## What **Tokyo** brings new to this equation ### A more assertive **Japan** on the regional stage **Japan's** direct involvement in maritime talks with the **Philippines** marks a notable shift in **Tokyo's** regional posture, traditionally more cautious on territorial files that do not directly concern it. This more assertive **Tokyo** posture reflects growing Japanese concern over Chinese maritime ambitions, which also directly touch **Japan** in the separate but related matter of the **Senkaku Islands**. ### A regional solidarity building gradually This nascent solidarity between **Tokyo** and **Manila** on maritime issues could, if it consolidates over time, form a significant regional counterweight to Chinese ambitions, complementary to the already well-established American support in the region. It is precisely this gradual consolidation that **Beijing** visibly seeks to discourage through its repeated warnings, apparently with little success so far. *Seeing **Japan** commit more firmly alongside the Philippines gives me a reason for cautious optimism: regional coordination against Beijing is taking shape, despite the repeated intimidation.* ## The limits of this letter and what it does not claim to know ### A fast-moving situation This letter, written in early July 2026, reflects a situation that is by nature evolving: new patrols, new statements, or new diplomatic developments could arise quickly after its publication. I do not claim, therefore, to offer a definitive judgment on the outcome of this maritime dispute, but rather an honest snapshot based on verifiable information available at this precise moment. ### What I cannot state with certainty I cannot state with certainty whether the **Code of Conduct** targeted by **ASEAN** for the end of 2026 will actually be completed within the announced timeline, nor whether current Chinese patrols will intensify or calm down in the coming weeks. This honest uncertainty is an integral part of any serious geopolitical analysis, and I would rather own it than pretend to a clairvoyance current facts do not support. *I own this uncertainty without embarrassment. Pretending to know everything about the outcome of this dispute would be dishonest, and intellectual honesty matters more to me than comfortable certainty.* ## A direct appeal for Chinese restraint ### What Beijing would gain from **de-escalation** Dear government of **Beijing**, a sincere de-escalation of your patrols around **Scarborough** and genuine respect for the **Code of Conduct** under negotiation would strengthen your international credibility far more than continuing a pressure strategy that, as shown above, mainly produces the opposite of the intended effect. This de-escalation would not mean abandoning your territorial claims, but simply pursuing them through legitimate diplomatic and legal channels rather than repeated naval intimidation. ### What the entire region would gain from it A genuine de-escalation would benefit the entire region: Filipino fishermen who could resume their activities without fear, international trade passing through these waters, and the **regional stability** that every actor, including China itself, publicly claims to seek. It is this vision of a stable and prosperous region, rather than one dominated by fear and intimidation, that this letter sincerely calls for. *My appeal to Beijing is not naive: I know it has little chance of being heard in the short term. But clearly naming what should change remains, I believe, the very least a committed columnist owes his readers.* ## What this letter concretely demands ### Three specific demands addressed to Beijing I am concretely asking three things of **Beijing**: stop the intimidating patrols around **disputed reefs**, respect the **2016 arbitral ruling** without further conditions, and negotiate the **Code of Conduct** with **ASEAN** in good faith, without trying to strip it of its binding substance. These three demands are not a maximalist anti-China stance, but simply the minimal respect for **international law** that China itself claims elsewhere, on other international files that suit it better. ### What the West must demand of itself At the same time, this letter asks the West to translate its rhetorical support for the Philippines and **Japan** into concrete, lasting **commitments**, rather than one-off statements that fade the moment the news cycle moves elsewhere. It is this dual demand, toward Beijing and toward ourselves, that fundamentally structures this **open letter**. *I close this section convinced that demanding consistency from Beijing without demanding the same consistency from our own Western camp would ultimately be a form of hypocrisy I refuse to endorse.* ## What history will remember of this precise moment ### A tipping point few notice yet The year **2026** may, in hindsight, be remembered as the one when the **coalition** between **Japan**, the **Philippines**, and their **Western partners** stopped being a mere statement of intent and became a concrete security architecture in the **South China Sea**. The joint patrols, the expanded **military exercises**, and the **intelligence**-sharing agreements signed in recent months are not mere diplomatic symbols: they are quietly but durably redrawing the regional balance of power against **Beijing**. ### What the coming months will say about our collective resolve The real question is no longer whether **China** will keep testing the limits of international law in the region, because it almost certainly will, but whether **Japan**, the **Philippines**, and the **West** can maintain their cohesion beyond the next headline incident. It is this endurance, more than any one-off statement, that will determine whether this **open letter** turns out to have been a mere rhetorical exercise or the reflection of a genuinely embraced turning point. *I do not know whether history will remember this moment as a turning point or as one more missed opportunity; what I do know is that silence in the face of intimidation has never protected anyone for long.* ## Conclusion: a region that deserves better than fear ### A file that will not close anytime soon The maritime dispute between China, the Philippines, and Japan will probably not be resolved in the coming weeks, despite the ambitious deadline set by **ASEAN** for the Code of Conduct by the end of 2026. What this letter hopes for, more modestly, is to help clearly name the respective responsibilities of each actor, without indulgence toward any side, including the West when it falls short of its own rhetorical **commitments**. ### A final word for those who live on these coasts For the Filipino fishermen, for the worried Japanese coastal communities, and for everyone who lives daily with the consequences of this geopolitical dispute, this letter hopes at least to bear witness that their situation is not forgotten by those who, from afar, observe and write about these issues. *If this letter changes nothing in Beijing, I hope it will at least remind the West that consistency is proven over time, not in a single statement of solidarity.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [The Star — China ramps up warnings to Japan and the Philippines — July 3, 2026](https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2026/07/03/china-ramps-up-warning-to-japan-philippines-over-maritime-talks) - [Reuters — China conducts patrols around Scarborough Shoal — June 30, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-conducts-patrols-around-scarborough-shoal-disputed-south-china-sea-2026-06-30/) - [Associated Press — Philippines and Beijing, disputes in the South China Sea — 2026](https://apnews.com/article/philippines-beijing-south-china-sea-disputes-dac69e3e7159dc3672879feeee87de5d) ### Secondary sources - [South China Morning Post — China condemns Japan-Philippines maritime border talks — May 29, 2026](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3355351/illegal-and-void-china-condemns-japan-philippines-maritime-border-talks) - [Philstar — Philippines targets end of 2026 for South China Sea Code of Conduct — June 10, 2026](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2026/06/10/2534209/philippines-targets-end-2026-south-china-sea-code-conduct) - [Reuters — China threatens Taiwan, Japan strengthens its defense posture — June 11, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/reuters-china-menaces-taiwan-japan-stands-taller-under-new-defense-posture-2026-06-11/) - [Council on Foreign Relations — Tracking the territorial dispute in the South China Sea — 2026](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/pekin-cessez-dintimider-manille-et-tokyo-en-mer-de-chine