# NOTE: Xi Jinping Changes Tactics on Taiwan

> The daily average of Chinese air incursions into the Taiwan Strait has fallen by half compared with 2025, according to the Straits Times of June 15, 2026, a spectacular decline that nonetheless reflects no real easing…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/note-xi-jinping-changes-tactics-on-taiwan

## Introduction

The daily average of Chinese air incursions into the **Taiwan** Strait has fallen by **half** compared with 2025, according to the **Straits Times** of June 15, 2026, a spectacular decline that nonetheless reflects no real easing of the pressure **Beijing** exerts on Taipei. This **note** examines this Chinese tactical shift, which now favors quieter diplomatic and economic levers over the loud aerial demonstrations of previous years. *Fewer planes never means less pressure; it most often means pressure that has changed shape to become harder to name, harder to measure, and therefore harder to counter effectively.*

This **note** documents three dimensions of this tactical shift: the measurable decline in air incursions reported by the **Straits Times**, the emergence of Chinese coast guard patrols east of **Taiwan** reported by the **New York Times** on July 5, 2026, and the wider Chinese budgetary context reported by **Reuters** on March 10, 2026.

This **tactical evolution**, observed over several consecutive months in 2026, invites a reconsideration of how Western observers measure Chinese **pressure** on **Taiwan**, a pressure no longer confined to the simple daily count of air incursions.

## The number that changes everything: half as many incursions

### A decline confirmed by the Straits Times

The **daily average** of Chinese air incursions into the **Taiwan** Strait fell by half compared with 2025, according to the **Straits Times** of June 15, 2026, a decline confirmed by a journalistic source specializing in regional Asian coverage, without exhaustive detail on the precise monthly figures used to establish this comparative average. *A number that falls this dramatically always deserves to be questioned about what it has been replaced with, rather than celebrated in isolation as good news that speaks for itself.*

This **note** confirms, based on the **Straits Times**, that this decline in air incursions constitutes an observable and measurable shift in China's direct military posture toward **Taiwan** during the first half of 2026, compared with the previous year.

### What this decline does not necessarily mean

This **note** specifies that this decline in air incursions does not necessarily signal a general easing of tensions between **Beijing** and **Taipei**, an essential nuance the Straits Times explicitly underscores by simultaneously documenting the emergence of new, quieter diplomatic and economic levers of pressure.

This **nuance**, central to this note, calls for never reducing the assessment of Chinese pressure on **Taiwan** to the single indicator of daily air incursions, an indicator that has become insufficient to capture the complexity of the current Chinese **strategy**.

## The new diplomatic and economic levers

### Pressure shifting toward quieter channels

**Beijing** now favors quieter **diplomatic and economic levers** toward **Taipei**, according to the **Straits Times** of June 15, 2026, a shift that reflects strategic refinement rather than disengagement, with China apparently seeking to exert continuous pressure while reducing the risk of direct and visible military escalation. *A quiet lever is never a weak lever; it is, often, more effective precisely because it escapes the simple measurement and the immediate international condemnation that a visible military overflight triggers.*

This **note** observes that this quieter diplomatic and economic pressure fits within a long-term logic, capable of producing cumulative effects on **Taiwan**'s **economy** and international standing without triggering the immediate international reactions that massive air incursions provoke.

### What this discretion implies for Western detection

This strategic **discretion**, documented generally by the Straits Times without exhaustive detail on each specific economic or diplomatic lever employed, complicates the task of Western observers responsible for measuring and documenting the pressure **Beijing** exerts on **Taiwan**.

This **note** emphasizes that this complication of detection constitutes precisely one of the likely objectives of this tactical shift, a hypothesis consistent with the documented evolution though it cannot be confirmed as an officially declared intention by **Beijing**.

## Coast guard patrols east of Taiwan

### A new front documented by the New York Times

China has simultaneously announced **coast guard patrols** east of the island, according to the **New York Times** of July 5, 2026, a significant development given that **Taiwan**'s east coast had historically been less exposed to Chinese maritime pressure than the western strait, which is more closely monitored by **Beijing**'s naval and air forces. *A new maritime front opened to the east never simply supplements pressure already present to the west; it progressively surrounds it, shrinking the space Taipei could previously consider relatively secure.*

This **note** confirms, based on the New York Times, that these patrols east of **Taiwan** constitute a geographic extension of the Chinese presence around the island, consistent with the increased presence in the South **China** Sea documented more broadly by the Straits Times.

### What this geographic extension reveals about Chinese strategy

This **geographic extension**, documented by cross-referencing the **New York Times** and the Straits Times, illustrates for this note a Chinese strategy that seeks to progressively encircle **Taiwan** on several simultaneous fronts rather than concentrating all its pressure on the traditionally monitored western strait alone.

This **note** observes that this geographic diversification of Chinese **pressure** complicates Taiwanese defense planning, which must now anticipate a potential Chinese presence across several maritime approaches simultaneously rather than a single main front.

## The budgetary context of this tactical shift

### A budget rising but at a slowed pace

This tactical evolution fits within a context of a Chinese **defense budget** rising but at a slowed pace, according to **Reuters** of March 10, 2026, with the 2026 budget increasing by 6.9%, the slowest growth pace since 2021, a figure that invites reconsideration of the assumption of a uniform and linear Chinese military intensification toward **Taiwan**. *A budget that slows its growth never tells a simple story of de-escalation; it tells, more precisely, a story of reprioritization in which certain costly levers like air incursions give way to less costly but equally effective ones.*

This **note** observes that this relative budgetary slowdown could constitute a partial explanatory factor for the tactical shift documented by the **Straits Times**, with **China** potentially substituting less costly diplomatic and economic levers for the repeated and expensive aerial demonstrations of previous years.

### What this budgetary hypothesis does not allow us to claim

This **note** specifies that this hypothesis of a link between budgetary slowdown and tactical shift remains a plausible interpretation rather than a fact explicitly confirmed by the available sources, with no official Chinese statement directly connecting these two developments in the reports consulted for this text.

This interpretive **caution**, maintained throughout this note, clearly distinguishes the observed temporal correlation between these two developments from any proven causality, an essential methodological distinction for the credibility of this **analysis**.

## Taiwan's response to this tactical evolution

### A necessary adaptation to pressure that is changing shape

This **note** observes that **Taipei** must now adapt its defense doctrine to a Chinese **pressure** that is changing shape, moving from an easily measurable aerial demonstration to more diffuse diplomatic, economic, and maritime levers, an adaptation that requires detection and response instruments different from those developed to counter repeated air incursions. *A defense designed to count planes never automatically protects against pressure that shifts toward economic and diplomatic channels; to remain relevant, it must evolve at the same pace as the threat it seeks to counter.*

This **necessary adaptation**, not explicitly detailed in the sources available for this note beyond the general observation of the Chinese tactical shift, constitutes a major strategic challenge for Taiwanese authorities in the months following these documented developments.

### The role of Western partners in this adaptation

This **note** observes that **Taiwan**'s Western partners, notably the **United States**, are also affected by this Chinese tactical evolution, insofar as their support for the island must likewise adapt to pressure shifting from visible military channels toward diplomatic and economic channels harder to counter by strictly military means.

This **involvement** of Western partners, consistent with the broader context of regional mobilization illustrated by the **Balikatan 2026** exercise according to **Asialink**, confirms for this note the collective dimension of the response to this Chinese tactical evolution toward **Taiwan**.

## The link with Chinese presence in the South China Sea

### The same logic deployed across several regional theaters

This **note** observes that this tactical evolution toward **Taiwan** fits within a broader logic of increased Chinese presence in the South **China** Sea, documented notably by the diplomatic ban targeting the Philippine defense minister reported by **Al Jazeera** on June 11, 2026 and the persistent situation at **Scarborough** Shoal documented by **Reuters** on July 10, 2026. *The same hand that shifts its levers toward Taiwan never stops acting simultaneously on other regional theaters; it instead multiplies the fronts on which it exerts continuous pressure adapted to each specific context.*

This **common logic**, documented by cross-referencing several sources covering distinct regional developments, confirms for this note that Chinese strategy toward **Taiwan** cannot be understood in isolation from the broader context of its regional ambitions in the South **China** Sea.

### What this common logic implies for regional analysis

This **implication**, central to this note, invites observers to jointly analyze developments concerning **Taiwan** and those concerning the **Philippines** rather than treating them as strictly separate files, an integrated approach that better reflects the documented Chinese regional strategic coherence in 2026.

This **note** recommends this integrated approach as an essential analytical tool for anticipating **Beijing**'s future tactical evolutions across the entire Indo-Pacific region rather than on a single isolated bilateral **file**.

## The limits of available information on this evolution

### A main source that does not detail every mechanism

This **note** acknowledges that the **Straits Times**, the main source documenting this tactical shift, does not exhaustively detail every specific diplomatic and economic mechanism employed by **Beijing** toward **Taipei**, an information limit that calls for caution in any precise description of these new levers of pressure. *A tactic that shifts toward discretion escapes, by definition, journalistic documentation as precise as that available for visible and countable air incursions; this limit must be named rather than filled with speculation.*

This **information limit**, explicitly acknowledged by this note, does not invalidate the general observation of the tactical shift reported by the **Straits Times**, but it calls for caution in any overly precise claim about the exact mechanisms of this new diplomatic and economic **pressure**.

### What this acknowledgment imposes as an analytical posture

This **note** adopts an analytical posture that favors describing the observable shift over speculating on mechanisms not detailed by the available sources, a posture consistent with the requirement for factual rigor that must take precedence over the ambition of descriptive completeness.

This **posture**, maintained throughout this note, clearly distinguishes what is confirmed by the **Straits Times** and the **New York Times** from what remains a gray area requiring additional journalistic follow-up in the months following this text's publication.

## What this evolution suggests about long-term Chinese doctrine

### A strategy of continuous pressure rather than occasional escalation

This **note** observes that this tactical evolution suggests a **Chinese doctrine** of continuous and adjustable **pressure** rather than occasional and spectacular **escalation**, a doctrine that would favor the accumulation of diplomatic, economic, and maritime effects over the long term rather than the immediate and visible show of force characteristic of previous years. *Pressure that spreads out over time rather than striking all at once never reassures more; it worries, differently, through its capacity to accumulate without ever offering the clear moment when a firm response would become obvious and consensual.*

This **doctrine of continuous pressure**, if confirmed in the months following the observations reported by the **Straits Times** and the **New York Times**, would represent a major strategic evolution in the Chinese approach to the Taiwan file over several years.

### What this doctrinal hypothesis does not yet allow us to conclude

This **note** specifies that this hypothesis of a continuous **pressure** doctrine remains an analytical interpretation rather than an official Chinese confirmation, with no available source citing an explicit statement from **Beijing** formulating this doctrinal shift in these precise terms.

This interpretive **caution**, maintained by this note, calls for considering this hypothesis as a useful reading framework rather than an established certainty, a framework that will need to be confirmed or refuted by continued observation in the following months.

## The role of regional military exercises in this context

### Balikatan 2026 as a counterpoint to this tactical evolution

This **note** observes that the **Balikatan 2026** exercise, which mobilized **17,000 troops** from seven countries according to **Asialink**, including for the first time since 1945 a Japanese combat deployment, constitutes a significant regional counterpoint to this quieter Chinese tactical evolution toward **Taiwan**, illustrating the persistence of a visible military response from regional partners. *Pressure that becomes quieter on one side never meets symmetrical silence on the other; it meets, instead, a mobilization that remains visible precisely because the opposing discretion never excuses vigilance.*

This **note** confirms, based on **Asialink**, that this regional mobilization continues to unfold visibly and demonstratively, in contrast with the growing discretion of the Chinese tactic toward **Taiwan** documented by the Straits Times.

### What this contrast reveals about the current regional dynamic

This **contrast**, between a Chinese **pressure** that grows quieter and a regional response that remains visible and demonstrative, illustrates for this note an interesting strategic asymmetry that could favor **Beijing** insofar as its pressure becomes harder to counter through classic and visible military means.

This **asymmetry**, observed without being precisely quantifiable from the available sources, constitutes for this note a major strategic issue that **Taiwan**'s Western and regional partners will need to integrate into their doctrinal thinking in the following months.

## What Taiwanese businesses and the economy might feel

### Economic pressure potentially harder to quantify

This **note** observes that if **Beijing** now favors quieter economic levers toward **Taipei**, according to the Straits Times, this evolution could progressively affect Taiwanese businesses and the economy in a more diffuse and harder-to-quantify way than the already documented impact of air incursions on market and investor confidence. *A quiet economic lever never makes the evening news the way a fighter jet overflight does; it acts, more silently, on investment decisions and supply chains that are measured in months rather than minutes.*

This **diffuse economic pressure**, not precisely detailed in the sources available for this note, would deserve specialized follow-up from economic analysts capable of documenting its concrete effects on Taiwanese businesses in the months following this Chinese tactical shift.

### What this economic follow-up would require as complementary expertise

This **note**, centered on the military and diplomatic tactical evolution documented by the **Straits Times** and the **New York Times**, acknowledges the limits of its own analytical framework for precisely assessing the economic impact of this evolution, an impact that would require specialized economic expertise complementary to that mobilized in this text.

This **acknowledgment** of this note's disciplinary limits illustrates the requirement for methodological rigor that refuses to speculate beyond the sources and analytical competencies specifically mobilized for this text devoted to the Chinese military and diplomatic tactical evolution.

## What the next months should reveal about this tactic

### Concrete indicators to watch to confirm this evolution

To confirm or refute this Chinese tactical evolution, this **note** identifies several indicators to watch in the following months: whether the decline in air incursions reported by the Straits Times persists, any intensification of Chinese coast guard patrols east of **Taiwan** reported by the **New York Times**, and the evolution of the Chinese defense budget for 2027. *A tactic observed over a few months never automatically becomes a confirmed doctrine; it becomes one only when the observation repeats, month after month, without significant contradiction from new documented developments.*

This **note** calls for rigorous journalistic follow-up of these indicators, the only way to distinguish a durable tactical evolution from a temporary and reversible adjustment in the Chinese approach to the Taiwanese **file** observed during the first half of 2026.

### The Taiwanese response also worth watching in the following months

Symmetrically, this **note** identifies Taiwan's response to this Chinese tactical evolution as an essential indicator to watch, whether it takes the form of an explicit doctrinal adaptation, reinforced **cooperation** with regional partners, or increased public communication aimed at documenting this quieter diplomatic and economic **pressure**.

This Taiwanese **response**, not yet detailed in the sources available for this note at the time of writing, will constitute a key element for assessing, in the following months, the relative effectiveness of this new Chinese tactic against the island's institutional and economic resilience.

## How this note situates itself relative to other regional coverage

### A complementary reading to broader South China Sea coverage

This **note** situates itself as a complementary reading to broader coverage of the South **China** Sea, notably the developments concerning the **Philippines** and the persistent situation at **Scarborough** Shoal documented by **Reuters**, without claiming to exhaustively cover every dimension of the current Chinese regional strategy beyond the specific Taiwanese tactical shift analyzed here. *A note focused on a single file never claims to explain an entire region; it claims, more modestly, to illuminate precisely the piece it has chosen to document with rigor.*

This **complementary positioning**, deliberately adopted by this note, invites readers to consult in parallel the coverage devoted to the Philippines and the South China Sea for a more complete picture of the current Chinese regional strategy documented across 2026.

### What this deliberate focus allows and does not allow

This **deliberate focus** on the Taiwanese tactical shift allows this note to document with precision the specific evolution reported by the **Straits Times** and the **New York Times**, but does not allow it to draw general conclusions about the entirety of Chinese **strategy** across the Indo-Pacific region.

This **note** accepts this analytical limit as the price of the precision it seeks to offer on this specific file, preferring a documented depth over a superficial breadth that would risk diluting the rigor of the observations reported here.

## Why this tactical shift matters beyond Taiwan alone

### A precedent that could inspire other regional postures

This **note** considers that this Chinese tactical shift toward **Taiwan**, if confirmed as an effective and durable doctrine, could constitute a precedent studied by other regional actors seeking to exert continuous **pressure** without triggering the direct international condemnation that a visible military escalation provokes.

This **precedent hypothesis**, not confirmed by any source cited in this note, remains a plausible but speculative extrapolation that this text explicitly identifies as such rather than presenting it as an established analytical certainty.

### What Western democracies should retain from this observation

This **note** suggests that Western democracies, attentive to the defense of **Taiwan** and the broader Indo-Pacific stability, should retain from this tactical shift the necessity of developing detection tools adapted to diplomatic and economic **pressure**, and not solely to visible military escalation as in previous years.

This **necessity**, which this note formulates as a recommendation rather than a confirmed fact, constitutes the final analytical contribution of this text devoted to the Chinese tactical evolution toward **Taiwan** documented during the first half of 2026.

## Conclusion

This **note** confirms that the daily average of Chinese air incursions into the **Taiwan** Strait fell by half compared with 2025, according to the **Straits Times**, while **Beijing** now favors quieter diplomatic and economic levers toward Taipei, a tactical shift that coincides with the announcement of Chinese coast guard patrols east of the island reported by the **New York Times**.

This **evolution**, documented in a context of a Chinese defense budget rising but at a slowed pace according to **Reuters**, reflects no real easing of the pressure exerted on Taiwan, but rather a strategic refinement that complicates the task of Western observers responsible for measuring and countering this continuous pressure. *A curve that rises and then falls never tells the same story as a curve that rises without interruption; it tells the story of an actor adjusting its means according to observed results rather than a fixed doctrine applied mechanically.*

This **note** concludes that Chinese strategy toward **Taiwan** remains adaptable and reactive rather than fixed in a mechanical and predictable escalation, an observation that should temper any linear forecast of the pressure's future trajectory. *A tactic that grows quieter never deserves less attention than a tactic that makes noise; it often deserves more, precisely because its discretion is the condition of its lasting effectiveness.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Reuters — China's 2026 defense budget — March 10, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-lifts-military-budget-modernize-weapons-defence-technology-2026-03-10/)

### Secondary sources

- [Straits Times — Tactical shift toward Taiwan — June 15, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-swaps-fighter-jets-for-diplomatic-hardball-to-squeeze-taiwan)

- [New York Times — Patrols east of Taiwan — July 5, 2026](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/05/world/asia/china-taiwan-east-coast-guard-patrols.html)

- [Asialink — Balikatan 2026 exercise — 2026](https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/diplomacy/insights/between-talks-and-tensions-why-south-china-sea-wont-stabilise-2026/)

- [Al Jazeera — Ban on Philippine defense minister — June 11, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/11/china-bars-philippines-defence-chief-as-south-china-sea-spat-sails-onwards)

- [Reuters — Situation at Scarborough — July 10, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/decade-after-historic-ruling-philippine-fishermen-say-driven-away-disputed-shoal-2026-07-10/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/note-xi-jinping-changes-tactics-on-taiwan