# Ukraine and Moldova force Europe's door open

> Introduction: one more step toward membership, despite Budapest

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Commentary
- Published: 2026-07-04
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/lukraine-et-la-moldavie-forcent-la-porte-de-leurope

## Introduction: one more step toward membership, despite Budapest

### The sixth cluster unlocked on July 3

At a technical meeting held on **July 3, 2026**, the **Twenty-Seven** unanimously agreed to move forward with opening **cluster 6**, devoted to **external relations**, as part of the **accession** **negotiations** of **Ukraine** and **Moldova** with the **European Union**. This decision marks a further step in an **accession** process that, just a few months ago, seemed indefinitely stalled by Hungary's veto.

Concretely, the meeting of the **Working Party on Enlargement** approved a screening report, formally concluding the analytical review of both candidate countries' laws against the European legal framework. A formal invitation letter must still be approved at an upcoming ambassadors' meeting, ahead of a formal opening scheduled at an intergovernmental conference on **July 14, 2026**.

### An advance that owes much to a political shift in Budapest

This gradual unlocking is largely explained by **Péter Magyar's** electoral victory over **Viktor Orbán** in April 2026. The new Hungarian government, which took office in May, agreed to lift the veto that had paralyzed the opening of **negotiations** with **Ukraine** for two years, following an agreement reached with **Kyiv** on the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.

This Hungarian political shift illustrates, almost symbolically, how a domestic democratic change can unlock a major geopolitical file that had seemed condemned to paralysis since Russia's invasion of February 2022.

*It took Hungarian voters getting rid of Orbán for Europe to finally regain its capacity for collective action on this file. That's a valuable lesson: one country's internal democracy can literally paralyze the fate of two entire nations.*

## The complex mechanics of European accession

### Thirty-three chapters, six clusters, unanimity at every step

The **European Union** **accession** process consists of **33 chapters** grouped into **six thematic clusters**. The first, called "fundamentals," covers the rule of law, human rights, and the judicial system; it must be the first opened and the last closed, making it the cornerstone of the entire process. Every intermediate step, including the opening of each **cluster**, requires the unanimous agreement of the **27 member states**.

**Ukraine** and **Moldova** officially opened this first "fundamentals" **cluster** on **June 15, 2026**, a day that the European Commissioner for Enlargement, **Marta Kos**, called the biggest step forward in the process since the two countries obtained **candidate** status in 2023.

### A "package" approach linking both files from the start

Since the two countries filed their respective applications in the wake of Russia's invasion of **Ukraine**, **Brussels** has treated the Ukrainian and Moldovan files as an inseparable pair, an approach known as the "package approach." This linkage means that any blockage of the Ukrainian file, notably through the Hungarian veto, automatically froze **Moldova's** file too, despite **Chișinău** sometimes making faster progress on certain chapters.

This interdependence, frustrating as it has been for **Chișinău** at times, reflects a simple geopolitical reality: both countries share a **border** with the war zone and a direct vulnerability to Russian interference attempts against their respective democratic processes.

*Linking the European fate of **Ukraine** and **Moldova** is not just bureaucratic technicality. It is an implicit recognition that one country's **security** depends directly on the other's, in the face of a Russian neighbor that has never truly reconciled itself to their sovereignty.*

## Maia Sandu and Moldova's existential gamble

### A president who made accession a matter of survival

Moldovan president **Maia Sandu** confirmed she had signed the decree allowing accession **negotiations** to move forward, explicitly presenting **European Union** membership as the path to stability for her small country wedged between Romania and **Ukraine**. For **Chișinău**, European **accession** goes far beyond simple economic **integration**: it represents an existential bulwark against repeated destabilization attempts orchestrated from Moscow.

**Moldova** was judged ready by the European Commission to open all six clusters as early as July 2026, a faster pace than Ukraine's, which is slowed by the added complexity of fighting an active **war** on its own territory.

### A possible decoupling of the two paths

At an **EU-Moldova** summit held in **Brussels** on **June 22, 2026**, European Commission president **Ursula von der Leyen** suggested that decoupling the two accession paths could become inevitable, with each **candidate** country now expected to be held accountable for its own specific progress and reforms. This announcement was welcomed by **Chișinău**, which has long argued against being slowed down by Ukraine's pace.

European Council president **António Costa** praised the speed with which the Moldovan administration has implemented its reforms, suggesting this pace could allow **Moldova** to quickly unlock the five remaining clusters.

***Maia Sandu** is literally betting her country's democratic future on this European accession. Anyone downplaying the importance of this file has clearly never looked at a map to see just how squeezed Moldova is between European hope and the Russian threat.*

## Hungary's veto, a persistent but weakened brake

### Magyar lifts the veto but stays cautious on the timeline

While **Péter Magyar** agreed to lift the veto blocking the opening of the first **cluster**, he clearly signaled his opposition to any form of accelerated procedure for Ukrainian accession. He even raised the possibility of holding a referendum in **Hungary** if Ukraine managed to close all 33 chapters within a ten-to-fifteen-year horizon, a timeframe that shows just how much **Budapest** still wants to slow the process down.

On June 23, 2026, **Hungary** was in fact the only member state that did not immediately give its green light to the Cypriot presidency's proposal on common European positions for opening the five remaining clusters, a move European diplomats nonetheless described as a mere "scrutiny reservation" rather than firm opposition.

### Brussels scales back its summer ambitions

Facing this persistent resistance from **Budapest**, the European Commission had to revise its initial ambitions, which called for opening all five remaining clusters before the summer break. The Irish presidency of the Council, which took office on July 1, 2026, opted for a more pragmatic approach, opening clusters one by one rather than all at once.

This gradual strategy appears to be paying off: **cluster** 6, judged relatively less sensitive than others, secured the unanimous agreement of the **Twenty-Seven**, including **Hungary**, which bodes well for the momentum of the process going forward.

*Seeing **Budapest** agree, even grudgingly, to open a new **cluster** is an encouraging sign. But one should never underestimate Hungary's ability to pull its veto back out at the worst possible moment for **Kyiv**.*

## Ukraine at war, a candidate unlike any other

### Negotiating accession while fighting the Russian invasion

Ukraine is carrying out this complex accession process under circumstances no other **candidate** country has ever faced: in the middle of an active **war** against the full-scale invasion launched by **Russia** in February 2022. Ukrainian president **Volodymyr Zelensky** noted, after exchanges with G7 leaders, that no one currently sees any obstacle preventing the opening of all clusters within the European timeline.

This Ukrainian determination to pursue European **integration** despite the **war** sends a powerful political message: **Kyiv** refuses to let Russian aggression dictate the pace of its democratic and economic future, a choice that deserves the full support of every Western capital.

### The symbolism of a Russian attack on the very day of the opening

Tellingly, **Russia** launched an attack on Ukraine on the exact day of the official opening of the first **negotiations** cluster, June 15, 2026. European officials noted that this timing "speaks for itself," interpreting the strike as a deliberate attempt by Moscow to symbolically sabotage **Kyiv's** European advance.

This coincidence, if one can still call it a coincidence at this stage of the conflict, shows just how much the **Kremlin** views Ukraine's European **integration** as a direct **strategic** threat to its historic influence over the region.

*Bombing Ukraine on the very day it opens its European accession **negotiations** is not a military calendar coincidence. It's a clear message from Moscow, and Europe would be wrong not to read it exactly for what it is.*

## Internal debates over the Union's institutional future

### Should unanimity be scrapped to speed up enlargement

The **European Parliament** adopted, back in March 2026, a resolution proposing to drop the unanimity rule for intermediate steps in the accession process, such as opening and closing clusters, a measure several observers see as a direct attempt to bypass Hungary's blocking power. The final accession decision would nonetheless remain subject to unanimity among member states.

This proposal, though still far from formal adoption, illustrates growing frustration within **European institutions** over a single member state's ability to paralyze for years a process backed by a large majority of other capitals.

### The debate over future members' veto rights

The European Commission is also studying proposals to delay the automatic granting of veto rights to future new members, including Moldova and the **Western Balkan** countries, for several years after their accession. German chancellor **Friedrich Merz** has even proposed a form of "associate status" for Ukraine, letting it take part in European discussions without full voting rights, a transitional solution suited to the special context of a country still at **war**.

These institutional debates reflect a real awareness in **Brussels**: the Union's rapid **enlargement** will require deep structural adjustments to prevent a new member state from, in turn, reproducing the kind of blockage **Hungary** has exercised over the past two years.

*Reforming European voting rules to stop a single country from holding twenty-six others' future hostage is an urgent and necessary conversation, even if it risks bruising some legitimate national sensitivities.*

## The concrete economic stakes of enlargement

### The sensitive question of the common agricultural policy

The **integration** of Ukraine and Moldova into the European single market raises particularly delicate economic questions, notably regarding their future participation in the **Common Agricultural Policy**. Countries like **Poland** and **France**, whose farmers benefit heavily from this program, could resist rapid **integration** of Ukraine's massive agricultural sector, which represents considerable potential competition.

These internal economic tensions, though less publicized than Hungary's political blockages, could prove just as significant a brake in later phases of the negotiations, particularly when the chapters on agriculture and European structural funds are opened.

### Enormous long-term economic potential for the Union

Despite these challenges, Ukraine's economic integration would eventually represent a considerable asset for the **European Union**, in terms of agricultural resources, skilled labor, and post-war industrial rebuilding potential. Several European economists point out that Ukraine could become, once the war ends, one of the continent's most dynamic growth markets.

This long-term prospect justifies, in the eyes of many European leaders, the considerable political and **diplomatic** investment devoted to overcoming the accession process's current obstacles.

*Polish and French farmers have legitimate concerns, but Europe cannot afford to sabotage Ukrainian accession to protect short-term sectoral interests. The geopolitical stakes far outweigh these bookkeeping calculations.*

## The security dimension of accession for the West

### European anchoring as a security guarantee

For several Western analysts, **European Union** membership represents, in the absence of rapid **NATO** accession, one of the best available **security** guarantees for Ukraine against **Vladimir Putin's** revisionist ambitions. A strong institutional anchoring within European structures would make any renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine considerably more costly for Moscow, both **diplomatically** and economically.

This logic partly explains why several Western capitals, including Berlin under chancellor **Friedrich Merz**, have called European **enlargement** a "geopolitical necessity," going far beyond the traditional economic considerations that historically guided this kind of decision.

### A signal of firmness sent to Moscow

Every step forward in the accession process, however technical and laborious, sends a clear political signal to the **Kremlin**: Europe has no intention of abandoning Ukraine to its fate, nor of yielding to Russian military intimidation attempts aimed at slowing its Western integration. This message matters especially at a time when some observers feared European support might fade as the war drags on.

The continued progress of this file, despite Hungarian obstacles and technical complexities, instead demonstrates a European institutional resilience worth highlighting, particularly against an adversary counting precisely on Western fatigue to achieve its strategic goals.

*Every unlocked cluster is another nail in the coffin of **Putin's** **strategic** bet that the **West** would tire out before he did. For now, despite the bureaucratic slowness, Europe keeps moving forward.*

## The role of Western allies in this process

### Romania, an active advocate for Moldova's file

Romania's president has actively pushed for accelerating both the Moldovan and Ukrainian accession files, a natural stance given the close historical, linguistic, and geographic ties between Romania and Moldova. This regional solidarity shows how some member states take on the role of active **enlargement** champions, partly offsetting Hungarian resistance.

This Romanian support, combined with that of Baltic and Nordic countries historically in favor of Ukraine's rapid integration, forms an informal coalition within the Union that keeps pushing **Brussels** to stay the course, despite repeated attempts at slowdown from **Budapest**.

### The United States, an interested spectator of the file

Although European accession is exclusively an EU institutional matter, the **Trump** administration is following this file with genuine interest, since successfully integrating Ukraine into Western economic and political structures would reduce pressure on Washington to provide direct long-term military and financial support. This transatlantic dynamic, though rarely spelled out publicly, indirectly influences the **strategic** calculations of several European capitals.

A solid European anchoring for Ukraine would thus serve American interests as much as those of the European continent, consolidating a united **Western** front against the combined ambitions of **Russia**, **China**, **Iran**, and **North Korea**.

*Even Washington, under an administration that has sometimes seemed ambivalent toward **NATO**, understands the **strategic** value of a Ukraine firmly anchored in European structures. It's a rare point of transatlantic convergence worth cultivating.*

## The technical challenges still to be overcome

### Demanding judicial and anti-corruption reforms

The first "fundamentals" cluster, which must stay open until the very end of the process, requires deep and lasting reforms from Ukraine and Moldova in the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and judicial independence. These reforms, especially demanding for Ukraine in the middle of war, will require years of sustained effort before they can be considered fully satisfactory by **Brussels**.

The difficulty of carrying out these deep structural reforms amid active war is one of the biggest practical challenges facing the Ukrainian government, which must simultaneously manage a national defense effort and the complex institutional transformation demanded by its European partners.

### An ambitious but realistic timeline according to Brussels

Despite these considerable challenges, European officials, including commissioner **Marta Kos**, continue to voice measured optimism about Ukraine's and Moldova's ability to keep up the pace of necessary reforms. The targeted timeline, a possible Moldovan accession around 2028 and a technical Ukrainian accession finalized within a four-year horizon according to some officials, remains ambitious but is considered achievable if the current political momentum holds.

The exact date of Ukraine's effective entry into the **European Union** will nonetheless remain, according to several European officials, an eminently political question, closely tied to the eventual outcome of a peace agreement with **Russia**.

*Setting an accession timeline while a country is literally fighting for its territorial survival takes almost reckless optimism. But it is precisely this kind of structured optimism that lets institutions keep moving forward despite the uncertainty.*

## What this advance means for Western cohesion

### A demonstration of European institutional resilience

The fact that the European Union has managed to overcome, even slowly and imperfectly, a political blockage that lasted two full years demonstrates a real institutional capacity to absorb internal tensions without abandoning its fundamental strategic goals. This resilience contrasts favorably with the image of a fragmented Europe incapable of collective action that certain detractors, notably in Moscow and Beijing, like to spread.

Every step forward, however modest it may appear on the surface, helps demonstrate that Western democracies, despite legitimate internal disagreements, retain the capacity to build lasting consensus on major strategic issues.

### A test for the credibility of future enlargement

How the European Union handles this Ukrainian and Moldovan file will necessarily set a precedent for future enlargements, notably those involving **Western Balkan** countries such as **Montenegro** and **Albania**, currently further along on certain technical aspects of their own accession process.

Successfully completing this complex integration, amid active war and internal political resistance, would considerably strengthen the European Union's credibility as a geopolitical actor capable of keeping its most ambitious strategic commitments.

*Europe often navel-gazes over its own bureaucratic dysfunctions. But successfully integrating, even laboriously, two candidate countries this strategically crucial would be a victory that deserves to be recognized at its true worth.*

## Poland and the Baltic states' place in this file

### Neighbors with everything to gain from a European Ukraine

**Poland**, **Lithuania**, **Latvia**, and **Estonia** are among the most consistent defenders of Ukraine's rapid accession, a position that flows directly from their own historical experience with Russian imperialism. These countries believe that a Ukraine firmly anchored within European structures is the best possible bulwark against any future westward expansion of **Vladimir Putin's** territorial ambitions.

This regional solidarity, grounded in a shared and clear-eyed reading of the Russian threat, contrasts sharply with Hungary's more ambiguous posture, whose economic and energy ties with Moscow continue to shape its foreign policy, even under **Péter Magyar's** new administration.

### Constant diplomatic pressure on Brussels

These Eastern European countries do not hesitate to exert sustained **diplomatic** pressure on **European institutions** to keep up the pace of accession negotiations, regularly reminding their Western partners that every additional delay directly benefits the **Kremlin's** war-of-attrition strategy.

This informal coalition of front-line countries facing **Russia** plays an essential counterweight role against the temptation to slow things down that, to varying degrees, comes from several other European capitals farther from the front line geographically.

*Countries that lived directly under the Soviet boot instinctively understand what is at stake with Ukrainian accession. Their voice should carry more weight in this debate than that of capitals that never faced this existential threat up close.*

## The Western Balkans precedent

### Montenegro and Albania, further along but lower priority

**Montenegro**, currently the most advanced **candidate** among the nine countries officially seeking EU accession, hopes to become the Union's twenty-eighth member by 2028, while **Albania** is aiming to conclude its negotiations by the end of 2027. Both **Western Balkan** countries show that an accession process, however laborious, can succeed with enough sustained political will on both sides.

The comparison between the relatively fast pace of these Balkan files and the slowness of the Ukrainian file, largely due to Hungary's blockage rather than any shortcoming on **Kyiv's** part, underscores just how much the **Twenty-Seven's** collective political will remains the decisive factor in the actual accession timeline.

### A lesson in institutional patience for Kyiv and Chișinău

The Balkan experience, marked by decades of sometimes frustrating negotiations, reminds Ukraine and Moldova that the road to full accession remains long, even when European political will appears favorable. This institutional patience, however hard to accept for countries facing an immediate existential threat, remains nonetheless the rule of the European game.

It remains to be seen whether the geopolitical urgency created by the Russian war can, in this particular case, speed up a process historically known for its proverbial bureaucratic slowness.

*Comparing the Ukrainian file to that of the **Western Balkans** shows that Europe knows how to move forward when the political will is there. The real question remains whether that will can hold over time against a war that drags on.*

## The Kremlin's reaction and the information war

### Moscow denounces a Western maneuver against its interests

Russian diplomacy quickly labeled this cluster opening a purely political maneuver orchestrated by Brussels to further isolate **Russia**, a reading that conveniently ignores that it was **Ukraine** and **Moldova** themselves who sought this accession following Russia's February 2022 aggression. This **Kremlin** rhetoric, echoed by state media such as **TASS**, seeks to present European **enlargement** as a provocation rather than the legitimate exercise of these two nations' sovereign right to choose their own alliances.

This information war, waged alongside the military conflict, aims to undermine the legitimacy of the accession process in the eyes of European publics weary of the war's duration, a strategy that exploits the Union's internal divisions rather than offering any credible alternative to Kyiv's and **Chișinău's** European aspirations.

### Disinformation as a complementary weapon to the military front

Russian services are stepping up **disinformation** campaigns specifically targeting Moldova, where false accusations of Western interference and electoral fraud regularly circulate on local social media, in a repeated attempt to undermine the legitimacy of President **Maia Sandu** and her firmly pro-European orientation.

This information battle confirms, if confirmation were needed, that the **Kremlin** views the European anchoring of its former satellites as a top-tier **strategic** threat, justifying the investment of considerable resources in influence operations rather than constructive diplomacy with its neighbors.

*That Moscow spends so much energy denouncing a simple technical negotiation cluster says a lot about the **Kremlin's** real nervousness over this accession. Russian **disinformation** is itself unintentional proof that this file hurts **Putin**.*

## Conclusion: a slow but resolutely moving process

### Cluster 6 is just one step among several to come

The upcoming opening of the sixth cluster, formally scheduled for **July 14, 2026**, is just one more step in an institutional marathon that will still require years of sustained effort from Ukraine and Moldova, along with continued commitment from **European institutions** to overcome persistent internal resistance, notably in **Budapest**.

But the simple fact that this process keeps moving forward, despite the ongoing war and repeated political blockages, sends an important strategic message: the European anchoring of Ukraine and Moldova remains a priority that Brussels refuses to abandon, whatever difficulties arise along the way.

### A Pyrrhic victory for Putin if he does not react

Every advance on this file represents, by implication, a further failure for the **Kremlin's** strategy, which initially hoped its February 2022 invasion would further isolate Ukraine from the **West** rather than accelerate its integration into European structures. This strategic irony deserves to be highlighted at every step taken by Kyiv and **Chișinău**.

For the **West**, firmly supporting this accession trajectory, despite its complexity and inevitable slowness, remains one of the most cost-effective geopolitical investments available against **Russia's** revisionist ambitions and the broader threat posed by **China**, **Iran**, and **North Korea** to the rules-based international order.

*This accession file, however technical and slow it may look from the outside, will remain one of the most concrete responses the **West** could offer to Russian aggression. History will remember that Kyiv and Chișinău kept moving toward Europe precisely because Moscow wanted to stop them by force.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Euronews, Ukraine and Moldova set to open another cluster of EU accession talks — July 3, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/2026/07/03/ukraine-and-moldova-set-to-open-another-cluster-of-eu-accession-talks)

- [Wikipedia, Accession of Moldova to the European Union — updated July 2026](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Moldova_to_the_European_Union)

- [Euronews, Ukraine and Moldova press ahead with bid to join the EU on "Enlargement Mega Monday" — June 15, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/06/15/ukraine-and-moldova-press-ahead-with-bid-to-join-the-eu-on-enlargement-mega-monday)

### Secondary sources

- [The Guardian, EU could deny new member states veto rights as bloc pushes for enlargement — May 26, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/may/26/eu-could-deny-new-member-states-veto-rights-as-bloc-pushes-for-enlargement)

- [Ukrainska Pravda, EU may not open all clusters in July — June 17, 2026](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/06/17/8039777/)

- [Euronews, EU sets stage for decoupling Moldova's accession bid from Ukraine's — June 22, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/2026/06/22/eu-sets-stage-for-decoupling-moldovas-accession-bid-from-ukraines)

- [Reuters, EU envoys greenlight first phase of membership talks with Ukraine, Moldova — June 12, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-envoys-greenlight-first-phase-membership-talks-ukraine-moldova-2026-06-12/)

---

Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/lukraine-et-la-moldavie-forcent-la-porte-de-leurope