# OPEN LETTER: MOBIDIK — the Ukrainian naval drone that changes the rules of war in the Black Sea

> I have a deep admiration for Ukraine's capacity to innovate under the most extreme constraints imaginable. No surface navy, no aircraft carriers, coastlines partially under occupation — and yet, a dro

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Open letter
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-mobidik-le-drone-naval-ukrainien-qui-change-les-regles-de-la-guer

## Introduction: a letter to those who still doubt

### What the world isn't watching yet

A war on the surface and beneath it has been unfolding in the **Black Sea** since **2022**, and the world has yet to give it the attention it deserves. We talk about missile strikes, kamikaze drones in the sky, ground battles in the **Donbas**. But in the meantime, **Ukraine** has been building something remarkable — and quiet: a fleet of unmanned surface drones capable of threatening Russian warships hundreds of kilometers from the Ukrainian coastline. And at the **Ukrainian-Nordic DIH Naval Forge 2026** conference in **Kyiv**, at the end of **June 2026**, a new system was unveiled: the **MOBIDIK**, developed by Ukrainian company **Avarid**.

I am writing this open letter because the **MOBIDIK** deserves serious attention — not to mythologize it, but to understand what it says about **Ukraine**, about its capacity for innovation, and about what naval warfare will look like tomorrow. This drone is not a proof of concept. According to **Avarid**, it is **already in operational use**. Its six configurations are **already developed**. The transition to **codification and serial production** is underway. This is not a prototype. It is a weapon.

### Why this letter, now

Because **Russia** has lost a substantial portion of its **Black Sea Fleet** since **2022** — not to conventional missiles, but to **Ukrainian surface drones**. **Ukraine** has sunk or severely damaged Russian warships, including several significant vessels, using unmanned craft. That capability, built from scratch under wartime conditions, is one of the most significant military innovations of the **21st century**. And it keeps evolving. The **MOBIDIK** is the latest documented iteration of that evolution. I believe **Ukraine**'s allies — governments, defense industry players, policymakers — need to understand what they have in their hands.

## What the MOBIDIK is: the verified technical data

### A long-range autonomous surface vessel

The **MOBIDIK** is an **Unmanned Surface Vessel** (**USV**) developed by Ukrainian company **Avarid**. Its core specifications, as disclosed to **Militarnyi** at the **DIH Naval Forge 2026** conference on **June 28, 2026**: operational range of **up to 1,400 kilometers**, autonomy of **120 hours** (five full days), maximum speed of **65 kilometers per hour**, and the ability to operate in sea conditions with **waves up to 1.2 meters**. These figures define a vessel capable of reaching targets across the entire **Black Sea** — and beyond its immediate shores.

To put that range in geographic context: the **Black Sea** spans a maximum length of roughly **1,175 kilometers**. A **MOBIDIK** launched from a Ukrainian coastline can technically reach any Russian or Turkish port on the Black Sea and return — or simply reach a target at **700 kilometers** and remain stationed there for another **two to three days** before striking. That is the definition of a game-changer for naval warfare in enclosed seas.

### Six configurations: a modular platform

What sets the **MOBIDIK** apart from other naval drones is its modular design. **Avarid** has developed **six distinct configurations**, all operational according to the company. The **MD-1** configuration carries **five fixed-wing interceptor drones** to establish a **maritime aerial defense barrier**. The **MD-2** replaces those interceptors with **eight multirotor interceptor drones** (quadcopter-type). Both defensive configurations protect a maritime zone against enemy aircraft or drones — a capability that barely existed in unmanned naval force doctrine until now.

Configurations **MD-3** through **MD-6** are offensive. The **MD-3** integrates **MORRIGAN medium-range strike drones**, developed in-house by **Avarid**, to engage **surface vessels**, **coastal targets**, and **ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) assets**. The **MD-4** is a launch platform for a **jet-propelled strike drone** designed for **strategic-range targets** — the most threatening configuration for deep naval infrastructure.

## MD-5 and MD-6: the configurations that shift the balance

### Air-to-air missiles on a maritime hull

The **MD-5** configuration is the most unusual weapon in the **MOBIDIK**'s arsenal. It combines a **remotely operated weapon station armed with a Browning M2 heavy machine gun** with the ability to carry **two AIM-9 or R-73 air-to-air missiles** (or equivalent systems). This configuration allows the **MOBIDIK** to simultaneously engage aerial and surface targets — a versatility that, until now, was reserved for crewed combat frigates. Deploying **AIM-9** missiles from an autonomous surface drone represents a technological convergence between naval and aerial warfare that few analysts had anticipated in this format.

The tactical logic is simple but powerful: a **MOBIDIK MD-5** operating in a maritime zone can shield a strike drone group from Russian attack helicopters or low-altitude enemy drones — while maintaining a surface defense capability through the **Browning M2**. It is an autonomous escort vessel. Its cost is a fraction of a frigate's. Its risk in case of loss is zero for crew members — because there are none.

### MD-6: 300 kilograms of payload and FPV drones

The **MD-6** configuration is the most directly destructive. It is designed as an **assault platform** combining a **300-kilogram warhead** against large surface targets or **port infrastructure**, with the simultaneous ability to carry and launch **FPV strike drones**. This double strike — a naval drone that launches aerial drones while approaching the target, itself being a **300-kilogram weapon** — creates a complex defensive problem for the adversary. Intercepting the **FPVs** while the main platform continues advancing divides and exhausts defensive resources.

For **Russian port infrastructure** — the shipyards of **Sevastopol**, the **Black Sea Fleet** installations that sought refuge in ports further inland on Russian territory — the **MOBIDIK MD-6** represents a specific, documented threat. The **1,400-kilometer range** places installations such as **Novorossiysk** within the system's theoretical operational zone.

## The Harpun by NOAH X: MOBIDIK's lightweight complement

### 100 kilograms, 48 hours on standby

At the same **DIH Naval Forge 2026** conference in **Kyiv**, a second Ukrainian company — **NOAH X** — presented its first product: the **Harpun** surface drone. The specifications published by **Euromaidanpress** (June 28, 2026): length of approximately **2 meters**, weight of approximately **100 kilograms**, payload of **30 kilograms**, **hydrojet propulsion**, speed of **35 km/h**, range of **40 kilometers**, autonomy of **48 hours**. What that last figure means operationally: the **Harpun** can reach its waiting zone, cut its motors, float silently for two full days, then strike on command.

The **Harpun**'s communication system was developed by **DevDroid** under the name **Universal Droid Box**. It runs **three parallel communication channels simultaneously**, with the ability to switch between them in seconds if one is lost — a direct response to the Russian electronic warfare systems used to cut Ukrainian drone communications. **NOAH X** states that the **Harpun has already struck Russian targets in combat** and is now undergoing formal military codification.

### Three functions for a single craft

The **Harpun** covers three distinct roles. Its primary configuration is that of a **single-use weapon** — in the direct words of a **NOAH X** representative: **"its primary mission is to go, do the job, and not come back."** Its secondary configuration swaps the military warhead for a cargo hold to **deliver supplies and ammunition** to soldiers in forward positions through waterways too dangerous for crewed boats. Its third configuration integrates a **sonar for seabed mapping**.

This logistical versatility is frequently underestimated in military analysis. The ability to resupply isolated positions without risking lives is one of the most immediately useful applications of surface drones in amphibious or coastal defense contexts. **Ukraine**, with difficult access to certain positions along its coastlines and rivers, has a direct and documented operational need for exactly this capability.

## Ukraine's unmanned surface fleet: context and precedents

### How Ukraine invented a new form of naval warfare

**Ukraine** had no unmanned naval warfare doctrine before **2022**. It had no budget for developing submarines or high-technology frigates. What it had: engineers, emergency budgets, a land and aerial drone industry already active, and an absolute necessity to contest Russian dominance in the **Black Sea** without a conventional surface navy. The response was pragmatic and remarkably effective: **explosive surface drones**, developed from scratch, launched against the Russian fleet.

Since **2022**, these drones — whose earliest models were GPS-guided inflatable craft packed with explosives — have evolved into increasingly sophisticated systems. The **Russian Black Sea Fleet** was forced to modify its deployments, routes, and bases. Significant vessels were hit or sunk. **Russia** had to relocate part of its fleet to ports less accessible to Ukrainian naval drones. That is a measurable strategic shift in Russian naval behavior, directly caused by a Ukrainian capability built under wartime conditions.

### From improvisation to serial production

The trajectory of Ukrainian naval drone capability is an example of a military innovation cycle accelerated by necessity. The first craft were artisanal prototypes. Those that followed incorporated more precise navigation systems, heavier payloads, more resilient hulls. Today, companies like **Avarid** and **NOAH X** are announcing structured programs with **official codification** and **serial production**. This transition from improvisation to industrialization is the hallmark of a capability that is normalizing — and therefore a threat that is stabilizing and amplifying.

The fact that the **DIH Naval Forge 2026** conference brought together Ukrainian and Nordic industrial players (**Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark**) — all NATO members or close partners with a long tradition of maritime defense — is not incidental. **Ukraine** is seeking to integrate its naval developments into a broader architecture of industrial cooperation. The **MOBIDIK** is not only a Ukrainian weapon: it is a prototype for the unmanned naval warfare doctrine of the entire **Alliance**.

## What the MOBIDIK says about Ukraine's Black Sea strategy

### Contesting dominance without a conventional navy

**Ukraine**'s strategy in the **Black Sea** since **2022** rests on a simple but powerful principle: you do not need a conventional navy to contest an adversary's naval dominance, provided you have enough long-range surface drones, solid ISR coverage, and a redundant communication network. The **MOBIDIK** embodies that principle at its most evolved stage: **1,400 km of range**, **120 hours of autonomy**, six weapons configurations covering aerial defense, surface strike, infrastructure attack, and reconnaissance.

What this means for **Russia**: no port in the **Black Sea**, no naval base, no coastal maritime infrastructure can now be considered safe within reasonable distance of Ukrainian-controlled shores. The **1,400-kilometer range** exceeds the Black Sea's maximum length. Theoretically, a **MOBIDIK** can reach any maritime target in that sea. That is a strategic declaration, not merely a technical specification.

### The limitations the record requires us to name

It would be inaccurate to present the **MOBIDIK** as an invincible weapon. Its limitations are real. Its ability to operate in waves exceeding **1.2 meters** is constrained — the **Black Sea** can be significantly rougher than that, particularly in autumn and winter. Its maximum speed of **65 km/h** makes it vulnerable to antisubmarine helicopters and fast patrol boats. **Russia** has developed countermeasures against Ukrainian surface drones, including protective nets at port entrances and dedicated helicopter patrols.

The range and autonomy figures (**1,400 km / 120 h**) are those declared by the manufacturer at a promotional conference. They have not yet been independently verified under documented combat conditions. That distinction — between declared specifications and proven operational performance — must remain part of the analysis. **Ukraine** has every incentive to present its capabilities optimistically at international conferences. That does not mean the figures are false — but analytical caution demands it.

## Implications for NATO doctrine and maritime defense

### What Western navies must take away

**NATO navies** have been studying the lessons of Ukrainian naval warfare since **2023**. What the **MOBIDIK** adds to that body of knowledge is substantial. First, modularity: a single platform that can be reconfigured for maritime aerial defense, surface strike, infrastructure attack, or combined strike is a concept that traditional naval architectures realize at the scale of an entire ship. Applying it to a surface drone the size of a large inflatable boat radically shifts the cost-to-capability ratio.

Second, scalability: a fleet of **MOBIDIK** vessels can be deployed in swarms. Twenty **MOBIDIK MD-6** units launched simultaneously against a port facility represent **6,000 kilograms of combined explosive payload**, with not a single sailor at risk. No conventional frigate can achieve that payload-to-risk ratio. For the **Baltic**, **North Sea**, and **Eastern Mediterranean** navies facing growing pressure from **Russia**, the Ukrainian model offers a path to powerful, affordable asymmetric capability.

### Nordic industrial cooperation as a model

The presence of Nordic partners at **DIH Naval Forge 2026** is not decorative. It reflects a reality: **Sweden**, **Finland**, **Norway**, and **Denmark** have specific naval defense needs in enclosed or semi-enclosed maritime environments (the **Baltic Sea**, **fjords**, **archipelagos**) that closely resemble Ukraine's situation in the **Black Sea**. Long-range surface drones capable of operating autonomously for days in electronic warfare environments match precisely what those countries need for coastal defense.

If **Avarid** and other Ukrainian companies enter co-development or co-production partnerships with Nordic industrial players, this would accelerate both Ukrainian production and the integration of these capabilities into **NATO** doctrine. That is one of the least-discussed benefits of **Ukraine**'s European accession process: pooling real-war experience with allies who have less of it.

## What the MOBIDIK reveals about Ukraine's industrial strategy

### Decentralized innovation under maximum pressure

The fact that **Avarid** and **NOAH X** are two distinct companies presenting complementary products — one with a large long-range USV in six configurations, the other with a small **100-kilogram drone** capable of a **48-hour ambush** — illustrates the structure of Ukrainian defense innovation: **decentralized, competitive, fast**. There was no grand centralized program that produced the Ukrainian naval drone. There were dozens of teams developing their own approaches in parallel, the best of which emerged through a selection process accelerated by actual combat.

This decentralized approach carries risks — difficult coordination, duplication of effort, heterogeneous standards — but it also carries a decisive advantage: the speed of innovation. When **Russia** develops a specific countermeasure against one type of naval drone, **Ukraine** has multiple teams simultaneously working on counter-countermeasures, without waiting for approval from a single program authority. That is an innovation architecture that is very hard for an adversary to neutralize.

### Codification as a marker of industrial maturity

The term **codification** — mentioned for both **Avarid**'s **MOBIDIK** and **NOAH X**'s **Harpun** — refers to a formal process: the official registration of a military system in the armed forces' inventories, with standardized nomenclature numbers, defined maintenance protocols, and operational qualification procedures. This process transforms a prototype that has proven itself in war into a weapon that forces can order, maintain, and replace systematically.

The fact that both naval systems are undergoing codification simultaneously means that **Ukraine** is normalizing its unmanned naval warfare capability. This is no longer an experiment. It is doctrine. That transition — from artisanal urgency to standardized production — is one of the most significant developments in Ukrainian defense industry in **2026**.

## The Russian response: what we know and what we don't

### Documented countermeasures

**Russia** has adapted its naval defenses against Ukrainian surface drone threats since **2022**. What is publicly documented: the deployment of **anti-drone underwater nets** at the entrances to **Sevastopol** and **Novorossiysk** ports (photographed through OSINT), the reinforcement of coastal surveillance helicopter patrols, and the installation of electronic warfare systems specifically targeting the communication frequencies used by Ukrainian surface drones. These adaptations are real and have reduced the success rate of certain strikes.

What we do not know: the degree to which these countermeasures will be effective against the **MOBIDIK** with its triple-redundant communication system and six modular configurations. The response to a swarm of **MOBIDIK MD-1/MD-2** units (maritime aerial defense) escorting **MD-6** assault platforms is not the same as the response to a conventional surface drone. The multi-layered dimension of the threat — naval drones launching aerial drones, covering an explosive payload, all operating simultaneously — fundamentally complicates point defense.

### What Putin cannot buy quickly

**Russia** can develop specific countermeasures against each Ukrainian drone — and it does. But what it cannot easily replicate is the decentralized innovation architecture that produces those drones. Russia's defense industrial structure is centralized, hierarchical, subject to slow bureaucratic validation processes. It can produce massive quantities of approved systems — like the **Geran-2**. It is less comfortable generating rapid, modular new solutions in response to emerging tactical problems.

This is the fundamental asymmetry the **MOBIDIK** illustrates: **Ukraine** innovates faster than **Russia** can adapt its defenses. As long as that asymmetry holds — which depends partly on maintaining adequate Western funding — Ukrainian pressure on Russian naval positions will continue.

## What allies must do: specific demands

### Fund serial production, not just prototypes

The **DIH Naval Forge 2026** conference demonstrated that **Ukraine** has the capacity to develop highly sophisticated unmanned naval warfare systems. What it needs now is the transition to **industrial serial production**. That transition requires capital investment — for production lines, raw materials, testing infrastructure, technician training. These investments can be structured as repayable loans, co-production agreements, or firm orders from allied navies.

The Nordic governments that sent representatives to **Kyiv** on **June 28** have the capacity to turn their presence into concrete orders. An order for **50 MOBIDIK** units by **Sweden** or **Finland** for their own coastal defense needs would fund the scale-up of Ukrainian production while giving those countries a maritime capability they do not yet possess. That is a doubly profitable investment.

### Integrate Ukrainian naval drones into NATO doctrine

**NATO** navies have exercises, doctrines, and interoperability protocols. Integrating Ukrainian surface drones into those exercises — even in virtual format before **Ukraine** becomes a formal member — would allow the development of swarm employment tactics, communication protocols, and coordination procedures with air and submarine forces. This early integration would avoid years of delay once membership is formalized.

**Ukraine** is not waiting for formal NATO membership to cooperate. It has demonstrated since **2022** that it can adapt its systems to allied standards with remarkable speed. The **MOBIDIK**, with its **MD-5** configuration integrating **AIM-9** missiles — a **NATO** munition — illustrates precisely this intentional compatibility.

## The moral dimension: weapons that protect lives

### Zero crew, zero Ukrainian deaths in naval operations

There is an ethical dimension to naval drone warfare that deserves to be stated clearly: every successful strike by a **MOBIDIK** or a **Harpun** against a Russian warship or military installation is a strike that required no Ukrainian sailor to risk his life. In a war where every soldier lost is a national tragedy for a country that has already paid an immeasurable human price, this reduction of risk to Ukrainian combatants carries real moral value.

This is not an argument for dehumanizing war or celebrating technological destruction. It is an acknowledgment that **Volodymyr Zelensky** and the Ukrainian military command have a responsibility to their soldiers — a responsibility to minimize casualties when effective technological alternatives exist. Naval drones, when they work, are precisely that kind of alternative. Their development is therefore an ethical choice as much as a military one.

### What the world owes Ukraine's defenders

**Ukraine** is not only defending its own territory. It is defending the principle that international borders cannot be changed by military force without consequences. It is defending the credibility of international law in a world order that depends on it to maintain relative peace. Every Ukrainian naval drone that sustains pressure on the Russian fleet in the **Black Sea** contributes to that larger project.

**Ukraine**'s allies who still hesitate to increase their support — who calculate domestic political costs before military commitments — would do well to remember what a withdrawal of Western support would mean: a **Russia** victorious, emboldened in its conviction that force pays, and a catastrophic precedent for every revisionist power on the planet — from **China** to **Iran** to **North Korea**.

## A letter that demands a response

### To those who decide defense budgets

This letter is addressed to you: defense ministers, members of security committees, industrial decision-makers in allied countries. The **MOBIDIK** is not just another technological footnote in the flood of information about the war in **Ukraine**. It is documented, verifiable proof that a country at war is producing naval defense solutions representing a genuine qualitative leap. Your role is not only to fund weapons for **Ukraine** — it is to integrate the lessons of this war into your own defensive preparation.

The **Baltic Sea**, the **North Sea**, the **Eastern Mediterranean**: all these seas bordering **NATO** members can face asymmetric naval threats from **Russia** or other destabilizing actors. Long-range naval drones — like the **MOBIDIK** — are an asymmetric response to those asymmetric threats. Investing in their development and production today is investing in the deterrence of tomorrow.

### What I expect from this letter

I do not expect a personal reply to this letter. I expect decisions. Orders. Industrial partnerships. Joint exercises. A measurable increase in support for the Ukrainian defense industry — not merely in the form of material drawn from our aging stockpiles, but in the form of investment in Ukrainian production capacity itself. That is more effective, more sustainable, and more respectful of what **Ukraine** has become: a first-tier defense partner, not merely an aid recipient.

The **MOBIDIK** was presented on **June 28, 2026**. In six months, in a year, this drone will be in serial production — with or without your help. With your help, it will be produced faster, in greater numbers, with further enhanced capabilities. Without your help, it will be produced anyway — but more slowly, with more limited Ukrainian resources. The choice is yours. And history is keeping score.

## MOBIDIK and the strategic legacy of Ukrainian innovation

### A strategic legacy being built in real time

The **MOBIDIK**, with its **1,400 km of range**, its **120 hours of autonomy**, and its **six modular configurations**, is more than a Ukrainian weapon. It is a prototype for the unmanned naval warfare doctrine of the next decade. The navies that learn from it — by studying it, funding it, co-developing its successors — will hold a real tactical and strategic advantage over those that wait for doctrine to be written in military academies. **Ukraine** is writing that doctrine in real time, under the most demanding conditions possible. It would be a shame not to benefit from it.

The company **Avarid** has announced the transition to **codification and serial production**. The company **NOAH X** has indicated that its **Harpun** has already struck targets in combat and is undergoing codification. These announcements of **June 28, 2026** are not marketing: they are milestones in a Ukrainian naval capability building program that did not exist four years ago. This program deserves your attention, your support, and your respect.

### The letter that continues

**Zelensky** asks for weapons. **Avarid**'s engineers build weapons. Ukrainian operators risk — and sometimes lose — their lives defending their country. What this letter asks of allies is, comparatively, modest: understand what is being developed, fund its scaling, integrate its lessons. The war in **Ukraine** is not a distant spectacle watched from a position of comfortable security. It is the test of the credibility of the international order our countries claim to defend. The **MOBIDIK** is, in its own way, a letter from **Ukraine** to the world's democracies. That letter deserves a response equal to the moment.

## The future of naval warfare: what 2026 inaugurates

### The Black Sea as a global laboratory

The **Black Sea** is becoming the **global laboratory for unmanned naval warfare**. What is developing there under actual combat conditions — tactics, countermeasures, swarm employment doctrines, communication protocols resistant to electronic warfare — will be the foundation of naval doctrine for decades to come. **NATO** navies that send observers, engineers, and buyers to **Kyiv** for conferences like **DIH Naval Forge 2026** are making the right calculation: learn now what their own peacetime exercises cannot teach.

This laboratory carries an immense human cost that we must never forget in the enthusiasm of strategic analysis. Every Ukrainian innovation was born in the context of a war that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives. **Avarid** and **NOAH X** engineers work in a country under permanent attack. Their industrial production takes place in buildings that **Geran-3** drones and **Iskander** missiles could reach. That reality gives every technical breakthrough a particular ethical dimension: it is paid for by a collective resilience that commands respect.

### The next generation: toward stealthy propulsion USVs

If **Ukraine**'s innovation trajectory over the **past four years** is any guide, today's **MOBIDIK** will be the precursor to even more sophisticated craft within **two to three years**. The foreseeable axes of improvement: stealthier propulsion reducing acoustic signature, satellite communication capability reducing dependence on conventional radio links, and onboard intelligence enabling higher levels of mission decision autonomy. These developments are in the observable logic of technological evolution, not speculation.

The question is whether **Ukraine** will have the resources — human, financial, industrial — to pursue that trajectory at the pace the conflict demands. That is precisely where allied support makes a concrete, measurable difference. Not in declarations of solidarity, but in co-development contracts, access to dual-use components, and electronic intelligence sharing that improves drone communication systems. Tomorrow's war is being prepared in today's industrial decisions.

## Conclusion: what June 28, 2026 changed forever

### A presentation that goes beyond a conference

The presentation of the **MOBIDIK** at the **Ukrainian-Nordic DIH Naval Forge 2026** conference in **Kyiv** on **June 28, 2026** was not a routine event on the arms show calendar. It was the public demonstration of an already operational capability — six configurations of a naval drone with **1,400 km of range**, all developed, all already in use, in transition to serial production. In the context of the ongoing war, this represents a qualitative shift in **Ukraine**'s naval projection capability.

This shift deserves to be documented, analyzed, and transmitted — not to fuel a narrative of premature victory, but to inform the decisions that will allow this capability to develop until the moment when it no longer needs to defend **Ukraine**, because the war will have ended on Ukrainian terms. That is the goal. That is what the **MOBIDIK** serves.

### Innovation as an act of resistance

Every Ukrainian drone designed, tested, and codified under wartime conditions is an act of resistance as much as a military advance. It tells **Putin** that the economic attrition he is imposing on **Ukraine** is not producing the paralysis he hoped for — it is producing innovation. That **Ukraine**'s engineers, in offices that may have heard air raid sirens during design meetings, have built something that military analysts around the world are studying with close attention.

This is a message that **Ukraine** does not need to send through official statements. It sends it through the **MOBIDIK**'s technical specifications: **1,400 km of range. 120 hours of autonomy. Six configurations. Already in operational use. In transition to serial production.** Ukrainian resistance is not only human and military. It is also industrial and inventive. And it deserves our unconditional support.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Militarnyi — Ukraine unveils MOBIDIK unmanned surface vessel with missile-drone payload — June 28, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukraine-unveils-mobidik-unmanned-surface-vessel-with-missile-drone-payload/)

- [Euromaidanpress — A new 100-kilogram Ukrainian drone boat can wait two days, then strike on command — June 28, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/28/a-new-100-kilogram-ukrainian-drone-boat-can-wait-two-days-then-strike-on-command/)

- [Militarnyi — Ukrainian company NOAH X unveils Harpoon small unmanned surface vessel — June 28, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrainian-company-noah-x-unveils-harpoon-small-unmanned-surface-vessel/)

### Secondary sources

- [United24 Media — Ukrainian drones: coverage and updates — 2026](https://united24media.com/tags/ukrainian-drones)

- [Kyiv Independent — War in Ukraine: news and videos — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/tag/video/)

- [Euromaidanpress — Russian aggression: full archive — 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/category/russian-aggression/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-mobidik-le-drone-naval-ukrainien-qui-change-les-regles-de-la-guer