# OPEN LETTER: Mr. Trump, the Panama Canal Is Not a Trophy

> Introduction: A letter to a president obsessed with a canal

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Open letter
- Published: 2026-07-03
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-lettre-ouverte-monsieur-trump-le-canal-de-panama-nest-pas-un-trophee

## Introduction: A letter to a president obsessed with a canal

### A remark that wasn't in the script

Mr. President, you said it yourself Wednesday, at the opening of the **Theodore Roosevelt Presidential Library** in **Medora**: that line about **China** and the **Panama Canal** **"wasn't in the script."** You added, almost laughing, that you didn't really have a script. But words, once spoken by an American president, stop being improvised: they become foreign policy.

**"And now China is trying to take over the Panama Canal, and we're not going to let that happen, okay?"** you declared. It's a simple sentence, almost banal in its phrasing, but heavy with consequences for a region that has already lived through, in barely eighteen months, one of the most intense geopolitical battles of the century over a single 51-mile waterway.

### Why I'm writing to you, and why now

I am writing you this open letter because your words on Panama, Mr. President, come at a pivotal moment: after the judicial cancellation of the Chinese concessions, after the arrival of **BlackRock** and **MSC**, after months of diplomatic arm-wrestling between **Washington**, **Beijing**, and **Panama City**. You speak as though the battle were still to be won, when it has already, largely, turned in your favor.

I am also writing because I sincerely believe that vigilance toward Chinese influence in the **Western Hemisphere** is justified. But I believe just as strongly that a strategic **victory** deserves to be told with precision, not with the theatrical exaggeration of a man who seems to rediscover, every week, a threat already largely neutralized.

## What you said, word for word

### The historical grievance over the 1999 handover

You were clear about your founding grievance: **"The Panama Canal, so we gave it away. The first thing they did, you know what they did? They raised the prices for ships by four times, and they didn't lose a single ship. And then they raised it again twice more, and they didn't lose a single ship. All they did was make enormous amounts of money for years and years. How stupid that was,"** you said, in a mix of regret and retrospective anger.

This statement rests on a real historical fact: the **Torrijos-Carter Treaties** of **1977** set in motion the canal's gradual transfer, completed on **December 31, 1999**, under President **Jimmy Carter**. You have elsewhere recalled that the canal was, in your words, bought for **"1 dollar"** by one of your predecessors, a shocking formula that grossly oversimplifies a complex diplomatic negotiation.

### The direct accusation against Beijing

Your accusation against **China** fits within a thesis you've defended since your inauguration: that of a Chinese **"malign influence"** establishing itself at both ends of the canal through a **Hong Kong** company. This thesis, unlike some of your other claims, was based on verifiable facts: for more than **twenty years**, a subsidiary of **CK Hutchison** did in fact operate the ports of **Balboa** and **Cristobal**, at both ends of the canal.

But here is what your Wednesday statement leaves out: this Chinese influence you describe in the present tense largely already belongs to the past. The legal and commercial battle that dismantled it played out over several months, with clearly identified actors, rulings handed down, and Western companies already installed at the helm.

## A reminder of the facts: how Beijing lost the canal

### An audit that started it all

Allow me, Mr. President, to reconstruct the exact timeline for your readers. Under pressure from your administration, the Panamanian government launched an audit of **CK Hutchison**'s activities, revealing that the company had deprived **Panama** of considerable sums: roughly **$300 million** since its concession was renewed in **2021**, and up to **$1.2 billion** over the entire original twenty-five-year agreement.

This audit fueled a legal action led by the Panamanian comptroller general, culminating on **January 29, 2026**, in a resounding decision by **Panama's Supreme Court**: the concessions granted to **CK Hutchison**'s subsidiary were ruled **unconstitutional**, ending more than two decades of Chinese control over these strategic facilities.

### BlackRock, MSC, and the Western takeover

As early as March 2025, under direct pressure from your administration, **CK Hutchison** had agreed to sell most of its global port portfolio, including the two Panamanian ports, to a consortium led by **BlackRock**, alongside **Terminal Investment Limited**, a subsidiary of the Swiss company **MSC**. The deal, valued at roughly **$23 billion**, covered **43 ports across 23 countries**.

After the judicial cancellation of **CK Hutchison**'s concessions, it was ultimately the Danish company **Maersk**, through its subsidiary **APM Terminals**, and **Terminal Investment Limited** that temporarily took over management of the ports of **Balboa** and **Cristobal**, completing the shift to Western control of these critical facilities.

## The Chinese resistance that should not be underestimated

### Beijing tried to block the sale

It would, however, be unfair, Mr. President, to claim that **China** simply gave up the fight. When **CK Hutchison** announced the sale of its non-Chinese ports to **BlackRock**, **Beijing** intervened directly, demanding that the transaction be submitted to China's merger review process and suggesting that the state-owned shipping conglomerate **Cosco** join the buying consortium as a **"major strategic investor."**

This maneuver was viewed by your administration as entirely **unacceptable**, causing a prolonged blockage of negotiations throughout the summer and fall. This Chinese resistance shows that **Beijing** considered, rightly from its own perspective, this port position to be a top-tier strategic asset, not a mere commercial asset to be given up without a fight.

### Wang Yi's diplomacy

In March, Chinese Foreign Minister **Wang Yi** stated that **Beijing** was ready to strengthen practical cooperation with Panama, urging Panamanian authorities to **"protect the rights of Chinese enterprises."** He added that ties between Beijing and **Panama City** should **"not be subject to interference from third parties,"** a barely veiled reference to the pressure exerted by **Washington**.

This Chinese diplomatic rhetoric, measured in appearance, concealed real frustration at the loss of a strategic foothold acquired over nearly three decades. Panamanian President **José Raúl Mulino**, for his part, has always denied any foreign interference, repeatedly stating that **"every square meter of the Panama Canal"** belongs exclusively to Panama.

## The economic scale of what is at stake

### A global chokepoint of maritime trade

Mr. President, you are right about one essential point: the economic stakes are colossal. The **Panama Canal** sees more than **13,000 ships** pass through it every year, carrying roughly **5 to 6% of global trade**. According to a **Council on Foreign Relations** report, this waterway facilitates hundreds of billions of dollars in annual trade and remains a central hub for American supply chains.

The United States remains, by far, the canal's largest user: roughly **40% of all American container traffic** passes through it each year. **Chile**, **China**, **Japan**, and **South Korea** are among the other major users of this global trade artery, which explains why control over it generates such geopolitical interest.

### What port control really means

Controlling the ports of **Balboa** and **Cristobal** does not mean controlling the canal itself, which remains administered by the **Panama Canal Authority**, a sovereign Panamanian institution. But it confers a considerable informational and logistical advantage: knowing ship movements, managing loading operations, and potentially influencing transit priorities in the event of major geopolitical tensions.

It is precisely this dimension of indirect influence, more than direct control, that explains why your administration deemed the Chinese presence via **CK Hutchison** unacceptable from a **national security** standpoint, even though the canal remained, in theory, under full Panamanian **sovereignty**.

## The gray areas your speech doesn't address

### CK Hutchison's uncertain fate

Mr. President, your Wednesday statement leaves out a crucial development: **CK Hutchison** has launched **international arbitration** against Panama, vigorously contesting the Panamanian Supreme Court's decision to cancel its concessions. This legal battle, which could drag on for several years, represents a financial and diplomatic risk your triumphant speech never mentions.

Moreover, negotiations between **MSC**, **BlackRock**, and **CK Hutchison** regarding the **41 other ports** held by the Hong Kong conglomerate around the world remain, to this day, unfinalized, with **China** continuing to exert regulatory pressure on this broader transaction that goes well beyond the Panamanian case alone.

### A victory that remains fragile

It would be unwise to present this affair as definitively closed. The Chinese government could seek other levers of influence in the region, whether through investment in other Panamanian infrastructure or through broader bilateral economic pressure on a country that remains, despite everything, economically tied to **China** for a significant share of its trade.

Your rhetoric of **"we're not going to let that happen,"** spoken in the future tense, implicitly suggests, moreover, that you yourself perceive this **victory** as incomplete, or at least reversible should American vigilance ease in the months ahead.

## The Panamanian reaction to your remarks

### Mulino, guardian of a contested sovereignty

Panamanian President **José Raúl Mulino** has, repeatedly since December 2024, reaffirmed that the canal **"is and will always remain Panamanian."** This position, consistently repeated under successive pressure from your administration, illustrates a persistent diplomatic tension between the regional ally that Panama represents and the protective power the United States represents.

When you had previously raised the possibility of directly retaking the canal by force or economic pressure, Mulino responded firmly that Panamanian **sovereignty** **"is not negotiable."** This Panamanian firmness deserves recognition, Mr. President, even from a columnist who largely shares your strategic concerns about **Beijing**.

### An ally who delivered the goods without being publicly summoned

What stands out in this affair is that Panama ultimately acted in line with American interests: the audit, the legal action, and the cancellation of the Chinese concessions all occurred through legitimate Panamanian institutional channels, without **Washington** having to resort to open threats of military or economic seizure of the canal.

This diplomatic success achieved through institutional means rather than direct coercion deserves, in my view, to be celebrated as a model of effective hemispheric cooperation, rather than reframed, as you did Wednesday, as a personal battle still to be fought against an adversary already largely weakened on this specific matter.

## What this means for American doctrine in Latin America

### The return of an assertive hemispheric posture

Your speech on Panama fits within a broader doctrine that some observers have nicknamed the **"Donroe Doctrine,"** a nod to the historic Monroe Doctrine, reaffirming that the **Western Hemisphere** remains a priority sphere of influence for **Washington**, closed to Chinese, Russian, or Iranian strategic ambitions.

This doctrine has also shown up in your repeated statements about **Greenland**, where you have expressed a similar strategic interest, driven by comparable concerns about the influence of rival powers in territories considered strategically vital to American **national security**.

### A strategic consistency that deserves recognition

Despite my reservations about the theatrical form of your announcements, Mr. President, I recognize a real strategic consistency in this approach: identifying Chinese footholds in the **Western Hemisphere** one after another, and mobilizing the diplomatic, judicial, and economic pressure needed to dismantle them before they become irreversible.

This approach, if applied consistently and without sliding into pure military coercion, could indeed slow the expansion of Chinese influence in a region that **Beijing** has patiently courted for more than two decades through massive infrastructure investment.

## The lessons for other nations in the region

### A precedent Beijing is watching closely

The outcome of the Panamanian affair sends a clear signal to other Latin American nations that maintain close economic ties with **China**: critical infrastructure, port-related or otherwise, can become targets of American diplomatic pressure if **Washington** deems it strategically threatening to its **national security**.

Countries like **Peru**, where **China** has invested massively in the port of **Chancay**, or **Brazil**, engaged in multiple infrastructure partnerships with Chinese companies, are probably watching closely how the Panamanian affair unfolded, trying to anticipate whether similar dynamics could someday apply to their own agreements with **Beijing**.

### The risk of a regional resentment backlash

There is, however, a real risk that this American **victory**, if presented with the arrogance that characterized some of your past remarks on Panama, could feed latent resentment in a region already sensitive to accusations of North American imperialist interference, a heavy history stretching back more than a century of direct and indirect U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs.

A more measured American **diplomacy**, one that explicitly acknowledged Panamanian agency and **sovereignty** in this **victory**, would probably better serve **Washington**'s long-term strategic interests than rhetoric that seems to minimize the role of Panamanian institutions in favor of a narrative centered exclusively on your own personal determination.

## The underlying military dimension

### A strategic canal for the U.S. Navy too

Beyond trade, the **Panama Canal** retains considerable military strategic value for the United States, allowing rapid transit of ships between the **Atlantic** and **Pacific** theaters of operation without having to sail around the entire South American continent, a time saving that could prove decisive in a major conflict scenario involving **China** in the Pacific.

This military dimension partly explains why your administration has handled this matter with an urgency that has sometimes seemed disproportionate to observers focused solely on the commercial aspects of the port controversy.

### Historical precedents of American intervention

The United States has, in the past, demonstrated its willingness to act militarily to protect its strategic interests in Panama, notably during the **1989** invasion that toppled General **Manuel Noriega**. This history weighs heavily on the Panamanian collective memory and explains the particular sensitivity of any American rhetoric evoking a possible retaking of the canal.

I do not believe, Mr. President, that you seriously contemplate military intervention in Panama over this port affair already largely resolved through institutional channels. But your words, spoken without nuance in such a historically charged context, risk being interpreted more menacingly than you may have actually intended.

## What the West truly needs to watch now

### Beyond Panama, a hemispheric Chinese strategy

The real issue, Mr. President, extends well beyond the Panamanian case alone: it concerns China's broader strategy of acquiring port, energy, and digital infrastructure across all of Latin America and the Caribbean, a patient strategy aimed at building, over several decades, a network of economic influence that is difficult to dismantle after the fact.

Focusing public attention exclusively on Panama, however symbolically important this canal may be, risks diverting attention from equally concerning matters, such as Chinese investment in the power grids of several Central American countries or **5G** telecommunications infrastructure in certain South American nations.

### Vigilance that must be systemic, not one-off

What the West needs, in my view, is not a series of spectacular announcements on isolated cases, but a coherent and systemic strategy for monitoring strategic Chinese investments across the entire **Western Hemisphere**, coordinated with European allies and multilateral financial institutions that share these security concerns.

Panama could serve as a model for this broader approach: precise identification of vulnerabilities, mobilization of sovereign local institutions, and quiet support rather than open coercion. It is this method, not campaign-rally rhetoric, that will durably protect Western interests in the region.

## A message to European and Asian allies

### Western solidarity in the face of Chinese expansion

This Panamanian affair should also speak to our European and Asian allies, who face similar dynamics of Chinese expansion in their own regional spheres of influence, whether in Africa, Southeast Asia, or the Balkans, where **Beijing** has likewise invested massively in strategic port and energy infrastructure.

The active participation of European companies like the Danish **Maersk** and the Swiss-Italian **MSC** in taking over the Panamanian ports shows that this fight against strategic Chinese influence is not an exclusively American battle, but a broader Western effort that would benefit from being more coordinated and publicly recognized as such.

### Why this informal coalition must be strengthened

Rather than presenting this **victory** as a unilateral American accomplishment, Mr. President, publicly acknowledging the role played by these allied companies and governments would strengthen the credibility of a broader **Western coalition**, essential to effectively countering a **China** that closely coordinates its own strategic initiatives through its state and semi-state channels.

This Western coordination, if built over time, represents the only credible structural response to a Chinese strategy that, unlike yours, does not depend on election cycles and the shifting priorities of a single administration.

## What Taiwan is watching in this affair

### A precedent scrutinized in Taipei

Far from Panama, Taiwanese authorities are following with particular interest how **Washington** dismantled Chinese port influence in the **Western Hemisphere**, seeking to gauge American consistency on similar strategic matters directly involving **Beijing** and its broader regional ambitions.

For **Taiwan**, facing far more direct and existential Chinese pressure, the American demonstration in Panama is an encouraging signal: **Washington** is willing to mobilize significant diplomatic, judicial, and financial resources to counter Chinese strategic expansion, even on matters that don't necessarily make international headlines.

### A consistency to maintain against Beijing everywhere in the world

But this consistency, Mr. President, must extend beyond the **Western Hemisphere** alone. If your administration applies rigorous vigilance in Panama while tolerating Chinese expansion elsewhere, in the Pacific or in Africa, the message sent to **Beijing** would lose considerable global deterrent force.

It is this global strategic consistency, more than one-off rhetoric on a single matter, that will determine whether **China** truly perceives the United States as an adversary resolved to contest its expansion, or merely as a power reacting case by case according to the electoral priorities of the moment.

## What American public opinion actually retains

### A priorities poll that doesn't put Panama first

It must be acknowledged, Mr. President: despite the real strategic importance of the Panamanian matter, American **opinion polls** regularly show that voters place **inflation**, **immigration**, and **domestic security** well ahead of hemispheric foreign policy issues as immediate governance priorities.

This electoral reality perhaps explains why your statements on Panama often take a condensed, dramatic form: they must capture the attention of a public that doesn't necessarily follow, day to day, the legal subtleties of **international arbitration** or the complex negotiations between **CK Hutchison**, **BlackRock**, and the Chinese government.

### The risk of rhetorical fatigue

But this simplification carries a medium-term risk: by repeating dramatic claims about **victories** already largely secured, the American public could develop a form of generalized skepticism toward your foreign policy announcements, making it harder to mobilize public opinion during future crises that are truly urgent and unresolved.

It's a classic rhetorical trap: crying wolf over old **victories** eventually erodes the credibility needed to mobilize public attention the day a genuinely new and unresolved threat demands a swift, determined collective response.

## Conclusion: A real victory, a rhetoric to adjust

### What I take from your Wednesday remarks

Mr. President, your statement on the **Panama Canal** contains an important measure of strategic truth: vigilance toward Chinese influence in the **Western Hemisphere** remains necessary, and the results achieved in Panama, through judicial and commercial means rather than military coercion, deserve to be recognized as a real diplomatic success of your administration.

But this **victory**, already largely secured since January, would have benefited from being presented with the factual precision it deserves, rather than with the theatrical exaggeration of a still-looming threat. The facts, Mr. President, are solid enough to do without rhetorical embellishment.

### A call for precision, not for softened firmness

I am not asking you, Mr. President, to abandon your firmness toward **Beijing**: that firmness serves Western interests in a strategically vital region. I am simply asking you to tell this **victory** with the accuracy it deserves, acknowledging the role of sovereign Panamanian institutions, allied Western companies, and the judicial process that made this outcome possible.

Because a truth told with precision strengthens American credibility on the world stage, whereas an exaggerated **victory**, once revealed as such, risks weakening the trust your allies and adversaries place in your presidential word.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Trump says the US will not let China take over Panama Canal — Reuters, July 1, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-us-will-not-let-china-take-over-panama-canal-2026-07-01/)

- ['China trying to take over Panama Canal,' warns Trump — Livemint, July 2, 2026](https://www.livemint.com/news/us-news/china-trying-to-take-over-panama-canal-warns-trump-vows-he-will-not-let-it-happen-11782956710289.html)

### Secondary sources

- [U.S.-China power struggle thrusts Panama Canal back into focus — CNBC, February 6, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/06/panama-canal-us-trump-china-xi-ck-hutchison-ports.html)

- [Chinese contract at Panama Canal canceled by court in win for Trump's "Donroe Doctrine" — Axios, January 29, 2026](https://www.axios.com/2026/01/29/trump-panama-canal-court-ruling-china)

- [Trump Administration Scores Major Victory as Panama Supreme Court Rules Against Chinese Shipping Firm — Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 2, 2026](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/02/02/trump-administration-scores-major-victory-as-panama-supreme-court-rules-against-chinese-shipping-firm/)

- [Trump Warns that he will not Allow Foreign Influence Regarding his Favorite Canal in Panama — Newsroom Panama, March 7, 2026](https://newsroompanama.com/2026/03/07/trump-warns-that-he-will-not-allow-foreign-influence-regarding-his-favorite-canal-in-panama/)

- [The Panama Canal is a hinge point in Donald Trump's new order — The Economist, February 5, 2026](https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/02/05/the-panama-canal-is-a-hinge-point-in-donald-trumps-new-order)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-lettre-ouverte-monsieur-trump-le-canal-de-panama-nest-pas-un-trophee