# OPEN LETTER: The Supreme Court slams the door shut on $370 billion in Section 301 refunds

> On June 15, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States added to its weekly orders list two words that rang like a hammer blow in the offices of 3,600 importers across America: "certiorari denied." No hearing. No reasoning. No recorded dissent. One line. A door slammed shut forever on the hope of a refund in the case of HMTX Industries, LLC v. United States — the largest tarif

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Op-Ed
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-la-cour-supreme-ferme-definitivement-la-porte-aux-370-milliards-d

## Introduction: June 15, 2026 — the verdict falls, and there is no appeal

### Two words to bury six years of legal combat

On **June 15, 2026**, the **Supreme Court of the United States** added to its weekly orders list two words that rang like a hammer blow in the offices of **3,600 importers** across America: **"certiorari denied."** No hearing. No reasoning. No recorded dissent. One line. A door slammed shut forever on the hope of a refund in the case of **HMTX Industries, LLC v. United States** — the largest tariff litigation in American history.

This decision ends six years of exhausting legal proceedings aimed at recovering the **customs duties** collected on **$370 billion** worth of Chinese goods taxed under **Section 301**. **Lists 3** and **4A** — furniture, auto parts, building materials, clothing, shoes, everyday consumer products — will remain taxed at **25%** and **7.5%** respectively, and importers will never see a cent of those refunds. That money now belongs to the federal government, **permanently**.

*I do not often write open letters. But this decision warrants addressing directly the decision-makers, importers, and lawyers who believed, for six years, that legal logic would ultimately prevail. Because in this case, it was not justice that spoke — it was commercial policy disguised as administrative law.*

## To you, American importers — you did not lose for lack of arguments

### A solid legal argument, rejected by **tariff geopolitics**

Your central argument was clear, coherent, and reasonably grounded in statutory text: **Section 307 of the Trade Act of 1974** authorizes the USTR to **modify or terminate** a Section 301 action — but "modify" means adjustments to an existing action, not a sevenfold expansion of its scope, scaling from **$50 billion** to **$370 billion** in taxed goods. You said: this is not a modification, it is a radical transformation. And those are not the same thing.

The **Court of International Trade** partially agreed with you in **2022**, **remanding** the case to the USTR to better justify its reasoning. That was a partial victory — a signal that your argument at least deserved to be taken seriously. Then the USTR produced additional justification. The CIT validated it in **2023**. The **Federal Circuit** confirmed that ruling on **September 25, 2025**, citing Chinese retaliation as additional justification for the tariff expansion. And the Supreme Court refused to go further.

*What I see in that trajectory is not pure legal reasoning. I see courts that did not want to destabilize a trade policy already in place for years, with billions of dollars already collected by the Treasury. There is an implicit jurisprudence that says: do not touch executive decisions that have produced massive and irreversible effects. That is not law — it is institutional pragmatism.*

## To you, President Trump — you won this battle

### HMTX and the permanent consolidation of executive tariff authority

This decision is a major victory for the American executive — regardless of which administration sits in office. It confirms that the president of the United States holds considerable authority to **massively expand customs tariffs** under Section 301 without explicit legislative approval, as long as the USTR can provide a coherent administrative justification — even after the fact. This is a precedent that will outlast your presidency. Any future administration — Democratic or Republican — can now rely on this precedent to expand tariffs far beyond their original scope.

The **178 product exclusions** that remain active through **November 10, 2026** represent the only remaining relief valve for importers. And the **second quadrennial review** of Section 301 tariffs, launched in **May 2026** by the USTR, could bring new modifications — in either direction: additional increases or targeted adjustments. But the legislative lever for challenging the basic framework is now closed. The **Supreme Court** has just locked it.

*I understand the political logic behind this policy. China spent decades systematically stealing American intellectual property, forcing technology transfers, and deploying massive state subsidies that distorted international competition. Section 301 tariffs were a response to a documented reality. But that response was built unilaterally, without transparent legislative debate, and it was American consumers and importers who paid the price — without ever having a say.*

## To you, USTR and Department of Justice — your victory raises troubling questions

### The expansive reading of the word "modify": dangerous precedent

The **Federal Circuit** ruled that section **307(a)(1)(C)** authorized the USTR to modify a Section 301 action when Chinese retaliation had increased the "burden or restriction" on American trade. In other words: because China retaliated against Lists 1 and 2, the USTR was justified in escalating with Lists 3 and 4A. This is circular reasoning: punishing the adversary's retaliation by using it as justification for an escalation that provokes yet another retaliation. The loop is closed, and executive authority is never constrained.

This logic now applies far beyond the Section 301 tariffs on China. It creates a precedent for any situation where a foreign country responds to American tariffs with countermeasures: those countermeasures automatically become legal justification for a new American escalation. This is a legal architecture that systematically favors **endless escalation** in trade wars.

*And this is where I pause to speak plainly. That precedent worries me — not so much for the $370 billion at stake today, but for what it means tomorrow. 21st-century trade wars are not like those of the 19th century. They affect integrated global supply chains, small businesses that lack the resources to absorb 25% cost increases, ordinary consumers who pay more for essential goods. Structurally legitimizing escalation without legislative guardrails is building a machine with no brakes.*

## The structure of the tariffs that remain in place — the concrete numbers

### Four layers of taxation stacking up

For importers who continue to source from China, the tariff reality in **2026** is staggering. Duties stack up in successive layers: the **base MFN duty** of 0 to 20% depending on the product, the **original Section 301 tariffs** on Lists 1 and 2 at **25%**, the **Section 301 tariffs from quadrennial reviews** that can reach **100%** on certain products — **electric vehicles at 100%**, **medical gloves at 100%**, **semiconductors at 50%** — and **Section 232** tariffs of 25 to 50% if the product contains steel, aluminum, or copper.

To illustrate: a product on **List 3** with a base **MFN duty of 5%** bears a combined rate of **30%** before any Section 232 addition. For a business that was importing that same product in **2016** at 5% duties, the tariff burden has been multiplied by six. And the **HMTX** ruling has just confirmed there is no judicial recourse left to challenge that reality. The only remaining avenues are administrative: **product exclusions** or **supplier relocation**.

*I think of the American small businesses that built their business models on importing Chinese products throughout the 2000s and 2010s — small entrepreneurs who had no reason to anticipate a **trade war** of this magnitude. They did not engage in aggressive lobbying. They just built companies on an economic reality that existed. And today they face cost structures that have exploded, with no judicial remedy available. Trade policy has human faces that Supreme Court decisions never erase.*

## To you, members of Congress — your legislative abdication has real consequences

### The legislative void that made all of this possible

The **HMTX** case would never have existed if the American Congress had not progressively delegated its trade authority to the executive. The **US Constitution** explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations — that is Article I, Section 8. But since the 1930s, and accelerating since the 1970s with the Trade Act of 1974, Congress systematically delegated that authority to the executive for reasons of flexibility and speed. The result: a president can now tax hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods without a congressional vote, with minimal judicial oversight.

The **HMTX** case could have been an opportunity for the Supreme Court to reassert the limits of that **delegation**. It did not seize that opportunity. The **non-delegation doctrine** — or the "major questions" argument that demands a clear **legislative authorization** for decisions of enormous consequence — was not applied here. Yet $370 billion and 3,600 companies are precisely the kind of decision that should require an **explicit legislative authorization**. Congress watched the train go by.

*This is a point I want to make forcefully, even as I acknowledge my view is pointed: American trade democracy suffers from an accountability deficit. When massive economic decisions — those that directly affect consumer prices and business viability — can be made by presidential decree without a legislative vote, something breaks in the democratic chain. This is not a partisan question. It is a fundamental constitutional one.*

## What "certiorari denied" means — and what it does not mean

### A refusal to hear is not a validation of the reasoning

It is crucial to understand the precise scope of the **June 15, 2026** decision. When the Supreme Court denies **certiorari** — that is, refuses to hear an appeal — it does not validate the reasoning of the lower court. It simply says: this case does not warrant our attention at this time. The denial may reflect agreement with the **Federal Circuit's** decision, but it may also reflect considerations of scheduling, docket burden, or the judgment that the case does not present constitutional questions sufficiently significant to merit their time.

In practice, however, the distinction matters little for the **3,600 importers** affected. The denial of certiorari means the Federal Circuit's ruling is final and binding. There is no higher court left. The **CBP protests** that were filed will be rejected because the agency has no basis for granting refunds on legal theories the courts have rejected. The only remaining variable is the statute of limitations: if entries were liquidated more than two years ago and no filing was made, there is no **recovery** mechanism left.

*This nuance — a refusal to hear is not an endorsement — has rhetorical importance I refuse to lose sight of. Supporters of Section 301 tariffs will brandish this decision as total validation of their policy. That is not what the Supreme Court said. It said: we take no position. That is not the same thing. And that difference matters for the legal future of this policy.*

## Remaining options — and their real limits

### Product exclusions: a safety net with holes

The only remaining administrative relief mechanism is the **product exclusion program**. As of the **June 15, 2026** ruling, **178 product-specific exclusions** remained active, but they expire on **November 10, 2026**. The USTR launched its **second quadrennial review** in **May 2026**, with results expected by **late 2026** or **early 2027**. For businesses whose products are not covered by those exclusions, the only real option is **supplier diversification** — Vietnam, Mexico, India, Thailand — or **absorbing** the additional costs into margins.

The distinction between **IEEPA and Section 301** is important: refunds linked to **IEEPA** tariffs struck down by the **Federal Court's February 2026** ruling and the resulting **CAPE** program operate under different legal authorities and are not affected by the **HMTX** ruling. If you are an importer, you must carefully distinguish under which authority your duties were imposed before drawing any conclusions about your potential remedies.

*I want to be honest about the limits of what I understand in the complexity of these tariff instruments. The interactions between Section 301, Section 232, IEEPA, and the quadrennial reviews create a regulatory labyrinth that even specialist lawyers navigate with difficulty. What I know with certainty is that this labyrinth systematically favors large economic actors — those with the resources to hire the right experts — and penalizes small businesses that cannot afford to navigate it alone.*

## The question of global supply chains — a real geopolitical impact

### Pressure on Washington's trading partners

The definitive confirmation of **Section 301** tariffs sends a clear signal to all global trade actors: the United States has become structurally protectionist in its commercial relations with China. This is no longer one administration's policy — it is now a permanent legal precedent. Countries that export to the United States and use Chinese components in their manufacturing chains — **Mexico, Canada, Vietnam, India** — must integrate that risk into their long-term planning.

For Western allies, this decision raises a strategic question: how to navigate between the demands of modern supply chains, deeply integrated with Chinese production, and American political pressures that reward diversification away from China? Western trading partners — the **European Union, Japan, South Korea** — will watch this decision carefully and assess its implications for their own trade policies.

*Here is my underlying geopolitical read: Section 301 tariffs, confirmed by HMTX, are not just American trade policy. They are one of the first bricks in a structural economic decoupling between the West and China. That decoupling is painful in the short term. It may be necessary in the long term, given how Beijing weaponizes its industrial capacity as geopolitical leverage. But it should be decided openly, democratically, by elected legislators — not imposed by decree and retroactively validated by cautious courts.*

## To you, USTR and the future of American trade policy

### A confirmed power — but to what extent?

The **USTR** emerges from this decision with expanded and legally consolidated powers. The second quadrennial review of **Section 301** tariffs, launched in **May 2026**, can now be conducted with the assurance that resulting expansions will be difficult to challenge in court. The USTR proposed new **Section 301** tariffs of **10 to 12.5%** on imports from **60 economies** linked to forced labor — a potentially considerable expansion of the scope of this tool.

But unchecked power corrupts its own legitimacy. If economic actors can no longer reasonably anticipate future tariff costs because the executive can modify them by decree without effective legal constraints, the investment climate and long-term planning suffer. **Predictability** is an economic value in itself. And this decision has just substantially reduced the amount of it available in American international trade.

*What I am asking of the USTR is not to renounce its newly confirmed powers. It is to exercise them with a transparency and consultation that the current legal framework does not require but that the American economy deserves. The 3,600 importers who lost today were not your enemies. They were your economic constituents. And their loss of $370 billion in hoped-for refunds deserved an explanation — not just judicial validation by decree.*

## What this decision says about the current Supreme Court

### A cautious court in the face of geopolitical stakes

The denial of certiorari in **HMTX** reflects institutional caution on the part of the **Supreme Court**: avoiding engagement on commercial policy questions with complex geopolitical ramifications, preferring to leave the executive and Congress to resolve these tensions through political channels. This caution has a certain logic — courts are not best positioned to referee global trade wars. But it leaves a void: without judicial guardrails, who controls the expansion of executive trade powers?

The same **Supreme Court** has shown a willingness to reassert the limits of federal agencies in other contexts — the major questions doctrine, decisions limiting the authority of the EPA or OSHA. But in matters of international trade, where foreign policy and national security are invoked as justifications, the Court appears more reluctant to intervene. The result is an asymmetry: the executive is constrained in domestic regulation but nearly unconstrained in international trade policy.

*I do not claim to have all the answers on the right institutional balance between executive, legislative, and judicial power in trade matters. It is a deep constitutional question on which serious legal scholars disagree. But I know that the total absence of guardrails is not the right answer either. And today, the Supreme Court confirmed it is not ready to build any in this domain.*

## To you, American consumers — you also paid

### The invisible costs no one accounts for publicly

The **HMTX** ruling does not mention American consumers. Yet they ultimately absorbed a significant portion of those **$370 billion** in customs duties, through higher prices on thousands of products: **furniture, electronics, clothing, shoes, building materials**. Economic studies published between **2019** and **2025** documented that Section 301 tariffs were passed on to consumer prices at a significant rate, though variable by sector and depending on importers' bargaining power.

These costs are **diffuse** — spread across millions of households in small additional amounts per transaction — which makes them politically less visible than the concentrated gains in certain protected sectors. That is why tariff policy survives judicial challenges and electoral cycles: its costs are diluted, its political benefits are concentrated. The **HMTX** ruling permanently cements that incentive structure.

*I write this open letter knowing it will have no direct effect on American tariff policy. But if someone at the USTR, in Congress, or in an executive office ever reads it, I hope they take this away: the costs of trade wars have human faces. They are real even when courts validate the policies that create them. And decision-makers who ignore those faces lose something essential in their mandate to govern.*

## The business community and industry associations' reaction

### Industry associations between resignation and concern

Associations representing **American importers** reacted to the **HMTX** ruling with pragmatic resignation. The **National Retail Federation**, which had supported the petitioners in amicus curiae briefs — the Latin term for friend-of-the-court submissions — had called for more robust **congressional oversight** of executive tariffs. The **US Chamber of Commerce** stressed that American businesses need **tariff predictability** to plan their **long-term investments** — a predictability that the **current regime** does not structurally guarantee.

On the side of **manufacturing sectors protected** by the tariffs — **steel**, **aluminum**, certain **strategic technology sectors** — the reaction was different. These industries saw in the ruling a confirmation that the tariff protections they had secured would not be challenged through judicial channels. For these actors, the **stability of Section 301 tariffs** represents a **competitive advantage secured** after years of lobbying and political litigation. The **HMTX** ruling thus creates two categories of American economic actors: those protected by these tariffs and those who pay the cost.

### The impact on Sino-American bilateral trade negotiations

The **HMTX** ruling arrives in the context of trade negotiations between the **United States and China** that, since **2025**, have alternated between periods of tension and attempts at de-escalation. The judicial confirmation of the legality of **Section 301** tariffs reinforces the American negotiating position: Washington can now maintain these tariffs indefinitely without fear of **judicial challenge**, using them as leverage in negotiations on structural issues such as **intellectual property**, **state subsidies**, and **market access**.

Beijing has used the tariffs as justification for reinforcing its own import-substitution policies and accelerating its **domestic technology development** program. The paradox is striking: American tariffs, designed to force behavioral changes in China, have partly accelerated Chinese **economic self-sufficiency** in strategic sectors like **semiconductors**, **electric vehicles**, and **renewable energy**. Data published in **2025** show that **China's share** of global exports of **high-value manufactured goods** continued to grow despite — or because of — these tariffs.

### Chinese exporters and their adaptation to the new tariff reality

On the Chinese side, exporting companies developed several strategies to circumvent **Section 301** tariffs: relocating final assembly to third countries like **Vietnam**, **Mexico**, or **Malaysia**; partially absorbing costs through margin compression; and diversifying toward less restrictive markets. These adaptations partially reduced the effectiveness of tariffs as leverage for behavioral change, but also created complex **indirect trade flows** that American customs authorities are now working to identify and block.

**Tariff circumvention** — the practice of routing Chinese goods through third countries to avoid customs duties — has become a major issue in American customs administration. Investigations by **CBP** and the **Department of Commerce** have documented circumvention patterns in several sectors, notably **solar panels**, **steel**, and certain **electronics**. This reality further complicates the assessment of the actual effectiveness of **Section 301** tariffs confirmed by the **HMTX** ruling.

### Chinese exporters and their adjustment to the tariff reality

On the Chinese side, the adaptation to **Section 301** tariffs has accelerated significantly since the **HMTX** ruling confirmed their permanence. The finality of the court's decision removed any residual uncertainty about whether these tariffs might be judicially struck down, prompting exporters to deepen their **supply-chain restructuring** rather than waiting for a legal reversal that will not come. **Vietnam**, **Malaysia**, and **Mexico** have seen accelerating investment in Chinese-funded assembly operations.

The structural impact of this adaptation is felt beyond tariff revenues: the reshaping of **global supply chains** is creating new dependencies and new vulnerabilities that American trade policy will need to address in subsequent rounds of negotiation. The **HMTX** ruling has locked in the tariff framework, but it has not resolved the underlying **competitive dynamics** it was designed to manage.

*There is a historical irony in all of this that I cannot ignore: by trying to slow China's technological rise through tariffs, the United States may have stimulated exactly what it feared — an accelerated Chinese technological independence program. That is not a reason to stop challenging Beijing's unfair practices. It is a reason to do so with a more sophisticated strategy than a permanent tariff war.*

## Lessons for other ongoing tariff disputes

### IEEPA, Section 232, and separate parallel proceedings

The **HMTX** ruling does not cover all tariff disputes currently before **American courts**. Tariffs imposed under **IEEPA** — used by the Trump administration for **10% universal tariffs** on all global imports — are the subject of entirely separate proceedings. The **Federal Circuit Court of Appeals** in **June 2026** extended a block on a ruling against those global tariffs in a proceeding wholly distinct from **HMTX**. Importers and lawyers reading the **HMTX** ruling should avoid automatically extrapolating it to those **different legal instruments**.

**Section 232** — tariffs on steel and aluminum based on **national security** — has its own jurisprudence, with courts generally deferring to the executive on **national security** questions. **Section 201** — safeguards — has a distinct procedure including investigations by the **US International Trade Commission**. Each instrument has its own rules, its own **judicial review** standards, and its own potential legal vulnerabilities that future challenges could explore.

### What trade lawyers took from HMTX

**International trade law** specialists noted several practical lessons from the **HMTX** case: first, that American courts are extremely reluctant to invalidate **trade policies** that have been producing massive economic effects for several years; second, that the interpretation of statutory terms delegating trade powers will be very generous toward the executive; third, that the **major questions doctrine** — which demands clear legislative authorization for decisions of great consequence — was not applied here, creating a legal gray zone exploitable in other contexts.

These lessons will ripple far beyond tariffs on **China**. Any future administration seeking to impose sweeping tariffs under **delegated trade authorities** can rely on the **HMTX** precedent to defend the legality of its actions. That is a tool both American parties can use — and one that Washington's trading partners will need to factor into their long-term **risk analysis** of their **economic relations** with the **United States**.

*I close this section with a personal note addressed to the lawyers and economists who will continue debating HMTX's legacy in the years ahead: do not lose sight of the 3,600 companies that fought for six years. They funded this legal battle. They believed in the system. And the system said no. The next time economic actors are asked to trust judicial channels to challenge massive executive decisions, they will remember HMTX. That is not trivial for long-term institutional legitimacy.*

## Conclusion: one door closed, a trade democracy to rebuild

### The question of reciprocity and WTO negotiations

The **HMTX** ruling sits within a broader context of tensions around the multilateral trade rules of the **World Trade Organization**. **Section 301** tariffs have been challenged before the **WTO** by China, which obtained a favorable panel ruling in **2020** — but the United States appealed and continues to block the functioning of the **WTO Appellate Body**. The **HMTX** ruling confirms that the United States has no intention of submitting its tariff policy to effective multilateral supervision.

This American position weakens the multilateral trading system that the United States itself helped build after **World War II**. If the world's largest economy can impose massive tariffs unilaterally, without effective domestic judicial or multilateral oversight, the architecture of **rules-based international trade** fragments. **Global South** countries and emerging economies are watching this evolution closely: if Washington can act this way, why shouldn't they?

### The question of reciprocity and WTO negotiations

The **HMTX** ruling sits within a broader context of tensions around the multilateral trade rules of the **World Trade Organization**. **Section 301** tariffs have been challenged before the **WTO** by China, which obtained a favorable panel ruling in **2020** — but the United States appealed and continues to block the functioning of the **WTO Appellate Body**. The **HMTX** ruling confirms that the United States will not submit its tariff policy to effective multilateral supervision.

This American position weakens the multilateral trading system that the United States itself helped build after **World War II**. If the world's largest economy can impose massive tariffs unilaterally, without effective domestic judicial oversight or multilateral governance, the architecture of **rules-based international trade** fragments. **Global South** economies and emerging markets are watching this evolution closely — one that redefines the norms of global trade governance.

### What HMTX leaves behind

The case of **HMTX Industries v. United States** leaves several lasting legacies: the confirmation of expansive **executive authority** in tariff matters, the permanent closure of the judicial avenue for challenging the scope of **Section 301** tariffs, and the consolidation of a precedent that will make it very difficult for courts to constrain these powers in the future. These tariffs are now as permanent as the legal framework that authorizes them — and that framework has just been fortified by the highest court in the land.

### The imperative of legislative reform

The only viable path to restoring democratic guardrails over American trade policy runs through **Congress**. Legislators from both parties have, at various points, floated bills to rein in executive tariff powers — requiring congressional approval for tariff increases above certain thresholds, establishing mandatory periodic review mechanisms, or restoring more accessible judicial appeal avenues. These efforts have rarely succeeded. The **HMTX** ruling should put the urgency of this reform back on the agenda — not just for the **3,600 importers** who lost today, but for the long-term democratic health of American trade policy.

*I address this open letter to the decision-makers, lawyers, importers, and consumers who silently bear the cost of these tariff policies. The HMTX ruling is final. But the story of American trade policy is still being written. And those who believe that **economic democracy** deserves better than unsupervised presidential decrees still have a role to play — in Congress, in the courts, and in public debate.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [TariffLens — Supreme Court denies certiorari in HMTX Industries v. United States, ending Section 301 refund hopes — June 19, 2026](https://www.tarifflens.ai/blog/supreme-court-section-301-china-tariffs-hmtx-refund-2026)

- [Federal Circuit Blog — Recent news on the Federal Circuit, including HMTX decision — June 16, 2026](https://fedcircuitblog.com/2026/06/16/recent-news-on-the-federal-circuit-580/)

- [National Law Review — US Trade Update: IEEPA refund litigation, Section 232, new Section 301 — 2026](https://natlawreview.com/article/us-trade-update-ieepa-refund-litigation-section-232-modifications-new-section-301)

### Secondary sources

- [US News — US Appeals Court extends block on ruling against Trump's 10% global tariff — June 11, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2026-06-11/us-appeals-court-extends-block-on-ruling-against-trumps-10-global-tariff)

- [Straits Times — US government appeals judge's order for tariff refunds — 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/us-government-appeals-judges-order-for-tariff-refunds)

- [LinkedIn — Tariff Watch: Week of June 15, 2026 — June 15, 2026](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/tariff-watch-week-june-15-2026-jmrodgersco-pmkqe)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-la-cour-supreme-ferme-definitivement-la-porte-aux-370-milliards-d