# OPEN LETTER: To those who still believe the Russian sky is protected — 194 proofs to the contrary

> I recognize something unusual in the exercise of this open letter. One does not normally write to anonymous adversaries to explain their own defeat. But there is something necessary in this exercise:

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Open letter
- Published: 2026-07-02
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-a-ceux-qui-croient-encore-que-le-ciel-russe-est-protege-194-preuv

## Introduction: A letter addressed to the architects of a collapsing network

### To the Russian strategists who built the layers

This letter is addressed to those who planned, deployed, and maintained the **Russian integrated air defense network** in **occupied Ukraine** and on the adjacent Russian territory. You built something impressive on paper: layered systems of **S-400**, **S-300**, **Buk**, **Tor**, and **Pantsir**, linked by a dense radar network, each layer protecting the next, each system covering the blind spots of its neighbor. It was an air deterrence architecture designed to make the sky impenetrable.

In **2026**, that network has been struck **194 times**. Since the beginning of the year alone. Since the creation of the **Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces** as a distinct branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on **June 11, 2025**, the total reaches **276 elements destroyed**: **169 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems**, **76 radar stations**. Plus **426 mobile radars** and **3,838 mobile electronic warfare systems**. I am writing to tell you what these figures mean — and what they announce.

### What I am and what I am not

I am a columnist. I am not a military officer, a defense strategist, or an intelligence officer. I do not have access to Ukrainian operations rooms or classified post-strike reports. What I have are verified public data, testimonies from Ukrainian commanders, and reports from organizations following this conflict in real time. And these data tell a story that Russian generals know better than I do — but that I will tell here, for those who have not yet read the figures closely.

## The principle of layers, and why it no longer works

### The logic of defense in depth

Russian air defense rests on a classic military principle: defense in depth, or "**layers**." Each system covers a specific radius and a specific altitude. The **S-400**, with an official range potentially reaching **400 km** (frequently engaged up to **200 km**), covers high-altitude, long-range threats. The **S-300** covers similar but older threats. The **Buk** and **Tor** handle medium-altitude threats. The **Pantsir** protects the low layer. And the radars — mobile and fixed — bind it all together into a coherent detection and guidance network.

The principle is sound. Each layer makes the attacker's task more difficult. Each system protects its neighbor. A breach in one layer is compensated by the layers that follow. This is what the company commander of the Ukrainian **413th Unmanned Systems Regiment "Raid"**, using the call sign "**Churchill**," described to **Euromaidan Press** in June **2026**: "**In certain points on the front, the Russians are losing the concept of layered air defense.**" This assessment comes from someone actively working to destroy those layers, one by one.

### When the layers become individual targets

The Ukrainian strategy consists precisely in exploiting this layered logic against itself. By targeting **radars** — the network's eyes — and **mobile launchers** — its fists — Ukrainian drone operators are not trying to break through Russian air defense. They are trying to **hollow it out**, to progressively widen the blind spots until safe aerial corridors appear. **Kostiantyn Kryvolap**, a former aeronautical test engineer at the **Antonov** design bureau, explained that the **Russians have significantly reduced the number of available S-400 and S-300 systems** under pressure from these strikes.

Each radar or launcher destroyed in occupied territories or in **Crimea** widens a "**window**" for subsequent deep strikes. This window allows Ukrainian aircraft to fly closer to targets and drop glide bombs on objectives they could not reach a year earlier. The drone campaign against air defense is not an end in itself — it is the prerequisite for a deep-strike capability that **Ukraine** is building in real time.

## June 2026: 31 strikes in one month

### The pace is accelerating

In **June 2026** alone, the **Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces** struck **31 elements** of the Russian integrated air defense network. This is one of the most intense months since this branch was created. To put that figure in perspective: in a single month of June, **Ukraine** destroyed or damaged more Russian air defense systems than most countries hold in their entire national arsenals. This attrition rate is sustainable and growing.

Between **June 27 and 29, 2026**, operators continued targeting Russian **energy infrastructure**, **fuel**, and **military logistics** simultaneously. In occupied **Crimea**, the **1st Separate Unmanned Systems Center** struck a **Pantsir-S1** system, an **ST-68** radar, and a **48Ya6-K1 Podlyok** radar. In **Crimea**, the **412th Nemesis Brigade** targeted railway fuel wagons. In the **Zaporizhzhia** region, a fuel depot and two Russian tanker trucks. In the **Bryansk** region, on Russian territory itself, the **413th Raid Brigade** hit a locomotive supporting Russian military logistics.

### Crimea as the central theater

**Crimea** occupies a central place in this campaign. The peninsula is the main **southern logistics hub** of **Russia** for supplying its forces in the occupied territories. It depends on passage through the **Kerch Strait**, ferries, and the land corridor through **southern occupied Ukraine**. Each radar destroyed in **Crimea** reduces the aerial coverage of these supply lines. Each launcher neutralized widens the window in which Ukrainian aircraft can operate over the **Black Sea** and **southern occupied Ukraine**.

## Drones as doctrinal revolution

### Forces created from scratch since June 2025

The most remarkable fact in this campaign is not only its effectiveness — it is its youth. The **Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces** have existed as a distinct branch of the Armed Forces only since **June 11, 2025**. In less than a year of existence, they have destroyed **276 air defense elements**, struck **426 mobile radars**, neutralized **3,838 mobile electronic warfare systems**. These figures represent an offensive capability built in real time, on the basis of lessons learned in the field, without decades of institutional doctrine behind them.

The creation of this distinct branch is itself a major strategic decision. It recognizes that drones are no longer an accessory to the traditional military — they are a fully-fledged dimension of modern combat, requiring specialized doctrines, training, and command chains. **Ukraine** has made this institutional leap that most Western armies have not yet accomplished. This is a lesson for every general staff watching this conflict.

### Fire Point and Ukrainian industrial power

Behind the drone operators, there is a Ukrainian military industry that emerged from urgency. The company **Fire Point**, which did not exist before the **2022 Russian invasion** — it was then a film casting agency — is today one of **Ukraine**'s largest military contractors. Its **FP-1** and **FP-2** drones, and its **FP-5 Flamingo** cruise missiles, are reportedly responsible for approximately **60%** of Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory, according to co-founder **Denys Shtilerman**. Its modernized drones struck a refinery in Russia's **Tyumen** region, **2,070 km** from the Ukrainian border, in June **2026**.

## Operation Ashan: another front in the drone offensive

### 1,180 targets across two phases

Alongside the air defense campaign, the **Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces** conducted **Operation Ashan**, a two-phase campaign against Russian armored vehicles and artillery. The first phase destroyed more than **800 armored vehicles** — tanks, personnel carriers, other armored units — "**in just a few nights**," according to Defense Minister **Mykhailo Fedorov**. The direct result: the **Russians conducted no mechanized offensive for six months** after these strikes.

The second phase, named "**ArtAshan**," launched in **June 2026**, focused on Russian artillery in the **Kherson**, **Zaporizhzhia**, **Donetsk**, and **Starobilsk** sectors. It struck **231 targets**, destroyed **171** of them, and reduced Russian activity across the entire front line by **30 to 81%** on the first day of strikes. These figures were verified by objective monitoring systems and intercepted communications.

### A paradigm shift in ground warfare

**Operation Ashan** illustrates a fundamental paradigm shift: drones no longer serve only for reconnaissance or symbolic strikes. They have become a **tactical force multiplier** capable of halting mechanized offensives, systematically destroying enemy artillery, and altering the balance of forces across entire front sectors. This is no longer experimental drone warfare — it is proven operational doctrine.

## Fire Point and missile defense: the next frontier

### The Freyja system: intercepting ballistics for under a million dollars

But **Fire Point** does not stop at offense. In partnership with German radar manufacturer **Hensoldt**, the company is developing the **Freyja** system — a ballistic missile interceptor designed to engage at **25 km altitude** for under **$700,000** per shot. For comparison: one **Patriot PAC-3** interceptor costs approximately **$3.8 million**. The cost reduction exceeds **80%**. If this system reaches its announced performance levels, it will change the economics of missile defense.

Co-founder **Shtilerman** told **Reuters**: "**If we can bring the cost under a million dollars, it will be a game-changer in air defense solutions.**" The company plans a production rate of **three interceptors per day** from August **2026** and a first ballistic missile interception test by the end of **2027**. Co-founder **Terekha** posted on **X** a video of a test flight of the **FP-7.X** in **June 2026** — "**a fully controlled maneuvering flight**."

### Ukraine as a security provider, not merely a recipient

**Shtilerman** made a statement worth quoting in full: "**Ukraine is no longer just a consumer of aid — it has become a provider of security solutions for all of Europe, and perhaps for the entire world.**" This claim, which would have seemed extravagant in **2022**, is today defensible on the facts. **Ukraine** produces long-range drones that strike **Russia** at distances only major powers could reach yesterday. It is developing missile interceptors at costs lower than anything on the Western market.

## What 276 systems destroyed means for Moscow

### Systems that cannot be replaced quickly

To grasp the impact of **276 systems** destroyed since June **2025**, one must consider replacement lead times. One **S-400** system represents years of industrial production and millions of dollars. **Russia**, under Western sanctions since **2022**, has limited access to the advanced electronic components needed to produce these systems. Its factories are running at full capacity, but with lower-quality substitutes. Replacing **276 systems** within a few months, while maintaining a presence across the entire front and defending Russian territory itself, likely exceeds available industrial capacity.

**Russia** has indeed relocated **S-300** and **S-400** systems toward **Moscow** following the latest mass strike on the capital. This defensive strategic choice — protecting the capital at the expense of the front — illustrates the real constraint. Each system moved toward **Moscow** is one fewer system above **occupied Ukraine**. It is a zero-sum game that **Ukraine** is progressively winning.

### Attrition as a long-term strategy

**Ukraine** cannot militarily retake all occupied territories in a single offensive. Its human and material resources, despite Western support, are lower than Russia's in raw terms. Its strategy is therefore one of **asymmetric attrition**: use low-cost drones to destroy high-cost Russian systems, exhaust Russia's industrial capacity, progressively degrade **Moscow**'s offensive and defensive capability to the point where maintaining the occupation becomes unsustainable. This strategy is slow. It is painful for **Ukraine** too. But it is coherent, and it is working.

## What the destroyed radars open as possibilities

### Glide bombs that reach farther

The direct operational consequence of destroying Russian radars and launchers is the widening of the airspace in which Ukrainian aviation can operate. Ukrainian aircraft can now "**fly deeper and drop glide bombs on targets they could not have reached a year ago**," according to analysis from **Euromaidan Press**. **Ukraine** also launched serial production of its first domestically produced guided glide bomb, the **Vyrivniuvach**, in **June 2026**.

This combination — airspace widened by radar destruction, glide bombs of domestic production — represents a qualitative step up in Ukrainian strike capability. It is not an instant transformation, but a progressive build-up of capabilities that, six to twelve months from now, could significantly shift the balance of strikes.

### Long-range strikes deep into Russian territory

Simultaneously, the long-range strike campaign against Russian territory's interior is intensifying. In **June 2026**, at least **28 strikes** targeted Russian oil infrastructure — refineries, depots, pipelines. These strikes **reduced Russian gasoline production to historically low levels**, forced **Moscow** to restrict domestic sales, and disrupted the logistics chains feeding the front. Refineries in the **Urals** and **Western Siberia** are now within reach of Ukrainian drones.

## The implications for Ukraine's allies

### Doctrinal lessons for NATO

What **Ukraine** has developed in offensive drones and air defense attrition is the richest body of military doctrine generated in a major conflict in decades. **NATO** member armies are progressively integrating these lessons into their own doctrines. The creation of unmanned systems units, the priority given to striking adversary radar and electronic warfare networks, the models of asymmetric attrition — all of this is reshaping Western military thinking in real time.

**Fire Point**'s **Freyja** system is attracting the attention of European partners. **Hensoldt** (Germany), **Thales** (France), **Leonardo** (Italy), and **Kongsberg** (Norway) are all mentioned as potential partners for the radar and command-and-control systems. A transatlantic industrial collaboration between **Ukraine** and its allies to produce low-cost missile interceptors would be a major transformation of the European defense industrial landscape.

### Support must not falter

Behind all these impressive figures — **194**, **276**, **3,838** — lies a reality that Western allies must not lose sight of: this campaign is possible because **Ukraine** still receives support in materials, munitions, financing, and intelligence from the **West**. If this support weakens — for political, budgetary, or fatigue-driven reasons — the pace of strikes will slow, the Russian layers will reform, and the sacrifices made since June **2025** will lose part of their strategic effect.

## To Russian commanders: one thing to understand

### The doctrine of erosion will not stop

I return to those this letter primarily addresses: the architects and operators of the Russian air defense network. You have seen the figures. You know what **194** strikes in six months mean for your capabilities. You know that the systems you moved to **Moscow** to defend the capital are systems you no longer have above **Crimea** and the **Donbas**. You know that every destroyed radar opens a corridor you cannot close without a replacement that your sanctions-constrained industry is struggling to supply.

What you may not have known is the speed at which **Ukraine** built this capability. The **Unmanned Systems Forces** are less than a year old. **Fire Point** had four years of existence. The doctrine of erosion, as it is being applied, improves with every strike, adapts to every countermeasure, learns from every failure. It will not stop.

### What history will say about this choice

I close this section of the letter with a question I pose without rhetoric: what will history say of a war launched by a regime that believed it could conquer in a few days a country of **44 million people**, and that four years later is watching its air defense network eroded by a branch of the opposing army that did not exist when the conflict began? This question deserves an honest answer from all those in **Russia** who supported, ordered, or simply stood by while this war was launched.

## To the Russian people: a necessary distinction

### The army is not the people

This letter is addressed to those who made the decisions, not to those who bore their consequences. There are in **Russia** citizens who did not want this war, families who lost sons in an invasion they never approved, soldiers sent to the front without an honest explanation of what they are fighting for. These people are not my adversaries — they are, in their own way, additional victims of the **Putin** regime. I make this distinction because it is real and because it matters for the future peace.

What I refuse is to let the institutional silence of generals, strategists, and bureaucrats mask the reality of what is happening in the field. **194 strikes in six months**. **276 systems destroyed since June 2025**. These figures do not lie. And the Russian people, like all peoples, deserve to know the truth about the war their government is waging in their name.

## The response the West must maintain

### Not letting ourselves be distracted from what matters

To my Western readers now: the figures from this campaign show that the Ukrainian strategy is working. It is slow, costly in human and material resources, and requires a patience that Western political culture — with its 24-hour news cycle — is not naturally inclined to sustain. But it is working. Maintaining support for **Ukraine** — in materials, munitions, financing, and intelligence — is not charity toward a country at war. It is an investment in the collective security of the **West**.

Every Russian air defense system destroyed by a Ukrainian drone is a system that will not be available to threaten **NATO** members. Every refinery struck in **Russia** is a liter of fuel less for tanks. **Ukraine** is fighting for itself — but it is also fighting, indirectly, for the values and security of the entire **West**. We cannot afford to falter now.

## What the 276 strikes announce for what comes next

### A turning point in the air war

The **276 air defense elements** destroyed since June **2025** represent a turning point in the air war above **Ukraine**. The sky is not yet safe for Ukrainian aviation — but it is progressively more so than it was a year ago. Aerial corridors are opening. Ukrainian aircraft are flying deeper. Glide bombs are hitting targets at extended range. The trajectory is clear.

If this pace is maintained — and Ukrainian industrial capabilities and allied commitments suggest it can be — the air warfare balance will continue to shift in **Ukraine**'s favor. This will not be a spectacular victory broadcast one evening on screens — it will be the sum of thousands of strikes, one layer at a time, until the point at which maintaining the occupation becomes militarily unsustainable for **Moscow**.

### The Vyrivniuvach glide bomb: a name to remember

The launch of serial production of Ukraine's first domestically produced guided glide bomb, the **Vyrivniuvach**, in **June 2026**, is one of the least-covered but most important developments in this phase of the conflict. This weapon, produced on Ukrainian soil, combines the extended range made possible by the destruction of Russian radars with guided precision that reduces civilian casualties. It symbolizes Ukraine's trajectory: from a country that requested weapons, to a country that manufactures them, to a country that exports them to defend **Europe**.

## Conclusion: 194, 276, and counting

### What these figures really mean

This open letter began with two figures: **194** and **276**. These are cold military numbers. Systems destroyed, radars neutralized, launchers eliminated. But behind each figure are Ukrainian drone operators who planned, executed, and risked their lives for these strikes. Engineers who developed the vehicles. Commanders who defined the targets. Soldiers holding the lines while the drones do their work.

### A strategy that deserves to be supported

What this campaign demonstrates is that **Ukraine** has developed a coherent, effective, and sustainable strategy for progressively degrading the offensive and defensive capacity of **Russia**. This strategy deserves to be supported by its allies with the same coherence and effectiveness. No wavering, no political conditions, no "**support fatigue**." A firm line, maintained over time, until **Moscow** understands that continuing this war costs more than ending it.

## What this letter cannot say

### The limits of my position

I must name what this letter cannot say. I do not know Ukraine's operational plans for the coming weeks. I do not know which sectors will be prioritized, nor which Russian systems remain functional despite the reported attrition. The data I use are public and therefore incomplete. The reality on the ground is always more complex and brutal than the reports that emerge from it.

I also acknowledge that behind the figures of destroyed systems, there are Russian soldiers who died, who were wounded, who survived. This war has an enormous human cost on both sides of the lines. That cost does not make the Russian aggression less illegal, nor the Ukrainian resistance less legitimate. But it deserves to be named, even in an engaged open letter.

### What I hope from this letter

I hope this letter will be read by those who wonder whether supporting **Ukraine** is worth it. These **194 strikes**, these **276 systems** — they are not propaganda. They are verifiable results of a coherent strategy. **Ukraine** is progressively winning the air battle. It is building a first-rate military industry. It is defending not only its territory but the principles on which the **West** claims to stand. Maintaining support for this effort is not an act of charity — it is an act of consistency with our declared values.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [United24 Media — Ukraine's Drone Force Is Punching Holes in Russia's Air Defense: 194 Hits This Year — June 30, 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraines-drone-force-is-punching-holes-in-russias-air-defense-194-hits-this-year-20303)

- [Euromaidan Press — Russia built its air defense in layers. A Ukrainian commander says the drones are peeling them off one by one — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/26/russia-built-its-air-defense-in-layers-a-ukrainian-commander-says-the-drones-are-peeling-them-off-one-by-one/)

- [Militarnyi — Ukraine Strikes Over 1000 Russian Armored Vehicles and Artillery Systems: Operation Ashan — July 1, 2026](https://militarnyi.com/en/news/operation-ashan-ukraine-strike-1000-targets/)

### Secondary sources

- [Kyiv Independent — Ukraine War Latest — July 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-141/)

- [Euromaidan Press — Ukraine War Coverage — July 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/category/news-ukraine/)

- [Military Times — Ukraine's top strike-drone maker moves into ballistic missile defense — June 25, 2026](https://www.militarytimes.com/unmanned/2026/06/25/ukraines-top-strike-drone-maker-moves-into-ballistic-missile-defense/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-a-ceux-qui-croient-encore-que-le-ciel-russe-est-protege-194-preuv