# OPEN LETTER: To Those Who Want Ukraine to Negotiate — A Country Does Not Surrender Its Future

> I write this letter grounded in a single number. One. Seventy percent. That is the proportion of Ukrainians skeptical that ongoing talks will lead to a durable peace — according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, in its survey of March 2026. Seventy percent. Not a fringe minority, not a radical nationalist wing, not the extremes: seven Ukrainians out of ten, surv

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Open letter
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-70-des-ukrainiens-ne-vous-croient-pas-et-ils-ont-raison

## Introduction: To those who want Ukraine to negotiate quickly

### A statistic that should stop everyone cold

I write this letter grounded in a single number. One. Seventy percent. That is the proportion of **Ukrainians** skeptical that ongoing talks will lead to a durable peace — according to the **Kyiv International Institute of Sociology**, in its survey of March **2026**. Seventy percent. Not a fringe minority, not a radical nationalist wing, not the extremes: seven Ukrainians out of ten, surveyed seriously by a recognized institution. Seven out of ten who don't believe you when you tell them peace is close. Seven out of ten who have looked history in the face and decided that skepticism is the reasonable position.

This letter is addressed to you — decision-makers, diplomats, Western commentators, envoys heading to **Moscow**, politicians exhausted by four years of war. To you who want **Ukraine** to "be reasonable." To you who talk about "painful but necessary compromises." To you who use the word "realism" as if Ukrainian resistance were irrational stubbornness. The **70%** of Ukrainians who are skeptical are not irrational. They are informed. The difference is crucial.

### What Ukrainians know that you seem to have forgotten

Ukrainians know things that certain Western decision-makers seem to have filed under "inconvenient historical context." They know what **Bucha** was. They know what **Mariupol** was. They know what the **Minsk** agreements were — signed, violated, and used by **Putin** as a pause to prepare the **2022** offensive. They know what the **Budapest Memorandum** of **1994** guaranteed — their renunciation of nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from the **United States**, the **United Kingdom**, and **Russia**. Those assurances did not survive the first morning of **February 24, 2022**.

This memory is not stubbornness. It is learning. It is the result of generations who bore the consequences of trusting the wrong promises at the wrong time. Treating that skepticism as an obstacle to overcome rather than a warning to heed is committing the same mistake as those who signed **Minsk** believing **Putin** would honor his commitments.

*70% skeptics — that is the most important number in Ukrainian diplomacy in 2026. Not because it blocks negotiations, but because it conditions them. Any negotiation that ignores this skepticism to impose a fast peace on Ukraine will produce a peace that Ukrainians won't honor and that Russians won't respect. Ukrainian skepticism isn't a wall. It's a thermometer.*

## The numbers behind the skepticism — what the polls really say

### 62% refuse to cede a single inch of territory — that is not extremism

The **KIIS** survey of March **2026** does not just measure skepticism about negotiations. It documents a set of positions that form a coherent and nuanced picture — not a refusal of all negotiation, but a precise definition of acceptable terms. **62% of Ukrainians** refuse to cede any territory to **Russia** as a condition of peace. This figure is often cited in Western capitals as evidence of Ukrainian "intransigence." That is a profoundly unfair reading.

These **62%** are not refusing to talk. They are refusing to legitimize aggression through territorial concession. The distinction is fundamental. Agreeing to cede **Crimea**, or the **Donbas**, or oblasts occupied since **2022** as "the price of peace" validates the doctrine that wars of aggression pay. It sends a message to every regional actor in the world — **China** vis-à-vis **Taiwan**, **Iran** vis-à-vis its neighbors, **North Korea** on the Korean peninsula — that taking by force works. Ukrainian refusal to cede territories is not narrow nationalism. It is a contribution to international security.

### 54% ready to endure the war for as long as necessary

**54% of Ukrainians** say they are prepared to endure the war as long as necessary to achieve their goals. This figure must be read alongside the **68%** who consider the continuation of military operations the greatest risk to the country. The apparent tension between these two numbers is not a contradiction — it is the psychological reality of a nation at war. Yes, we are suffering. Yes, we want it to stop. No, we will not stop it at any price. These three propositions are simultaneously true.

This capacity to hold two contradictory truths at once is not irrational — it is political maturity. Populations that have never known occupation or betrayal by great powers sometimes struggle to understand why "peace" cannot simply trump everything. **Ukrainians** understand in their bones that some peaces cost more than the wars that preceded them. That is wisdom acquired through pain. It deserves to be respected.

*54% ready to endure for as long as necessary. That isn't warmongering — it is the conscious decision not to repeat Minsk. And when you tell these 54% that their skepticism is a problem, you are essentially telling them: learn from your past mistakes but ignore the experience that taught you. That is a demand that doesn't merit the respect it claims for itself.*

## Mobilization after a ceasefire — what the numbers reveal

### The drop in mobilization expectations — a signal of uncertainty, not war-weariness

The **Chatham House** survey published in June **2026** contains a revealing number about the evolution of Ukrainian expectations. The expectation of full mobilization after a possible ceasefire fell from **64% to 49%** nationally, and from **72% to 60%** regionally, between **2025** and **2026**. This drop is sometimes interpreted as a sign of "war fatigue" — Ukrainians want less mobilization, therefore they want to fight less. That interpretation is wrong.

The drop in post-ceasefire mobilization expectations reflects something more subtle: growing uncertainty about the nature of the proposed ceasefire and what would follow. **Ukrainians** who in **2025** believed mobilization would be necessary after a ceasefire believed it less in **2026** — not because they want to defend their country less, but because they are less certain a ceasefire will happen, and they imagine its contours less clearly. Uncertainty produces less categorical survey responses. That is not the same as capitulation.

### 63% in favor of keeping defense spending high

**63% of Ukrainians** say defense spending must remain high even after a peace agreement. **60%** say **Ukraine** must remain mobilized. These figures, combined with the **70%** skepticism about talks, paint a coherent picture: **Ukrainians** do not exclude negotiation, but they do not trust negotiations to produce durable security. For them, security is maintained through sustained military readiness — not enthusiastic demobilization following a theoretically solid ceasefire.

Is this position compatible with a negotiated peace? Yes — if security guarantees are real. A **Ukraine** that maintains a strong defense posture after peace, backed by reliable Western partners and potentially covered by the **NATO** umbrella, is not a **Ukraine** preparing revenge. It is a **Ukraine** avoiding a repeat of **Budapest** and **Minsk**. That is not the same thing.

*63% in favor of high defense spending after peace — that is a people that has learned from history. Not stubbornness, but lessons absorbed. And if the West gave Ukraine the NATO membership guarantees it deserves, that percentage would probably fall. But refusing the guarantees and then reproaching Ukrainians for needing them — that is pure cynicism.*

## What the Minsk history teaches — and what the West prefers to forget

### Minsk I and Minsk II — the bitter lesson

The **Minsk I** (September **2014**) and **Minsk II** (February **2015**) agreements are the precedent that everyone in **Ukraine** carries in collective memory as a scar. Those agreements provided for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces, and a political process for the **Donbas**. They were signed. They were violated — by **Russia** — almost immediately. Combat in the **Donbas** continued for eight years, until the full-scale offensive of **2022**. Those eight years also allowed **Russia** to reconstitute and modernize its forces.

**Angela Merkel**, in an interview given in December **2022**, stated explicitly that the **Minsk** agreements were designed to buy time for **Ukraine** — which implicitly acknowledged she knew they would not be respected by **Russia**. That retrospective admission, of considerable political gravity, confirmed what **Ukrainians** had always suspected: **Minsk** was not peace — it was tactical time management. If it was time management for **Ukraine**, it was for **Russia** too. The result: **2022**.

### The Budapest Memorandum — the founding betrayal

The **Budapest Memorandum of 1994** remains the founding betrayal of Ukrainian trust in international guarantees. In exchange for renouncing the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world — inherited from the **Soviet Union** — **Ukraine** received security assurances from the **United States**, the **United Kingdom**, and **Russia**. These assurances were not binding treaties with automatic enforcement mechanisms — that is what Western lawyers are quick to point out. But they were formal political commitments, recorded, signed.

Those commitments were trampled on **February 24, 2022**. The **Russia** that had guaranteed Ukraine's territorial integrity invaded **Ukraine**. The **United States** and the **United Kingdom** that had guaranteed Ukraine's security provided weapons and support — but not Article 5, not direct intervention, no mechanism making their guarantees as concrete as what **Ukraine** had renounced. That asymmetry is inscribed in Ukrainian memory — and explains why **62% of Ukrainians** refuse to sign anything without guarantees that surpass the Budapest level.

*Budapest 1994. Minsk 2015. Bucha 2022. That is the CV of broken international commitments that Ukrainians carry into every peace discussion. Their skepticism isn't a pathology. It is a curriculum vitae of betrayals. And anyone asking them to trust again without guarantees substantially different from those that already failed must explain why this time would be different.*

## Security guarantees — what "enough" really means

### NATO membership as the only credible guarantee

**Ukrainians** have watched the world long enough to know what constitutes a credible security guarantee and what does not. The credibility of a security guarantee rests on an automatic response mechanism in the event of aggression — exactly what **Article 5** of the **NATO** treaty provides. Not a promise to "consider" a response. Not "urgent consultations." A collective defense obligation. That is the only guarantee **Ukraine** needs — and the only one it considers real.

Alternative proposals have been advanced: bilateral guarantees with several **NATO** countries, Israeli-model "security agreements," mutual defense treaties. These alternatives have merit. They are better than nothing. But they are not **NATO** — and **Ukrainians** know it, because they know what sub-NATO guarantees have historically been worth. The obstacle to Ukrainian **NATO** membership — mainly American under the **Trump** administration — is one of the most serious barriers to any peace agreement that would be durable rather than temporary.

### Capability-based guarantees — arming to deter

In the absence of immediate **NATO** membership, a partial alternative involves equipping **Ukraine** with military capabilities sufficient to deter renewed aggression. An army adequately equipped with robust air defense systems, precision long-range missiles, drones at industrial scale, and institutionalized training partnerships with Western allies creates conventional deterrence that reduces the risk of a third Russian aggression.

This "capability-based guarantee" strategy is what the **United Kingdom** and several Baltic states actively promote. It has the advantage of not depending on a **NATO** decision — which requires unanimity, and therefore an American veto under a reluctant administration. It has the disadvantage of creating permanent asymmetry: a **Ukraine** maintaining its army on a war footing to deter a neighbor that has not renounced aggression. That is not peace. It is permanent armistice. Better than war. Less than real security.

*Arming Ukraine to deter without giving it NATO is telling it: you deserve to be protected but not to be a member of the club that protects. That is a hierarchy of value between peoples that says something deep about how the West conceives its alliances. Ukraine deserves better than an armed waiting room.*

## Skepticism as vigilance — not as obstacle

### Reframing Ukrainian skepticism

The way **Ukrainian skepticism** is treated in diplomatic discussions must change radically. It is not an obstacle to overcome. It is not a symptom of nationalist radicalism. It is not ingratitude toward generous allies. It is a strategic resource — a collective vigilance function that protects against repeated mistakes in similar circumstances. The **70%** who doubt that talks will lead to durable peace carry in their collective memory every reason to doubt. Their skepticism is rational. Their distrust is grounded. And their resistance to a bad peace protects not only **Ukraine** but the international security framework.

Reframing this skepticism as a resource means using it to define the minimum conditions for an acceptable peace — and holding those conditions as non-negotiable. Not from intransigence, but from realism: a peace that **Ukrainians** do not believe will last, won't. The **63% who want to maintain high defense spending** will still be there. Institutional distrust of **Russia** will still be there. A peace that does not address that distrust is peace on paper, not in practice.

### What Ukrainian skepticism asks of the West

The skepticism of the **70%** is also an implicit demand addressed to Western allies. Prove to us that this time is different. Give us guarantees you will honor, not promises you will forget. Commit your signature to binding treaties with automatic response mechanisms. Invite us into **NATO** — not into an indefinite anteroom. Back our reconstruction with real money, not conference promises. Skepticism is not irreducible. It can be addressed. But with actions, not words.

Western allies who are tired of Ukrainian skepticism should honestly ask themselves: what have we done to justify it? **Budapest** — that was us. The slowness of arms deliveries — that was us. Discussions with **Moscow** without **Kyiv** at the table — that was us. Ukrainian skepticism is in part the mirror of Western shortcomings. Correcting it starts with correcting those shortcomings.

*The 70% skeptical Ukrainians are presenting the West with a bill. It is called Budapest. It is called Minsk. It is called late delivery promises. That bill will not disappear with communiqués of "unwavering" support. It will disappear when guarantees are as solid as Budapest's letters should have been. Not before.*

## The whole-society reconstruction model — what Chatham House calls essential

### Rebuilding society at the same time as the state

The **Chatham House** report of June **2026**, in which the figure of **70%** skeptics is presented, advocates for a reconstruction model it calls a "**whole-society approach**." The argument is that the physical reconstruction of **Ukraine** — roads, power plants, hospitals — will not be enough if it is not accompanied by a reconstruction of social trust, civic institutions, and the social contract between citizens and their state. Trust is also infrastructure. And it too is destroyed by war.

This approach acknowledges that the **70%** skeptical about peace negotiations are also, often, people who have lost faith in international institutions — the **UN Security Council** that **Russia** can veto, treaties that great powers do not honor, coalitions that fray under pressure. Rebuilding that international institutional trust is a project as important as rebuilding **Kyiv**'s power plants. And it happens not through declarations — it happens through kept commitments.

### The role of Ukrainian civil society in peace

Ukrainian civil society — NGOs, independent journalists, activists, entrepreneurs, religious communities — has demonstrated a resilience and organizational capacity that astonished the world. It maintained critical services where the state could not. It documented war crimes where armies would not. It supported displaced people, wounded soldiers, families of the missing. This civil society is an irreplaceable resource for any durable reconstruction.

But Ukrainian civil society is also the first to say that conditions for a just peace cannot be defined by great powers without popular consultation. Democratic participation mechanisms in any negotiation process — consultations, structured referendums, civic deliberations — are essential for the final agreement to genuinely reflect the will of the Ukrainian people. Without this popular legitimacy, any negotiated peace risks producing internal opposition that undermines it from the moment it is signed.

*"Whole-society approach" — that is the most important concept the West systematically ignores in its Ukraine discussions. We talk GDP, front lines, weapons systems. We don't talk enough about social trust, the civic contract, Ukrainians' capacity to find themselves in a shared project after the war. Without that, reconstruction is bricks on sand.*

## What "durable peace" means to Ukrainians — a precise definition

### Beyond the ceasefire — conditions for real peace

When **Ukrainians** say they don't believe talks will produce a durable peace, they have a precise definition of what "durable" means. It is not the absence of fighting on the date the agreement is signed. It is the disappearance of credible risk of renewed aggression within five, ten, twenty years. A durable peace for **Ukraine** means a **Russia** that can no longer or no longer wants to attack. And that condition — can no longer or no longer wants to — requires deep changes in **Russia** that peace negotiations alone do not produce.

The conditions for durable peace include, according to the vast majority of serious analysts: binding security guarantees for **Ukraine**, a reparations mechanism for the destruction caused by Russian aggression, a justice process for war crimes, a verification framework for Russian conventional weapons, and — ideally — a political transformation in **Russia** that reduces the risk of future aggression. None of these conditions are in sight in the current "talks." That is precisely why **70%** of Ukrainians are skeptical.

### The difference between "end of fighting" and "real security"

One of the most common confusions in the Western debate about peace in **Ukraine** is the equation of "end of fighting" with "real security." A ceasefire stops the fighting. It does not guarantee security. A **Russia** that has accepted a ceasefire but retains its full arsenal, maintains its territorial ambitions, and has not changed its military doctrine is not a **Russia** with which **Ukraine** is secure. It is a temporarily immobilized **Russia** — reconstituting its forces for the next offensive.

That is not paranoia. That is what happened after **Minsk**. **Minsk** stopped the fighting in the **Donbas**. It did not prevent **2022**. The **70%** skeptics know that. They live with that knowledge every day. And when Western diplomats present them with new talks bearing guarantees similar to **Minsk**'s, their skepticism is the rational response of a population that paid for its previous trust in hundreds of thousands of lives.

*End of fighting is not real security. That distinction, so simple, so obvious to anyone who lived through Minsk, is systematically absent from Western diplomatic discussions that use "peace" and "ceasefire" as synonyms. That is not a semantic problem. It is a matter of life or death for Ukrainians living after that ceasefire.*

## Negotiations that exclude Kyiv — the danger of imposed peace

### Washington-Moscow without Kyiv — a red line

Reports of direct communication channels between **Washington** and **Moscow** — envoys **Witkoff** and **Kushner** heading to **Moscow**, the **Alaska Trump-Putin summit** — raise a fundamental question for multilateral diplomacy principles: can a peace for **Ukraine** be negotiated without **Ukraine**? The answer is no — not because it violates formal diplomatic rules, but because any agreement reached without **Kyiv** at the table will lack the legitimacy needed to last.

**Ukraine** is not a territory to be negotiated. It is a sovereign state with a population, an elected government, and interests that cannot be represented by proxy by the **United States** — whatever the good intentions of the American administration. Any **Washington-Moscow** agreement that defines the terms of a Ukrainian peace without direct consultation with **Kyiv** will be experienced in **Ukraine** as betrayal — the latest betrayal by a great power deciding the destiny of a smaller country without its consent. That kind of betrayal has a long and painful history.

### The Yalta lesson — and its contemporary relevance

The memory of **Yalta** — the **1945** conference where great powers redefined European spheres of influence without consulting the peoples concerned — is deeply present in Eastern European political memory. Countries like **Poland**, the **Baltic states**, and **Ukraine** were assigned to the Soviet sphere at that conference without having a voice. They have not forgotten. And they see in any **Washington-Moscow** arrangement defining the terms of Ukrainian peace an echo of that dynamic.

The comparison is imperfect — historical contexts differ, current American intentions are not those of **1945**. But the structure of the problem is identical: great powers deciding between themselves the security of smaller states. The correct response to that structure is ensuring that the states involved — **Ukraine** first, but also European allies whose security is affected — are fully involved in any negotiation. That is not an unreasonable demand. It is the foundation of diplomacy that respects state sovereignty.

*Yalta 1945. The déjà vu is unbearable for Ukrainians and Eastern Europeans who know what it cost to be defined by others. Washington and Moscow can talk. But what they conclude about Ukraine must be approved by Ukraine. Not consulted after the fact. Not informed during the process. Approved. Ukrainian sovereignty isn't a diplomatic footnote — it is the entire subject of the discussion.*

## What the Ukrainian population really wants — nuance against caricature

### Not war for its own sake — peace with dignity

The caricature of Ukrainian skepticism circulated by some Western commentators depicts **Ukrainians** as a people thirsting for war, incapable of compromise, manipulated by a nationalist government. This caricature is factually false and morally indecent. The polls show a far more nuanced picture. Yes, **70%** are skeptical about talks. But that does not mean they want war for its own sake. It means they want peace with dignity — a peace that respects their sovereignty, that does not reward aggression, and that does not expose them to the next aggression in five years.

This desire for peace with dignity is precisely what Western allies should defend — not out of charity, but strategic interest. A **Ukraine** that accepts a humiliating peace will not be stable. A population that feels betrayed by its allies is not a reliable long-term partner. And a precedent of humiliating peace for an aggressed democracy sends a signal that democracies send reluctantly to their populations and potential enemies.

### The silent majority that simply wants to live

Behind the statistics — the **70%**, the **62%**, the **54%** — there is a simpler and more universal human reality. Millions of **Ukrainians** simply want to live. Live without nighttime sirens. Live without calculating which corridor is safest in a strike. Live without wondering whether their son or brother will come back from the front. Live without the **90%** food price inflation in conflict zones. Live in a country that can afford to invest in schools and hospitals rather than air defense systems.

These deeply human aspirations coexist with skepticism about talks — and that coexistence is not contradictory. You can intensely want peace while refusing a false peace. You can long for normalcy while knowing normalcy cannot be built on capitulation. **Ukrainians** live with that tension every day. The minimum their allies can do is understand it rather than simplify it into an obstacle to overcome.

*Behind the 70% statistic, there are faces. Children who want a room without blast-proofed windows. Parents who want their sons back from the front, whole. Old people who want to die in their rebuilt homes. These people don't want war — they want the peace they were promised in 1994. Their refusal to accept less isn't stubbornness. It is dignity.*

## The pressure to "normalize" the war — what it costs

### The temptation to treat the Ukrainian war as the new normal

Four years after the start of the full-scale invasion, a troubling phenomenon is observable in Western democracies: the temptation to "normalize" the war in **Ukraine** — to treat it no longer as an emergency to resolve, but as a persistent state to manage. Journalists covering it less. Politicians discussing it less. Public opinion thinking about it less. This normalization is not deliberate — it is natural human psychology in the face of a lasting event. But its consequences are dangerous.

Normalizing the war in **Ukraine** allows those who want to reduce support to frame their decisions as reasonable adjustments rather than abandonments. It allows those who want to rush compromises to present them as "pragmatism" rather than capitulations. And it allows time to work for **Putin** — who is counting precisely on the erosion of Western attention and commitment. The **70%** skeptics' resistance is also a refusal of that normalization. It is a refusal to accept that this situation is normal.

### What "being an ally" should mean over time

Being **Ukraine**'s ally over time does not mean supporting indefinitely without conditions. It means maintaining commitment until the conditions for a just peace are created — and actively working to create those conditions rather than passively waiting for them to appear. It means increasing humanitarian funding to match needs. It means delivering promised weapons on the promised timeline. It means not negotiating behind **Ukraine**'s back for the convenience of your own political agenda. It means treating Ukrainian security guarantees as a top-tier geopolitical priority — not as one file among many.

The **70%** skeptical Ukrainians are watching their allies to see whether these behaviors are in place. What they see — late deliveries, restrictions on weapon use, direct **Washington-Moscow** diplomatic channels, humanitarian funding at **42.7%** — is not likely to reduce their skepticism. Trust is built through consistent action over time. It cannot be decreed through communiqués of "unwavering" support.

*Being an ally over time is the test the West is taking right now. And the 70% skeptical Ukrainians are the judges. Every time promised weapons are delivered, they notice. Every time they're negotiated around, they notice that too. Alliance is played out in those details. And too many of those details currently speak in favor of skepticism.*

## The refugee question and their return — peace starts here

### 5.6 million abroad waiting for a signal

The **5.6 million Ukrainians** still abroad in June **2026** are also, in a sense, a sign of skepticism about peace. If they truly believed peace was close and durable, many would return — the return movement has already reached **4.2 million** people under active war conditions. The continued presence of **5.6 million** abroad says something about individual assessments of the situation. These millions making concrete life decisions — staying in host countries, continuing to integrate into labor markets, enrolling their children in local schools — are speaking with their feet as much as polls speak with their responses.

For these **5.6 million** to return en masse, it will take more than calls to come back. It will take credible security, a functioning economy, available housing, and a prospect of a future in a country that won't be attacked again in two years. Those conditions depend largely on decisions that Western allies will make in the coming months — on security guarantees, on reconstruction, on economic support. The return of refugees is a barometer of peace's credibility. When they return in numbers, that will be the signal that peace is real.

### What returning refugees say about conditions for return

Studies of the motivations of Ukrainians who have already chosen to return to secure areas show that their decisions are based on rational assessments of security, the economy, and family networks — not on nationalist impulses or government appeals. They return when they judge conditions acceptable. They stay abroad when they don't. This individual pragmatism is the most honest form of assessment of the real situation in **Ukraine** — and it yields a fairly clear result: for millions of people, conditions are not yet secure enough to justify returning.

This individual assessment is more reliable than many macroeconomic indicators. It integrates security, housing, employment, future prospects, family situation, and confidence in the peace's durability. When this cumulative indicator of millions of individual decisions still yields **5.6 million** abroad, the message is clear: peace is not yet real enough for people to return. Honestly acknowledging this is the first step toward creating the conditions that will change this calculus.

*5.6 million who haven't come back. That is the figure diplomats should put on their whiteboards before every discussion about "peace talks." Not as a refugee statistic. As a vote of confidence — or its absence. These millions of people are saying with their feet what 70% say with their survey answers. Listen to them.*

## What I am asking — the short list of concrete commitments

### Five requests, nothing more

This letter is not only a critique. It is also a request. Concrete. Limited. Achievable. First: **include Ukraine in all negotiations that concern it**. No **Washington-Moscow** agreement on Ukrainian peace without **Kyiv** at the table. Not merely consulted — present and decisive. Second: **give Ukraine a concrete timeline for NATO membership**, not an indefinite horizon that leaves the door open to every bad surprise. Third: **fund the humanitarian plan at 100%** — not at **42.7%**. That is not astronomical compared to military budgets already committed.

Fourth: **deliver promised weapons on the promised timeline**, without additional restrictions that have no real security justification. Fifth: **maintain and amplify economic sanctions** described by the **Kiel Institute** as being at a moment of maximum pressure on Russia's war economy. These five requests are not radical. None exceeds what has already been promised in principle in dozens of official communiqués. They only ask that those commitments be honored — with the consistency and constancy that transforms promises into credibility.

### Ukraine's patience has limits — and they are approaching

I must say, with all the candor this letter requires: **Ukraine**'s patience with allies who promise and delay, who commit and stall, who support publicly and hesitate privately — that patience has limits that are approaching. Not because **Ukrainians** will give up — their **54%** ready to endure as long as necessary are real. But because every delay, every hesitation, every secret negotiation feeds the skepticism, erodes trust, and makes it harder to build a durable peace on the ruins of this war. Time is running. And it is not running in favor of eroding trust.

Ukraine's allies have a window to transform their rhetorical commitments into concrete credibility. That window aligns with the window of maximum economic pressure on **Russia** described by the **Kiel Institute**. Both windows are progressively closing. Acting now — with consistency, with constancy, with the acts that match the words — is the best strategic decision the **West** can make. For **Ukraine**. For **Europe**. For the credibility of the international order it claims to defend.

*Five requests. Nothing unrealistic. Nothing that hasn't already been promised in principle. Just: honor your commitments. That is the only thing the 70% skeptics are asking. Not guaranteed victory. Not perfection. Just consistency between words and actions. That is the minimum of what an ally should be.*

## What winning means — for Ukrainians and for the West

### Defining victory in a war of attrition

"Winning" this conflict does not carry the same definition for everyone. For some in the **West**, "winning" means preserving the international order without engaging in direct conflict with **Russia** — an objective largely achieved. For **Ukraine**, "winning" means something far more concrete: recovering its territories, or at minimum living in security without the threat of renewed invasion, in a state whose sovereignty is respected. These two definitions are not incompatible — but they are not identical, and confusing one with the other produces costly strategic misunderstandings.

The Western version of "winning" — preventing Russian domination of **Europe** without direct **NATO** conflict — is on track to be achieved, if **Ukraine** holds long enough and Western support is maintained. But that version of victory is insufficient for **Ukrainians** if it comes at the cost of their long-term security. A Western victory on the back of a Ukrainian defeat is not victory — it is a reorganization of sacrifice. That is not what allies promised. That is not what they should accept.

### Solidarity as a strategic principle

Solidarity with **Ukraine** is not sentimental foreign policy. It is cold strategic calculation. A world where state aggression is defeated costs less in the long run than a world where it is partially rewarded by democratic fatigue. Solidarity with **Ukraine** is the most strategically profitable investment of the current generation — for European security, for alliance credibility, and for the legitimacy of international norms that protect states of all sizes against the appetites of the most powerful.

The **70%** of Ukrainians skeptical about talks are not asking for the impossible. They are asking for what was promised. They are asking for the dignity that is owed to them. They are asking for the peace they deserve. And if the **West** is what it says it is — a community of values that believes in sovereignty, in justice, and in collective responsibility — then their demand must be heard, respected, and satisfied through actions.

*Solidarity with Ukraine is the best strategic investment the West can make. Not out of generosity. Out of enlightened self-interest. A world order where aggression is defeated costs less to maintain than the global disorder that follows rewarded aggression. That calculation, done honestly, leads to the same conclusion: support Ukraine all the way. That means supporting the order that protects us all.*

## Conclusion: Listening to the 70% — that is wisdom, not an obstacle

### What this skepticism is asking you to hear

The **70% of Ukrainians** skeptical about peace talks are asking you to hear something simple: don't act as though history doesn't exist. Don't ask us to trust the same mechanisms that already failed. Don't negotiate our future without us. Don't impose on us a peace that's convenient for you but dangerous for us. And if you want your support to be real and not merely rhetorical, align your actions with your words — with the consistency and constancy that trust requires.

This skepticism is not an obstacle to peace. It is a guardian of durable peace. It says: build something solid, not something fast. It says: respect our experience, not your convenience. It says: the peace you propose must be a peace we can live — not just survive. Listening to this skepticism is wisdom. Ignoring it is the road to **Minsk III**.

### A final word to the 70%

To the **70% of Ukrainians** who are skeptical: your skepticism is documented, justified, and respected. It tells the truth about your history and your legitimate expectations. Do not silence it. Do not apologize for doubting when logic demands it. And know that among the **Western** observers watching you, there are those who hear your skepticism not as a problem, but as a healthy warning — for you, for us, and for the credibility of an international order that still needs to be defended.

*70% skeptics. That is not bad news. It is good news dressed as a challenge. It is a nation that can no longer be sold illusions. That demands proof rather than promises. That has learned, through pain, to distinguish real peace from capitulation dressed in an agreement. That lucidity is precious. It deserves to be honored — not bypassed.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Chatham House — Why a Whole-Society Model is Essential for Ukraine's Recovery — June 2026](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/why-whole-society-model-essential-ukraines-recovery)

- [KIIS — Kyiv International Institute of Sociology — March 2026 survey](https://kiis.com.ua/eng/)

- [IOM — Ukraine displacement data — 2026](https://www.iom.int/ukraine-displacement-data-2026)

### Secondary sources

- Kyiv Independent — Ukrainian public opinion on peace talks — 2026

- Foreign Policy — What Ukrainians think about peace talks — June 2026

- [Euromaidan Press — 70% of Ukrainians skeptical about peace talks — KIIS analysis — June 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/ukraine-70-percent-skeptical-peace-talks-kiis/)

- The Guardian — Ukrainian public opinion and peace negotiations — June 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/lettre-ouverte-70-des-ukrainiens-ne-vous-croient-pas-et-ils-ont-raison