# Baltic states top 5 to 7% of GDP on defense ahead of Ankara

> Three days before the opening of the NATO summit in Ankara, the leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania met German Chancellor Friedrich

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-07
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/les-pays-baltes-depassent-5-a-7-du-pib-en-defense-avant-ankara

## Key takeaways

- Estonia's Prime Minister Kristen Michal said Estonia already invests more than 5% of GDP in its core defense, while an Anadolu factbox puts Estonia at 3.38%.
- Latvia's President Edgars Rinkēvičs recalled The Hague commitment to reach 5% of GDP; Anadolu gives Latvia 3.73%.
- Lithuania's President Gitanas Nausėda said Lithuania would devote nearly 7% of GDP to defense and security this year; Anadolu gives Lithuania 4%.
- The Hague summit set a 5% target by 2035, including a 3.5% core defense sub-target; Spain secured a cap of 2.1%, and Merz said Germany would reach 3.5% by 2029.
- Baltic spending is focused on drones, air defense and munitions, and is helping build a local defense industry.

## Introduction: three small countries, one immense signal

### Living on the bear's doorstep leaves no choice

Three days before the opening of the **NATO** summit in **Ankara**, the leaders of **Estonia**, **Latvia** and **Lithuania** met German Chancellor **Friedrich Merz** in **Berlin** on **July 3, 2026**, to underline a simple reality: their defense budgets already exceed, or are about to exceed, the **symbolic threshold** of **5% of GDP**, well above the **Western average**, according to information reported by **Euronews**.

This piece decodes what these numbers actually mean, where they come from, and why the Baltic states chose to act before the alliance as a whole even agreed on a common target.

### What this decoding sets out to explain

Between the official figures cited by Baltic leaders and the comparative data published by the **Anadolu** agency, there are important nuances to clarify before drawing broad conclusions about the real state of these three countries' defense effort.

This decoding separates political announcements from verified data, and tracks the budgetary trajectory of each of the three Baltic states in the face of the Russian threat.

*I find the clarity with which Baltic leaders own their budgetary choices admirable. There is no rhetorical ambiguity from them about the nature of the threat, unlike some of the softer language one sometimes hears elsewhere in Western Europe.*

## What Baltic leaders actually said in Berlin

### Estonia, already past 5% on the core of its defense

Estonian Prime Minister **Kristen Michal** stated that **"Estonia is already investing more than 5% of GDP in its core defense,"** a claim made during the **Berlin** meeting. That political statement must be distinguished from the more precise comparative data published elsewhere, which places Estonia's effort at a slightly different level depending on the calculation method used.

This nuance takes nothing away from the **clearly upward trajectory** of Estonia's defense effort, a country that shares a **direct border** of several hundred kilometers with **Russia**.

### Latvia and Lithuania, same logic, same soaring numbers

Latvian President **Edgars Rinkēvičs** recalled the commitment made at the **The Hague** summit to reach **5%** of GDP. Lithuanian President **Gitanas Nausėda**, for his part, announced that **Lithuania** was on track to devote **"nearly 7% of its GDP to defense and security"** this year, according to remarks reported by **Euronews**.

These three announcements, made on the same day in the same place, sketch a region that has clearly decided to stop waiting for **NATO consensus** before acting on its own timeline, dictated by its own perception of the danger.

*I am struck by how consistent the message from the three Baltic leaders is, speaking almost with one voice despite the nuances between their respective countries. This regional unity in the face of Russia should serve as an example to a Western Europe that is sometimes more divided over the real scale of the threat.*

## What the Anadolu agency's comparative figures clarify

### Slightly different percentages, an identical trend

A factbox published by the **Anadolu** agency ahead of the **Ankara** summit puts **Estonia's** defense effort at **3.38% of GDP**, **Latvia's** at **3.73%**, having already crossed the intermediate threshold of 3.5%, and **Lithuania's** at **4%**, a budget that has quintupled since **2014**. These figures, based on comparative data across allies, differ from the political announcements made in **Berlin**, which sometimes include broader security spending beyond the strict defense perimeter.

This **methodological difference** largely explains the gap between the figures cited by Baltic leaders and those published in **international comparisons**, without either being necessarily wrong.

### Poland, the regional benchmark that outpaces everyone

The same factbox places **Poland** at the top of all **NATO** allies with **4.48% of GDP** devoted to defense, a figure that exceeds even each of the three Baltic states taken individually under this calculation method. The entire region, from the **Baltic** to the **Black Sea**, thus stands out for a **defense effort well above** the Western average.

This regional contrast underscores how much **geographic proximity** to Russia remains the most decisive factor in each government's budgetary decision, far more than diplomatic pressure from Washington or Brussels.

*I believe this methodological gap between political announcements and comparative statistics should not be used to downplay these countries' real effort. Whether the figure is 3.38% or 5%, the trajectory is the same: a region investing without hesitation in its own survival.*

## The 5% target set at The Hague, a necessary reminder

### A new threshold replacing the old 2% target

The **The Hague** summit set a **new target** for all **NATO** allies: reach **5% of GDP** in defense and security spending by **2035**, with an intermediate sub-target of **3.5%** devoted strictly to **"core defense."** This new target replaces the old **2%** threshold that had prevailed for years and that many allies were already struggling to reach.

By already comfortably clearing this new intermediate threshold, the Baltic states are positioning themselves at the front of this new **budgetary race**, well ahead of the deadline set collectively for the alliance as a whole.

### Spain, the counter-example that highlights the Baltic contrast

At the opposite end of the spectrum, **Spain** secured a **formal exemption** from the 5% threshold, negotiating a cap set at **2.1% of GDP**. This striking contrast between Madrid and the Baltic capitals illustrates just how radically the perceived Russian threat varies depending on each country's geographic distance from the Russian border.

This unevenness within the alliance itself raises a fundamental question about the **real solidarity** of **NATO** in the face of a threat that, by definition, does not affect all its members with the same immediate intensity.

*I find this contrast between Spain and the Baltic states revealing of a geographic fault line running silently through the entire Atlantic alliance. One cannot demand the same budgetary effort from a country fifteen hundred kilometers from the Russian border as from a country that touches it directly, but this reality deserves to be stated clearly rather than diplomatically sidestepped.*

## Merz and Germany, a partner also raising its tone

### "Baltic security is our security too"

German Chancellor **Friedrich Merz** stated during this meeting in **Berlin** that **"the security of the Baltic states is also the security of Germany,"** adding that **"the threat is not abstract, it is very real on NATO's eastern flank"** and that **"Moscow is testing how united and determined NATO truly is,"** according to quotes reported by **Euronews**.

These remarks mark a **more assertive tone** from German diplomacy, historically more cautious on questions of direct confrontation with **Russia**, notably because of its past **energy dependence** on **Moscow**.

### Germany promises 3.5% by 2029, a slower timeline

**Merz** specified that **Germany** would reach the **3.5%** of GDP mark **"by 2029,"** a **notably later timeline** than what the Baltic states have already achieved. This difference in pace illustrates the persistent difficulty major Western economic powers face in accelerating their rearmament as quickly as countries directly exposed along the Russian border.

The contrast between Germany's promises for 2029 and the figures Lithuania has already reached in 2026 sums up, by itself, the **gap in threat perception** between the core and the eastern periphery of Europe.

*I welcome Friedrich Merz's change of tone, but I also note that the 2029 promise still lags well behind the reality the Baltic states are already living in 2026. Words matter, but timelines matter just as much, and Germany's remains noticeably slower than that of its most exposed eastern neighbors.*

## What this money is actually funding on the ground

### Drones, air defense and munitions as priorities

According to available information on regional budget priorities, the Baltic states are concentrating their investments on **drones**, **air defense systems** and **munitions production**, three areas identified as critical against **Russian military capabilities** stationed in the **Kaliningrad** enclave and on neighboring Belarusian territory.

This choice of priorities reflects lessons drawn directly from the war in **Ukraine**, where the availability of munitions and air defense capacity proved decisive for a country's survival against a prolonged Russian assault.

### A local defense industry developing rapidly

Beyond direct equipment purchases, these sharply rising budgets are also enabling the development of a local defense industrial base in the three Baltic states, gradually reducing their dependence on foreign suppliers for certain basic equipment.

This **industrial self-reliance**, though partial, represents a long-term investment that goes beyond the immediate response to the current threat.

*I regard this rise of local industrial capacity as the most durable aspect of this Baltic budgetary effort. A country that learns to produce part of its own munitions and defense systems builds a **resilience** that will outlast the current crisis with Russia by far.*

## What this Baltic lead reveals about the rest of the West

### A lesson in clarity for more distant allies

The comparison between the Baltic states and other **NATO** members further removed geographically from **Russia** raises an uncomfortable question: how many other allies are waiting for a direct, immediate threat before seriously adjusting their own defense budgets? The Balts did not have that luxury of time and had to act upfront, driven by their geography rather than by a general **NATO consensus**.

This difference in **posture between frontline countries** and more distant ones remains one of the most persistent structural tensions within the Atlantic alliance since the start of the Ukrainian conflict.

### A **precedent that could influence** other European capitals

The Baltic example, widely publicized ahead of the **Ankara** summit, could serve as a political argument for European governments seeking to justify similar budget increases to their own publics, often reluctant to accept budgetary sacrifices deemed abstract.

It remains to be seen whether this example will be enough to convince countries thousands of kilometers from the Russian border, where the sense of urgency is necessarily less immediate than in Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius.

*I believe this Baltic race for industrial resilience should inspire a broader reflection on Europe's dependence on foreign arms suppliers. Producing locally, even partially, also means reclaiming control over one's own rearmament timeline rather than depending on a distant partner's goodwill.*

## The Ankara summit as a credibility test for the entire alliance

### The Balts arrive with proof, not just promises

Unlike several other delegations attending the **Ankara** summit, Baltic representatives can show up with figures already achieved rather than mere future commitments. This position strengthens their **diplomatic credibility** when they call on other allies to accelerate their own defense efforts against **Russia**.

This lead also gives them a **particular legitimacy** to demand stronger **NATO** support on their portion of the eastern flank, where the threat remains the most immediate and the most documented.

### Moral pressure on the slower allies

By displaying such high figures even before the summit officially opens, the Baltic states are exerting a form of moral pressure on allies still far from the **5%** target. This pressure, while not legally binding, weighs politically on the deliberations to come in **Ankara**.

It is a concrete example of how small countries can influence the debate within an alliance of thirty-two members, simply through the force of their budgetary example.

*I think this moral pressure exerted by the small Baltic states on the major Western powers is one of the most interesting dynamics to watch as the Ankara summit approaches. Sometimes it is the smallest who show the way to the largest, and that is exactly what is playing out here.*

## Conclusion: the social cost of this unprecedented budgetary effort

### **Painful trade-offs** in national budgets

Devoting **5 to 7% of GDP** to defense does not come without consequences for other national budget lines. Health, education, civilian infrastructure: these sectors often have to give up part of their resources in the face of the absolute priority given to defense in the three Baltic states. This **budgetary sacrifice**, rarely highlighted in official statements, nonetheless deserves recognition.

Baltic populations themselves appear to largely support these choices, aware that **geographic proximity** to **Russia** leaves their respective governments little other reasonable option.

### Public support that is not guaranteed forever

This public support, however solid it may be today, is not guaranteed in the long run if economic pressure were to intensify without a visible improvement in the regional security situation. Baltic governments will have to keep justifying these sacrifices to their voters, year after year, without letup.

It is a delicate exercise in **democratic balance** that few other European countries have had to face with such sustained budgetary intensity.

*I deeply respect the **budgetary sacrifice** made by Baltic citizens, a sacrifice few Western populations would accept as readily without major political pushback. This collective resilience deserves recognition as an example of **civic courage** as much as political courage.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- Ministry of Defense of Ukraine — official statements, accessed July 2026

- NATO — official Alliance website, accessed July 2026

- Euronews — Security of the Baltics is our security, Merz meets Baltic leaders, July 3, 2026

### Secondary sources

- Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO defense spending ahead of Ankara summit, July 2026

- The New York Times — NATO defense spending, Trump, Rutte, July 7, 2026

- Foreign Policy — geopolitical analysis, accessed July 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/les-pays-baltes-depassent-5-a-7-du-pib-en-defense-avant-ankara