# REPORT: European Rearmament in 2026 — the Speeches Are Grand, the Factories Can't Keep Up

> Europe is rearming. That sentence, repeated like a mantra since 2022, is both true and misleading. True because European defense budgets have indeed increased dramatically. Misleading because between a political decision and the delivery of a tank or a missile lies an industrial

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/le-rearmement-europeen-en-2026-les-discours-sont-grandioses-les-usines-peinent-a

## Introduction: Between Summit Promises and the Reality of Production Lines

### A historic moment that delivers only delays

**Europe** is rearming. That sentence, repeated like a mantra since **2022**, is both true and misleading. **True** because European defense budgets have indeed increased dramatically. **Misleading** because between a political decision and the delivery of a tank or a missile lies an industrial chasm that no head-of-state speech can bridge. In **June 2026**, that gap is more visible than ever. Orders are pouring in. The factories, for their part, simply cannot produce fast enough.

European leaders gathered in **Berlin** in late June reaffirmed their commitment to deeper defense cooperation. The figure of **250 billion dollars** circulates regularly — that is think tank **Bruegel**'s estimate of the annual budget increase Europe needs to achieve strategic autonomy. The **IISS** estimated in **2019** that between **288 and 357 billion dollars** in investment would be needed to compensate for a hypothetical withdrawal of American forces from Europe. In both cases the scale is colossal. And in both cases the industrial question — how do you physically manufacture all that equipment? — remains unanswered.

### Defense stocks collapsing on the market

A telling indicator: European defense stocks, lionized by investors since **2022**, suffered a significant correction in **2026**. According to **Bloomberg**, markets are worried that cash-strapped governments may fail to honor their spending promises should peace return to **Ukraine**. This stock-market anxiety reveals a structural tension: European rearmament rests on political commitments, not long-term binding contracts. And political commitments change with governments.

The slide in defense valuations also raises questions about market expectations for what equipment will actually be purchased. Drones are transforming the battlefield in **Ukraine**, reopening the question of the **continuing relevance of tanks and heavy artillery**. If European armies bulk-buy expensive conventional equipment, they risk investing in platforms that are partly obsolete. This dilemma sits at the heart of the European rearmament identity crisis.

*There is a deep irony in the fact that **Europe**, after thirty years of under-investing in defense, now finds itself rearming in a rush, in a context of major technological uncertainty about what tomorrow's battlefield demands. It is like renovating a burning house while debating mid-repair whether to redo the roof or install solar panels.*

## Rheinmetall: The German Giant Between Record Orders and Limited Capacity

### Record orders, stagnant production

**Rheinmetall**, the German defense giant, is often presented as the champion of Europe's industrial resurgence. Its revenue has exploded since **2022**. But behind the headlines of annual reports lies a more complex reality. The defense industry is, according to experts cited by **Bloomberg**, « **a long-cycle industry: you order equipment today that takes time to manufacture and will serve in armed forces inventories for several decades** ». That slow cycle is incompatible with the current geopolitical urgency.

**Rheinmetall** must simultaneously deliver existing orders, recruit and train personnel, open new production lines, and negotiate with governments that want immediate delivery. A **Leopard 2** tank contains thousands of components, some of which are produced by single-source suppliers in Europe. If one of them falls behind, the tank never leaves the factory. This subcontractor dependency is the Achilles' heel of any rapid industrial ramp-up.

### The debate over drones versus heavy tanks

The war in **Ukraine** has exposed the vulnerability of armored vehicles to armed drones. Modern main battle tanks have been destroyed by **FPV** drones worth a few hundred dollars. That battlefield reality is fueling a deep strategic debate within European armies: should they keep investing heavily in expensive tanks and artillery, or pivot quickly toward more agile, lower-cost autonomous systems? **Rheinmetall** is well positioned on both fronts — **Leopard** tanks and counter-drone systems — but that duality creates internal industrial priority tensions.

Military analysts point out that the two types of systems are complementary rather than substitutes. Drones excel at reconnaissance and precision strikes. Armored vehicles remain necessary for holding and controlling terrain. But the optimal balance between the two is still being defined — and armies ordering equipment today are placing a bet on doctrines not yet settled.

***Rheinmetall** is simultaneously good news and a problem. Good news because **Europe** needs its industrial capacity. A problem because concentrating so many hopes on a single industrial actor creates a dependency that weakens the entire continental rearmament effort. The industrial diversification of European defense remains to be built.*

## KNDS: The Franco-German Deal of June 22, 2026, and Its Lessons

### A historic agreement driven by industrial impatience

On **June 22, 2026**, **France** and **Germany** announced an agreement on the joint governance of **KNDS**, the Franco-German tank and military equipment manufacturer, paving the way for a major stock-market listing. The deal stipulates that **Paris** and **Berlin** will hold **equal stakes** in the company. According to **Le Monde**, the company's anticipated valuation could reach between **15 and 20 billion euros**. It is a meaningful diplomatic breakthrough — and a positive signal for the European defense industry.

But the **June 22** deal also lays bare all the time that was lost. **KNDS** was created in **2015** through the merger of French and German entities. Eleven years later, its shareholders were still bickering over governance structure. The **Wegmann** family, on the German side, sought to sell its stake. **Berlin** announced in **May 2026** that it wanted to acquire a **40 %** share, before reworking the architecture toward Paris-Berlin parity. During these drawn-out negotiations, the company had expressed « **its frustration at what it perceived as foot-dragging by the German government** », according to reports cited by **Le Monde**.

### The collapse of FCAS: a warning no one heeded

The **KNDS** deal comes shortly after the collapse of the **FCAS** project — the Franco-German-Spanish next-generation fighter program. That cancellation dealt a severe blow to efforts to deepen defense cooperation across Europe. **FCAS** was supposed to be the cornerstone of European strategic autonomy in the air domain. Its abandonment reignites questions about European nations' capacity to overcome their industrial divergences and see through ambitious defense programs.

This pattern is recurring: Europeans announce ambitious programs, spend years negotiating the split of industrial workshares and national economic benefits, then hit deadlocks. Defense is a domain where national sovereignty instincts run particularly deep — every country wants its share of production, its own technologies, its jobs. This logic of national industrial sharing is incompatible with the efficiency required to respond to an urgent military threat.

*The collapse of **FCAS** is a diplomatic scandal as much as an industrial one. Three major European countries failed to build a combat aircraft together. Meanwhile **Russia** is producing missiles by the tens of thousands and **Ukraine** is manufacturing drones on assembly lines. **Europe** has a defense industrial governance problem — and that problem is existential.*

## The F126 Frigate: A Symbol of Industrial Long-Cycle Reality

### A naval program that illustrates structural delays

The **F126** frigate, a program for the German navy, is another example of the difficulties European armaments programs face. The **F126** frigates were ordered from **Damen Shipyards** (Netherlands) with integration work in **Germany**. Originally scheduled for delivery in the **2020s**, the program has accumulated significant delays due to technical and industrial problems. In a context where **Germany** is seeking to rapidly modernize its navy in the face of Russian and Chinese threats, these delays starkly illustrate the gap between political ambition and industrial reality.

The challenges are not solely related to contractors' capabilities. Electronic component and weapons system supply chains are experiencing bottlenecks. Global demand for critical materials — specialty steels, electronic components, high-performance engines — has exploded since **2022**, creating shortages that lengthen production timelines. A frigate program cannot advance unless its dozens of critical subcontractors advance as well.

### Recruitment and training: the other bottleneck

The European defense industry faces a demographic and skills challenge that is often underestimated. For thirty years of post-Cold War disarmament, major defense companies downsized their workforces, closed production lines, and failed to train enough specialized engineers and technicians. A skilled naval hull welder is not trained in six months. Neither is a naval propulsion engineer.

Estimates cited by industry experts suggest that a full reinvestment in European defense capabilities could take between **ten and twenty years**. This time reality is brutally at odds with the current geopolitical urgency. **Europe** needs credible military capabilities now — but its industry cannot produce them at the snap of a finger.

*Let us be honest: rearming **Europe** in a few years is physically impossible. Engineers take ten years to train, factories take five to build, armaments programs take seven to design. Politicians who promise otherwise are lying to their voters. The real question is: what do we do now, with what we have?*

## What Europe Can Learn from Ukraine — and How to Adapt It

### The Ukrainian agile model as a reference

Faced with delays and difficulties in conventional defense industry, **Europe** is increasingly looking to **Ukraine** as a model for rapid innovation. The Ukrainian iteration cycle for drones — from design to mass production in a matter of weeks — is the polar opposite of European procurement procedures. Bilateral partnerships such as that of the **Netherlands** with **Ukraine** (a **250 million euro** memorandum for drone production) show that some European actors have absorbed the lesson and are seeking to integrate these new capabilities into their own defense ecosystems.

But transplanting the Ukrainian model to **Europe** is not simple. The Ukrainian wartime model was born of absolute necessity, in a context of existential urgency that shatters bureaucracies. European countries, even under geopolitical pressure, are not operating under that regime of absolute emergency. Their procurement regulations, security requirements, and labor structures create friction that the Ukrainian agile model does not face. Adaptation, if possible at all, will be partial and gradual.

### The budget reality: ambition and fiscal constraints

Behind the ambitious announcements lies a hard fiscal constraint. European governments face high public debts, rising social pressures, and divergent citizen expectations. **Bloomberg** notes that markets are worried precisely about this risk: governments that promise record military spending but may revisit their commitments if political pressure on other line items intensifies. The countries that have increased defense spending most significantly — **Poland** (**4% of GDP**), the Baltic states — are also those that feel most directly threatened by **Russia**.

The further one moves from the eastern border, the more fragile the political consensus on defense becomes. This geography of defense commitment is a structural challenge to the cohesion of the European rearmament effort. **Western Europe** is still working to convince its own publics that military investment is a necessity, not a choice. That persuasion takes time — and time is precisely what geopolitics does not grant.

*Fiscal constraints are real, but they are not a sufficient excuse. **Europe** made conscious budget choices for thirty years — cutting armies, closing arms factories. Those choices have a geopolitical cost. Walking them back takes time and money. But not walking them back will cost even more.*

## Industrial Alternatives: Mini-Programs, Partnerships, and Private Innovation

### Defense startups as accelerators

One encouraging development in the European industrial landscape is the emergence of a defense startup ecosystem that bypasses the cumbersome processes of large groups. Companies like **Helsing AI** (Germany), specializing in drones and military artificial intelligence, or **Anduril Europe**, have raised significant capital and developed capabilities in just a few years where large groups would have taken a decade. These startups benefit from a culture of rapid iteration and decision-making agility that the large groups have lost.

Countries like **Estonia** and **Latvia** have created accelerated procurement procedures to allow these startups to access public defense markets without going through the usual **ten-to-fifteen-year** cycles. These examples show that institutional innovation is possible — even if it remains marginal relative to the scale of the challenge. Integrating these new companies into the supply chains of large European programs is the necessary next step.

### The European Commission's role in industrial integration

The **European Commission** has launched several initiatives to facilitate defense industrial integration: the **EDIP** (European Defence Industry Programme), the **EDIRPA** and **ASAP** regulations that fund joint equipment purchases, and the **European Defence Fund**. These instruments have both symbolic and practical importance — they build habits of cooperation and fund shared research. But their budget remains modest relative to the stakes: a few billion euros against an estimated need of **250 billion per year**.

Real defense industrial integration in **Europe** cannot come from a bureaucracy in **Brussels** — it must come from national governments that decide to pool their requirements, budgets, and production capabilities. The **KNDS** deal of **June 22, 2026** is an example of what that cooperation can produce when political will exists. But it took eleven years to get there. **Europe** no longer has eleven years to waste.

*The **European Commission** cannot do the work in place of member states. European rearmament is a state project, not a community one. And as long as national governments put their own industrial interests ahead of collective efficiency, European defense programs will continue to deliver delays rather than capabilities. That is a political truth that nobody wants to say out loud in **Brussels**.*

## The Gap Between Eastern and Western Europe Facing the Russian Threat

### Poland and the Baltic states: rearmament by necessity

**Poland**, with a defense budget at **4% of GDP** in **2026**, has become the best-armed nation in **Eastern Europe** relative to its economy. It has ordered **F-35s**, American **Abrams** tanks, Korean **K9** self-propelled howitzers, and is developing its own defense industry. The **Baltic states** — **Estonia**, **Latvia**, **Lithuania** — have all reached or exceeded **3% of GDP** on defense. This ardor is not ideological: it is geographic proximity to **Russia** that dictates it. They live the reality of the threat. The others are still debating it.

This disproportion creates a fracture within European **NATO**. On one side, nations investing massively because they feel directly exposed. On the other, **Western European** nations that are increasing their budgets, but more cautiously, more slowly, with less felt urgency. This asymmetry in threat perception translates into an asymmetry of effort — and it weakens the Alliance's collective cohesion against a **Russia** that observes and calculates.

### Germany between historical guilt and strategic reality

**Germany** is the most complex case. Its structural hesitation to rearm rapidly — deeply rooted in the trauma of the **Second World War** and in the doctrine of **Ostpolitik** — slows its military build-up. The **Zeitenwende** (historic turning point) announced by Chancellor **Olaf Scholz** in **2022** created a **100 billion euro** defense fund. But actual spending has lagged behind commitments. The German procurement bureaucracy remains one of the slowest in Europe. And the domestic political debate over delivering certain weapons to **Ukraine** continues to generate unnecessary friction.

**Germany** is essential to European rearmament — its economy, industry, and central geographic position make it an indispensable actor. But its structural ambivalence is a collective drag. The rest of **Europe** is waiting for **Berlin** to fully commit. And **Berlin** is waiting for the domestic political consensus to be solid enough to move forward without electoral risk. That is not cowardice — it is politics. But it is politics at the expense of strategic efficiency.

***Germany** in **2026** is caught between its past and its future. Its hesitation is historically understandable. But facing a **Russia** that shares none of those scruples and a **China** watching European hesitations with interest, German ambivalence is a luxury that **Europe** can no longer afford. **Berlin** must choose: leader of European defense, or passenger of its own security.*

## Public Procurement as a Lever: How to Accelerate Without Sacrificing Quality

### Accelerated procurement mechanisms in Europe

Instruments exist to accelerate public defense procurement without sacrificing quality standards. The **ASAP** mechanism (Act in Support of Ammunition Production) put in place by the **EU** in **2023** accelerated ammunition production for **Ukraine** by directly funding European manufacturers' production capacities. This model — upstream public funding, firm long-term orders, government guarantees — gives manufacturers the visibility they need to invest in new production lines without waiting for orders to arrive one by one.

Other countries have used similar mechanisms. **Poland** signed multi-year contracts with Korean manufacturers of **K2** tanks and **K9** howitzers, with clear delivery commitments and contractual penalties for delays. This strict contractual approach forces manufacturers to prioritize Polish orders. **Western Europe** could adopt similar mechanisms — but that requires governments to commit to volumes and timelines, not merely budget intentions.

### The AUKUS model: what Europe can draw from it

The **AUKUS** partnership, which provides for the delivery of nuclear-powered submarines to **Australia** using American and British technology, offers a model of large-scale defense industrial cooperation. It rests on multi-year commitments, the sharing of sensitive technologies, and deep integration of the three countries' industrial bases. That level of integration is exceptional — and it shows what is possible when allies genuinely decide to pool their industrial resources rather than maintain national silos.

A European « **AUKUS** » for land or air defense is not utopian. The **KNDS** deal of **June 22, 2026** is a modest first step. What would be needed is to extend that logic to other domains: artillery, missiles, guided munitions, cyber defense. But that requires European governments to abandon the fiction of the « national champion » in every industrial sector. That is a cultural revolution more than a technological one. And that is precisely why it is so difficult to accomplish.

*The **AUKUS** model should inspire **Europe**. Not for the nuclear submarines — **Europe** has other priorities. But for the philosophy: truly commit, share sensitive technologies, integrate industrial bases. Trust allies rather than guard national secrets. That is European strategic autonomy — not national industrialism dressed up as cooperation.*

## Conclusion: The Gap Is Real, but It Can Be Closed — if Europe Chooses to Close It

### Positive signals in a gloomy picture

The picture is not entirely dark. The Franco-German deal on **KNDS** of **June 22, 2026** is genuine progress. Bilateral partnerships between European nations and **Ukraine** on drones are rapidly creating new capabilities. The rise of **Rheinmetall** is real, even if it takes time. And the political awareness that defense is an existential priority is now embedded in most European capitals. That was not the case in **2019**.

### The condition: overcoming national industrial self-interest

The true condition for the success of European rearmament is as much political as industrial. It lies in the capacity of European governments to overcome their national industrial sovereignty reflexes and enable genuinely integrated defense programs — as the **KNDS** deal is beginning to do. Without that political willingness to pool industrial capabilities, **Europe** will continue to produce suboptimal national programs that cost more, take longer, and deliver less than promised. The gap between rhetoric and production will be closed — once Europe has made peace with its own urgency.

*What is expected of **Europe** on defense in **2026** is not perfection. It is consistency. Commitments kept. Programs delivered. Industrial partnerships that transcend national interests. That is not revolutionary. It is simply what geopolitical survival demands. And **Europe** can do it — as long as it stops promising and starts producing.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Bloomberg Opinion — Europe's Weapons Makers Are Facing a Battalion of Problems — June 25, 2026](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-06-25/rheinmetall-knds-european-weapons-makers-face-a-battalion-of-problems)

- [Le Monde — France and Germany reach deal on arms maker KNDS — June 22, 2026](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2026/06/22/france-and-germany-reach-deal-on-arms-maker-knds_6754751_19.html)

- [European Relations — European Leaders Push for Stronger Defence Unity — June 25, 2026](https://europeanrelations.com/quick-brief/european-leaders-push-for-stronger-defence-unity/)

### Secondary sources

- [Le Monde — The challenges posed by Europe's rearmament — March 2025](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2025/03/12/les-defis-que-pose-le-rearmement-de-l-europe_6579701_4355770.html)

- [Defense News — France is two years from fielding drone swarms in its armed forces — December 2025](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/12/03/france-is-two-years-from-fielding-drone-swarms-in-its-armed-forces/)

- [Modern War Institute — Battlefield Drones and the Accelerating Autonomous Arms Race in Ukraine — January 2025](https://mwi.westpoint.edu/battlefield-drones-and-the-accelerating-autonomous-arms-race-in-ukraine/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/le-rearmement-europeen-en-2026-les-discours-sont-grandioses-les-usines-peinent-a