# REPORT: Kim Jong Un's nuclear programme accelerates at a pace that seriously alarms Washington > On June 25, 2026, the 76th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, Kim Jong Un personally oversaw a series of weapons tests of considerable strategic scope. This was no calendar coincidence. The date was chosen to send an unambiguous message to Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo: N - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Reportage - Published: 2026-06-27 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/le-programme-nucleaire-de-kim-jong-un-accelere-a-une-vitesse-qui-inquiete-serieu ## Introduction: Pyongyang on the launch pad ### A carefully choreographed show of force On **June 25, 2026**, the **76th anniversary of the start of the Korean War**, **Kim Jong Un** personally oversaw a series of weapons tests of considerable strategic scope. This was no calendar coincidence. The date was chosen to send an unambiguous message to **Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo**: **North Korea** is transforming its arsenal into a qualitatively new threat — more precise, longer-range, harder to counter. The official North Korean agency **KCNA** reported the tests in detail — which is unusual and deliberate. The systems tested that day include a **"special mission" warhead for tactical ballistic missiles**, an **improved 240mm multiple-launch rocket system** with an extended range of **90 kilometres** and an autonomous precision guidance system, as well as a **155mm self-propelled howitzer** with extended-range shells reaching **65 kilometres**. If these figures are accurate — and analysts at **Kyungnam University** consider them plausible — **Seoul and its 10 million inhabitants** now fall within the direct range of North Korean units stationed near the border, without those units needing to reposition. ### An unprecedented pace of expansion **Kim Jong Un** is demanding a "**deadly and destructive**" posture for his army — his own words during his speech to troops on June 25. He demands "**ultra-high precision and long-range capabilities**" across all weapons programmes. This rhetoric is alarming not because it is new, but because it now corresponds to real, measurable technical capabilities. As early as May 2026, **Pyongyang** had tested tactical ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, and cruise missiles guided by **artificial intelligence**. *I must admit one thing here: predicting the precise timeline of Pyongyang's nuclear programme is a task the world's best experts consistently fail to accomplish reliably. What I can analyse are the concrete signals — and they are all pointing in the same direction: more, faster, further.* ## North Korea's nuclear arsenal in 2026: a state of play ### Nuclear warheads multiplying rapidly North Korea's nuclear programme is described as "**exponential**" by experts at **The Guardian** in an article published on **June 24, 2026**. The most recent estimates place **Pyongyang's operational nuclear warheads** at between 40 and 60, with a production capacity that would allow it to manufacture **6 to 7 new ones per year**. At this rate, by **2030**, North Korea could possess an arsenal of **70 to 90 nuclear weapons** — firepower comparable to some official members of the nuclear club. Even more concerning: miniaturisation. For a nuclear arsenal to constitute a credible intercontinental threat, it must be possible to place a sufficiently compact and light nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile (**ICBM**). **Kim declared in June 2026** that his navy would be equipped with nuclear weapons and larger ships — a declaration signalling the desire for multidimensional deployment of nuclear capability, not merely a land-based one. ### ICBMs and the continental American threat The **Hwasong-17 and Hwasong-18**, North Korea's most recent ICBMs, have demonstrated during previous tests a theoretical range capable of reaching **the continental United States**. The question is no longer whether **Pyongyang can launch a missile toward California** — it is whether the warhead can survive atmospheric re-entry and reach its target with sufficient precision. On this point, analyses diverge, but the **technological trajectory is clearly ascending**. The June 25 test of "special mission" warheads fits squarely within this objective of perfecting the terminal strike component. *The absence of serious diplomacy since the failure of the Hanoi summit in 2019 has created a vacuum that Pyongyang has filled with ballistic tests. Every year without negotiations is a year of nuclear progress for Kim Jong Un. This is a relentless calculation that Washington has still not found a way to counter.* ## New conventional weapons: Seoul in the crosshairs ### The 240mm rocket system reprogrammed for precision strikes The most immediately alarming announcement from June 25 concerns the **improved 240mm multiple-launch rocket system**. With a range extended to **90 kilometres** and an **autonomous precision guidance system**, this weapon positioned near the **Demilitarised Zone (DMZ)** can now strike virtually any target in the **greater Seoul metropolitan area** without requiring launcher repositioning. Analysts at **Kyungnam University** confirmed to **Yonhap** that these tests are "**specifically designed to directly threaten Seoul**." The psychological dimension is as significant as the technical one. **Kim Jong Un** wants the **30 million inhabitants** of the Seoul metropolitan area — and their governments — to understand that they now live under the permanent threat of a precision strike. The **"special mission" warhead** tested is aimed, according to KCNA, at "**inflicting fatal damage on enemy airstrips, ports, and electrical installations**." This vocabulary clearly designates the civilian and military infrastructure of South Korea. ### Seoul's response: 500,000 "drone soldiers" South Korea's response was swift. On **Friday, June 26**, **Defence Minister Ahn Gyu-back** announced that South Korea plans to train **500,000 "drone soldiers"** capable of using drones as "**personal weapons**." This initiative represents a major doctrinal transformation of the South Korean military, which anticipates that future conflicts on the Korean peninsula will be dominated by drone swarms, in a manner similar to what is unfolding in Ukraine. *Training 500,000 "drone soldiers" is a creative and serious response to the North Korean threat. But I cannot help noting the historical irony: it is the Ukrainian experience, forged in pain since 2022, that is today inspiring military doctrines across the Asia-Pacific. The war in Ukraine has changed the nature of all future wars.* ## Naval nuclear power: a new dimension of the threat ### Kim wants to arm his navy with nuclear weapons The most recent — and most alarming — declaration from **Kim Jong Un** concerns his navy. In early June 2026, he announced that the **North Korean navy will be equipped with nuclear weapons** and larger ships, to guarantee "**multidimensional and effective**" operations. This announcement, reported by **Al Jazeera on June 26**, means that **Pyongyang** is seeking to deploy a nuclear strike capability from the sea — a **potential second-strike** even if land-based installations were destroyed. This concept of **naval nuclear deterrence** is particularly destabilising in the **East China Sea and the Sea of Japan**. A submarine or surface vessel carrying short-range nuclear missiles creates a diffuse threat — difficult to locate, difficult to neutralise. **Tokyo, Seoul, and Washington** must now integrate this dimension into their deterrence calculations. ### The time factor: within what timeframe can Kim threaten the continental United States? Assessments from the **US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)** — never released in full — generally estimate that **North Korea already possesses a limited nuclear strike capability against the continental United States**. The real question is one of reliability and volume. Ten nuclear missiles capable of reaching the US West Coast create a different deterrence from fifty accurate ones. At the current pace of expansion, some analysts estimate that **Pyongyang could achieve credible first-strike capability against American targets by 2028–2030** — but this projection remains highly uncertain. *I'll be honest: I am not able to give you a precise date for a North Korean nuclear "world first strike." Nobody can with certainty. What I know is that every successful test brings that moment closer — and that the Western world is not paying this threat the attention it deserves, too focused on Ukraine and China.* ## The role of Russia and China in accelerating the programme ### Russo-North Korean military cooperation: a technological accelerator The deployment of **North Korean troops to Russia** and the supply of missiles and ammunition to **Moscow** for its war against Ukraine have come at a price: a **transfer of Russian military technology** to Pyongyang. Ukraine has documented the spectacular improvement in the precision of North Korean missiles used by Russia: in 2024, the margin of error was **approximately 1 kilometre**; in 2026, it had dropped to **1 to 5 metres**. This qualitative leap can only be explained by an external technological contribution — and Russia is the most obvious candidate. This cooperation creates a **geopolitical vicious cycle**: Russia gets ammunition for its war, North Korea gets technology for its nuclear and ballistic build-up, and all Western allies find themselves financing two simultaneous fronts of threat. **Kim Jong Un's** calculation is cynical but rational: the war in Ukraine has offered him a real-world laboratory and a valuable technological partner. ### Beijing's calculated ambiguity **China** observes this North Korean build-up with an ambiguity analysts have been unable to dispel. **Beijing** has never genuinely enforced sanctions against **Pyongyang**. Officially, it opposes nuclearisation of the peninsula. Unofficially, a **nuclear North Korea** that occupies and distracts the United States, Japan, and South Korea suits China's geostrategic interests reasonably well. This passive complicity has real consequences for regional security. *China claims to want a denuclearised Korean peninsula. But if Beijing had truly wanted to bring that about, it had the economic and diplomatic means to do so. Choosing not to act is itself a strategic choice. And that choice carries a cost the whole of Asia will eventually pay.* ## The humanitarian impact: a population held hostage by the regime ### The North Korean paradox: missiles and famine While **Kim Jong Un** invests billions of dollars in ballistic and nuclear missile programmes, the North Korean population continues to suffer from **chronic malnutrition**. The **United Nations** estimates that more than **40% of the North Korean population** suffers from food insecurity. International sanctions, designed to deprive the regime of resources, have a perverse effect: they hit the most vulnerable first, not the military elites who control the distribution of resources. This reality creates a moral dilemma for sanctions policy designers. Strengthening economic pressure on **Pyongyang** is necessary to limit weapons programmes, but it worsens the suffering of a population that has no control over its government's decisions. **North Korea** actually uses this situation as a diplomatic lever: in every round of negotiations, the regime demands **humanitarian concessions** as a precondition — a way of turning its own population's distress into a geopolitical bargaining chip. *I often think about the **26 million North Koreans** whose lives are entirely determined by a regime they cannot challenge. They do not choose Kim Jong Un's missiles — they bear the cost in terms of deprivation, confiscated freedoms, and a mortgaged future. Any strategy vis-à-vis North Korea must keep in mind that the regime and the population are two distinct realities — even though the regime does everything it can to make the world confuse them.* ## North Korean missiles supplied to Russia: a valuable technological laboratory ### The war in Ukraine as a ballistic testing ground One of the most troubling developments of 2025–2026 is the deployment of **North Korean ballistic missiles** by Russian forces in Ukraine. These missiles — **KN-23 and KN-24** — have been used in dozens of attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. What makes this deployment particularly alarming for non-proliferation analysts is what it gives **Pyongyang**: **real-combat performance data**, feedback on the weaknesses and successes of guidance systems, and information on how Western defences respond to these missiles. Ukraine has documented a spectacular improvement in the precision of these missiles: the margin of error fell from approximately **1 kilometre in 2024** to just **1 to 5 metres in 2026**. This qualitative leap can only be explained by a **transfer of precision guidance technology** from Russia to North Korea — a transaction that violates all UN Security Council resolutions on Pyongyang sanctions, but that neither Russia nor North Korea will ever officially acknowledge. *This Russo-North Korean technological transfer via the war in Ukraine is one of the most dangerous side effects of the conflict. The international community had built mechanisms to prevent North Korea from improving its missiles. Russia, in exchange for ammunition, gave Kim Jong Un what years of sanctions had denied him. This is a betrayal of international non-proliferation norms.* ## North Korean diplomacy: why Pyongyang refuses to negotiate ### The lessons of 2019 and the fait accompli strategy Since the failure of the **Hanoi summit in February 2019** between **Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump**, North Korea has adopted a clear strategy: develop nuclear and ballistic capabilities until achieving **de facto recognition as a nuclear power**, then negotiate from that position of strength. Kim drew the lesson from Hanoi — he did not obtain the lifting of sanctions in exchange for partial denuclearisation — and concluded that the only viable posture was the **refusal of any unilateral concession**. **Kim Jong Un** has responded to recent American attempts to resume diplomacy by demanding that the United States abandon its denuclearisation demand. This is a condition **Washington** cannot accept without demolishing its entire non-proliferation architecture. This diplomatic deadlock is deliberate on North Korea's part: **every month without negotiations is a month of technological progress**. North Korea uses time as a weapon. *I understand the frustration of American negotiators facing Kim Jong Un. But the "maximum pressure" strategy without an offer of a honourable exit has not worked either. Sanctions have impacted the North Korean population without changing the regime's strategic calculus. It will probably take a radically different approach — one nobody has clearly formulated yet — to break this deadlock.* ## Conclusion: A threat requiring a coordinated response ### The urgency of a coherent strategy Faced with North Korean nuclear expansion, the international community lacks a coherent response. Sanctions are being circumvented. Diplomacy has been frozen since 2019. Security consultations between **Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo** are advancing, but the controversial deployment of the **THAAD** system remains a sensitive issue. The South Korean drone response is promising, but insufficient to counter a nuclear threat. ### What the international community must understand North Korean nuclear expansion is not a regional problem — it is a global threat under construction. If **Pyongyang** achieves a credible intercontinental strike capability by the end of the decade, this will fundamentally alter American deterrence calculations in the **Asia-Pacific**, weaken security guarantees extended to South Korea and Japan, and could encourage other states to reassess their own abandonment of nuclear programmes. This is a proliferation dynamic that deserves far more serious attention from Western capitals. *I end this report with an uncomfortable conviction: we may be living through the final years before **North Korea** becomes a full-capacity intercontinental nuclear power. If that threshold is crossed, the options available — sanctions, diplomacy, military pressure — will all have demonstrated their limits. And we will be condemned to live with an unpredictable nuclear regime for decades to come. I don't know how to break this deadlock. I only know that time matters.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Al Jazeera — North Korea conducts major weapons tests; South training 'drone warriors' — June 26, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/26/north-korea-conducts-major-weapons-tests-south-training-drone-warriors) - [Yonhap — N. Korea's Kim oversees tests of key weapons seen as aimed at S. Korea — June 26, 2026](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20260626001751315) - [The Guardian — North Korea nuclear program Kim Jong Un — June 24, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/24/north-korea-nuclear-program-kim-jong-un) - [US News — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 25, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-25/north-korean-leader-kim-oversees-weapons-tests-kcna-reports) ### Secondary sources - [Straits Times — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 26, 2026](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/north-korean-leader-kim-oversees-weapons-tests-kcna-reports) - [SFGate/AP — North Korea's Kim watches weapons tests and calls for 'deadly and destructive' military posture — June 25, 2026](https://www.sfgate.com/news/world/article/north-korea-s-kim-watches-weapons-tests-and-calls-22321476.php) - --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/le-programme-nucleaire-de-kim-jong-un-accelere-a-une-vitesse-qui-inquiete-serieu