# Canada Picks Its Future Submarines Just Before the NATO Summit in Ankara > The Canadian government of Prime Minister Mark Carney was expected, according to the Globe and Mail, to announce the winner of its - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Note - Published: 2026-07-06 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/le-canada-choisit-ses-futurs-sous-marins-juste-avant-le-sommet-de-l-otan-a-ankar ## Introduction: a $60 billion decision that arrives at just the right moment ### A strategic choice announced the day before Ankara The Canadian government of Prime Minister **Mark Carney** was expected, according to the **Globe and Mail**, to announce the winner of its bidding process for **12 new submarines** this Monday, **July 6, 2026**, barely **24 hours** before the opening of the **NATO** summit in **Ankara**. The timing is no accident: **Ottawa** wants to arrive at the allied table with concrete proof of its commitment to Western rearmament. Two contenders are competing for this contract, worth up to **60 billion Canadian dollars**, or roughly **42.9 billion U.S. dollars**: Germany's **TKMS** with its **Type 212CD**, and South Korea's **Hanwha Ocean** with its **KSS-III Batch II**. This program, called the **Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP)**, is meant to replace the aging fleet of **Victoria-class submarines**. ### Why this contract matters for the whole Alliance A better-equipped **Canada** under the water means a stronger North Atlantic flank for all of **NATO**. At a time when **Russia** is ramping up submarine activity in the **Arctic** and the **North Atlantic**, every additional Canadian submarine represents real deterrence capability, not just a budgetary symbol. The first submarine won't be delivered, at the earliest, until **2035**, which shows just how much these weapons decisions commit future generations far beyond the immediate electoral cycle of the government that signs them. *I'll say it plainly: a Canada that invests heavily in its submarine capabilities is good news for the entire West, not just for Ottawa. For far too long, Canada has been the weak link in NATO defense spending. This contract, no matter who wins it, marks a shift in posture that deserves unreserved praise.* ## TKMS versus Hanwha, two opposing industrial visions ### The German case for NATO integration **TKMS** is banking on its European roots and immediate compatibility with **NATO** standards. The German company points out that **Germany** and **Norway** could potentially transfer **submarines** already on order to **Canada**, allowing for accelerated delivery as early as **2036** rather than waiting for entirely new production. This argument appeals to Canadian officials concerned with interoperability with their European allies, at a moment when transatlantic cohesion is more valuable than ever in the face of combined Russian and Chinese ambitions. ### South Korea's promise of speed and volume For its part, **Hanwha Ocean** promises to deliver **four submarines** by **2035**, a production pace South Korea's shipbuilding industry has repeatedly demonstrated for other international clients. **South Korea** has established itself in recent years as a major player in arms exports, banking on delivery timelines noticeably shorter than its traditional Western competitors. Canada's defense minister has, for his part, ruled out splitting the contract between the two suppliers, judging that an even split would drive up costs disproportionately compared with the benefits of a standardized fleet. *Between Atlanticist loyalty and pure industrial efficiency, Canada faces a dilemma that goes well beyond the submarine question itself. Personally, I lean toward the option that strengthens ties with NATO Europe, even if it costs a bit more or takes a bit longer. Western cohesion is worth that extra investment.* ## Why the Victoria-class fleet can't wait any longer ### Aging submarines with limited capabilities The current fleet of **Victoria-class submarines**, acquired secondhand from the **United Kingdom** in the 1990s, keeps racking up maintenance problems and extended downtime. These vessels, originally designed for a strategic context very different from today's, struggle to meet modern requirements for submarine patrols in the **Arctic** and the **North Atlantic**. Replacing this fleet is therefore not a strategic luxury but an urgent operational necessity, so that **Canada** can keep monitoring its territorial waters and contribute credibly to joint **NATO** missions in the **North Atlantic**. ### A gap built up against other Alliance members While other **NATO** members, notably the Scandinavian countries and **Germany**, have modernized their submarine fleets over the past decade, **Canada** has fallen significantly behind in this specific capability area. This contract for 12 **submarines** directly aims to close that gap before it becomes a structural handicap to Canadian military credibility within the Alliance. This race against the clock partly explains the Carney government's urgency to close this file even before the **Ankara** summit, rather than letting a bidding process already years in the making drag on further. ## The Arctic, a new theater of submarine competition ### An increasingly contested strategic region The Canadian **Arctic** is no longer the quiet zone it once was. The gradual melting of ice is opening new shipping routes and drawing the strategic attention of powers like **Russia** and, increasingly, **China**, which presents itself as a "near-Arctic state" despite having no territory in the region. A modernized submarine fleet would allow **Canada** to better monitor these new routes and deter any unwanted incursion into waters whose Canadian sovereignty remains, in certain areas, disputed by other nations. ### Canada's role in broader North Atlantic deterrence Beyond its own Arctic sovereignty, **Canada** plays a role in the wider North Atlantic deterrence architecture, alongside the United States, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries. Modern, quiet **submarines** would strengthen this collective contribution against increasingly frequent Russian submarine activity in the region. It's this allied dimension, not just the national one, that explains why other **NATO** members are paying such close attention to the outcome of this Canadian bidding process. *The Arctic is no longer just a frozen postcard — it's an active strategic front where Russia and China are already testing the limits of Western vigilance. Canada carries a particular responsibility in this region, and it was about time it finally gave itself the material means to match, instead of settling for declarations of sovereignty with no real military substance behind them.* ## The expected industrial and economic fallout ### A contract that goes beyond the purely military dimension Beyond its strictly defense-related component, this **60 billion Canadian dollar** contract represents a major economic stake for the shipbuilding industry, whether it's ultimately led by **TKMS** or **Hanwha Ocean**. Benefits in terms of jobs, technology transfers and local industrial partnerships are expected, regardless of who ultimately wins the bid. These economic benefits form an important political argument for a government that must justify such a considerable expense to a Canadian population not always convinced of the need for massive military investment in seemingly peaceful times. ### Expectations placed on the chosen industrial partner Whether **Germany** or **South Korea** wins, **Canada** will likely demand guarantees of skills transfer to its own shipyards, a now-standard practice in this kind of major defense contract between allies. These industrial requirements could, in fact, weigh more heavily in the final decision than purely technical considerations between the German Type 212CD and the South Korean KSS-III Batch II. *I remain convinced that industrial benefits, as important as they are, should never take precedence over the actual operational performance of the chosen submarines. A less capable submarine that's more politically profitable locally would be a serious strategic mistake given the current tensions with Russia and China.* ## What this contract says about Mark Carney's posture ### A prime minister who wants to embody military budget seriousness Since coming to power, **Mark Carney** has sought to position himself as a leader capable of reconciling economic rigor with credible military commitment to Western allies. This submarine announcement, coming right before a major **NATO** summit, fits precisely into this combined communications and foreign policy strategy. A **Canada** perceived as a reliable defense partner also strengthens Carney's diplomatic standing in his dealings with other allied leaders, notably on other parallel economic and trade files. ### Persistent pressure from allies for more commitment **Canada** has long been criticized by its **NATO** partners, notably the United States, for chronic underinvestment in defense relative to its real economic weight within the G7. This **submarine** contract, however costly, directly responds to this allied pressure that has built up over years. It remains to be seen whether this one-time effort will translate into a lasting, structural commitment, or whether it will remain an isolated gesture designed above all to meet the immediate expectations of the **Ankara** summit. ## The Australian precedent and the lessons not to repeat ### AUKUS, a contract that turned into a diplomatic nightmare **Canada** is watching closely the precedent of the **AUKUS** deal, in which **Australia** abruptly canceled a conventional **submarine** contract with **France** in 2021 in favor of American and British nuclear submarines, triggering a major diplomatic crisis with **Paris**. **Ottawa** wants to avoid at all costs such a costly, humiliating reversal after the July 6 announcement. This caution partly explains the slowness of the Canadian process, spread over several years, rather than a rushed decision that could be reversed by a future government or by unforeseen industrial pressure from a spurned partner. ### Industrial diplomacy as the decision's hidden variable The choice between **TKMS** and **Hanwha Ocean** is therefore not just technical, it's also diplomatic: favoring **Germany** would strengthen **Canada**'s ties with the **European Union** and continental **NATO**, while favoring **South Korea** would deepen Canada's partnership with allied Asian democracies facing **China**'s rising power in the Pacific. This broader geopolitical calculation explains why the final decision interests observers in **Berlin**, **Seoul** and **Washington** just as much as it does in **Ottawa** itself. *The AUKUS fiasco remains a harsh lesson for any Western government tempted by a last-minute reversal. Canada is right to take its time to avoid repeating that mistake, even if this slowness frustrates some allies impatient to finally see Canada's submarine fleet modernized.* ## What military experts expect from this modernized fleet ### Strengthened deterrence capabilities in the North Atlantic Military experts consulted by the specialized press agree on one point: a fleet of **12 modern submarines** would give **Canada** unprecedented deterrence capability in the **North Atlantic**, allowing it to more effectively monitor Russian naval movements and contribute meaningfully to joint **NATO** operations in the region. This increased capability fits into a broader trend of Western naval reinforcement in the face of a **Russia** that keeps modernizing its own submarine fleet despite the economic sanctions imposed since the start of its invasion of **Ukraine**. ### An investment that must come with training and maintenance Beyond acquiring the **submarines** themselves, experts stress the crucial importance of also investing in crew training and in Canadian naval maintenance infrastructure, elements often neglected in major defense contracts but essential to the fleet's long-term operational viability. Without this complementary investment, even the most technologically advanced **submarines** could end up grounded for lack of qualified personnel or adequate facilities, repeating the problems that plagued the **Victoria-class** fleet for decades. *Buying capable submarines isn't enough: you also have to train the crews and build the infrastructure to maintain them properly. It's exactly this kind of overlooked detail that undermined Canadian military credibility for years, and I sincerely hope Ottawa has learned the lesson this time.* ## Conclusion: a signal sent to Ankara before the summit's first word ### Western rearmament isn't just talk Whether the final choice lands on **TKMS** or **Hanwha Ocean**, Canada's **July 6** announcement sends a clear message on the eve of the **NATO** summit: the defense spending commitments made in recent years across the Alliance are now translating into concrete contracts, not just abstract budgetary promises. As allied leaders prepare to discuss in **Ankara** how defense efforts should be shared among members, **Canada** arrives with a tangible file rather than a simple figure committed on paper. ### What comes next must confirm The real test won't be the announcement of the winner itself, but **Canada**'s ability to meet its delivery deadlines through **2035** and beyond, in an industrial sector where delays and cost overruns are unfortunately common currency across the **West**. *I'll close on a note of measured hope: this contract, if properly executed, could mark a lasting turning point in Canada's defense posture. But the recent history of major Western military contracts calls for caution rather than premature euphoria.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - The Globe and Mail — Canada submarines competition to be announced Monday — July 5, 2026 - Reuters — Canada to announce submarine contract winner Monday — July 5, 2026 ### Secondary sources - The Straits Times — Canada to announce submarine contract winner — July 5, 2026 - Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit - Forbes — What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit — July 1, 2026 - The Chosun Daily — Hanwha Ocean submarine bid coverage — July 1, 2026 --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/le-canada-choisit-ses-futurs-sous-marins-juste-avant-le-sommet-de-l-otan-a-ankar