# Germany wants to build Tomahawks, and that's excellent news

> Introduction: Berlin no longer asks for permission, it builds

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-07-04
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/lallemagne-veut-fabriquer-des-tomahawk-et-cest-une-excellente-nouvelle

## Introduction: Berlin no longer asks for permission, it builds

### A negotiation that changes the strategic equation

There are pieces of news that pass almost unnoticed in the whirlwind of the daily cycle, yet still mark a turning point. On **July 1, 2026**, the **Financial Times** revealed that **Germany** is actively negotiating with **Washington** to obtain authorization to produce, on its own soil, **Tomahawk** cruise missiles and **Patriot PAC-3 MSE** interceptors. If this deal materializes, Berlin would become the first continental European nation to manufacture these two of the most technically sensitive American weapons systems (**Army Recognition**, July 1, 2026, see Sources).

This move fits a precise context: German officials are pressing their American counterparts to conclude a **co-production** agreement before the **NATO summit in Ankara**, scheduled for the following week. A source close to the matter indicated that the American response, both governmental and industrial, has proven **"more positive than expected"** (**United24 Media**, July 1, 2026, see Sources).

### Why this file deserves your attention

One might think this is just another technical file, one more arms negotiation in a world that already has plenty. But that would misjudge the scale of the change. Moving from a simple **financial burden-sharing** arrangement — Europe paying, America producing — to genuine **transatlantic industrial integration** represents a change in kind, not merely in degree.

This is exactly the kind of decision that, ten years from now, will be identified as the moment **Europe** stopped being a mere customer of American defense and became a full industrial partner. *I'll say it bluntly: watching Germany demand the right to build Tomahawks at home is watching the West finally act like a coherent bloc rather than a collection of dependent customers. It's exactly the strategic maturity Europe should have reached long ago.*

## The context: a year of twists on the Tomahawk file

### From Biden's promise to Trump's cancellation

To understand the significance of this moment, we need to go back. In **July 2024**, the **Biden** administration and Chancellor **Olaf Scholz** announced the temporary deployment, starting in 2026, of a multi-domain American force equipped with **Typhon** launchers capable of firing **Tomahawk** and **SM-6** missiles on German soil — a measure presented as a temporary bridge while Europe developed its own long-range strike capabilities.

Yet in early May 2026, the **Trump** administration suspended this deployment, citing a broader review of American military commitments in Europe. Chancellor **Friedrich Merz** confirmed this pullback, leaving Berlin facing a brutal capability gap it had not anticipated (**Defense News**, May 5, 2026, see Sources).

### A reversal that forced Berlin to rethink its strategy

This American retreat sent shockwaves through Berlin. Defense Minister **Boris Pistorius** had to publicly admit that **"this temporary agreement"** reached with Biden might not hold, leaving Germany without an **immediate solution** to fill its **long-range strike capability gap**. Rather than simply absorbing the blow, Berlin chose to come back with a more ambitious proposal: no longer just buy, but manufacture.

This strategic pivot illustrates a hard but necessary lesson: depending entirely on a partner, even the closest ally, carries political risks that only partial industrial autonomy can mitigate. *An uncomfortable truth must be acknowledged: American reversals on this file have hurt European trust. But instead of giving in to resentment, Germany turned that disappointment into a concrete industrial project. That's a mature response, not an emotional reaction.*

## What Berlin is concretely asking Washington for

### Ground-launched Tomahawks and PAC-3 interceptors

The German proposal covers two specific systems. First, a ground-launched version of the **Tomahawk** cruise missile, with a range exceeding **1,600 kilometers**, would require transferring **sensitive proprietary software** and **guidance algorithms** to German companies. Second, the **Patriot PAC-3 MSE** interceptor, a cutting-edge hit-to-kill missile-defense technology, would help densify European air-defense coverage against tactical ballistic missiles.

According to Germany's defense ministry, an **"intensive and well-established"** cooperation already exists between American and German manufacturers, citing **Rheinmetall's** production of fuselage sections for **F-35** fighter jets and a new joint **MBDA-Raytheon** facility manufacturing **GEM-T** missiles for Patriot systems (**Chosun Biz**, July 3, 2026, see Sources).

### A realistic industrial timeline, not a miracle one

It would be naive to believe that this co-production, even if approved quickly, would produce immediate effects. **Analysts** stress that a **gradual, incremental approach** — starting with the manufacture of structural components or propulsion modules before reaching full final assembly — represents the most realistic regulatory path, given American export controls and **ITAR** licensing requirements.

Even with swift political and regulatory approval from Washington, establishing operational production lines will take several years before having a measurable impact on **NATO** inventories. This is a decade-long project, not a short-term fix. *I prefer a patient Germany building real industrial capacity over a Germany buying quick, fragile fixes. Slowness here isn't a flaw, it's the mark of a serious project.*

## The Rheinmetall-Lockheed Martin example, a precedent that inspires

### A European center of excellence already under construction

This German-American project doesn't start from zero. In **May 2025**, **Rheinmetall** and **Lockheed Martin** announced the creation of a joint venture in Europe to produce **ATACMS** missiles and **Patriot PAC-3 MSE** interceptors, with Rheinmetall holding up to **60% of the shares**. The **stated goal**: produce up to **10,000 missiles** and as many **rocket motors** annually once full capacity is reached.

Rheinmetall's CEO, **Armin Papperger**, called this facility a **"European center of excellence for rockets."** Solid-propellant motor production was to begin in 2026, full missile assembly from 2027, reaching full capacity between 2028 and 2029 (**Militarnyi**, May 2025, see Sources).

### A model that reassures technology-transfer skeptics

This precedent demonstrates that transferring American intellectual property to Europe, though politically sensitive, remains feasible when both parties see a shared strategic interest. The fact that **research and development** are being carried out jointly with Lockheed Martin means the intellectual property rights will also be based in Europe, a far from trivial detail for the continent's strategic autonomy.

This growing trust between American and European manufacturers is the ground on which today's even more ambitious proposal to build Tomahawks on German soil is now taking root. *It's not said enough: this industrial cooperation is weaving a stronger bond between America and Europe than any diplomatic summit. Shared factories create a mutual dependency that actually discourages sudden ruptures.*

## Why Germany is acting now, without waiting

### The Iranian threat has emptied American stockpiles

The timing of this initiative is not incidental. American **Tomahawk** missile stockpiles have been significantly depleted by the military campaign against **Iran**, forcing the **Pentagon** to prioritize **replenishing** its own forces before considering any additional deployment in Europe. War Secretary **Pete Hegseth** himself acknowledged before Congress that it would take **"months, if not years"** to rebuild these inventories (reports picked up by several specialized outlets, May 2026, see Sources).

This American shortage, however frustrating for Berlin in the short term, paradoxically constitutes the strongest argument in favor of co-production: if the United States cannot guarantee reliable supply, then the only durable solution is to manufacture these weapons directly in Europe, with American consent and expertise.

### Mounting pressure ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara

The diplomatic calendar adds further urgency. Berlin hopes to reach a framework agreement before the **NATO summit in Ankara**, seeking to present a concrete example of transatlantic industrial reinforcement at the very moment the alliance is navigating tensions over burden-sharing and the announced withdrawal of thousands of American troops stationed in Germany (**Eurasia Review**, July 3, 2026, see Sources).

Successfully closing this negotiation before Ankara would send a **strong signal** to Moscow and Beijing: despite occasional political friction between Washington and its European allies, the architecture of Western deterrence keeps getting stronger and deeper. *This is exactly the kind of news that Putin and Xi Jinping dread most: proof that transatlantic tensions, however real, don't fracture deep military cooperation. The West bickers sometimes, but it keeps building together.*

## The limits and risks we cannot ignore

### The weight of American export bureaucracy

It would be **dishonest** to present this file as a **mere administrative formality**. American export controls, governed by the **ITAR** (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) regime, impose rigorous vetting on any transfer of sensitive military technology. The American Congress, the domestic defense industry, and intelligence officials must all sign off before a final agreement is signed.

These checks, though sometimes perceived as frustrating obstacles by European partners, exist for good reason: they protect technologies that, if they fell into the wrong hands, could compromise Western collective security itself.

### Transatlantic trust remains fragile

The **American reversal** on the initial Tomahawk deployment in Germany, announced then canceled within two years, has left **scars**. Chancellor Merz himself publicly admitted he no longer has **"much hope"** regarding certain earlier American promises. This legitimate caution should push Berlin to diversify its options rather than bet everything on a single co-production deal.

This is, in fact, exactly what Germany is doing in parallel, simultaneously investing in autonomous European projects like the **Ruta Block 2** cruise missile, developed with Dutch startup **Destinus**, as an industrial safety net independent of Washington. *I believe this is the right approach: negotiate with the Americans without depending exclusively on them. A Europe that keeps several options open is a Europe negotiating from strength, not weakness.*

## What this reveals about the balance of power with China and Russia

### Beijing is watching this industrial reorganization closely

It would be a mistake to analyze this German-American negotiation in isolation, without placing it within the broader context of the rivalry between the **West** and the powers seeking to weaken it. **China** watches with particular attention every sign of cohesion or division within the transatlantic alliance, since its own strategic calculus on **Taiwan** depends heavily on its perception of Western solidity.

A **successful co-production** between Germany and the United States would send a clear message to Beijing: trade tensions and occasional disagreements over burden-sharing do not stop the West from strengthening, together, its most critical defense industrial capabilities. That's a deterrent signal that goes far beyond the European framework.

### North Korea and Iran, indirect beneficiaries of a divided West

Conversely, any sign of transatlantic fragmentation would directly benefit regimes seeking to exploit Western fault lines. **North Korea**, which already supplies munitions and soldiers to Russia, and **Iran**, whose missile stockpiles precisely caused the American shortage behind this file, are both watching whether the West can turn its internal tensions into concrete projects rather than paralysis.

This is precisely why the success or failure of this German-American negotiation goes far beyond the technical question of missiles: it tests the West's ability to stay united against an increasingly coordinated axis of hostile powers. *I keep repeating this in my columns: Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang are cooperating more and more closely with each other. It would be suicidal for the West, on its side, to let its own internal tensions stall industrial projects as essential as this one.*

## What this means for Ukraine and the eastern flank

### An industrial capacity that indirectly benefits Kyiv

This German industrial buildup isn't only about defending national territory — it has direct repercussions on Europe's ability to sustain support for **Ukraine** over the long haul. Every additional production line for **PAC-3** interceptors or Patriot missiles means, eventually, more **available munitions** to equip the **Ukrainian air-defense batteries** protecting cities against Russian strikes.

Germany has already demonstrated this concrete commitment by financing, through a **$3.7 billion** contract with Raytheon, the production of Patriot missiles bound for Ukraine, produced partly at the new facility in **Schrobenhausen**, Bavaria (**Euromaidan Press**, April 14, 2026, see Sources).

### A signal of resolve toward Moscow

For **Vladimir Putin**, who has long bet on the exhaustion of Western will to support Ukraine, this new transatlantic industrial architecture sends a clear signal: the West isn't retreating, it's reorganizing to endure. The ability to manufacture sophisticated weapons directly on European soil makes this deterrence less vulnerable to the political whims of a single supplier nation.

This may be the most important message to take away from this seemingly dry technical file: the resilience of support for Ukraine will no longer depend solely on Washington's goodwill, but on an increasingly autonomous and robust European industrial base. *Zelensky and his government should watch this file closely: every advance in this German-American co-production is one more guarantee that military support for Ukraine will survive changes of government in Washington or Berlin.*

## Conclusion: a step toward a Europe that finally stands on its own

### The deeper meaning of this negotiation

What this German-American negotiation reveals goes far beyond the **technical specifications** of Tomahawk missiles or PAC-3 interceptors. It marks a step in Europe's strategic maturation, as it gradually stops being a mere passive buyer of American military equipment and becomes an industrial partner capable of producing, innovating, and contributing directly to its own collective security.

This transformation, if it fully materializes in the years ahead, will durably reshape the balance of the transatlantic partnership, making it more resilient to the inevitable political ups and downs on both sides of the Atlantic.

### Staying watchful on execution

It now falls to **German and American leaders** to turn this political intention into **concrete industrial reality**, a process that will take years rather than months. **Western citizens**, and particularly the **German taxpayers** who will fund this buildup, have the right to demand **transparency** and **accountability** at every stage of this ambitious project.

But on the principle itself, there should be no ambiguity: a Europe that manufactures its own deterrence weapons, in close partnership with America rather than in total dependence on it, is a stronger, more credible Europe, and ultimately one more useful to the collective security of the entire West. *I'll close with a simple conviction: ten years from now, we will look back at July 2026 as the month Germany stopped waiting for Washington's permission to act as a responsible industrial power. That's exactly the kind of wake-up call the entire West should imitate, and fast.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [NATO, defence spending commitment at 5% of GDP — 2026](https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment)

- [Army Recognition, Germany seeks authorization to produce Tomahawk and PAC-3 — July 1, 2026](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/germany-tomahawk-patriot-missile-production)

- [United24 Media, Germany pushes the United States to build Tomahawk and Patriot missiles on its soil — July 1, 2026](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/germany-pushes-us-to-build-tomahawks-and-patriot-missiles-on-german-soil-20346)

### Secondary sources

- [Chosun Biz, Germany leads US-Europe arms co-production — July 3, 2026](https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-international/2026/07/03/I2BROT7B2RHHRFEWFLM62XQTJA/)

- [Eurasia Review, US seeks to ease Europe troop drawdown concerns at NATO summit in Ankara — July 3, 2026](https://www.eurasiareview.com/03072026-us-seeks-to-ease-europe-troop-drawdown-concerns-at-nato-summit-in-ankara/)

- [Defense News, German defense minister laments long-range strike gap caused by planned US drawdown — May 5, 2026](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/05/05/german-defense-minister-laments-long-range-strike-gap-caused-by-planned-us-drawdown/)

- [Euromaidan Press, Germany will pay for hundreds of Patriot missiles for Ukraine as strategic partnership signed — April 14, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/04/14/germany-will-pay-for-hundreds-of-patriot-missiles-for-ukraine-as-strategic-partnership-signed/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/lallemagne-veut-fabriquer-des-tomahawk-et-cest-une-excellente-nouvelle
