# Turkey Ready to Ditch Its Russian S-400s to Return to the F-35 > Since 2019, Turkey has been excluded from the American stealth fighter program F-35 after purchasing the Russian S-400 air-defense systems, a decision - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Reportage - Published: 2026-07-06 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/la-turquie-prete-a-ceder-ses-s-400-russes-pour-retrouver-les-f-35 ## Introduction: a strategic reversal ahead of the Ankara summit ### A file frozen since 2019 Since **2019**, **Turkey** has been excluded from the American stealth fighter program **F-35** after purchasing the Russian **S-400** air-defense systems, a decision that triggered American sanctions under the **CAATSA** regime in **December 2020**. Since then, **Ankara** has relentlessly demanded its reinstatement into the program, a dispute that has poisoned relations between the two **NATO** member states for more than six years. Ahead of the **NATO summit in Ankara** planned for early July 2026, several outlets report that Turkey is seriously exploring the option of selling its **S-400s** to a third country, a move that would remove the legal obstacle blocking its return to the **F-35** program. This is a development I would call potentially historic for the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. ### Why this file matters to all of NATO Turkey's possible reinstatement into the **F-35** program would not be a simple bilateral matter between **Washington** and **Ankara**. It would directly affect the coherence of **NATO's** collective defense posture against **Russia**, at a time when every additional military capability matters to deter **Moscow** from any adventure beyond **Ukraine**. *I'll say it upfront: if Turkey truly gives up its Russian S-400s to return to the F-35 fold, that will be a clean win for Western cohesion, even though Erdogan remains an unpredictable partner who needs close watching.* ## The origin of the rift: the S-400 purchase ### A choice that cost Ankara dearly Turkey's acquisition of the Russian **S-400** systems had been justified by **Ankara** as a necessity for air defense against regional threats. But **Washington** immediately deemed the purchase incompatible with the integrity of the **F-35** program, fearing that Russian radars could collect sensitive data on the American jet's stealth capabilities if the two systems operated on the same territory. The penalty was severe: **Turkey** was expelled from the **F-35** production and purchase program in **2019**, losing both its aircraft orders and its industrial participation in the plane's international production chain. The **CAATSA** sanctions imposed in **December 2020** directly targeted Turkey's defense-industry presidency. ### Six years of diplomatic tension Since that rupture, Turkish President **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** has never stopped repeating that his country's return to the **F-35** program was an essential condition for **NATO's** security as a whole. On **January 5, 2026**, he was still publicly declaring that this reinstatement was a cornerstone of the Alliance's security, according to remarks reported by **Bloomberg**. *I understand the Turkish frustration, but I refuse to forget that it was Ankara that chose to buy Russian equipment in the middle of tension with the West. Responsibility for this six-year deadlock doesn't rest solely on Washington's shoulders.* ## The third-country sale scenario ### South Korea floated as a potential buyer According to several reports circulating in late June 2026, the American administration is reportedly considering allowing **Turkey's** return to the **F-35** program on condition that the **S-400** systems are sold to a third country rather than returned to **Russia**. The outlet **Euractiv** reported this option, later picked up by several publications, which mention **South Korea** as a plausible potential buyer. This solution would defuse the original security problem without publicly humiliating **Ankara**, which could present the sale as a sovereign decision rather than a capitulation to American demands. It's a clever diplomatic compromise, if it actually materializes. ### Turkey's September 2025 denial It should be noted that **Turkey's Ministry of Defense** had denied as early as **September 2025** any intention to sell its **S-400s**, calling such rumors baseless. That earlier denial casts legitimate doubt on the solidity of the current scenario, and I refuse to present it as an established certainty. *I remain cautious here: an official Turkish denial from just months ago doesn't simply evaporate because new rumors are circulating on the eve of a summit. Truth will be verified by actions, not by anonymous leaks.* ## The Trump administration's position ### A tug-of-war between the Pentagon and diplomacy American Vice President **JD Vance** confirmed that the **Pentagon**, under the leadership of Defense Secretary **Pete Hegseth**, is currently examining whether **Turkey** meets the legal criteria needed for its reinstatement into the **F-35** program. This technical and legal review is a mandatory step before any final political decision by the White House. The outlet **Al-Monitor** reported as early as **June 25, 2026** that **Donald Trump** himself had hinted that a major diplomatic breakthrough on this file could come before the **NATO summit**, a strong signal of the president's determination to resolve this dispute ahead of his visit to Turkey. ### A calculated gesture before Ankara According to **Kurdistan24**, **Trump** would travel to **Ankara** with a concrete offer on the **F-35** as well as other commercial gestures toward President **Erdogan**, which would mark the first visit by a sitting American president to Turkey since **Barack Obama's in 2015**. This diplomatic symbol is not trivial in the context of rebuilding transatlantic trust. *I'll credit Trump for one thing here: his willingness to resolve this file before the summit shows a correct reading of Western strategic priorities, even though I remain critical of his domestic management on other, completely separate fronts.* ## Opposition in the US Congress ### A bipartisan resolution to block the return Turkey's potential return to the **F-35** program is not unanimously welcomed in **Washington**. According to **Turkish Minute**, American lawmakers, led by Democratic Representative **Dina Titus**, were preparing as early as **June 29, 2026** a bipartisan resolution specifically aimed at blocking this reinstatement as long as Turkey still holds the Russian **S-400** systems. This legislative push illustrates the persistent distrust part of **Congress** holds toward **Ankara**, particularly regarding the risks posed by the presence of Russian equipment on the territory of a **NATO** member state with potential access to the most sensitive American stealth technologies. ### The Senate's weight in the equation According to **Newsmax**, a bipartisan letter was also sent to **Trump** in early July 2026 urging him to reject any Turkish return to the **F-35** program. The chairman of the **Senate** Foreign Relations Committee, Republican **Jim Risch**, is among the firmest voices against this reinstatement, which considerably complicates the president's room for maneuver on this file. *Here's an opposition I respect: the security concerns raised by these lawmakers aren't partisan bad faith — they rest on a real technical risk that I refuse to brush aside simply because I want to see Turkey return to the Western fold.* ## The CAATSA legal framework ### A law that blocks any transaction as long as the S-400s stay in Turkey The legal core of the problem rests on **Section 1245** of the **National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)** for fiscal year 2020, which formally bans any transfer of **F-35** technology as long as **Turkey** retains the **S-400** systems on its soil. This legal provision explains why **Trump's** political will alone is not enough to unlock the file without a concrete gesture from **Ankara**. It is precisely this legal constraint that makes the third-country sale scenario so attractive to both parties: it would let them honor the letter of American law without **Ankara** having to publicly admit a past strategic mistake. ### Similar legal precedents Other countries have faced similar dilemmas in the past between Russian acquisitions and Western partnerships, but none reaches the strategic scale of **Turkey's** case, **NATO's** second-largest army by troop numbers and a key player on the Alliance's southeastern flank against **Russia** and the **Middle East**. *I believe this Turkish case will become a reference point for NATO: how this file gets settled will send a clear signal to any future ally tempted to play both sides between Washington and Moscow.* ## The parallel F110 engine sale ### A good-faith gesture before the summit Alongside the **F-35** file, the American administration has notified **Congress** of its intent to proceed with a sale of **F110 engines** destined for the Turkish **Kaan** fighter jet, a national project Turkey is developing to reduce its dependence on foreign aircraft. This sale, valued at roughly **$700 million**, is presented by **Ankara** as a preliminary step toward a broader normalization of defense relations with **Washington**. According to **Reuters**, this advance on the **F110** engines was announced as early as **June 24, 2026**, even before the rumors about the **S-400** sale, suggesting a gradual, coordinated thaw rather than a last-minute improvised decision before the summit. ### The strategic link between the two files The **Kaan** program and the **F-35** file are closely tied in Turkish strategy: by demonstrating its ability to produce a competitive national fighter while negotiating its return to the American program, **Ankara** seeks to maximize its influence and industrial sovereignty, regardless of the final outcome of the **S-400** negotiations. *This dual Turkish strategy impresses me tactically, even as it irritates me on principle: Ankara is playing every side at once, and the West needs to stay clear-eyed that Turkish loyalty remains conditional.* ## Industrial stakes for the United States ### The return of a major industrial partner Before its exclusion in 2019, **Turkey** manufactured several essential **F-35** components, including fuselage elements and landing gear. Its return to the program would represent significant relief for manufacturer **Lockheed Martin's** supply chain, currently under pressure to meet growing demand from **NATO** allies facing the Russian threat. This industrial dimension explains why some American officials, outside the most cautious security circles, are actively pushing for a quick resolution of the Turkish file, independent of the purely diplomatic or symbolic considerations of the **Ankara** summit. ### The economic payoff for Ankara For **Turkey**, reinstatement into the **F-35** program would also represent a major economic gain, with the revival of industrial contracts suspended for six years and the chance to renew its aging air fleet amid growing regional defense needs in an unstable **Middle East**. *I note that this economic dimension often counts for more than pure diplomacy in this kind of file, and I think it's exactly this economic calculation that could ultimately convince Ankara to let go of its S-400s.* ## Russia's reactions ### Moscow watches with concern A potential Turkish abandonment of the **S-400** systems would be a symbolic setback for **Moscow**, which had once presented this sale as proof of its ability to pierce **NATO's** ranks and sow discord among Western allies. Losing this emblematic contract would instead confirm the resilience of Atlantic cohesion against Russian attempts at division. The **Kremlin** has not yet officially reacted to these reports, but Russian military analysts are closely following this file, aware that it illustrates the limits of Russian influence over the strategic decisions of its trading partners, even those with significant economic ties to **Moscow**. ### A signal for other potential Russian clients This Turkish file could also influence other countries that have considered or carried out purchases of Russian military equipment, showing them the lasting diplomatic and economic consequences of such a choice under American and Western pressure. *I see in this possible outcome a broader lesson for every regime that thinks it can play Moscow against Washington without paying a price: Russia promises quick fixes, but it leaves its partners alone once Western pressure rises.* ## What this means for NATO as a whole ### Renewed cohesion against Russia Resolving this Turkish dispute just days before the **NATO summit in Ankara** would send a strong signal of cohesion at a critical moment in the war in **Ukraine** and persistent tensions with **Russia**. A united Alliance, where even its most difficult members find a negotiated solution, strengthens the credibility of collective Western deterrence. Western defense officials, cited notably by **Forbes**, stress that this summit must above all demonstrate **NATO's** ability to maintain strategic unity despite internal divergences, in a context where **China**, **Iran**, and **North Korea** are closely watching for signs of Western weakness. ### Turkey's pivotal role in the security architecture **Turkey's** geographic position, at the hinge between **Europe**, the **Middle East**, and the **Black Sea** region, makes it an ally whose strategic loyalty remains indispensable, even when its past choices have cast doubt on its full reliability toward **NATO**. *I still believe the West needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the West on strict geographic terms, which explains why Washington is making so many concessions in this file despite Congress's legitimate reservations.* ## Skeptical voices persist ### The lack of concrete guarantees Despite the optimism displayed by some sources close to the file, several security experts point out that no firm **S-400** sale has been officially confirmed by **Ankara** to date. Skepticism remains warranted until a signed agreement is made public by Turkish or American authorities. This caution is reinforced by the earlier Turkish denial from **September 2025**, a reminder that statements of intent don't always translate into concrete actions on this highly sensitive matter of Turkish national sovereignty. ### The risk of another diplomatic failure If the **Ankara** summit ends without concrete progress on this file, it could reignite tensions between **Washington** and **Ankara**, with the risk that **Turkey** turns further toward other industrial partners, notably through its national **Kaan** program, reducing its dependence on American equipment even further. *I refuse to give in to premature euphoria: until I see a signed document, I consider this file a credible but unconfirmed possibility, and I'll keep treating it with that journalistic caution it deserves.* ## The human dimension of the military file ### Aerospace industry workers left waiting Behind the diplomatic maneuvering lie thousands of industrial jobs, both in the **United States** and in **Turkey**, hanging on the outcome of these negotiations. The skilled Turkish workers who once manufactured **F-35** components have been waiting six years for a clear signal about the future of their sector, held hostage by geopolitical considerations far beyond their control. This human reality, often absent from strictly strategic analyses, deserves to be remembered: the decisions made in **Ankara** and **Washington** in the coming days will have a concrete impact on entire families whose incomes depend on this transatlantic defense industry. ### Service members on the ground, the first affected For pilots and air forces of **NATO** member states, resolving this Turkish file would also represent a concrete operational gain, with better interoperability between allied fleets facing a Russian threat that shows no sign of retreat on the Ukrainian front. *We too often forget that these abstract debates over sanctions and American laws touch real lives, real paychecks, entire careers built around an aerospace program that became hostage to a geopolitical choice made seven years ago.* ## The timeline for the days ahead ### The NATO summit as the moment of truth The **NATO summit in Ankara**, set to bring together Alliance leaders in the coming days, looms as the pivotal moment when this file could finally be resolved, one way or the other. **Donald Trump** is expected to hold a bilateral meeting with President **Erdogan** even before the leaders' official dinner, a sign of the priority given to this dispute. Diplomatic observers expect at least a partial announcement to be made during this summit, if only to send a positive political signal before the broader discussions on support for **Ukraine** and strengthening **NATO's** eastern flank. ### The next legislative steps in Washington Even with a preliminary agreement between **Trump** and **Erdogan**, the file will still have to clear the hurdle of the American **Congress**, where the bipartisan resolution led by **Dina Titus** could delay or complicate its concrete implementation, even after a confirmed sale of the **S-400s** to a third country. *I expect weeks, if not months, of legislative arm-wrestling in Washington even if a preliminary deal is struck in Ankara: this kind of file never gets settled in a single summit, no matter the diplomatic staging.* ## Comparison with other NATO allies ### Greece and Poland, examples of successful cooperation Unlike **Turkey**, other **NATO** members such as **Greece** and **Poland** have recently deepened their integration within Western defense programs without ever introducing Russian equipment that could compromise the Alliance's interoperability. These positive examples illustrate what a fully reinstated **Turkey** could look like, without the complications tied to its past Russian purchases. **Poland**, in particular, has ramped up orders for **F-35s** and other advanced Western systems in recent years, becoming a model of rapid rearmament consistent with **NATO** standards — a trajectory **Washington** would like to see **Ankara** eventually follow. ### The cost of isolation for Turkey **Turkey's** prolonged exclusion from the **F-35** program has already cost its defense industry dearly, depriving it of contracts and technology transfers that its European **NATO** neighbors were able to obtain freely during these same years. This regional comparison partly explains the urgency **Ankara** feels to resolve this file before it becomes irreversible. *I think Turkey looks at Poland with a certain strategic envy, and that's a good thing: nothing beats a direct comparison with an ally who made the right choices to convince a reluctant government to change course.* ## Conclusion: a test for Western solidarity ### An opportunity NATO cannot afford to miss This Turkish file perfectly illustrates the internal tensions **NATO** must manage while maintaining a facade of unity against **Russia**. If **Turkey** truly gives up its **S-400s** and regains its place in the **F-35** program, it will be a net gain for Western military cohesion at a critical moment in the Ukrainian conflict and rising tensions with the **China-Russia-Iran-North Korea** axis. ### Staying vigilant despite the optimism But nothing is signed yet, and the recent history of Turkish-American relations calls for caution before celebrating an outcome that could still collapse at the last minute, as so many similar files have in this complex and often unpredictable bilateral relationship. *I close this report with cautious optimism: if Ankara finally takes the leap, NATO will emerge stronger against Russia, but I will keep judging this file by signed documents rather than summit promises.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - UA News — Turkey could sell its S-400s to return to the F-35 program, June 30, 2026 - Anadolu Agency — Factbox on NATO defense spending ahead of the Ankara summit, July 2026 ### Secondary sources - Izvestia — The United States again wants to sell F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, and here's why, July 1, 2026 - Reuters — Aerospace and Defense, July 2026 - Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit - Forbes — What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit, July 1, 2026 - Turkish Minute — US lawmakers prepare resolution to block Turkey's F-35 return, June 29, 2026 - Kurdistan24 — Trump heads to Ankara for NATO summit carrying F-35 offer for Erdogan, July 2026 --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/la-turquie-prete-a-ceder-ses-s-400-russes-pour-retrouver-les-f-35