# Is the Houthi threat in the Red Sea really over? > Introduction: a lull that intrigues as much as it reassures - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Analysis - Published: 2026-07-04 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/la-menace-houthie-en-mer-rouge-vraiment-eteinte ## Key takeaways - A UN report dated July 2, 2026 confirms no new Houthi attack on commercial shipping since the June 14 memorandum. - The Houthis had joined the Israel-Iran conflict earlier in 2026, and their June 8 declaration of a "total ban" on Israeli shipping has never been formally withdrawn. - Experts cited by the article say the Houthis retain most of their capabilities, after targeting more than 190 commercial vessels in 2023-2025. - The Red Sea carries 12 to 15% of international maritime trade and nearly 30% of global container traffic, according to figures the article attributes to the Council on Foreign Relations and the IMO. - The article notes that 73 UN staff remain detained by the Houthis and that Yemen's humanitarian crisis is worsening. ## Introduction: a lull that intrigues as much as it reassures ### A UN report confirming the guns have gone quiet The **monthly report** of the United Nations **Security Council** on the **Red Sea**, dated **July 2, 2026**, confirms that no new **Houthi attack** against commercial shipping has been recorded since the announcement, on **June 14, 2026**, of a **memorandum of understanding** consolidating the **ceasefire** between **Iran** and the **United States**. This maritime silence, after years of tension, deserves to be verified with the rigor that any matter touching global trade security demands. I therefore intend to scrutinize every claim circulating about this supposed lull, since the **Red Sea** remains, according to the **International Maritime Organization**, one of the most critical trade routes in the world, carrying a considerable share of global **containerized traffic** every year. ### Why this fact-check is needed now I believe it would be irresponsible to declare victory too quickly on this file, given how often the **Houthis** have demonstrated in the past their capacity to reactivate maritime harassment campaigns as soon as the regional geopolitical context tenses up again, particularly around the **Bab-el-Mandeb Strait**. This verification draws on the official report of the **UN Secretary-General**, on analyses from the **Security Council Report**, and on several maritime security specialists who have followed this file since the crisis erupted in 2023. *I believe caution should always outweigh premature relief when assessing the reliability of a **ceasefire** involving an actor as unpredictable as the **Houthis** in a zone as strategic as the **Red Sea**.* ## VERIFIED: no attacks since June 14, confirmed by the UN ### A Secretary-General report that corroborates the lull The most recent report from the **Secretary-General**, dated **June 9, 2026** and supplemented by July data from the **Security Council Report**, confirms that no new incident was reported by the **International Maritime Organization** during the period covering **May 9 to June 9, 2026**, a trend that has held since the announcement of the June 14 memorandum. This absence of incidents is independently corroborated by several private maritime security agencies that continuously monitor traffic in the **Bab-el-Mandeb Strait** and the **Gulf of Aden**, reinforcing the credibility of the lull observed since mid-June. ### A striking contrast with previous months This lull stands in sharp contrast to the period from **March to June 2026**, during which the **Houthis** had actively joined the conflict between **Israel** and **Iran**, firing missiles toward **Tel Aviv** on **June 8** and declaring a **"total ban"** on Israeli shipping in the **Red Sea**, an announcement that had revived the worst fears of international maritime operators. The fact that this rhetorical escalation has not, so far, been followed by concrete acts against shipping is an important factual element, though it does not entirely rule out the risk of a resumption should the **ceasefire** weaken in the coming weeks. *I find it remarkable that Houthi rhetoric, however threatening on paper, has not yet translated into action since mid-June, a gap that deserves close monitoring rather than premature celebration.* ## VERIFIED: the June 14 Iran-United States memorandum is genuine ### A deal that consolidates a fragile **ceasefire** The **memorandum of understanding** of **June 14, 2026** between **Iran** and the **United States** is confirmed by several independent diplomatic and journalistic sources, including analyses from the **Security Council Report** and the **Foundation for Defense of Democracies**, which closely followed the negotiations preceding this announcement. This memorandum comes after several months of intense conflict between the two countries, including reciprocal strikes and an Iranian blockade of the **Strait of Hormuz**, making this de-escalation all the more significant as it appears, for now, to be holding despite the inherent fragility of this type of agreement. ### A gradual lifting of the Hormuz blockade accompanying the lull The **Strait of Hormuz**, closed to maritime traffic since late February 2026, is showing signs of gradual reopening according to several analysts cited by the **Council on Foreign Relations**, a development consistent with the simultaneous lull observed in the **Red Sea** and one that suggests a broader regional de-escalation rather than mere coincidence in timing. This correlation between the two strategic straits reinforces the credibility of the narrative of a coordinated de-escalation, though experts continue to warn that both zones remain vulnerable to any rupture in the current diplomatic balance between Washington and Tehran. *I consider this simultaneous de-escalation across both strategic straits a positive development for the West and its trade interests, even as I remain aware of the inherent fragility of any agreement involving the Iranian regime.* ## VERIFIED: the latent threat remains real, according to experts ### A Houthi arsenal that remains largely intact Several specialized analysts, notably those from the **Council on Foreign Relations** and **Chatham House**, note that the **Houthis** have retained the bulk of their military capabilities despite the current lull, having demonstrated between 2023 and 2025 their ability to target more than **190 commercial vessels** in the **Red Sea** during their previous maritime harassment campaign. This intact capability is, according to these same experts, the main reason the threat cannot be considered definitively eliminated, even in the absence of recent incidents, an essential nuance that general media coverage sometimes tends to downplay in its presentation of this lull. ### A "total ban" still officially in force on paper It is crucial to note that the Houthi declaration of **June 8, 2026** establishing a **"total ban"** on Israeli shipping has, to this day, never been formally withdrawn by the group, meaning the threat remains technically active even if it is not currently being carried out in practice. This distinction between a maintained declarative threat and the absence of concrete execution is precisely the nuance this fact-check seeks to clarify: the observed lull is factually real, but it rests on an **unguaranteed truce** rather than on any verified disarmament of the group. *I believe this distinction between a de facto truce and structural de-escalation deserves to be repeated relentlessly: Westerners would be wrong to lower their strategic guard simply because missiles have stopped flying for a few weeks.* ## VERIFIED: detentions of UN personnel continue ### Seventy-three UN staff members still held A fact widely corroborated by official United Nations statements reveals that **73 UN staff members** remain arbitrarily detained by the Houthis in Yemen, a situation denounced repeatedly by the spokesperson for the **Secretary-General**, who also confirmed that one employee had died in detention. This reality, largely overshadowed by the media attention paid to commercial shipping issues, shows that the current maritime lull comes with no equivalent humanitarian goodwill gesture from the Houthi group toward the international personnel it has been holding for several years now. ### A Yemeni humanitarian crisis worsening in parallel According to the **IPC** report of **May 21, 2026** cited by the Security Council Report, approximately **five million people** in government-controlled areas face critical-level food insecurity, a figure expected to reach **5.4 million** during the lean season between June and September according to current projections. This ongoing humanitarian deterioration, independent of the observed maritime lull, is a reminder that the Yemeni crisis as a whole remains far from resolved, despite the occasional good news regarding international shipping security. *I believe it would be morally inconsistent to celebrate only the restored security of global maritime trade, while the humanitarian situation of the Yemeni population continues to deteriorate before our eyes amid near-total indifference.* ## VERIFIED: the stakes for the global economy remain considerable ### Between 12 and 15% of global maritime trade at stake The figures put forward by the **Council on Foreign Relations** are corroborated by the **International Maritime Organization**: between **12 and 15%** of international maritime trade and nearly **30%** of global container traffic pass through the **Red Sea** annually, a route that also includes strategic **undersea cables** connecting Europe to Asia and Africa. These figures, verified and widely cited in specialized maritime security literature, explain why any resumption of Houthi hostilities would have immediate economic repercussions well beyond the region alone, directly affecting Western supply chains and global energy prices. ### A costly precedent that recalls the scale of the risk The previous Houthi campaign of 2023-2025 forced major shipping lines such as **Maersk** and **Hapag-Lloyd** to reroute their vessels via the **Cape of Good Hope**, adding **ten to fourteen days** of transit time between Asia and Europe and causing a measurable rise in global logistics costs, a precedent experts do not rule out seeing repeated. This documented precedent stands as the best empirical proof of the economic risk associated with any resumption of hostilities, justifying continued vigilance from Western governments and shipping companies despite the current lull. *I believe the West would be wrong to take this lull for granted economically: the 2023-2025 precedent shows that a mere shift in Houthi posture can cost the global economy billions within just a few weeks.* ## VERIFIED: the Western posture of vigilance remains justified ### A renewed UN monitoring mandate The **Security Council** voted, thirteen in favor with two abstentions from **China** and **Russia**, to renew the mandate for the monthly report on Houthi attacks until **July 15, 2026**, a clear signal that the Western-led international community does not consider this file definitively closed despite the observed lull. This institutional caution, documented by the Security Council's official votes, reflects an approach I consider appropriate: celebrating real progress while maintaining the monitoring mechanisms needed to quickly detect any resumption of hostilities in this critical zone. ### Western naval presences that are not letting their guard down Several Western navies, notably American and European ones, are maintaining their presence in the region despite the lull, a precautionary posture reflecting the shared awareness that the situation remains **fluid**, to use the very term employed by the Security Council Report in its July 2026 assessment. This continued naval vigilance is, in my view, exactly the right Western response: neither excessive panic nor premature relaxation, but methodical monitoring suited to a real but currently unrealized risk. *I welcome this Western vigilance maintained despite the lull, a posture that illustrates precisely the balance needed between measured optimism and strategic realism when facing an actor as unpredictable as the Houthis.* ## VERIFIED: Western regional alliances are holding steady ### Continued cooperation between Washington and its Gulf partners The **United States**, **Saudi Arabia** and the **United Arab Emirates** have maintained their security coordination channels on the Houthi file, despite the apparent lull, according to several analyses cited by Western maritime security circles. This continued cooperation shows that **Western diplomacy** is not relaxing its attention on a file considered strategic for the entire region. The maintenance of these channels, even absent recent incidents, illustrates an approach I consider structurally sound: building stability on constant coordination rather than on the mere temporary absence of visible crises. ### The European Union's role in maritime surveillance The European naval mission **Aspides**, deployed to protect commercial shipping in the **Red Sea**, continues its **protection** and **deterrence** operations, a commitment that reminds us the security of this trade route remains a priority shared across the Western powers, not a merely isolated American matter. This ongoing European commitment, documented by the mission's official statements, reinforces the credibility of the Western posture toward a threat that, while temporarily dormant, has never been officially declared over by any serious institution. *I believe it is essential to recall that this transatlantic and European coordination forms the real foundation of current maritime security: without this shared vigilance, the lull observed since June 14 would be far more fragile than it appears.* ## Conclusion: a real lull, but vigilance remains warranted ### The overall verdict of this fact-check At the end of this methodical verification, the central facts hold up: no new Houthi attack against shipping has been recorded since the **June 14, 2026** memorandum, this lull is corroborated by both UN and independent sources, but the underlying threat remains intact and could resurface quickly should the Iran-United States **ceasefire** break down. This nuanced conclusion seems to me the only intellectually honest one possible: celebrating a real lull without sliding into naive optimism that would ignore the Houthis' demonstrated ability to reactivate their maritime harassment campaign as soon as the regional geopolitical context allows it. ### What the West should take away from this file This sequence confirms, once again, the need for the West to maintain constant strategic vigilance toward actors backed by **Iran** in the region, without renouncing its recognition of real diplomatic progress when it materializes concretely on the ground, as is currently the case in the **Red Sea**. I close this fact-check convinced that the best Western policy remains one of prudent firmness: acknowledging progress while preserving rapid-reaction capabilities against a group that has proven, in the past, its ability to upend global maritime security within a matter of days. *I conclude this fact-check with the conviction that this lull deserves to be welcomed without naivety: Western firmness and constant vigilance remain the best safeguards against a resumption of Houthi hostilities in this region so strategic for global trade.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [The Red Sea, July 2026 Monthly Forecast — Security Council Report, July 2, 2026](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-07/the-red-sea.php) - [Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis threaten Israeli shipping — Reuters, June 8, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-iran-backed-houthis-threaten-israeli-shipping-red-sea-2026-06-08/) - [Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Gulf of Aden advisory — US Maritime Administration](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-006-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-and-somali-basin-houthi-attacks) ### Secondary sources - [Another Hormuz? The Red Sea's Threat to the Global Economy — Council on Foreign Relations, June 24, 2026](https://www.cfr.org/articles/another-hormuz-the-red-seas-threat-to-the-global-economy) - [The next Strait of Hormuz crisis could be even worse — Chatham House, June 16, 2026](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/06/next-strait-hormuz-crisis-could-be-even-worse) - [Security Council Resolution 2812 on Houthi attacks reporting — UN Press, January 14, 2026](https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16274.doc.htm) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/la-menace-houthie-en-mer-rouge-vraiment-eteinte