# NATO Multiplied Its Shell Production Sevenfold, But It Still Isn't Enough

> NATO is undergoing an industrial transformation that none of its members would have deemed plausible before 2022. In four years, annual production

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-07-06
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-otan-a-multiplie-par-sept-sa-production-d-obus-mais-le-compte-n-y-est-pas

## Key takeaways

- Rutte stresses that money must be turned into combat-ready capabilities quickly, and Kubilius says Europe must learn to spend its funds and compares its defense industry to "haute couture" next to Ukraine's wartime output.
- Camille Grand doubts that current levels are where they should be, and the author notes Russian production estimates range from 2 to more than 4 million shells a year.
- Rheinmetall's Lithuanian plant, due mid-2026, is presented as a symbolic eastern-flank project, while the UK and Germany plan to produce American weapons under license.
- Remaining bottlenecks include European market fragmentation, dependence on Asian semiconductors, skilled labor shortages, and delivery delays.
- The author, who states an openly pro-Western bias, warns that industrial effort could fade once the threat seems less immediate and calls for verifiable delivery reporting.

## Introduction: the Alliance's industrial gamble

### An industrial transformation without precedent since the Cold War

**NATO** is undergoing an industrial transformation that none of its members would have deemed plausible before **2022**. In four years, annual production of **155-millimeter** shells has jumped from roughly **300,000 units** to a target of **2 million**, according to data reported by the **Economic Times** on the eve of the **Ankara summit**. That's nearly a sevenfold increase in four years, an industrial pace that recalls, with all due proportion, the economic mobilization of the last century's great wars.

Impressive as that figure is, it comes with a **warning** I consider essential to relay without filtering it: even at **2 million shells a year**, **Western capacity** would remain insufficient to sustain a **prolonged** high-intensity conflict, according to the very officials cited by the specialized press. That's the **paradox** of this story: we're celebrating a genuine industrial feat while admitting it still isn't enough.

*I see in this figure the best proof that the West has finally grasped the scale of the Russian challenge, but also proof that decades of military deindustrialization can't be undone in just a few years. The surge is real, but the safety margin remains dangerously thin.*

## Mark Rutte's assessment: money alone is no longer enough

### A warning aimed directly at European capitals

**NATO** Secretary General **Mark Rutte** delivered a warning of rare clarity to European leaders: **"Cash is crucial, but you can't stop a missile or a tank with a dollar or a euro."** That line, picked up by several outlets ahead of the **Ankara summit**, sums up the Alliance's shift in messaging: after years spent mainly convincing allies to raise their budgets, the urgent question now is whether that money can actually be turned into deliverable equipment.

**Rutte** stressed the need to **"turn the cash into combat-ready capabilities, and fast,"** a phrase reflecting a kind of open impatience with the structural slowness of European **military supply chains**, often fragmented across **27 national markets** with differing standards.

### An industry forum worth billions in contracts

On the sidelines of the summit, a **defense industry forum** is expected to produce contract signings totaling several billion dollars, according to reporting from **Politico** and **Brussels Signal**. This forum, billed as the flagship event for transatlantic defense production, illustrates NATO's determination to turn budget commitments into concrete orders rather than mere political promises.

According to **Politico**, European allies and **Canada** have already committed nearly **$120 billion** in **defense spending** over the past year, half of it on American-made equipment, a rise that U.S. official **Matthew Whitaker** called a **"good start"** while demanding more.

*I note with some relief that the language has shifted: we're no longer just talking about the percentage of GDP devoted to defense, but about the real capacity to produce and deliver. That's the right question, and it should have been asked well before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.*

## Andrius Kubilius and the language of military haute couture

### A comparison that lands

European Commissioner for **Defence** **Andrius Kubilius** delivered one of the sharpest lines of the pre-summit run-up: **"We've learned how to raise additional funds. We still need to learn how to spend them...to outproduce, out-innovate, outgun Russia."** He went further, comparing Europe's defense industry to **"haute couture,"** in contrast to Ukraine's industry, which has adapted to wartime conditions and can churn out millions of drones despite more than four years of relentless Russian bombardment.

Stinging as that image is for **European industrial pride**, it reflects a view shared by several experts: **Ukraine**, forced by necessity, has developed fast, low-cost **production capabilities** that Europe's traditional, heavier, more regulated industrial machine still struggles to match.

### Fragmentation, efficiency's silent enemy

**Fragmentation** in Europe's defense market remains one of the most well-documented obstacles to a rapid ramp-up. With **27 national markets** operating under distinct rules, the economies of scale that would cut costs and speed up production remain largely untapped, a structural problem **Kubilius** himself acknowledges without hedging.

**Germany**, however, illustrates a positive trajectory: the share of its military purchases sourced from domestic suppliers rose from roughly **30% to 60%** between the **2020-2021** period and the **2025-2026** fiscal year, a **doubling** that shows a rapid national industrial surge remains possible when the **political will** is there.

*The comparison between European "haute couture" and Ukraine's war industry strikes me as unfair in its phrasing but accurate in its substance. Ukraine was forced to innovate under bombs; Europe must now learn to innovate under the pressure of strategic necessity alone, which is a psychologically harder exercise.*

## Camille Grand and the doubt that lingers

### A question with no reassuring answer

**Camille Grand**, a former **NATO** official now a researcher at the **Alliance for Securing Democracy**, sums up the caution that should temper any triumphalism on this issue: **"But does that mean we're exactly where we should be? Probably not."** That reservation, coming from one of the most respected observers of transatlantic defense policy, deserves to be taken seriously rather than drowned out by the euphoria of summit announcements.

**Grand's** assessment aligns with what several **think tanks** have documented: current production, even ramped up to **2 million shells a year**, would remain insufficient against an adversary like **Russia**, whose annual production some estimates place between **2 and more than 4 million shells**, depending on the source and the **munition categories** considered.

### The inevitable comparison with Russian production

This documented asymmetry in industrial capacity forms the central argument for those within the **Alliance** demanding an even more radical acceleration of investment. Secretary General **Rutte** had nonetheless claimed in **November 2025** that **NATO** was now producing more ammunition than **Russia**, a statement not backed by precise figures and partially contradicted by other estimates.

This divergence in assessments illustrates the persistent difficulty of getting a reliable, consensus view of Russian and Western military industrial capacity respectively, a fog that complicates setting realistic production targets for **NATO** planners.

*I prefer Camille Grand's clear-eyed caution to triumphalist claims with no numbers attached. If NATO wants to convince Western public opinion of the urgency of continued investment, it needs to show verifiable figures rather than reassuring, unverifiable formulas.*

## The central role of the Rheinmetall plant in Lithuania

### Infrastructure symbolic of the eastern flank's rearmament

Among the most significant industrial projects in this ramp-up is German group **Rheinmetall's** new **155-millimeter** munitions plant in **Lithuania**, slated to come online in mid-**2026**. The facility is expected to produce tens of thousands of NATO-standard shells a year, directly strengthening the industrial resilience of the **Alliance's** eastern flank, according to an **Atlantic Council** analysis.

The plant's geographic location is no accident: placing **production capacity** directly in a Baltic country bordering the **Russian sphere of influence** sends a strong political and military signal, while also cutting **logistical timelines** for delivery to the most exposed zones in the event of an escalation.

### A model set to be replicated elsewhere

Other similar projects are under study or underway in several member countries, part of an industrial decentralization strategy aimed at reducing reliance on a limited number of production sites, a strategic vulnerability identified since the start of the war in **Ukraine** in **2022**.

This decentralization also reflects concern about **resilience** against possible strikes or sabotage, a scenario several **Western intelligence services** now consider a credible threat targeting Europe's **defense industrial infrastructure**.

*Building a munitions plant in Lithuania, a few hundred kilometers from the Russian border, is a move that goes beyond simple industrial logic: it's a political statement. I see it as a useful deterrent signal, provided the physical protection of these sites matches the risk they're taking on.*

## The UK and Germany, new manufacturers under American license

### A decision announced just before the summit

Days before the **Ankara summit**, the **United Kingdom** and **Germany** announced their intention to produce American weapons under license directly on their own soil, a decision reported by **Politico** that reflects the drive to bring Western production chains closer to Europe's potential conflict zones.

This announcement is part of a broader push for transatlantic industrial cooperation, in which European orders for American equipment would, according to **Rutte**, support roughly **110,000 jobs** in the **United States** through cumulative orders worth about **$300 billion**.

### A delicate balance between autonomy and dependence

This persistent **dependence** on American technology and licensing, however, raises a deeper strategic question several European voices have been asking for months: how to reconcile strengthening **European strategic autonomy**, often invoked by **Paris** and **Brussels**, with licensed production that de facto maintains a strong **technological dependence** on the **United States**.

This **tension** was not resolved before the summit, and it is likely to keep shaping the **Alliance's** internal debates for years to come, given how divergent national industrial interests remain from one member country to another.

*I understand the logic of speed that pushes London and Berlin to produce under American license rather than wait for a hypothetical European autonomy. But I can't help seeing it as a missed opportunity to build genuine long-term continental industrial independence.*

## The precedent set by this industrial surge

### A lasting lesson for Western defense planning

This munitions production story will, in my view, stand as one of the most revealing markers of this decade: it demonstrates that rapid industrial mobilization remains possible in the West, provided there is clear political will and sustained long-term funding, two conditions that were not in place before **2022**.

The **precedent** set by this sevenfold increase in shell production capacity could serve as a model for other **critical industrial sectors**, notably the production of **missile defense systems** or **military drones**, where similar delays have been documented in several **NATO** analyses.

### The risk of easing off once the urgency feels past

The **main risk** identified by several analysts remains a **relaxation** of the industrial effort should perceptions of the Russian threat fade, a scenario Western military history has already seen play out multiple times after periods of acute tension followed by **hasty disarmament**.

It is precisely to avoid that trap that several voices, including **Kubilius's**, are pushing for the **institutional entrenchment** of defense investment, beyond simple annual budget commitments subject to the whims of national political majorities.

*Like many observers of Western defense, I fear this industrial effort could lose steam as soon as the Russian threat feels less immediate. History teaches us that democracies disarm quickly once danger seems to recede, and that is precisely the relaxation Moscow is patiently waiting for.*

## Criticism from within the Alliance itself

### Voices demanding more transparency on timelines

Some defense officials, cited anonymously by several specialized outlets, accuse **NATO** of a lack of transparency about the actual delivery timelines for ordered equipment, a problem fueling a degree of skepticism among European publics about the real effectiveness of spectacular budget announcements.

That skepticism isn't unfounded: several contracts announced at previous summits have suffered significant delivery delays, sometimes by several years, due to bottlenecks in supply chains for electronic components and critical raw materials.

### The need for independent tracking of commitments

Several European think tanks are now calling for an independent mechanism to track the industrial commitments made at **NATO** summits, to separate political announcements from deliveries actually completed on the ground, a distinction the general public rarely has the means to verify itself.

This demand for greater transparency ties into a broader concern about the **Alliance's** long-term credibility with its own publics, whose financial support remains essential to sustaining this exceptional industrial effort.

*I believe NATO would gain credibility by publishing precise, verifiable annual reports on actual deliveries, rather than settling for summit announcements as spectacular as they are hard for ordinary citizens to verify.*

## The direct impact on the Ukrainian front

### A dependence that remains critical for Kyiv

For **Ukraine**, this Western industrial ramp-up remains a matter of immediate military survival. Every delay in ammunition delivery translates directly into increased pressure on the front lines, where Ukrainian forces continue to face Russian numerical superiority in artillery across several sections of the front.

This structural dependence explains why **Kyiv** follows every Western industrial announcement with particular attention, knowing that its own forces' ability to hold certain positions depends directly on the production pace of European and North American factories.

### The Ukrainian example that still inspires the West

Paradoxically, it is **Ukraine** itself that today offers one of the most closely studied models of rapid wartime industrial mobilization, particularly in the production of low-cost **drones** churned out by the millions despite constant Russian bombardment targeting its industrial infrastructure.

Several European defense officials, including **Kubilius** himself, explicitly acknowledge drawing inspiration from this Ukrainian model to rethink some of their own production chains, a striking reversal of roles compared with the traditional dynamic of Western aid flowing toward **Ukraine**.

*There's something deeply revealing about the fact that Europe, with all its historical industrial resources, now has to draw inspiration from Ukraine's wartime model to speed up its own production. It's an implicit admission that strategic urgency still hasn't been fully absorbed by Europe's traditional industrial machine.*

## The financial stakes weighing on what comes next

### The growing weight of defense in national budgets

This industrial ramp-up carries a considerable political and budgetary cost for European governments, who must justify substantial increases in defense spending to their respective publics, sometimes at the expense of other sensitive budget lines like health care or education.

This delicate budget equation partly explains the caution of some European governments about committing to even more ambitious defense spending trajectories than those already announced, despite repeated calls from **Mark Rutte** and other **NATO** officials to accelerate further.

### The ambiguous role of the United States in this equation

The American posture itself remains a source of uncertainty for European planners: while the **Trump** administration has indeed pushed European allies to invest more in their own defense, its position on the long-term continuation of the American military commitment to Europe remains open to divergent interpretations depending on the statement and the moment.

This structural uncertainty is pushing several European capitals to accelerate their own defense investments, not out of ideological choice, but out of strategic necessity in the face of real doubt about the durability of the American security umbrella in its current form.

*I credit the Trump administration, sometimes despite itself, with forcing Europeans out of their strategic comfort zone on defense. But I refuse to treat this pressure as a durable security policy: it looks more like a one-off shock than a coherent long-term transatlantic strategy.*

## What this story reveals about preparing for a prolonged conflict

### Planning that now factors in the possibility of a long war

The sevenfold increase in munitions production reflects a profound shift in Western military doctrine: the assumption of a brief, quickly resolved conflict has given way to planning that now explicitly incorporates the possibility of a prolonged confrontation, potentially lasting years, with **Russia** or another adversary of similar scale.

This doctrinal shift has concrete implications for building **strategic stockpiles**, an area where several European countries had drastically cut their reserves after the end of the **Cold War**, a budget-saving logic now widely viewed in hindsight as risky by many military experts.

### A project still far from finished

Despite the real progress documented in this story, several experts agree that rebuilding strategic stockpiles sufficient for a prolonged high-intensity conflict could still take several years, even at the production pace currently reached across all **NATO** member countries.

This long timeline demands constant vigilance, because it concretely means the **Alliance's** relative window of vulnerability against an adversary with larger stockpiles will not close immediately, despite the industrial efforts already under way since **2022**.

*This lingering window of vulnerability, despite all these efforts, genuinely concerns me. I'd rather have an Alliance that honestly admits its current limits than triumphalist rhetoric masking a strategic gap with Russia that is still very real.*

## The battle over critical electronic components

### A persistent dependence on Asia for certain semiconductors

Beyond shells and tanks, Western military production remains vulnerable to a persistent dependence on electronic components manufactured in **Asia**, including certain semiconductors essential to the guidance and communication systems of the most modern equipment. This dependence is, according to several **defense** analysts, one of the least visible yet most critical weak links in the current Western rearmament effort.

Several European governments, including **Germany** and **France**, have announced additional investments in domestic production of military-grade semiconductors, but these industrial projects generally require several years to reach meaningful production capacity, a timeline incompatible with today's strategic urgency.

*I find it ironic that the West, so proud of its industrial surge in munitions, remains just as dependent on Asian electronic supply chains for its most sophisticated equipment. This vulnerability deserves just as much political attention as shell production, if not more.*

## Skilled labor, another bottleneck

### A shortage of specialized workers in several member countries

The shortage of **skilled labor** is another well-documented brake on accelerating military production, with several European factories struggling to recruit enough engineers, specialized welders, and technicians trained to the safety standards specific to the defense industry, according to accounts gathered by several specialized outlets.

This shortage stems partly from decades of disinvestment in technical training pipelines tied to defense, a sector long seen as unappealing to young European workers before the strategic shock triggered by the Russian invasion of **Ukraine** in **2022**.

*I believe this shortage of skilled labor is underestimated in the public debate over European rearmament. You can announce billions in investment, but without workers trained to actually build this equipment, those announcements will remain largely theoretical.*

## The Turkish factor and hosting the summit in Ankara

### A rapidly expanding Turkish defense industry

The **choice** of **Ankara** to host this summit is not neutral: **Turkey** has, in recent years, developed a fast-growing national defense industry, particularly in the field of **armed drones**, becoming an indispensable supplier for several **NATO** member countries and beyond, including for certain equipment used by **Ukraine** itself.

This Turkish **industrial rise** reflects a welcome **diversification** of Western supply sources, partially reducing exclusive reliance on traditional major American and Western European defense conglomerates, while also raising new questions about equipment interoperability within the **Alliance**.

*I see Turkey's industrial rise as a useful strategic diversification for NATO, even though the sometimes tense relations between Ankara and certain Western allies continue to complicate a fully harmonious industrial integration within the Alliance.*

## Conclusion: a real industrial feat, a race still far from won

### A record that deserves honest nuance

The jump from **300,000 to 2 million** shells a year is, without question, one of **NATO's** most notable industrial successes since the end of the **Cold War**. But that success must be presented with all the nuance it deserves: it does not, by itself, resolve the persistent asymmetry with Russian production capacity, and it remains weakened by European industrial fragmentation and by uncertainty over long-term American commitment.

The **Ankara summit** will offer a chance to gauge whether Western leaders, including **Donald Trump**, are ready to turn this one-time industrial surge into a genuine long-term strategy, capable of withstanding the political and budgetary swings of the coming election years.

### A vigilance that must stay constant

I will keep following this industrial story with the rigor it deserves, documenting both the real progress made since **2022** and the persistent gaps identified by observers as qualified as **Camille Grand** or **Andrius Kubilius**, because it is this dual reading, neither naively optimistic nor excessively pessimistic, that lets us understand where Western military preparedness truly stands.

The West has demonstrated its ability to mobilize industrially when strategic necessity demands it; what remains is to prove its ability to sustain that effort over time, well beyond the news cycle of a single summit.

*I'll close this story with one conviction: NATO's industrial surge is legitimate grounds for hope, but it must never serve as an excuse to relax political vigilance. Europe's future peace will depend directly on the consistency of this effort, far beyond the Ankara summit alone.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- Economic Times — More cash, not enough weapons: NATO presses to produce more — June 30, 2026

- Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO defense spending, where allies stand ahead of Ankara summit

- Brussels Signal — NATO will seek to turn defence billions into firepower at Ankara summit — July 3, 2026

### Secondary sources

- Politico — How Trump is turning NATO into a cash machine — July 5, 2026

- Atlantic Council — How NATO's eastern flank is setting the standard for collective defense

- Defence Industry — NATO now producing more ammunition than Russia, says Secretary General Mark Rutte

- Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-otan-a-multiplie-par-sept-sa-production-d-obus-mais-le-compte-n-y-est-pas