# OPINION: Iran in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen — the invisible empire Washington refuses to name > While Washington and Tehran negotiate a memorandum of understanding (MoU) meant to end hostilities and open the path to a nuclear deal, Iran is methodically pursuing its imperial agenda on three simultaneous fronts: Lebanon via Hezbollah, Yemen via the Houthis, and a residual pre - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Note - Published: 2026-06-27 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-iran-en-syrie-au-liban-au-yemen-l-empire-invisible-que-washington-refuse-de-no ## Key takeaways - The fifth MoU clause asks Iran to discuss Strait of Hormuz management with Oman and other littoral states, which the author sees as a route to a central Gulf security role. - The author recalls that the 2015 JCPOA was followed by expanded Hezbollah and Houthi capabilities, and warns the current deal lacks robust verification. - Iran's demand for full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon could leave a vacuum that Hezbollah would fill. - The Houthis threaten Gulf states and maritime trade, and the MoU reportedly has no binding clauses on Houthi disarmament. - The author argues any deal must bind proxies to disarmament and withdrawal, and that Iran uses negotiations to gain time. ## Introduction: The paradox of a deal that rewards expansion ### Negotiating with Tehran while its proxies hold the region While **Washington and Tehran** negotiate a **memorandum of understanding (MoU)** meant to end hostilities and open the path to a nuclear deal, **Iran** is methodically pursuing its imperial agenda on three simultaneous fronts: **Lebanon** via **Hezbollah**, **Yemen** via the **Houthis**, and a residual presence in **Syria**. This reality — documented by the **Institute for the Study of War (ISW)** in its special report of **June 24, 2026** — is carefully avoided in official diplomatic communiqués. To name Iranian imperial expansion is to admit that the negotiations may actually be strengthening the aggressor's regional power. The **fifth clause of the MoU** tasks Iran with negotiating with Oman and other Gulf littoral states the future management of the **Strait of Hormuz**. On the surface, a merely technical matter. In reality, an invitation to **Tehran to establish itself as a central actor in the Gulf's security architecture** — exactly what the Islamic Republic has been pursuing since 1979. Iran's Parliament Speaker **Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf** stated this openly on June 24: Iran is "**ready for security agreements with Gulf states, made durable by economic cooperation**." Translation: a Pax Iranica in the making. ### What recent history teaches us There is a recent precedent worth reflecting on. In **2015**, the nuclear deal **JCPOA** lifted sanctions and unfroze billions in Iranian assets. The years that followed saw accelerated expansion of **Hezbollah's** military capabilities, a rise of the **Houthis** in Yemen, and a consolidation of Iranian presence in Syria. The peace money funded proxy warfare. There is no reason to believe **2026** will be different, unless the current deal contains robust verification mechanisms — which the **ISW** explicitly doubts. *I am not anti-diplomacy. I believe negotiations with Iran can and must take place. But diplomacy without clear-eyed realism is naivety dressed up as foreign policy. The problem is not the deal itself — it is the absence of any willingness to name what Iran is actually doing in the region while the hand of friendship is being extended.* ## Lebanon: Hezbollah between reconstruction and rearmament ### Lebanese negotiations as a manoeuvring ground On **June 23 and 24, 2026**, **Israeli, Lebanese, and American** officials discussed in Washington the possibility of deploying **Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)** in "pilot zones" of southern Lebanon, to replace Israeli positions. Iran, through **Ghalibaf**, laid down a central condition: a **full Israeli withdrawal**. This is a position that, if accepted, would leave a vacuum only **Hezbollah** is capable of filling — the LAF being too weak and too infiltrated to constitute a genuine barrier. **Qatar**, a member of the de-escalation cell alongside the **United States, Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan**, insisted that this cell "**monitor ceasefire violations**." In practice, this mechanism risks constraining Israel's ability to act against Hezbollah violations — exactly what **Tehran** is seeking to obtain. The **ISW** is explicit: Iran is using the Lebanese question to **delay any substantive negotiations on its nuclear programme**. ### Hezbollah, a state army within the Lebanese state After the 2024–2025 conflicts, **Hezbollah** has not disarmed — it is restructuring. Regional security analysts note that **Iran is maintaining resupply channels** through Syria, despite repeated Israeli strikes on logistical routes. The Lebanese Shia movement retains a precision arsenal capable of threatening the entire Israeli territory. Any US-Iran deal that allows pressure on **Hezbollah** to be frozen would be a major strategic victory for Tehran. *Lebanon is the most painful case. This magnificent and tragic country has for decades been the victim of Iranian imperialism by Hezbollah proxy. The Lebanese population — Christians, Sunnis, Druze — bears the consequences of an occupation disguised as resistance. If the US-Iran deal leaves Hezbollah intact and rearmed, it is the Lebanese people who will foot the bill.* ## Yemen: the Houthis as a permanent lever ### A proxy force that has shifted the regional balance Yemen's **Houthis**, officially known as **Ansarallah**, have demonstrated since 2023 their ability to **disrupt global maritime trade** by targeting vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This capability — ballistic missiles, long-range drones, maritime drones — derives directly from **Tehran's** military and technological support. Iran has created in Yemen a proxy force that threatens **Gulf states, Israel, and global maritime trade** simultaneously — at marginal cost to Iran itself. The **US-Iran MoU** apparently contains no binding clauses on Houthi disarmament or disengagement. **Gulf states** — particularly **Saudi Arabia**, directly targeted by Houthi attacks — are concerned by this gap. A nuclear deal signed without resolution of the Houthi threat leaves a sword of Damocles hanging over the **Arabian Peninsula**. ### Negotiations as a smokescreen There is a repeated tactic in Iran's posture: engage in negotiations on one issue (the nuclear programme, the Strait of Hormuz) to obtain real concessions, **while maintaining pressure through its proxies on other fronts**. While the nuclear programme is discussed, the Houthis fire. While the Strait of Hormuz is on the table, Hezbollah rearms. This multilayered strategy is brilliant and cynical. It demands a response that addresses all fronts simultaneously — not a compartmentalised deal that benefits Iran at every step. *Trump's maximum-pressure policy had concrete results in forcing Iran to the table. But a deal that does not dismantle the Iranian proxy network is not a victory — it is a pause. I understand the desire for peace. But you cannot make peace with someone who continues to encircle you during negotiations.* ## The strategy of regional architecture: Tehran's imperial project ### A coherent geopolitical project since 1979 The Islamic Republic of Iran has never concealed its regional ambitions. The concept of **"strategic depth"** — projecting Iranian power beyond its borders via allies, proxies, and militias — is embedded in the doctrine of the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)**. This coherent project aims to create a **Shia crescent** running from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, all the way to Lebanon — and to extend influence via the Houthis to the shores of the Red Sea. What is new in 2026 is that **Iran is now attempting to institutionalise this influence** within formal frameworks — positioning itself as co-manager of the Strait of Hormuz, seeking a role in Gulf security architecture, proposing "**security agreements**" bilaterally to Arab states. This is the transition from the informal — proxies and militias — to the formal — treaties and institutions. If this project succeeds, **Iran will have transformed its informal empire into a durable system**. ### Israel and Gulf states: alone against this project According to **Al Jazeera (June 25, 2026)**, the six states of the **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)** expressed formal support for the MoU — not out of enthusiasm, but out of a **desire to end the war**. Their deeper concerns about Iranian **drones and proxies** "**destabilising their sovereignty**" have not disappeared — they have simply been temporarily muted. **Israel**, absent from the negotiations, watches with concern an agreement that validates Iranian regional influence without having reduced any of its coercive tools. *I understand the pragmatism of Gulf states. When you have millions of citizens, economies exposed to maritime trade, and cities within range of Houthi missiles, you seek stability. But accepting Iran as co-architect of regional security is like handing the keys of the house to the burglar. This equation does not seem viable in the long term.* ## What the West should demand in any negotiation with Iran ### A serious deal must address the proxies If the **Trump** administration wants a durable deal with Iran, it must include binding clauses on the **disarmament and withdrawal of proxies**: Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, Houthis in Yemen. These conditions are not ideological whims — they are fundamental security requirements for America's regional allies. **Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates** cannot accept a nuclear deal that leaves intact the Iranian military network. The head of the **IAEA** declared on **June 26** that "**good intentions are not enough without robust inspections**." The same logic must apply to proxies. Deals without verification mechanisms, without binding disarmament timelines, without consequences for non-compliance — these are not agreements, they are parchments. ### Time works in Tehran's favour The current dynamic favours Iran. Every month of negotiations allows it to consolidate its regional positions, rebuild its allies, institutionalise its influence in Lebanon and the Gulf, and quietly advance its nuclear programme. The classic argument — "**better inside negotiations than outside**" — has its limits when one party uses negotiations to advance its agenda rather than resolve it. *I don't know whether this deal will produce something durable. What I know is that Iran is an intelligent regional power playing on multiple tables simultaneously. The West would do well to learn to do the same, rather than treating each negotiation as an isolated problem. Geopolitics is a chess game — and Iran often plays several moves ahead.* ## The proxy strategy: how Iran projects power without risking direct war ### The "Shia crescent" model as regional architecture Iran's regional power rests on a central principle: using armed proxies — **Hezbollah** in Lebanon, **Hamas** in Gaza, the **Houthis** in Yemen, **pro-Iranian militias** in Iraq and Syria — to project power at low cost with plausible deniability. This proxy architecture forms what analysts call the "**Shia crescent**" or "**axis of resistance**" — a belt of Iranian influence stretching from **Tehran to Beirut**, through Baghdad, Damascus, and Sanaa. Each proxy group maintains a degree of operational autonomy while operating within **Tehran's** overall regional strategy. The **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)**, and more specifically its **Quds Force**, is the architect of this network. It trains, funds, and arms proxy groups. Since the death of **Qassem Soleimani** in January 2020, his successor has kept the architecture in place — proof that the system is institutional, not personal. The death of a general, however charismatic, did not dismantle what decades of patient construction had built. **Iran does not need to deploy its regular army to influence conflicts** in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Yemen. *The strategic genius of Iran's proxy architecture lies in its efficiency at converting limited resources into disproportionate regional influence. Iran is not a major economic power — its GDP is lower than Belgium's. And yet it destabilises an entire regional crescent with armed militias and cheap drones. This is a lesson in strategic asymmetry that its adversaries have long underestimated.* ## The Strait of Hormuz and Iran's "shared security" project ### Control over the global energy flow The **fifth clause of the MoU** asks Iran to "**discuss**" the management of the **Strait of Hormuz** with Oman and other littoral states. But Tehran has transformed this invitation to discuss into something far more ambitious. Iran's negotiator **Ghalibaf** explicitly declared that Iran is "**ready for security agreements with Gulf states made durable by economic cooperation**" — a formulation that describes a regional security system co-built with **Iran as a central actor**. According to **Al Jazeera**, a Qatari delegation visiting Muscat discussed a framework involving **Iran, Iraq, and Arab Gulf states** for managing maritime flows through the Strait. If this project succeeds, Iran gains a **permanent lever over 20% of global oil**. Every tanker from the Gulf monarchies would have to navigate under a security architecture of which Tehran was co-architect. This is a major geopolitical transformation — obtained not through war but through diplomacy imposed in a post-conflict context. The Strait of Hormuz is **the obligatory passage for the world's hydrocarbon economy**. By establishing its influence there, Iran installs itself at the heart of global energy geopolitics. *I watch this development with an anxiety that is not ideological but geopolitical. Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz is Russia controlling gas pipelines to Europe — except the European awakening to that dependency came after it was too late. I hope Gulf states and their Western allies realise what is happening before the fait accompli becomes irreversible.* ## Saudi Arabia between normalisation and strategic mistrust ### Riyadh plays its own game **Saudi Arabia** occupies a particularly delicate position in the post-MoU landscape. On one hand, the kingdom has since 2023 been engaged in a process of **normalising its relations with Tehran**, brokered by China — an agreement that surprised Washington. On the other, Riyadh has suffered **direct Houthi attacks** supported by Iran on its oil installations and urban centres. This tension between diplomatic pragmatism and security mistrust shapes the Saudi position. The preparation of a "**reconciliation summit**" between Iran and Arab Gulf states — separate from the US-Iran negotiations — reveals the Saudi strategy: **manage its relationship with Tehran directly** without being locked into a US-Iranian bilateral framework. **Mohammed bin Salman (MBS)** has clearly demonstrated since 2020 that **Riyadh is willing to take autonomous geopolitical initiatives** — the rapprochement with China, normalisation with Iran, discussions on BRICS expansion — signalling a strategic diversification away from exclusive dependence on Washington. This emancipation is understandable but complicates Western coordination. *The Saudi Arabia I observe today is a country playing simultaneously on multiple tables. It is a rational posture for an actor caught between American security dependence and its region's geopolitical reality. But this Saudi multipolarity has a price: it reduces the coherence of collective responses to regional threats. When everyone plays solo, nobody plays as a team.* ## Conclusion: Naming imperialism is already a form of resistance ### Semantics as the first line of defence Words matter. Calling Iranian expansion "**regional influence**" instead of "**imperialism**," describing the proxy network as "**strategic partners**" rather than "**destabilising armed militias**," framing control of the Strait of Hormuz as "**maritime cooperation**" — this is allowing an expansionist project to advance under a benevolent vocabulary. The first act of resistance is to name things correctly. ### The West cannot look away While **Europe watches Ukraine and America calculates its tariffs**, Iran is patiently building its regional hegemony. This expansion is not only a problem for **Israel and Gulf states** — it threatens global maritime routes, the stability of energy markets, and the international order the West claims to defend. Ignoring Iranian expansion to facilitate a nuclear deal means buying peace today at the cost of war tomorrow. *I have no certainty about what the US-Iran MoU will become. Perhaps this framework will produce real regional stability. Perhaps it is a diplomatic illusion. What I know is that any security architecture that treats **Iran** as a good-faith partner without demanding an end to its proxy expansion is built on fragile foundations. The history of the region leaves me no other conclusion.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2026 — June 25, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-24-2026/) - [Al Jazeera — Pragmatic choice: Israel's war backfires as Gulf backs US-Iran deal — June 25, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/25/hard-headed-pragmatism-israels-war-backfires-as-gulf-backs-us-iran-mou) - [Politics Today — Gulf States Reassess Security Strategy as US-Iran Agreement Raises Regional Concerns — June 26, 2026](https://politicstoday.org/gulf-states-reassess-security-strategy-as-us-iran-agreement-raises-regional-concerns/) ### Secondary sources - [Iran International — Iran intentions not enough without strong inspections, IAEA chief says — June 26, 2026](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202606267183) - [Fondation Robert Schuman — Regional security framework analysis — 2026](https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/the-letter/1161) - [Washington Times — Tensions rise in disputed South China Sea — June 25, 2026](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jun/25/tensions-rise-disputed-south-china-sea-shoal/) - --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. 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