# EDITORIAL: Iran at Geneva in the Morning, Iranian Drones in Lebanon at Night — Duplicity as Doctrine

> On June 17, 2026, in Versailles, President Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding. The world applauded. Europeans congratulated themselves. Five days later, in Majun, in southern Lebanon, six kilometers from the Israeli bor

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Editorial
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-iran-a-geneve-le-matin-des-drones-iraniens-au-liban-le-soir-la-duplicite-comme

## Introduction: When Diplomacy Serves as Cover for Proxy War

### The Versailles signature and the reality of the Majun tunnels

On **June 17, 2026**, in **Versailles**, President **Trump** and Iranian Supreme Leader **Mojtaba Khamenei** signed a **14-point memorandum of understanding**. The world applauded. Europeans congratulated themselves. Five days later, in **Majun**, in southern Lebanon, **six kilometers** from the Israeli border, the **IDF** discovered one of the most sophisticated military installations Iran had ever built on foreign soil: an **underground drone base** buried inside a mountain, equipped with armored doors, assembly areas, explosive storage — and approximately **50 Iranian drones** at various stages of assembly, alongside **eight tons** of explosive material. This had been built, according to the IDF, with the « **direct support of Iran** ».

That is the problem with **Iran** and its diplomacy: it signs in Versailles and digs tunnels in Lebanon. It sends its negotiators to **Geneva** to discuss its nuclear program and the reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz**, while its military engineers oversee the construction of war infrastructure a few kilometers from the Israeli border. These two activities are not contradictory in Iranian doctrine — they are complementary. Diplomacy buys time, economic resources, and international legitimacy. Proxy war maintains strategic pressure and preserves offensive capabilities. It is a coherent strategy, and that is precisely why it is so dangerous.

### What the MoU says about Lebanon — and what it cannot do

The memorandum's first article is telling: it stipulates the « **immediate and permanent cessation of military activities on all fronts, including Lebanon** ». Iran moreover interpreted this wording as prohibiting any Israeli military operation in Lebanon, on the grounds that such operations would constitute a violation of the **MoU**. On **June 19, 2026**, according to the **ISW**, Iran conditioned the US-Iran nuclear negotiations on Washington obtaining a halt to Israeli operations against Hezbollah. In other words, Tehran is using the very text of the MoU as leverage to protect its armed proxy in Lebanon.

**The Guardian** reports that at the opening discussions in **Geneva** on **June 22**, a notable development occurred: Iran agreed to allow UN nuclear inspectors to return to its territory, in exchange for relief on certain Iranian oil export sanctions. US Vice President **JD Vance** praised the decision. But the same report notes that **Israel** continues to operate against Hezbollah in Lebanon — and that Iran has threatened to reinstate the blockade of the **Strait of Hormuz** if strikes continued. Peace on paper, war on the ground.

*I find it hard to share the enthusiasm of those who see the MoU as a historic breakthrough. What I see is a negotiation in which one party systematically uses the diplomatic process to maximize its strategic gains while minimizing real concessions. The history of Iranian diplomacy over the past forty years is the history of this technique, perfected. Geneva 2026 looks like Geneva 2015.*

## Hezbollah Still Receiving Weapons — During the Negotiations

### The Majun tunnels: physical proof of duplicity

The installation discovered at **Majun** is not an old Cold War relic. It is a recent, sophisticated, deliberate construction. The **IDF** described a complex extending « **hundreds of meters through the mountain** », including anti-explosion steel blast doors, drone assembly areas, storage rooms packed with explosives, and launch ramps designed to fire attack drones toward Israel. Inside, soldiers found approximately **50 Iranian drones** being assembled and **eight tons** of explosive material. The IDF states the site was captured this June by commando and reserve paratrooper units.

This discovery fits into a documented pattern. The **ISW** published in **February 2026** a map of arms smuggling operations into Lebanon between June 2025 and January 2026. **The Times of Israel** reported in **April 2025** that Hezbollah had shifted its supply routes to maritime channels after overland routes through Syria had largely been closed. A Western official cited in that report indicated that Hezbollah had begun retaking control of the port of Beirut to funnel funds and weapons while bypassing state monitoring. The **ISW** also notes that on **June 26, 2026**, the IDF struck and killed **seven Hezbollah operators** transporting weapons in the IDF security zone in Lebanon, near the village of **Manzala**.

### Iran denies, Iran delivers

Iran's posture in negotiations is built on plausible deniability. Officially, Iran is not arming Hezbollah in violation of the MoU. Officially, the weapons found at Majun were pre-existing stockpiles. Officially, the Hezbollah fighters killed while transporting weapons in the IDF security zone had nothing to do with Tehran. But **SIPRI** documents decades of Iranian arms transfers to Hezbollah, including anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missile launchers, reconnaissance drones, and multiple rocket launchers. Those transfers did not stop in June 2026. Only the routes changed.

The uncomfortable truth is that Iran proposed — according to reports cited in pre-MoU negotiations — to disarm and freeze the activities of Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and other groups as a condition of an agreement. But these commitments stayed in preliminary discussions and never made it into the MoU's final text. It is therefore impossible for Washington or any other party to compel Iran to honor a commitment that was never formally codified.

*Plausible deniability is the oldest technique in Iranian policy toward its proxies. What Western negotiators refuse to look squarely in the face is that Iran does not see Hezbollah as a problem to be solved — it sees it as a strategic asset to be preserved. As long as that reality is not built into the structure of negotiations, every agreement will be built on sand.*

## Iran's Strategic Logic: What Geneva Delivers for Tehran

### The immediate economic gains from the diplomatic process

What Iran has concretely obtained in **Geneva** in just a few days is considerable. The US Treasury is preparing a sanctions waiver on Iranian oil exports. **Qatar** and Iran signed a memorandum on the release of Iranian assets frozen in Qatari banks due to American secondary sanctions. The partial reopening of the **Strait of Hormuz** is underway. These are concrete, immediate economic gains that reinforce the financial capacity of the Iranian regime — including its capacity to fund its regional activities, Hezbollah among them.

In parallel, the **ISW** assesses that Iran is using the MoU-mandated discussions to reach agreements with **Gulf** states that would allow it to maintain influence around the Strait of Hormuz. If this analysis is accurate — and nothing refutes it — Iran is using diplomacy to consolidate its regional strategic position while benefiting from sanctions relief. That is a win-win situation for Tehran, and a lose-lose for anyone hoping for a genuine change in behavior.

### Time as a strategic weapon

The MoU provides for a **60-day** ceasefire period during which further discussions are supposed to address unresolved issues: Iran's nuclear program, uranium enrichment levels, the status of highly enriched uranium stockpiles. The expiration date is therefore **August 2026**. What can Iran accomplish in **60 days** of negotiations, with freed-up economic resources, reduced military pressure, and its regional infrastructure intact? Probably far more than Western negotiators imagine.

An Israeli analyst cited in a televised debate summed up the mechanism with brutal clarity: « **America wants to end the conflict. Iran wants to win the conflict.** » This asymmetry of objectives is the central problem in any negotiation with Tehran. It does not rule out diplomacy — but it should impose on any agreement robust verification mechanisms and automatic escalation clauses that the current MoU does not contain.

*Sixty days. That is the time the MoU gives Iran to advance its pieces on the regional chessboard, pocket economic gains, consolidate its positions in Lebanon — all while giving the impression of negotiating in good faith. I am not saying that is inevitably what will happen. I am saying that is exactly what the history of Iranian diplomacy makes plausible. And one would have to be blind or naive not to see it.*

## What Washington Should Demand — and Is Not Demanding

### The missing conditions in the MoU

A credible agreement with Iran on Lebanon should contain three elements the current MoU does not explicitly include. First, an **independent verification mechanism** for arms transfers to Hezbollah — not merely statements of intent, but inspections of known supply routes. Second, a **condition requiring weapons deliveries to halt** before any oil sanctions relief — not afterward, which would be too late. Third, the **inclusion of Israel** in the Lebanon deconfliction mechanisms, rather than leaving it the role of spectator in an agreement that directly concerns it.

These conditions are well known. They have been discussed in diplomatic circles. They were not imposed because the **Trump** administration, eager for an agreement it could present as a diplomatic victory, preferred a signable text over an enforceable one. That is an understandable political decision. It is a questionable strategic decision. And it is a decision that, if Iranian history repeats itself, will backfire on those who made it.

### The JCPOA precedent: lessons unlearned

The **2015 JCPOA** offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for a partial freeze of its nuclear program. In **2018**, Trump abandoned it, arguing it was not constraining enough. In **2026**, his administration is negotiating a memorandum that experts say raises similar questions about verification mechanisms and scope. The irony is complete. It is not that Trump is wrong to want a deal with Iran — it is that a poorly constructed agreement risks being worse than no deal at all, by legitimizing behavior that sanctions were meant to punish without changing that behavior.

The **ISW** stated it plainly in its special report of **June 24, 2026**: the Iranian regime is using the MoU discussions to delay any substantive negotiation on its nuclear program while banking the economic benefits of the agreement. The metaphor that comes to mind is a poker player sliding hidden cards from under the table while accepting the rules of the game. As long as the rules apply only to the visible game, the player will keep cheating.

*I am aware that I could be accused of adopting the Israeli position. I prefer to accept that charge rather than pretend to a neutrality that would make me ignore the obvious. The evidence of Iranian duplicity — the Majun base, Hezbollah fighters transporting weapons during negotiations, the Hormuz blockade reinstated and lifted according to Tehran's moods — is documented. It is not propaganda. These are facts.*

## Israel's Response: Between Resistance and Isolation

### Netanyahu on the hard line, Washington under pressure

On **June 24, 2026**, **Benjamin Netanyahu** reaffirmed that the **IDF** would remain deployed in the Lebanese security zone for as long as he remained in office. That statement is a de facto veto against the implementation of the Lebanese component of the MoU, which implies a conditional Israeli withdrawal tied to the stand-up of the **Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)**. Israel insists on completing its assessment of Hezbollah's capabilities before authorizing a broader withdrawal. That condition is reasonable from a security standpoint — but it is irreconcilable with the MoU's timeline.

The contradiction is stark: Washington wants a quick diplomatic result to validate the MoU before the **60 days** expire. Israel wants verified security before any withdrawal. Iran wants to use the MoU to force an Israeli withdrawal without security guarantees. In that triangle, Washington is the most pressured — and therefore the most vulnerable to Iranian delaying tactics. The temptation to pressure Israel to accelerate a presentable agreement is real. And that is exactly what Tehran is counting on.

### The June 26 line: seven Hezbollah fighters killed

While diplomats debated in Geneva, the IDF was striking on the ground. On **June 26, 2026**, it announced the killing of **seven Hezbollah operators** caught transporting weapons toward a military position in Lebanon, near the village of **Manzala**. The IDF had identified the group — spotted by an **Egoz** commando unit — moving weapons toward a structure « used as a fighting and observation post » and to prepare attacks against Israeli troops. That is the ground reality in Lebanon on the day Washington and Tehran were congratulating themselves on diplomatic progress.

That juxtaposition says everything. Diplomacy in Geneva and war in Manzala are not mutually exclusive in Iranian doctrine — they complement each other. As long as Western negotiators refuse to see that complementarity as a deliberate doctrine rather than a coordination failure, they will keep building agreements on foundations that Tehran quietly undermines, tunnel by tunnel, drone by drone.

*I want to end with a personal note: I am not opposed to diplomacy with Iran. I am in favor of diplomacy that accounts for reality. And the reality in June 2026 is that a state that negotiates in Geneva and builds an underground drone base in Lebanon is not negotiating in good faith. No serious diplomatic architecture can be built without acknowledging that reality.*

## The Majun Underground Base and the On-the-Ground Evidence

### What satellite images reveal about Lebanon

Beyond diplomatic speeches, the on-the-ground facts speak for themselves. The **ISW**, in its special report of **June 24, 2026**, documented the discovery of an Iranian underground drone base called « **Majun** » in **Lebanon**. This installation contained at least **50 Iranian drones** and **8 tons of explosives**. To recall the context: this discovery was made while **Iran** was in the middle of a negotiation process in **Geneva** as part of the follow-up to the **June 17 MoU**. The **simultaneity** is more than coincidence — it is a modus operandi.

The **Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)** neutralized **7 Hezbollah operators** on **June 26, 2026** who were attempting to access this base. The question that immediately arises is: how does **Washington**, which is negotiating with **Tehran** on regional security, respond to this discovery? The official American response was silence, or at best measured language. That silence speaks louder than any speech about the credibility of the negotiation process underway with **Iran**.

### The timeline of duplicity: documents and facts

The timeline must be established with precision. **June 17, 2026**: signing of the **MoU** in **Versailles**, with a first article calling for the « immediate and permanent » cessation of military activities on all fronts, including **Lebanon**. **June 22, 2026**: opening of follow-up negotiations in **Geneva**. Between those two dates and after: discovery of the **Majun** base, **7 Hezbollah operators** neutralized on **June 26**, documented Iranian drone deliveries. The consistency between diplomatic declarations and actions on the ground is, at best, nonexistent.

This is not an accusation without evidence — it is a documented reading of the facts reported by the **ISW**, investigative journalists, and corroborated by **IDF** statements. **Tehran** signs agreements with its right hand and rearms **Hezbollah** with its left. It is a documented, coherent, and effective strategy — because the Western world prefers to watch the right hand.

*We cannot pretend not to see the **Majun** base. We cannot feign ignorance of the **50 Iranian drones** discovered while **Tehran** negotiates in **Geneva**. If the signatories of the **MoU** — including **Washington** — turn a blind eye to this reality, they are not building a peace agreement. They are building a legitimization document for a regime that continues its shadow war.*

## What the History of Iranian Agreements Tells Us About This One

### The 2015 JCPOA: the precedent haunting everyone

In **2015**, the **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)** had been presented as a historic turning point. It capped Iranian enrichment capabilities, placed guardrails on fissile material production, and in return offered substantial sanctions relief. **Iran** signed. **Iran** respected the minimal terms — while simultaneously developing its ballistic missile program, its regional proxy infrastructure, and its cyber warfare capabilities. The letter of the agreement, perhaps. The spirit, certainly not.

The lesson of the **JCPOA** is not that diplomacy with **Iran** is impossible. It is that an agreement that constrains only direct nuclear capabilities while ignoring asymmetric vectors — missiles, drones, proxy militias — creates no durable security. It creates a diplomatic window during which **Iran** strengthens precisely the capabilities the agreement does not cover. The **June 17, 2026 MoU** appears to be reproducing exactly that pattern. It is an agreement on what **Iran** is willing to concede, not on what **Israel**'s neighbors and the Gulf states need to see constrained.

### What Iran learned from previous negotiations

**Tehran** has considerable experience in resistance diplomacy. Its negotiators know how to give the appearance of conceding without surrendering the essential. They know how to use negotiation cycles to gain time, extract economic concessions, and consolidate regional positions while the world watches press conferences in **Geneva**. It is a form of diplomatic judo: using the adversary's strength — its desire for peace — against it.

The **ISW** clearly articulated this analysis in its **June 24, 2026** report: **Iran** is using « the MoU-mandated discussions to delay any substantive negotiation » on its nuclear program. If that reading is accurate, it means every week of negotiations is one more week to reinforce Iranian positions in **Lebanon**, in the **Gulf**, and in underground nuclear facilities. Time works for **Tehran** in negotiations — and **Washington** seems not to have grasped that.

*It gives me no pleasure to say that I do not believe in the **June 17 MoU**. I would like to believe in diplomacy. I would like to believe that the 14 points can produce genuine de-escalation. But when I read the **ISW** reports on the **Majun** base, when I see the **7 Hezbollah operators** neutralized on **June 26**, when I reread the history of the **JCPOA** — my optimism capitulates before the evidence.*

## The Iranian Threat Against Israel: How Far Can the Provocation Go

### Iran's direct strike capabilities against Israel

The military reality is documented: in **April 2024**, **Iran** launched directly more than **300 drones and missiles** against **Israel** in the first direct attack in its history against the Jewish state. That operation was largely intercepted by Israeli, American, British, and Jordanian defenses. But it demonstrated something important: **Tehran** is willing to cross the threshold of direct attack when it calculates the political cost is bearable. The **50 drones at the Majun base** in **Lebanon**, the continuous deliveries to **Hezbollah** — all of this fits the same logic of strike capability accumulation.

The question is one of threshold: to what degree can **Iran** accumulate capabilities in **Lebanon** before **Israel** decides to intervene militarily? The answer depends on the Israeli political calculation, American pressure, and conditions on the ground. What the **June 17 MoU** is supposed to do — create a diplomatic space to reduce these capabilities — is precisely what the discoveries at the **Majun** base indicate it is not doing. The agreement is buying time for **Tehran**, not security for **Israel**.

### The Gulf between two fires: Arab allies in a bind

The **Gulf states** — **Saudi Arabia**, the **United Arab Emirates**, **Bahrain** — are watching the **US-Iran** negotiations with growing anxiety. These countries have normalized or begun normalizing relations with **Israel** under the **Abraham Accords**. They also have direct tensions with **Iran** — **Tehran** attacked Saudi infrastructure in **2019**, supports the **Houthis** in **Yemen**, and claims Emirati islands in the **Persian Gulf**. For these states, a **US-Iran** deal that legitimizes the Iranian regime without constraining its regional ambitions is an existential threat.

Yet their voices are barely audible in the **MoU**. It is the **United States** and the **European Union** that are negotiating with **Tehran** — not the countries directly threatened by Iran's proxy policy. That diplomatic architecture has a consequence: the agreements negotiated in **Geneva** or **Versailles** reflect **Washington**'s and **Brussels**'s priorities, not necessarily the security concerns of the **Gulf states** or **Israel**. That is a structural weakness of the current process that could ultimately doom it.

*The **Gulf states** live with the Iranian threat as a daily reality, not as a topic for diplomatic conferences. When **Riyadh** or **Abu Dhabi** sees a **US-Iran** deal that does not constrain the regime's **missile** and **drone** capabilities, their concern is legitimate. And their diplomatic silence on the matter should not be mistaken for approval.*

## Conclusion: Duplicity Is a Doctrine — Respond with Clarity

### No naivety, no cynicism: clarity

Iranian policy is not difficult to read — it is difficult to accept. Iran systematically uses diplomacy to extract economic gains while maintaining its regional military capabilities. That is not occasional bad faith: it is a coherent, practiced state doctrine, applied for forty years. Recognizing it is not cynicism — it is clarity. And clarity is the precondition of effective foreign policy.

### The response: mechanisms, not declarations

Against that doctrine, agreements without robust verification mechanisms are illusions. The true measure of the **June 17** MoU will not be its language, but Iranian behavior in the weeks and months that follow. If Hezbollah's arming continues, if the Majun base is rebuilt elsewhere, if supply routes are simply rerouted — then the agreement will have failed. And it will be necessary to draw the consequences, with the same clarity one should have had when signing it.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

*Diplomacy is a necessary tool. But a tool that delivers no results is not a success — it is a costly illusion. The **June 17, 2026 MoU** will be judged not by the words of the agreement, but by what **Iran** does or does not do in the **60 days** that follow. I am watching. I am keeping the memory of the **Majun** base. And I hold no naive hope.*

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [ISW — Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2026](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-24-2026/)

- [Al Jazeera — What the Trump-Iran agreement says about Lebanon, Hormuz and uranium — June 18, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/18/what-the-trump-iran-14-point-plan-says-about-lebanon-hormuz-and-uranium)

- [Robert Schuman Foundation — Europeans caught between trust and the need for protection — June 22, 2026](https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/the-letter/1161)

### Secondary sources

- [Foreign Policy — Iran nuclear diplomacy context — June 2026](https://foreignpolicy.com/)

- [Kyiv Independent — Regional security context — June 2026](https://kyivindependent.com/)

- [The Guardian — Regional geopolitical context — June 24, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/24/north-korea-nuclear-program-kim-jong-un)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-iran-a-geneve-le-matin-des-drones-iraniens-au-liban-le-soir-la-duplicite-comme