# Europe is rearming, but not every country at the same pace

> Just days before the NATO summit set for Turkey, ratings agency S&P Global Ratings published an analysis that tempers the general enthusiasm

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Reportage
- Published: 2026-07-06
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-europe-se-rearme-mais-pas-tous-les-pays-au-meme-rythme

## Introduction: a two-speed arms race

### A well-timed warning from **S&P Global**

Just days before the **NATO summit** set for **Turkey**, ratings agency **S&P Global Ratings** published an analysis that tempers the general enthusiasm around European **rearmament**: the rise in **defense** spending across the continent will, in its own words, be **"uneven"** from country to country. That finding, reported by **CNBC** on **July 1, 2026**, deserves to be told for what it really is: the story of twenty-seven national trajectories that are not converging at the same speed in the face of the same threat.

This comes as no total surprise to anyone who has followed this story since the start of the war in **Ukraine**, but a numbers-backed warning from an agency as influential as **S&P Global** lends extra legitimacy to a conclusion many observers had already been drawing more impressionistically.

### Why this particular moment matters

This analysis arrives just as the twenty-seven **European Union** countries and the European members of **NATO** prepare to gather once again to discuss their collective commitments on military spending, in a context where Russia's war against **Ukraine** continues to fuel exchanges of strikes and where American pressure for a fairer sharing of the transatlantic **defense** burden shows no sign of easing.

Telling this story means telling the story of a continent that has grasped the urgency, but that discovers, year after year, that political will alone doesn't always overcome very real budget constraints.

*I believe deeply that this European **rearmament** is necessary, even welcome, in the face of the Russian threat. But I refuse to look away from its internal fractures, because those fractures are exactly what Moscow will be watching most closely.*

## **Poland** and the **Baltic states**, undisputed frontrunners of **rearmament**

### A geography of fear that speeds up decisions

According to **S&P Global**, **Poland** and the **Baltic states**, namely **Estonia**, **Latvia** and **Lithuania**, are moving fastest in their **rearmament** efforts among all the European countries analyzed. This speed is no accident: these nations share a direct border or immediate proximity with **Russia** or its **Belarusian** ally, a geographic reality that turns every euro spent on **defense** into a matter of national survival rather than a simple budget choice.

This proximity to the threat largely explains why these countries have managed to build internal political consensus far more quickly than other European nations located farther from the **Ukrainian** war theater.

### Budgets that reflect an urgency fully owned

**Poland**, in particular, has announced a string of major military acquisitions in recent years, positioning itself as one of the European countries devoting the highest share of its **gross domestic product** to **defense**, a budgetary choice its government openly defends in the name of credible deterrence against **Russia**.

The **Baltic states**, despite economies far smaller than Poland's, are following a similar trajectory, convinced that their collective security depends directly on their ability to show an unambiguous willingness to defend themselves against a Russian neighbor whose aggressiveness has never let up since **2022**.

*I tip my hat to **Poland** and the **Baltic states**. Their resolve should serve as an example to wealthier countries that are clearly in less of a hurry to take seriously a Russian threat knocking at their collective door.*

## **Germany**, an economic giant with real budgetary room to maneuver

### A financial capacity **S&P Global** explicitly acknowledges

Still according to **S&P Global**, **Germany** has more **"fiscal headroom"** than many of its European neighbors to speed up its own **rearmament** efforts, an acknowledgment that contrasts with the image long attached to **Berlin** of an almost dogmatic budgetary caution on public spending.

This room to maneuver, recognized by the ratings agency, doesn't mean **Germany** has already fully tapped that potential, but it does indicate that the constraints weighing on other European countries, particularly around public debt, weigh less heavily on the continent's largest economy.

### A contrast that raises the question of European leadership

This finding raises a deeper political question: if **Germany** truly has greater fiscal capacity, to what extent should it take on a more assertive leadership role in the collective financing of European **defense**, beyond its own borders and its own armed forces?

This question is not purely theoretical: it connects to **Berlin**'s recent decisions to directly fund multilateral initiatives supporting **Ukraine**, a sign that the German government seems, at least partially, to have absorbed this greater responsibility into its own security doctrine.

***Germany** has long been criticized for its military reluctance. If it truly has this extra fiscal headroom, it now has a moral obligation to use it fully, not merely have it noted by a ratings agency.*

## **France**, the **United Kingdom** and **Belgium** facing their budget constraints

### Public debt that limits room to maneuver

In contrast to the German picture, **S&P Global** places **France**, the **United Kingdom** and **Belgium** among the countries facing **"greater debt constraints,"** a budgetary reality that mechanically complicates their ability to significantly raise **defense** spending without triggering other painful trade-offs elsewhere in their respective national budgets.

This is nothing entirely new for these three countries, whose public debt levels have been the subject of recurring domestic debate for years, but linking that reality directly to national **defense** gives it an added strategic dimension, particularly sensitive in the current geopolitical context.

### Competing political priorities that complicate the equation

Beyond the sheer financial constraint, **S&P Global** also cites **"competing political priorities"** weighing on these countries' ability to speed up their **rearmament**, a diplomatic phrasing that covers well-known political realities: social tensions, debates over pensions or public health, and a public opinion sometimes less mobilized on **defense** issues than in the Baltic states or **Poland**.

This combination of budgetary and political constraints creates a real risk of strategic fragmentation within the Western alliance itself, at a moment when the surface unity displayed at international summits masks increasingly divergent national trajectories.

*I understand French and British budget constraints, but I reject the easy excuse. When the continent's security is at stake, competing political priorities need to give way, not the other way around.*

## Southern **Europe**, the great overlooked corner of accelerated **rearmament**

### A region less directly exposed, but not immune to the consequences

**Southern Europe** also appears, according to **S&P Global**, among the regions facing greater constraints in their **rearmament** efforts. This geographic reality is partly explained by relative distance from the **Ukrainian** war theater, which makes the Russian threat feel less immediately real to public opinion in countries like **Italy**, **Spain** or **Greece** than in Central and Eastern **European** countries.

This perception of distance should not, however, obscure a broader strategic reality: a breakdown of collective European deterrence, even one localized in its eastern flank, would inevitably have repercussions across the entire continent, including its less directly exposed southern regions.

### More fragile economies that limit military ambitions

Several southern **European** countries also face structurally more fragile economic situations than their northern neighbors, a reality that objectively limits their ability to devote massive additional resources to **defense** without weakening other essential public services.

This relative economic fragility poses a major political challenge for the **European Union** as a whole: how can it guarantee credible collective deterrence if a significant portion of its members structurally cannot keep pace with the military investment of the wealthiest or most directly threatened countries?

*Southern **Europe** must not become the silent weak link of continental **defense**. European solidarity, if it means anything, has to include support mechanisms so that economic fragility doesn't turn into a strategic gap.*

## What the industrial fragmentation of European **defense** reveals

### A McKinsey report documenting structural inefficiency

Beyond budget spending alone, a **McKinsey** report published in February revealed an even deeper structural problem: the fragmentation of military platforms in **Europe** is more than **four times higher** than in the **United States**, a finding that reflects decades of national weapons programs run in parallel rather than in continental coordination.

This industrial fragmentation is not a minor technical detail: it generates considerable extra costs, needless duplication of research and development efforts, and a chronic inability to produce military equipment at the industrial scale needed to compete effectively with powers like **Russia** or **China**.

### A persistent dependence on American suppliers

This fragmentation partly explains why **Europe** remains heavily dependent on **American** suppliers for essential strategic capabilities: fighter jets, air **defense** systems, precision weapons, advanced military electronics and specialized software, not to mention strategic enabling capabilities like intelligence, heavy airlift and command-and-control systems.

This structural dependence, documented by **S&P Global**, illustrates the concrete limits of the strategic autonomy so often championed by some of the continent's leaders, an autonomy that remains, in practice, largely conditioned on the goodwill and industrial availability of the **United States**.

*This dependence on American suppliers makes me uneasy, even as I recognize the strategic importance of the transatlantic alliance. **Europe** cannot forever outsource its own security to an ally, however reliable it may be today.*

## Equipment stockpiles still below pre-war levels

### A shortfall that persists despite years of increased investment

One of the most troubling findings documented by **S&P Global** concerns the stockpile levels of military equipment among European **NATO** members, which remain **below levels seen in 2021**, that is, before the full-scale Russian invasion of **Ukraine** even began in **2022**.

This persistent shortfall, more than four years into the conflict, shows just how slow and complex rebuilding European military capabilities remains, far slower than regular political announcements about rising national **defense** budgets would suggest.

### A paradox that raises questions about the real effectiveness of announced investments

This paradox between rising budgets and still-insufficient stockpiles raises an essential question: where is the additional money invested in European **defense** actually going, if strategic stockpile levels still haven't returned to their pre-war levels more than four years after the start of the **Ukrainian** conflict?

This question deserves a clear political answer from the European governments concerned, rather than simple reassuring communication about overall budget figures that don't necessarily reflect a proportional improvement in concrete military capabilities on the ground.

*I am genuinely troubled by this paradox. Announcing billions in **defense** spending means nothing if real strategic stockpiles remain insufficient. European citizens deserve full transparency about this troubling gap.*

## **Defense** companies, the first visible winners of **rearmament**

### Credit quality strengthened by a rising order book

On the strictly financial side, **S&P Global** estimates that rising **defense** spending could support the **credit quality** of European companies in the sector, which benefit from an expanding order book and medium-term growth prospects far more favorable than before the war in **Ukraine** began.

This positive financial dynamic for the European **defense** industry contrasts with the budgetary difficulties faced by some states themselves, a gap that illustrates the complex macroeconomic balance triggered by this accelerated **rearmament** race.

### Rising pressure on sovereign budgets despite industrial gains

But this boom for **defense** manufacturers comes, according to **S&P Global**, alongside **increased pressure on sovereign budgets** in the countries concerned, which now have to make politically difficult trade-offs between **defense**, public services and controlling national debt.

These trade-offs, already visible in domestic budget debates across several European countries, could intensify in the coming months if international pressure for higher military spending keeps building as the **NATO summit** approaches.

*I can only hope that the renewed prosperity of **defense** manufacturers translates concretely into fast, effective deliveries, rather than mere shareholder profits disconnected from the urgent needs on the Ukrainian front.*

## The **NATO** summit in Ankara, a moment of truth for Western unity

### A packed agenda for Alliance leaders

The **NATO summit** set for **Turkey** is the major political gathering where these **rearmament** disparities will have to be discussed openly among allies, in a context where Western **defense** leaders will need to find common ground despite very different national budget realities.

This packed agenda includes, according to several **defense** analysts, discussions on sharing the financial burden among allies, a recurring topic at **NATO** summits that takes on a particularly sharp edge in the current context of a prolonged war in **Ukraine**.

### The ambiguous but decisive role of the United States in this equation

The **United States**, under the **Trump** administration, keeps demanding a bigger budgetary effort from its European allies, a stance that, on strictly military and strategic grounds, deserves credit: it has undeniably helped accelerate collective European awareness of the need for more robust **rearmament** against the Russian threat.

This American pressure, however diplomatically uncomfortable it may be for some European allies, has had the merit of turning theoretical discussions about burden-sharing into concrete budgetary commitments, even if those commitments remain, as **S&P Global**'s analysis shows, applied very unevenly from country to country.

*On this specific point, I give the Trump administration credit: its constant pressure on burden-sharing has produced real results in **Europe**, even if its method remains at times blunt and its consistency questionable on other files.*

## The lessons **Ukraine** draws directly from this uneven **rearmament**

### An urgent need for ammunition that cannot wait on European budget trade-offs

For **Ukraine**, this uneven **rearmament** among its European allies is not some theoretical question of budget macroeconomics, but a concrete reality that directly shapes its ability to withstand daily Russian strikes on its territory and energy infrastructure.

Every month of delay in one country's or another's budget decisions can potentially mean delayed deliveries of ammunition and military equipment for **Ukrainian** forces, a stake that goes far beyond the abstract accounting considerations found in ratings-agency reports.

### A Ukrainian dependence that underscores the urgency of Western cohesion

This direct dependence of **Ukraine** on the speed and coherence of European **rearmament** shows just how much the disparities documented by **S&P Global** are not mere abstract statistics, but data with real human and military consequences on the ground, in a country still fighting for its survival against Russian aggression.

It is precisely this human and strategic dimension that should, in my view, speed up awareness among the slower European countries, rather than treating it as just another budget exercise among competing national priorities.

*I think sincerely about what this uneven **rearmament** means for a Ukrainian soldier running short on ammunition because some European country chose to prioritize another budget item instead. That reality should haunt every European decision-maker.*

## China and **Russia** are watching these Western fractures closely

### A signal of weakness potentially exploited by strategic rivals

It would be naive to think these European **rearmament** disparities go unnoticed in **Moscow** or **Beijing**. On the contrary, these internal fractures within the Western alliance are exactly the kind of signal powers like **Russia** and **China** watch closely, looking to identify the weakest links of a coalition they view as their main strategic obstacle.

This geopolitical reality places an added responsibility on European leaders: to never hand, through their own budgetary inaction, extra arguments to adversaries waiting for proof of Western disunity to reinforce their own aggressive posture.

### Vigilance also required regarding North Korea and Iran

Beyond the Russia-China pairing alone, **North Korea** and **Iran**, both involved to varying degrees in logistical and military support for Russia's war effort against **Ukraine**, are also watching these European budget dynamics, aware that any Western weakness could eventually indirectly benefit their own regional ambitions.

It is against this wider backdrop of converging threats that the cohesion of Western **rearmament** takes on its full strategic meaning, well beyond the European framework alone or the current Ukrainian conflict alone.

*I'll say it plainly: every euro not invested in **defense** by a European country today sends a signal of weakness simultaneously to Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang. These regimes never forgive Western disunity.*

## What the coming months will need to prove concretely

### Budget commitments that must translate into actual deliveries

The coming months will serve as a critical test of whether the budget commitments announced by various European countries, including those **S&P Global** judges to be the slowest, actually translate into concrete orders, equipment deliveries and a measurable rebuilding of still-deficient strategic stockpiles.

This factual verification, case after case, **budget** after **budget**, is the only reliable way to tell genuine **rearmament** acceleration apart from mere political announcements meant to reassure a worried public or allies without binding financial commitment.

### The need for stronger industrial coordination among allies

Beyond national budget questions alone, reducing the industrial fragmentation documented by **McKinsey** is an equally urgent project, one that will require strong political will from European governments to favor joint weapons programs over redundant, strictly national initiatives.

This strengthened industrial coordination, if achieved in coming years, could gradually reduce European dependence on **American** suppliers, while improving the overall efficiency of **defense** investments made across the continent.

*I believe the real battle of European **rearmament** isn't fought only in national budgets, but in the collective ability to finally coordinate a **defense** industry that has been fragmented for far too long.*

## What this analysis reveals about the credibility of Western deterrence

### Deterrence that cannot afford to be a patchwork

The credibility of any military deterrence strategy rests on how coherent it appears to a potential adversary. A patchwork Western deterrence, with heavily armed countries alongside allies structurally slower to rearm, risks sending an ambiguous signal to **Moscow** about the true collective response capacity of the **Atlantic Alliance** in the event of major escalation.

This strategic ambiguity, indirectly documented by **S&P Global**'s analysis, is a geopolitical risk Western leaders can no longer afford to ignore, at a moment when the war in **Ukraine** demonstrates every day the determination and brutality of Russian aggression.

### An implicit call for greater intra-European financial solidarity

This situation argues, according to several analysts cited in coverage of this story, for strengthening intra-European financial solidarity mechanisms, capable of helping the most budget-constrained countries speed up their own **rearmament** without undermining their internal economic and social stability.

Without such reinforced solidarity, the risk of lasting strategic fragmentation across **Europe** in the face of the Russian threat remains very real, with potentially serious consequences for the continent's collective security as a whole.

*I openly advocate for greater European financial solidarity on **defense**. Credible deterrence cannot rest solely on each member state's individual goodwill, it requires binding collective mechanisms.*

## The role of financial markets in accelerating **rearmament**

### Investors increasingly focused on the **defense** sector

Beyond government decisions alone, financial markets have also welcomed the European **rearmament** dynamic, with a notable rise in investor interest for shares of the continent's major **defense** groups, a trend documented by several financial analysts cited in **CNBC**'s coverage.

This growing market confidence could, over time, help finance certain **defense** industrial projects privately, complementing public budget efforts in a sector where capital needs remain considerable given the scale of **rearmament** required to close the strategic stockpile gaps still documented today.

### A bubble risk some analysts are starting to flag

Some financial analysts, however, are beginning to warn of a risk of speculative overvaluation in European **defense** stocks, fueled by investor enthusiasm sometimes disconnected from the real industrial capacity of the companies involved to actually deliver announced orders on time.

This warning echoes, in a way, **S&P Global**'s broader finding about the persistent gap between ambitious budget announcements and the still-limited industrial reality of European short-term production capacity.

*I'm glad to see financial markets backing Europe's **defense** effort, but I urge caution against any speculative frenzy that would disconnect stock valuations from the industrial reality on the ground.*

## Conclusion: the urgency of a genuine strategic convergence

### Real **rearmament**, still too fragmented to be fully reassuring

**S&P Global**'s analysis confirms something this columnist has observed for years: **Europe** is genuinely rearming, with considerable financial efforts made by the vast majority of its members, but this dynamic remains too fragmented, too uneven, to be a fully credible and reassuring response to the persistent threat posed by **Vladimir Putin**'s **Russia**.

This fragmentation, backed by numbers from an agency as rigorous as **S&P Global**, must not be downplayed as the **NATO summit** in **Turkey** approaches, where Western leaders will need to show a collective ability to move beyond their respective national budget constraints.

### What history will remember of this pivotal moment in European **rearmament**

History will judge harshly the European leaders who let national budget constraints override the collective strategic urgency posed by a Russian aggression that shows, to this day, no sign of lasting de-escalation on **Ukrainian** soil.

This columnist will keep closely following developments in this crucial story, sincerely hoping that **Poland** and the **Baltic states** will not remain the only European nations to have fully grasped the historic urgency the continent now faces.

*I close this narrative with one certainty: history will not remember the speeches about European **rearmament**, it will remember the actual deliveries, the rebuilt stockpiles and the Ukrainian lives protected or lost because of these Western budget delays.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- CNBC — Europe's defense boom faces a new test: Can it actually deliver weapons?, 1er juillet 2026

- Anadolu Agency — Factbox: NATO defense spending, where allies stand ahead of Ankara summit, 2026

### Secondary sources

- El País — With NATO under pressure, Europe undertakes its biggest rearmament since the Cold War, 5 juillet 2026

- Reuters — Aerospace & Defense, 2026

- Wikipedia — 2026 Ankara NATO summit

- Forbes — What defense leaders will discuss at the 2026 NATO summit, 1er juillet 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-europe-se-rearme-mais-pas-tous-les-pays-au-meme-rythme