# ESSAY: Kim Jong Un's Exponential Escalation — Pyongyang Caught Democracies Off Guard

> For twenty years, the international community treated North Korea as a manageable problem — a dangerous but peripheral curiosity, a miserable regime that would eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions, a bluffer whose military posturing would never be acted

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Essay
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-escalade-exponentielle-de-kim-jong-un-pyongyang-a-pris-les-democraties-par-sur

## Introduction: the most costly strategic blind spot of our generation

### Twenty years to grasp what was unfolding before our eyes

For twenty years, the international community treated **North Korea** as a manageable problem — a dangerous but peripheral curiosity, a miserable regime that would eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions, a bluffer whose military posturing would never be acted upon. These assumptions were wrong. And in **June 2026**, reality asserts itself in all its brutality: **North Korea** possesses more than **50 nuclear warheads**, an intercontinental ballistic missile programme capable of reaching the **United States**, a deep-water navy under active construction, and now a **155mm self-propelled howitzer** — the **NATO**-standard calibre — tested on **June 25** before the eyes of **Kim Jong Un**.

This essay asks an uncomfortable question: how did we get here? How could the world's most powerful democracies watch for two decades while **Kim Jong Un** methodically built an arsenal without taking the necessary steps to prevent him? The answer is complex, but it begins with an honest diagnosis of our own analytical and political failures.

### The moment of June 24, 2026: The Guardian article as a revelation

On **June 24, 2026**, **The Guardian** published an in-depth article on **Kim Jong Un's** "exponential" nuclear programme, under the provocative headline "Why Kim Jong Un is racing to expand his arsenal." The article cited researchers describing an arsenal "vast and dispersed, whose location is unknown, whose potential actions are unpredictable, and whose threats are intentionally ambiguous." It documented **Kim's** commitment to increasing nuclear stockpiles "at an exponential rate."

This is not the first time this information has been published. North Korea's trajectory has been documented for years by specialized institutes. What is new is the tone — more urgent, more alarmed, more conscious that something irreversible is occurring. This essay explores why we arrived here and what it means for the decades ahead.

*I must start with a self-critique. I have myself, in previous articles, treated North Korea as a second-tier issue compared to more immediate crises — Ukraine, the Middle East, China. That was a prioritization error. Kim Jong Un was not waiting for us to find time to deal with him. He was building, testing, deploying. And while we were looking elsewhere, he was advancing.*

## Kim Jong Un's long-term strategy: a coherence we misread

### 2012–2026: fourteen years of a coherent programme

**Kim Jong Un** came to power at the end of **2011**, at approximately **27 years of age**. Since then, he has maintained a strategic orientation of remarkable consistency: accelerated development of nuclear and ballistic capabilities, modernization of conventional weaponry, resistance to all international pressure, and use of arms as a political and diplomatic instrument. This consistency was not obvious from the beginning — analysts debated whether he was seeking to reform his economy, gradually open up, or negotiate an agreement with the **West**.

In retrospect, **Kim's** programme had clear logic from the outset: build a credible nuclear deterrent that would make any regime change militarily too costly, then in parallel develop the conventional capabilities that would enable a multi-level military strategy. The nuclear as the ultimate shield. Ballistic missiles as a second-level threat. Modernized conventional artillery as an instrument of daily action. And now, a deep-water navy to project power beyond the peninsula.

### The milestones we systematically underestimated

Each **North Korean** advance was minimized or reinterpreted to avoid challenging our basic assumptions. The first nuclear test in **2006**: "a firecracker, probably a failure." The **2009** and **2013** tests: "limited progress, the programme is still rudimentary." The first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in **2017**: "a technical demonstration, not yet an operational threat." The inscription of the nuclear in the **Constitution in 2022** and reinforced in **2026**: "a political posture, not necessarily a final decision." At every step, the minimization was convenient — it avoided forcing difficult decisions.

This pattern of systematic minimization is one of the most important intellectual failures of **Western** foreign policy over the past twenty years. It reflects a deep cognitive bias: the tendency to believe that irrational actors — and the **North Korean** regime was often described as irrational — cannot actually execute sophisticated programmes over the long term. But **Kim Jong Un** is not irrational. He is ruthless, authoritarian, and dangerous — but his strategy has a coherence that we refused to recognize.

*The minimization of North Korea was not bad faith — it was collective wishful thinking. Acknowledging the full scope of the threat required making difficult political choices: severe economic confrontation with China that supports Pyongyang, risk of military escalation, real economic sacrifices to fund enhanced regional defence. It was more comfortable to tell ourselves the problem would resolve itself. It did not resolve itself.*

## The constitutional nuclear: why it is a point of no return

### Inscription in the Constitution: more than a symbol

In **2022**, **North Korea** inscribed its status as a nuclear state in its **Constitution**. An amendment adopted in **2026** reinforced this framework by granting **Kim Jong Un** **constitutional authority** over nuclear forces, with the possibility of delegating launch authority to a command in emergencies. According to researchers cited by **The Guardian**, this latest measure is a protection against a "decapitation strike" — an attempt to eliminate the leadership before it can order a launch.

This constitutionalization is a point of no return for several reasons. First, it signals to all audiences — domestic, regional, international — that **North Korea** no longer considers denuclearization a negotiable option. It is a declaration of permanent state identity, not a conjunctural posture. Second, it creates real institutional constraints for any future leader who might wish to engage in denuclearization: they would first have to revise the **Constitution**, implying a complex internal political process in a regime where any change is perceived as weakness.

### Ho Ry and Korean researchers: the voices that warned us

**Ho Ry**, researcher at the **Korea Institute for Defence Analyses** (**KIDA**), stated that **Pyongyang** wants to "establish the idea that denuclearization no longer applies to **North Korea**." This formulation has brutal clarity. It says that **North Korea's** objective is not to negotiate denuclearization on favorable terms — it is to permanently exit the category of "denuclearizable" states. **North Korea** wants to be treated as a recognized nuclear power, on the same terms as **Pakistan** or **India**, not as a proliferator waiting to be convinced to relinquish its weapons.

This researcher and others warned of this trajectory for years. They published analyses, testified before parliaments, participated in conferences. Their warnings were heard in specialized academic circles. They did not produce the policy responses they called for. This is a transmission-decision circuit failure that characterizes the policy of democracies on long-term threats.

*I often ask policy makers who have worked on the North Korean file: "When did you realize you had underestimated Kim Jong Un?" The answers are revealing. Many realized it too late — after the first credible ICBM, after the constitutional nuclear. Some admit they let immediate priorities override long-term threats. This is rare honesty in diplomatic circles, and it deserves to be recognized.*

## The deep-water navy: the least understood dimension

### The 5,000-tonne destroyer: a major strategic rupture

Among all the **North Korean** military advances of **2026**, perhaps the least covered is the launch of a **5,000-tonne destroyer** capable of firing missiles. **Kim Jong Un** announced his desire to build **two additional warships per year for five years** — an ambitious naval programme that, if realized, would give **North Korea** unprecedented maritime power projection capability. Combined with its increasingly advanced submarine fleet and its objective of arming warships with nuclear missiles, this emerging naval force sketches the contours of a maritime power strategy that goes far beyond coastal defence.

Why is this rupture so little discussed? Because our analytical framework for **North Korea** is still largely that of a land power with a limited nuclear deterrent confined to the peninsula. A country developing destroyers and deep-water submarines no longer fits that framework. It exits the category of "regional threat" to enter that of "naval power with global ambitions." And this category transition has not yet been integrated into our strategic response.

### Nuclear submarines: the most concerning dimension

**The Guardian** notes that **North Korea** is developing "an increasingly advanced submarine fleet." This cautious formulation may conceal something more precise: submarines capable of launching nuclear-range ballistic missiles. If **Pyongyang** succeeds in developing a credible submarine nuclear strike capability, it will have completed its nuclear triad — mobile land-based missiles, missiles launched from fixed bases, and submarine-launched missiles — making it practically impossible for a preemptive strike to neutralize all its nuclear forces simultaneously.

This credible second-strike capability is the keystone of a robust nuclear deterrent. It is precisely what the most stable nuclear powers possess — the **United States**, **Russia**, **China**, the **United Kingdom**, **France**. Their possession makes mutual deterrence almost unshakeable. For **North Korea**, acquiring this capability would represent a qualitative leap in its strategic security — and a qualitatively new threat for its adversaries.

*I must admit that the scope of the North Korean naval programme still surprises me. I had mentally placed North Korea in the box of "regional nuclear land power." A 5,000-tonne destroyer that fires missiles, deep-water submarines, an oceanic navy ambition — this is a different category. And this surprise reveals my own analytical blind spots, which I am trying to correct here.*

## How Kim exploited Western divisions

### China and Russia as diplomatic shields

**Kim Jong Un's** long-term strategy has systematically exploited divisions between the major powers, and in particular the inability of the international community to exert coordinated pressure due to a lack of unity among the permanent members of the **Security Council**. **China** and **Russia** have regularly vetoed or watered down sanctions against **North Korea**, maintaining an economic and diplomatic safety net that allowed **Pyongyang** to survive pressures without making substantial concessions.

This protection has a logic for each protector. **China** does not want a collapse of the **North Korean** regime that would send millions of refugees toward its border and place **American** military forces at its doorstep. **Russia**, since **2022**, has transformed **North Korea** into an active strategic partner, benefiting from its munitions against **Ukraine** and offering in return military technology transfers. This **Russian-North Korean** alignment may be the most unexpected and most dangerous consequence of the war in **Ukraine**.

### Negotiation cycles as diversion

Another mechanism that **Kim Jong Un** has exploited skillfully is the cycle of negotiations. At regular intervals, **Pyongyang** engaged in talks — with the **United States**, with **South Korea**, within the **Six-Party** framework — creating the illusion of a possible diplomatic solution and diverting attention from the actual progress of the nuclear programme. These negotiations never produced a substantial agreement, but they functioned as time gained for the ballistic and nuclear programme.

The **Singapore** and **Hanoi** talks between **Trump** and **Kim** in **2018-2019** are the most widely covered example of this pattern. During the months of negotiations and diplomatic contacts, the **North Korean** nuclear and ballistic programme continued. **Pyongyang's** actual concessions were minimal. And when talks failed in **Hanoi**, **North Korea** had used that time to advance its developments. Spectacle diplomacy had served its interests.

*I want to be fair to Trump on this point: his attempts at direct diplomacy with Kim were not stupid in their concept. The idea that the only way to change North Korea's behavior was to offer Kim what he wanted — international recognition, reduced pressures — had a certain logic. The problem is that Kim never intended to disarm in exchange. He obtained international recognition without a counterpart. And the programme continued.*

## Denuclearization: the objective nobody officially wants to abandon

### Trump, Xi, and the "shared denuclearization" that does not exist

In **May 2026**, **Trump** and **Xi Jinping** reaffirmed during a meeting at the **White House** what **American** sources called a "shared objective" of denuclearization of the **Korean peninsula**. A few weeks earlier, during **Xi's** visit to **Pyongyang**, **Chinese** state media had not mentioned this objective. This gap between the shared **American-Chinese** rhetoric and the reality of **Chinese** conversations with **North Korea** is revealing.

**Hong Min**, senior researcher at the **Korea Institute for National Unification**, noted that this goes "beyond simple minimal deterrence" and implies the "**American** nuclear umbrella, **US-South Korean** forces, and trilateral cooperation with **Japan**." This academic formulation means in plain terms that **North Korea** is dimensioning its arsenal not to deter an isolated attack, but to surpass the combined capability of **American** military alliances in the region. This is an ambition that far exceeds minimal deterrence.

### South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and denuclearization as a political pillar

**South Korean** President **Lee Jae Myung** has maintained denuclearization as a "pillar of his policy toward the North." This position is politically understandable: explicitly abandoning the denuclearization objective would be an admission of failure that would legitimize **North Korea's** nuclear status and could fuel demands from **Seoul** to develop its own national nuclear capability — an option that neither **Washington** nor **Beijing** wishes to see materialize.

But maintaining the denuclearization objective as a policy pillar when all serious analyses indicate it is no longer accessible in the short or medium term creates cognitive dissonance in regional policy. It is a diplomatic posture — saying what one is supposed to say — that substitutes for a real strategy. And this dissonance makes it harder to develop an alternative policy that would be grounded in the reality of **North Korea's** acquired nuclear capability.

*I believe the time has come to name the obvious: the denuclearization of North Korea is no longer a realistic short-term objective. This is not capitulation — it is realism. And it is the basis for an alternative strategy that could be more effective: managing the threat, building deterrence, maintaining dialogue without illusions about its immediate outcome. Continuing to pretend that denuclearization is possible in the next five years is to waste time we do not have.*

## Autonomous guidance: when precision is added to range

### The 240mm multiple rocket launcher guidance system

The **June 25, 2026** tests confirmed a development deserving particular attention: the **240mm 24-tube multiple rocket launcher** now features an **autonomous precision guidance system**, with range extended to **90 kilometers**. This is not an incremental improvement — it is a capability rupture. Previously, **North Korean** artillery was known for its range but not its precision. The addition of autonomous precision guidance transforms a saturation system into a surgical strike system.

This transformation is directly linked to lessons learned on the **Ukrainian** battlefield. **North Korean** soldiers deployed with **Russian** forces observed the effectiveness of precision guidance systems in modern artillery warfare. They returned with data and lessons that **Pyongyang's** military engineers have integrated into their own developments. The war in **Ukraine** has thus become an involuntary technological accelerator for the **North Korean** military programme.

### The "special mission" warhead: striking critical infrastructure

The "special mission" warhead tested for the tactical ballistic missile, explicitly described by **KCNA** as designed to "inflict fatal damage on major targets including airports, ports, and power generation facilities of the enemy," represents another rupture. It is the adoption of a doctrine of strikes against critical infrastructure — exactly what **Russia** does in **Ukraine** — adapted to the capabilities and geography of the **Korean peninsula**.

These targets — airports, ports, power plants — are not exclusively military. They are infrastructure on which civilian and economic life depends. Striking these targets in a conflict would create massive economic and humanitarian disruptions far beyond the combat zones. **North Korea** is explicitly developing the capacity to wage total war against **South Korea's** infrastructure — a war whose effects on the **50 million inhabitants** of the **South** would be catastrophic.

*What strikes me about the North Korean description of targets — airports, ports, power plants — is its deliberately terrifying character for the civilian population. This is not a defensive posture. It is a deterrence posture through the threat of economic and humanitarian disaster. And this posture demands a strategic response that goes beyond simply increasing military spending. It requires thinking about civilian resilience, protection of critical infrastructure, and rapid-response capability.*

## What democracies did wrong: a necessary self-critique

### Strategic engagement policy and its failure

The main **Western** policy toward **North Korea** since the **1990s** has been "strategic engagement" — the idea that diplomatic contacts, limited economic concessions, and human exchanges could gradually reform the regime from within. This policy produced the **1994 Agreed Framework**, the **2003-2009 Six-Party** negotiations, and numerous attempts at bilateral dialogue. None produced substantial nuclear concessions from **Pyongyang**.

Retrospectively, the engagement policy was exploited by **North Korea** as a source of economic resources and as diplomatic cover during the periods when it was advancing most rapidly in its nuclear programme. This is a brutal lesson: engagement without real verification conditions and consequences can give the adversary the time and resources needed to achieve its objectives.

### Sanctions without an accompanying strategy

The alternative to engagement — sanctions — also failed to produce the anticipated results. Sanctions created real economic constraints for **North Korea**, contributing to periods of scarcity that imposed considerable suffering on the population. But they did not stop the nuclear programme. They may even have contributed to pushing **Pyongyang** toward **Russia** as an alternative partner, accelerating the strategic partnership that transformed the situation in **2023-2026**.

This observation does not invalidate sanctions — they remain a legitimate and necessary instrument. But they are insufficient in the absence of a broader strategy that offers **North Korea** a credible exit path in exchange for verifiable nuclear concessions. Twenty years of alternating between engagement and sanctions without substantial results indicates the need for a fundamental rethinking of the approach.

*Rethinking the approach to North Korea is one of the most difficult tasks in contemporary foreign policy, precisely because there is no obvious good solution. But the absence of a good solution does not justify indefinitely continuing approaches that have failed. We must accept the discomfort of uncertainty and explore different paths, even if they carry risks. The status quo is itself risky — and increasingly costly.*

## Toward a realistic strategy for the North Korean nuclear era

### Accepting the nuclear fait accompli to manage its consequences

The first step of a realistic strategy is the most politically difficult: accept that **North Korea** is a de facto nuclear power, and that maintaining the objective of complete denuclearization as a short-term goal prevents the elaboration of a more effective threat management policy. This does not mean legitimizing the **North Korean** nuclear programme or abandoning the very long-term denuclearization objective. It means adapting policy to the real world rather than the desired one.

Realistic management policies would include: dialogue on accidents and miscalculations to reduce the risk of involuntary escalation; limits on additional tests and deployments in exchange for security assurances; direct communication channels to prevent military misunderstandings; and a robust deterrence strategy that makes any **North Korean** aggression unviable without requiring a nuclear "final solution."

### Investing massively in regional missile defence

A realistic policy also includes massive investment in **missile defence** systems deployed in **South Korea**, **Japan**, and at sea. The **THAAD** system deployed in **South Korea** remains insufficient to counter a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal. Multi-layer defence systems — capable of intercepting missiles at different phases of their trajectory — are necessary to maintain a credible defensive posture. This requires significant investments, but they are justified by the documented nature of the threat.

These investments must be accompanied by deeper trilateral cooperation between the **United States**, **South Korea**, and **Japan**. Currently, historical tensions between **Seoul** and **Tokyo** — linked to the legacy of **Japanese** occupation of **Korea** — complicate this cooperation. Overcoming these historical obstacles is a prerequisite for an effective regional response to the **North Korean** threat. And it requires active, persistent **American** mediation that previous administrations have not always provided.

*I am aware that proposing acceptance of North Korea's accomplished nuclear fact is a politically difficult position to defend publicly. It will be perceived as capitulation by some, as cynical realism by others. But I maintain that realism — even painful — is preferable to the illusion that cost us twenty years of advancing threat without adequate strategic response. Intellectual honesty requires naming what is real, even when it is uncomfortable.*

## Pyongyang's reinforced partnerships: a more dangerous world

### Kim, Putin, and Xi: the triangle that complicates everything

**North Korea's** reinforced partnerships with **Russia** and its relationship with **China** have fundamentally changed the landscape of external pressures to which **Pyongyang** is exposed. According to **The Guardian**, these partnerships "have further isolated **North Korea** from the external pressures that once made negotiations possible." This formulation is diplomatic for a brutal assessment: the sanctions and diplomatic pressure that might have worked in a context of real isolation no longer work in a context where **Pyongyang** has powerful allies.

This structural change is perhaps the most important development of the decade. **North Korea** is no longer the desperately isolated regime of the post-Cold War era. It is a strategic partner of **Russia**, a carefully maintained buffer state by **China**, and an actor whose arsenal is contributing to conflicts on different continents. This transformation redefines the problem — and the solution.

### Arms exports: a global problem

**North Korea's** capacity to export weapons — and its willingness to do so without regard for end users — makes it a global problem. **North Korean** artillery shells are killing **Ukrainians**. **North Korean** missiles have been reported in **Yemen**. If **Pyongyang** begins exporting **155mm** calibre munitions or its new autonomous guidance systems, the problem will spread to even more theatres of operations. Containing this proliferation is a strategic challenge that goes far beyond the **Korean peninsula**.

The response to this reality includes enhanced surveillance of **North Korean** arms transfers, increased pressure on countries that facilitate these transfers, and intelligence cooperation between allies to identify and disrupt distribution networks. These efforts exist but remain insufficient given the scale of the problem and the diplomatic protection offered by **Russia** and **China** to **Pyongyang**.

*In closing this essay, I face a question I cannot avoid: do we still have a window to act on North Korea, or is it too late? My honest answer is: it is too late to prevent the accomplished nuclear fact. It is not too late to manage its consequences more intelligently and more coherently than we have done so far. This is insufficient, but it is what remains. And it is enough to justify acting now rather than continuing to wait for a magical solution that will not come.*

## The North Korean nuclear as a constitutional element: a paradigm shift

### When nuclear deterrence becomes a fundamental right inscribed in law

In **2022**, **North Korea** inscribed its status as a nuclear power in its **Constitution** — an unprecedented gesture in the history of nuclear-armed states. Neither the **United States**, nor **Russia**, nor **China** have constitutionalized their nuclear arsenals in this way. This deliberate choice by **Kim Jong Un** signals something important: the nuclear programme is no longer a negotiating lever that **Pyongyang** could someday exchange for security guarantees and sanctions relief. It is now a founding element of **North Korean** state identity.

This constitutionalization has concrete diplomatic consequences that the international community has been slow to integrate. Any agreement requiring **North Korea's** denuclearization would now require a constitutional revision — a politically and institutionally cumbersome procedure, even in an authoritarian regime. **Kim Jong Un** has closed a door that his **American**, **South Korean**, and **Japanese** interlocutors kept pointing to as the labyrinth's exit. The door no longer exists. Another exit must be found.

### Implications for diplomacy over the coming decades

If **North Korean** nuclear capability is constitutionally permanent, then the entire strategy based on **complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization** (CVID) as a prerequisite for any engagement is doomed to fail. This uncomfortable conclusion has begun to be integrated by certain **American** foreign policy circles, which now speak of "managing" the **North Korean** nuclear threat rather than eliminating it. This semantic shift is revealing: it means that democracies are beginning to implicitly accept the idea of a **permanently nuclear North Korea**.

This implicit acceptance carries its own risks. It could encourage other states to follow the example — constitutionalizing their nuclear arsenals as ultimate protection against regime change. It makes **South Korea** and **Japan** more likely to reconsider their own nuclear posture. And it transforms the non-proliferation challenge in **Northeast Asia** into a management of coexistence with a de facto recognized nuclear power, with all the strategic uncertainties that entails.

*The constitutionalization of the North Korean nuclear is the clearest sign that Kim Jong Un is not playing by the rules we wrote for him. He understood that the only guarantee of survival for his regime was to make denuclearization institutionally impossible. This is a decision of cold strategic coherence that I dislike, but must respect analytically. It succeeded: nobody in Western capitals speaks seriously about denuclearization as a short-term objective anymore.*

## North Korea's deep-water navy: the most ignored dimension of Kim's arsenal

### Submarines capable of striking beyond the peninsula

The **North Korean** naval programme is probably the component of **Pyongyang's** arsenal that receives the least analytical attention despite its potentially heaviest implications. **North Korea** is developing a **ballistic submarine** (SSBN) capability that would allow it to deploy nuclear missiles from sea positions, considerably reducing the capability of adversaries for a preemptive strike. A nuclear submarine on patrol is, by nature, difficult to locate and eliminate before it fires — which confers a credible second strike even if land-based installations are destroyed.

**North Korea's Sinpo-class ballistic submarine** has conducted several submarine-launched missile tests since **2021**. Current capabilities are still limited — the propulsion, acoustic signature, and navigation of **North Korean** submarines are below **American** and **Russian** standards. But the programme is progressing. And even a mediocre ballistic submarine that can launch a nuclear missile from an unknown position represents a qualitative escalation in **Pyongyang's** deterrence capability.

### What the deep-water navy changes in the regional strategic equation

The progression toward a naval **second-strike** capability transforms the strategic geometry of **Northeast Asia**. Until now, **American** and **South Korean** military planners could theoretically envision a decapitation strike against known **North Korean** nuclear installations. A dispersed naval arsenal makes this scenario nearly impossible without risking triggering a nuclear response from a submarine that nobody can locate. This is precisely the deterrence that **Kim Jong Un** is seeking to build: a survival guarantee based not on conventional power but on nuclear uncertainty.

For **South Korea** and **Japan**, this evolution reinforces the arguments for an **enhanced American naval presence** in the region, increased investment in submarine detection systems, and closer cooperation between allied navies. It also strengthens the voices in both countries advocating for a national debate on the nuclear question — whether in the form of a return of **American** tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula, or in the form of a national capability, a hypothesis still taboo but increasingly less marginal in strategic circles.

*North Korea's deep-water navy is the blind spot in most analyses I read on Pyongyang. People talk about missiles, nuclear warheads, 155mm howitzers — and forget that Kim Jong Un is also building ballistic submarines. This diversification of the arsenal is precisely what makes North Korea so difficult to contain: the problem is no longer in one place — it is everywhere North Korean submarines float.*

## Russia as amplifier and partner of the North Korean military programme

### What Moscow has actually transferred to Pyongyang since 2022

The **Russian-North Korean** partnership since **2022** has a dual nature that deserves to be clearly distinguished. On one hand, documented transfers: millions of artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, and potentially multiple rocket launcher systems. On the other, less documented but probable transfers: propulsion, guidance, and stealth technologies to improve future **North Korean** systems. The distinction between these two categories is analytically important: the former are commercial transactions. The latter would structurally change **North Korean** military capabilities for decades to come.

**American** and **South Korean** intelligence sources have reported the presence of **North Korean officers** on **Russian** front lines in **Ukraine**, as well as visits by **North Korean** technical delegations to **Russian** defence installations. These exchanges represent a transfer of **operational know-how** and **performance data** that no amount of simulated exercises can replace. **North Korea** is learning from the war in **Ukraine** — by proxy, via **Russia** — what works and what does not in a high-intensity conflict against **Western** military systems.

### Limits and paradoxes of the Moscow-Pyongyang partnership

The **Russian-North Korean** partnership has its own internal tensions that outside observers tend to underestimate. **Moscow** needs **Pyongyang** in the short term for its munitions and additional personnel. But a too-powerful **North Korea** — equipped with a deep-water navy, precision artillery, and a constitutionally guaranteed nuclear arsenal — is a much harder partner to control than a dependent state. **Putin** is potentially creating a strategic problem he will have to manage himself in ten years.

**China**, which observes this partnership with growing ambivalence, sees the same paradox. **Beijing** has always wanted a **North Korea** stable enough to serve as a geopolitical buffer, but not powerful enough to become uncontrollable. The emergence of a **North Korea** equipped with deep-water military capabilities, precision artillery, and a war economy sustained by **Russia** is beginning to resemble the second scenario. This is one of the most interesting strategic contradictions of the current geopolitical moment.

*The Russian-North Korean partnership is one of the most underestimated developments of the post-2022 era. Moscow received what it needed in the short term. But it also made Kim Jong Un an actor that nobody — not even China, not even Russia — will be able to easily control in ten years. This is a perfect illustration of what I call the "fed monster" phenomenon: creating a useful ally up to the point where it becomes an autonomous constraint. History is full of these strategic errors.*

## The response of democracies: between ineffective sanctions and strategic urgency

### Twenty years of sanctions that did not stop Kim

The international response to **North Korea's** military programme has essentially amounted for two decades to a repetitive cycle: **nuclear or ballistic test** → **international condemnation** → **Security Council resolution** → **new sanctions** → **North Korea's violation of sanctions** → return to start. This cycle, which had a certain logic in the pre-**2022** world where **Russia** and **China** at least formally cooperated with the sanctions regime, is now completely broken. **Moscow** openly violates sanctions to purchase **North Korean** munitions. **Beijing** looks away.

The ineffectiveness of sanctions does not mean they had no effect — they probably slowed the **North Korean** programme compared to what it might have been without any restriction. But they did not stop **Kim Jong Un**. He absorbed the relative poverty of his economy, the suffering of his population, and diplomatic isolation, and continued methodically building the arsenal that sanctions were supposed to prevent. This is an international policy failure that democracies find difficult to acknowledge publicly because they have no clear alternative to offer.

### What democracies can still do effectively

Faced with the sanctions impasse, several alternative approaches deserve serious examination. First, the strengthening of **missile defences** in **South Korea** and **Japan** — notably the expansion of the **THAAD** system and the integration of low-layer defence systems. This approach does not neutralize the threat but reduces its reach. Second, increased **diplomatic pressure on China**, making explicit what **Beijing** would strategically lose if **Tokyo** and **Seoul** decided to develop their own nuclear capabilities.

Third, the development of improved intelligence capabilities on the actual state of the **North Korean** nuclear programme — its size, survival capabilities, and potential vulnerabilities. This knowledge is the prerequisite for any realistic diplomatic engagement. Fourth, maintaining communication channels with **Pyongyang**, even informal ones, even when no agreement is in sight — the objective being to reduce the risk of accidental escalation in a future crisis. These approaches are not spectacular. But they are realistic in a context where spectacular options are either impossible or catastrophic.

*I close this essay with an uncomfortable conviction: the international community has lost the non-proliferation battle in North Korea. Kim Jong Un has won. This assessment is not an invitation to fatalism — it is an invitation to change strategy. Continuing to apply policies that have failed for twenty years while hoping for a different result is the definition of obstinacy, not foreign policy. Democracies need a North Korea doctrine for the world of 2026, not the world of 2006.*

## Conclusion: learning from blind spots so as not to repeat the error

### The lesson of twenty years of minimization

The main lesson of twenty years of strategic blind spots toward **North Korea** is that long-term, gradual, and coherent threats are the most dangerous precisely because they do not create the immediate urgencies that trigger policy responses. **Kim Jong Un** built his arsenal methodically, taking advantage of the **West's** attention being fixed on more immediate urgencies — the war in **Iraq**, the financial crisis, the **Arab Spring**, the war in **Ukraine**. This strategic patience is his greatest achievement.

### Not repeating the error with other emerging threats

The second lesson is not to repeat this error with other emerging long-term threats. The rise of **China's** maritime power, the development of autonomous weapons, climate change as a conflict multiplier — all these threats have a progressive trajectory that does not create the urgencies that trigger policy responses. They require precisely the kind of long-term strategic thinking that our political systems struggle to generate and sustain. **North Korea** was the test we failed. Let it also be the warning that allows us not to fail the next ones.

*I close this article with the conviction that analyses, however rigorous, cannot capture the full human reality these events represent. Behind every figure, every strategic decision, every diplomatic maneuver are individual destinies — soldiers, civilians, families — whose lives are transformed by choices they did not make. It is for them, ultimately, that analytical journalism has a responsibility: to name realities clearly, without complacency or fatalism, because clarity is the prerequisite for just action.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [The Guardian — Kim Jong Un's exponential nuclear programme — June 24, 2026](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jun/24/north-korea-nuclear-program-kim-jong-un)

- [Reuters via US News — Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 25, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-25/north-korean-leader-kim-oversees-weapons-tests-kcna-reports)

- [Al Jazeera — North Korea conducts major weapons tests, South trains drone warriors — June 26, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/26/north-korea-conducts-major-weapons-tests-south-training-drone-warriors)

### Secondary sources

- [Defence-UA — North Korea begins production of 155mm self-propelled howitzers — May 9, 2026](https://en.defence-ua.com/news/north_korea_begins_production_of_155mm_self_propelled_howitzers_with_60km_range_could_russia_acquire_them-18434.html)

- [United24Media — North Korea reportedly plans new 155mm howitzers capable of reaching Seoul — May 2026](https://united24media.com/latest-news/north-korea-reportedly-plans-new-155mm-howitzers-capable-of-reaching-seoul-18601)

- [Taipei Times — Kim and the weapons tests: ranges revealed — June 26, 2026](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/06/27/2003859818)

- [Foreign Policy — Strategy analyses on the Korean peninsula — 2026](https://foreignpolicy.com/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-escalade-exponentielle-de-kim-jong-un-pyongyang-a-pris-les-democraties-par-sur