# COLUMN: The US-Iran Deal — Khamenei Plays for Time, Trump Plays Poker

> On June 17, 2026, in the golden light of the Château de Versailles, Donald Trump physically affixed his signature to a 14-point memorandum of understanding with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first agreement of its kind since the rupture of the JCPOA in 2018. Masoud Pezeshkian

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Column
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-accord-us-iran-khamenei-joue-la-montre-trump-joue-au-poker

## Introduction: Sixty Days to Change the World — or Blow It Up

### A deal signed in a palace, a bomb on hold

On **June 17, 2026**, in the golden light of the **Château de Versailles**, Donald Trump physically affixed his signature to a **14-point memorandum of understanding** with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first agreement of its kind since the rupture of the **JCPOA** in 2018. Masoud **Pezeshkian** signed in Tehran, his face impassive, while Trump stepped back from the table with a glass in hand. A surreal scene, heavy with a historical weight that both men seem barely to register.

Since then, the clock has been running. The **60-day deadline** written into clause 3 of this memorandum expires in mid-August. Sixty days to negotiate a definitive agreement on Iranian nuclear weapons — a question that global diplomacy has failed to resolve in twenty years. This is not ambition. It is poker.

### The architecture of an asymmetric deal

The memorandum was signed electronically by Trump and **Vance** the weekend before Versailles, then officially formalized in person at the dinner with Macron. **Implementation negotiations** began in **Burgenstock, Switzerland**, on June 21, with Pakistani and Qatari mediators. Vance's teams spoke of **«encouraging progress»** and a **«solid foundation»** having been laid.

But a careful reading of the 14 clauses reveals a **deep structural asymmetry**: the immediate concessions flow massively toward Tehran, while American gains on the nuclear file are deferred, conditional, or contested. It is the geography of this deal that defines it — and that should be alarming Washington more than it admits.

*I am not naive enough to believe Trump was duped. But when the architect of a deal receives his concessions upfront and the other party still has to negotiate what it gets in return — that is not a deal, it is a non-recoverable advance.*

## The 14 Points: Who Wins What, and Above All When

### Tehran's immediate gains

Clause 4 commits Washington to begin the **withdrawal of the naval blockade immediately** after signature, with full withdrawal within 30 days. Clause 5 guarantees **free passage through the Strait of Hormuz** for 60 days — «without fees», the text specifies — before deferring negotiations on future administration to Oman and the Gulf coastal states. The **U.S. Treasury** has already acted: a **General License X** authorizes sales of Iranian oil and eases sanctions dating back five decades, through August 21. A **$300 billion** reconstruction and development plan is on the table, co-subscribed by the United States and regional partners.

Pezeshkian publicly declared that his country had been unable to **export oil for 40 to 50 days** due to the blockade. That tap being reopened is economic oxygen for a suffocating regime. In 2024, Iranian oil revenues exceeded **$46 billion**. The return of that flow is the Islamic Republic's financial survival.

### What America expects in return

Clause 8 stipulates that Iran **«shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons»** and agrees to resolve its enriched uranium stockpile through **dilution under IAEA supervision**. Vance publicly confirmed that **nuclear inspectors** would return to Iran, potentially within days of the signature. Clause 14 requires that a final agreement be ratified through a **binding UN Security Council resolution** — a multilateral lock absent from the JCPOA.

But here is the problem: clause 13 specifies that **negotiations on the final agreement** begin only after the United States has started the blockade withdrawal, the free passage at Hormuz, the sanctions waivers, and the release of assets. In other words: **Iran secures its economic concessions first**. The hard negotiating comes after. That sequence defines everything.

*Obama lifted sanctions in exchange for temporary nuclear restrictions — and Trump called him a traitor for it. This memorandum follows almost the same path. The difference is that it is Trump who is signing. And the memory of partisans is short.*

## Khamenei: The Man Who Said No, Then Yes, Then Maybe

### Reluctant authorization

According to sources close to the negotiations, Supreme Leader **Ali Khamenei** reportedly said: **«I had a different point of view, but I authorized it.»** This barely veiled statement is a political bomb in its own right. It means the deal is not an internal consensus — it is a decision imposed by the executive under conditions of extreme military and economic pressure.

In parallel, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, **Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf**, immediately contradicted the spirit of the memorandum by insisting that **Strait of Hormuz transit fees**, presented as a «service charge», would continue after the 60-day window. This position directly contradicts **clause 5**. Welcome to Iranian diplomacy: the state speaks with one voice, the parliament with another.

### The deep internal divisions in Tehran

**Iran International** has reported **deep internal political divisions** in Tehran around this deal. Hardliners see the memorandum as a **humiliating capitulation** imposed by American military pressure and the Israeli strikes that had disrupted Iran's defense apparatus since February. The pragmatists around Pezeshkian see it as an **economic lifeline**.

These internal fractures are precisely what American diplomacy should be exploiting — but also what makes the deal fragile. An agreement that a third of Tehran's power structure rejects is not a consolidated agreement. It is a deal of convenience, valid until the pressure eases.

*Khamenei is 86 years old. He did not survive forty years in power by making concessions in good faith. When he says «I had a different point of view», he is preparing his exit route. He signs today to survive, not to negotiate tomorrow.*

## Trump and the Return of the «Worst Deal in History»

### From rhetoric to reality

In 2018, Trump called Obama's JCPOA **«one of the worst and most foolish deals ever negotiated»**. He accused Obama of having **«given away maximum leverage»** by lifting sanctions in exchange for nuclear restrictions he deemed temporary. He had given Iran a **«windfall of cash»** and **«access to the international financial system»**. Those words are on the record. They are now turned against their author.

The June 2026 memorandum commits Washington to a **substantially similar path**. Lifting sanctions will not only enable Iran's economic recovery, but will strengthen its military capabilities and its proxy network. Vance declared that he wanted a relationship with Iran that could **«fundamentally transform»**. Trump said Iran could keep its **ballistic missiles** and that he was **not in a hurry** to extract enriched uranium. The maximalist pre-war positions have melted away.

### The Israeli precedent and the fracture with Netanyahu

Israel was **entirely excluded** from the negotiations leading to the memorandum. Netanyahu himself admitted he did not even **know the content of the memorandum**. That is remarkable: the war against Iran had been launched in coordination with Tel Aviv, and Washington concluded an armistice agreement without consulting its closest regional ally.

Clause 1 declares the end of hostilities on **all fronts, including Lebanon**. Yet Israel insisted it retained **its freedom of action against Hezbollah**. Netanyahu declared that Israeli forces would remain in **South Lebanon for as long as necessary**. On June 19, Israeli strikes in South Lebanon killed at least 15 people despite the ceasefire. When Netanyahu threatened to bomb Hezbollah in Beirut in early June, Tehran threatened to abandon the negotiations — and Trump **dressed him down in a phone call**.

*The Trump-Netanyahu relationship is cracking in plain view. And Tehran knows it. Iran has mastered the art of widening fractures between allies. This is not diplomacy — it is surgery.*

## The Strait of Hormuz: A Weapon Tehran Never Really Surrenders

### Sixty days of free passage — and then what?

Clause 5 may be the most revealing of the memorandum in its entirety. It guarantees **free passage for commercial vessels for 60 days** — «without fees», the text specifies. After that, Iran must coordinate with Oman and the Gulf coastal states on **«the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz»**. The wording is deliberately vague.

The Iranian parliament immediately interpreted this as leaving the door open to transit fees after the grace period. **The long-term status of the Strait remains unresolved**, and firmly in Iranian hands to shape. The Strait of Hormuz, through which **20% of the world's oil** passes, remains Tehran's ultimate weapon — and the memorandum does not genuinely disarm it.

### The geopolitics of maritime control

Washington has established a **communications line on Hormuz** and a **Lebanon deconfliction cell** — concrete mechanisms that signal political will on both sides. The Qatari and Pakistani mediators declared **«encouraging progress»** in Burgenstock. These signals are real. But they do not resolve the fundamental problem: Iran controls the Strait, and no clause in the memorandum changes that geographic reality.

The **U.S. Treasury's General License X**, authorizing Iranian oil sales through August 21, is a strong signal. But it can be revoked. The sanctions on Iran — some dating back five decades — will require **congressional approval** for permanent removal — a politically explosive and time-consuming process that the memorandum's 60-day window cannot absorb.

*Hormuz is not a right of passage. It is a geographic ransom. And as long as a theocratic regime controls the valve of global oil, there is no diplomatic solution — only truces that are purchased.*

## The Nuclear Bomb: What the Deal Says — and What It Doesn't

### Clause 8 and its limits

Clause 8 commits Iran to **«not acquire or develop nuclear weapons»** and to resolve its enriched uranium stockpile through dilution under IAEA supervision. The return of **nuclear inspectors**, confirmed by Vance, is the most concrete signal that this commitment translates into action. Clause 14, which requires a **binding UN Security Council resolution**, adds a multilateral lock absent from the 2015 JCPOA.

But Trump declared that Iran could keep its **ballistic missiles** and that he **«was not in a hurry»** to extract enriched uranium. These public statements directly undermine the written commitments in the memorandum. If the uranium can remain in place, if the delivery vehicles stay intact — at what point do we consider the nuclear program genuinely frozen?

### The IAEA inspectors: a partial victory

The return of inspectors from the **International Atomic Energy Agency** is a real step forward. Iran had expelled several of them and drastically reduced access since 2021. Their return restores **minimum surveillance** — but surveillance is not full verification. Iran has demonstrated, over years, a capacity to conceal sensitive nuclear activities in undeclared facilities.

The American intelligence community estimated in early 2026 that **Tehran was only weeks away** from assembling a nuclear device if the political decision were made. That timeline is not erased by the signature of a memorandum. It can be suspended — but not eliminated.

*An IAEA inspector in an Iranian nuclear facility is better than nothing. But it is less than necessary. The history of inspections in Iran — and in Iraq before it — teaches us that determined regimes always find what is not being looked for.*

## The 60-Day Countdown: A Race Against the Clock

### What Burgenstock produced

The first direct implementation negotiations in **Burgenstock on June 21** produced tangible results: a **roadmap toward a final agreement**, a **high-level committee** to facilitate technical discussions on the nuclear file, and continuation of negotiations on all outstanding points the week of June 22. The mediators, Pakistan and Qatar, declared **«encouraging progress»**. Vance spoke of a **«good foundation»**.

But the session had nearly collapsed before it began: **Trump's social media threats** during the Burgenstock talks had pushed Iran to suspend negotiations. The signal is clear: American diplomacy is being conducted on two contradictory registers simultaneously — the negotiating table and the president's social media feed. Tehran has understood this, and treats it as leverage.

### The congressional lock

Even if the 60 days go well — and that is a gigantic «if» — American commitments on sanctions hit an institutional wall: **Congress**. Lifting decades of sanctions on Iran requires **politically explosive legislative approval**. A faction of the Republican party, aligned with Israel, will structurally oppose it. Pro-Israel senators have already signaled their resistance.

This constitutional reality is known in Tehran. It enters their calculations. If Washington cannot deliver what it promises in terms of permanent sanctions relief — because Congress blocks it — Tehran will have the perfect excuse to declare that the deal was broken **by the other party**.

*Sixty days to resolve what twenty years of diplomacy failed to. In the same window, Trump must convince a hostile Congress, manage a furious Netanyahu, and hope Khamenei keeps his hardliners on a leash. I call that playing poker with cards marked by someone else.*

## What This Deal Reveals About American Decline

### The abandoned positions

The sharpest analysis of the memorandum is simple: **Washington abandoned its maximalist positions** — the very ones that had justified **Operation Epic Fury**. The war had been launched, at least rhetorically, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb. The memorandum does not guarantee that. It initiates a negotiation process — one that Iran controls in large part through the sequencing of the clauses.

The symbolic concessions are equally significant: the mutual commitment to **«respect each other's sovereignty»** and to refrain from interfering in internal affairs signals the **effective abandonment by Washington of regime-change objectives** in Tehran. This is a major rhetorical capitulation that serves Tehran as an existential security guarantee.

### The JCPOA comparison that haunts Trump

The June 2026 memorandum commits Washington to a path **«substantially similar» to the JCPOA** that Obama had negotiated — the one Trump had called a national betrayal. The formal difference is that clause 14 requires a UN lock. But on substance — sanctions eased upfront, nuclear program moderated in return — the structure is the same.

Expert analysis is blunt: **«It is hard to see how Trump's final deal will substantially outperform what Obama obtained.»** The rhetoric has changed sides. **Sanctions relief, once treated as treasonous appeasement**, is now packaged as a **«strategic lever»**. American foreign policy is going in circles — and Iran has been playing that cycle for decades.

*Trump built his political career denouncing the weakness of his predecessors. This memorandum is either the deal of the century — or proof that rhetoric never survives contact with reality. History will judge. But at 60 days from the deadline, I prefer not to bet.*

## Conclusion: A Deal That Stands — But on How Many Legs?

### Reasons for cautious optimism

One must acknowledge what the memorandum has concretely produced: a **roadmap**, a **Lebanon deconfliction cell**, a **communications line on Hormuz**, and the return of **IAEA inspectors**. Both parties showed a **genuine political will** and a mutual understanding that compromises are inevitable. That is not nothing.

The war between the United States and Iran had begun on **February 28, 2026**. It lasted less than four months before an armistice agreement reached the table. For those who feared a regional nuclear escalation — this is a preliminary victory. Imperfect, asymmetric, fragile — but real.

### Reasons for structural pessimism

The list of destabilizing factors is long: the **Trump-Netanyahu tensions**, the **deep internal divisions in Tehran**, the **congressional lock**, Ghalibaf's ambiguous position on Hormuz, and **Trump's rhetorical threats** that destabilize negotiations in real time. Clause 3 allows extension by mutual consent — but if either party slams the door, the 60-day window closes without an agreement, and the question of military resumption immediately reasserts itself.

Khamenei is playing for time. Trump is playing poker. One has been 86 years old and has survived everything. The other cannot afford a second failure. The balance of power is clearer than it appears.

*This moment — imperfect, tense, full of contradictions — will remain in the history books. Not as a clean victory, but as proof that the world can still change direction when the pressure becomes unbearable. Hope never dies entirely. It waits.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Associated Press — US and Iran sign initial deal to end war, ease sanctions and open strait — June 17, 2026](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-israel-war-oil-deal-june-17-2026-19652f4611b704c0a991bf1f5bc9a4b9)

- [ORF Middle East, Clemens Chay — The MOU's Unequal Bargain: Iran's Advantage, Washington's Retreat — June 24, 2026](https://orfme.org/expert-speak/the-mous-unequal-bargain-irans-advantage-washingtons-retreat/)

- [CNBC — US-Iran roadmap, final deal, Switzerland talks, Lebanon deconfliction — June 22, 2026](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/22/us-iran-roadmap-final-deal-switzerland-talks-lebanon-deconfliction.html)

### Secondary sources

- [Robert Schuman Foundation — Europeans caught between trust and the need for protection — June 22, 2026](https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/the-letter/1161)

- [New America — What the Iran MOU gets right, gets wrong, and leaves unresolved — June 2026](https://www.newamerica.org/insights/what-the-iran-mou-gets-right-gets-wrong-and-leaves-unresolved/)

- [Iran International — Internal Iranian political divisions over the MoU — June 24, 2026](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202606247001)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/l-accord-us-iran-khamenei-joue-la-montre-trump-joue-au-poker