# Kyiv Has Wiped Out a Third of Russia's Refining Capacity and Is Hitting Putin's War Economy

> Since January 2025, Ukraine has struck 21 of Russia's 38 major oil refineries, according to an analysis by BBC Verify and BBC

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-05
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/kyiv-a-detruit-un-tiers-du-raffinage-russe-et-frappe-l-economie-de-guerre-de-pou

## Introduction: the fuel war Moscow refuses to name

### A number that speaks louder than any Kremlin statement

Since **January 2025**, **Ukraine** has struck **21 of Russia's 38** major oil refineries, according to an analysis by **BBC Verify** and **BBC Russian** picked up by multiple international outlets. This is not an isolated raid or a communications stunt: it is a **systematic campaign** that has now run for more than a year, and it has produced an effect even the **Kremlin** can no longer hide — fuel shortages on Russian soil.

The **Chinese ministry** has nothing to do with this story, but the affair speaks directly to the global geopolitical balance: every barrel of refined oil **Russia** can no longer produce is one less barrel to fund its missiles, its **Shahed** drones and its armored columns on the **Donbas** front. According to **Bloomberg**, **Ukraine** has carried out more than **50 strikes** on Russian refining facilities since the start of **2026**, compared with **82** for all of **2025** — a pace that reflects a deliberate intensification of the strategy.

### Why 21 out of 38 changes the equation

Damaged refining capacity is not the same as permanently destroyed capacity, but it translates immediately into a **cut in fuel output** available to the Russian army and population. According to a scientist quoted by **Al Jazeera**, Ukrainian drone strikes have knocked out **close to a quarter** of the country's total refining capacity, a figure indirectly confirmed by the sharp rise in pump prices seen across several Russian regions.

The **Washington Examiner** reports that Russia's daily output of refined oil fell from **5.2 million barrels a day** in late March to under **4 million barrels a day** by late May, before partially recovering in early June. That is a drop of more than **20 percent** in barely two months — an economic shock that even a centralized war economy struggles to absorb painlessly.

*I'll say it plainly: this is one of the smartest military campaigns of the entire war. No splashy headlines about territorial reconquest, just methodical sabotage that goes after Putin exactly where it hurts — his oil wallet.*

## A target list that goes beyond simple military logic

### From Yaroslavl to Ufa, no region is spared

According to a roundup published by **Reuters**, Ukrainian strikes have hit facilities as varied as the **Yaroslavl refinery**, roughly **700 kilometers** from the Ukrainian border, the **Syzran refinery** in the **Samara** region, the **Tuapse** plant on the Black Sea, and the **NORSI** facility near **Kstovo**, the country's second-largest gasoline producer. President **Volodymyr Zelensky** himself confirmed, on **July 1, 2026**, a strike on the **Ufa** refinery, more than **1,300 kilometers** from the front — the second such strike on that facility.

Ukraine's **Defense Ministry** said it hit **11 refineries** in **June 2026** alone, on top of fuel logistics sites and military plants. This geographic spread of targets makes life considerably harder for Russian air defense, which now has to protect a far larger swath of territory than at the start of the conflict.

### The central role of long-range drones

This strategic reach is made possible by **long-range kamikaze drones** of the **FP-1** type, introduced in late **2024** by the Ukrainian company **Fire Point**, according to the **Washington Examiner**. In **2025**, Ukraine carried out more than **150 successful strikes** against Russian oil infrastructure, averaging **13 to 17 strikes** a month. Over the first five months of **2026**, that pace jumped to nearly **70 strikes**, proof that both the technology and the doctrine have kept improving.

*It bears repeating: this cheap drone war against multibillion-dollar oil infrastructure is rewriting the military strategy playbook. Strike after strike, Ukraine is proving that an agile, low-cost defense industry can shake an entire petro-economy.*

## The economic price, spelled out in black and white

### Thirteen billion dollars in losses in one year

According to the **Washington Examiner**, Russian oil companies suffered total losses exceeding **$13 billion** in **2025**, including roughly **$1.29 billion** in direct physical damage, with the rest coming from lost profits and knock-on effects across the production chain. That figure does not even account for the extra spending **Moscow** has poured into repairing, protecting and rerouting around its damaged infrastructure.

In some Russian regions, according to the same outlet, gasoline prices have **doubled**, triggering endless lines at gas stations and purchase restrictions. **Reuters** reports that the national average gasoline price has climbed **11.6 percent** since the start of the year, reaching **72.38 rubles** a liter by late June, while independent stations are now charging upward of **100 rubles** a liter in some hard-hit areas.

### Occupied Crimea, ground zero of the shortage

In **Sevastopol**, in occupied **Crimea**, gasoline prices jumped **30 percent in a single week** in late June, according to official Russian statistics cited by **The Moscow Times**. Occupation authorities imposed **fuel rationing** as early as May and declared a **regional state of emergency** after fresh strikes on the power grid. The measure was set to remain in force for at least another month.

*There is a peculiar justice in watching Crimea, illegally annexed in 2014, become the most visible symbol of Russia's energy failure. This territory stolen from Ukraine is now paying the steep price of a war Moscow chose to drag on indefinitely.*

## Putin forced to admit the pain, without changing course

### A rare but calculated admission

Russian President **Vladimir Putin** acknowledged, on **June 28, 2026**, that Ukrainian drone strikes were **"painful"** for Russia, according to **Al Jazeera**. That is a rare admission for a leader accustomed to blanket denial, but he quickly added that **Moscow** had the situation under control, refusing any sign of weakness in front of his own public or Ukraine.

At the same time, **Putin** maintained — and even hardened — his demands for a settlement, insisting on **Ukraine's neutrality**, a cap on the size of its army, and de facto recognition of occupied territories, according to remarks reported on **June 23**. He even invoked the notion of **"Novorossiya,"** a territorial expansion well beyond the **Donbas**, going as far as raising the prospect of further Ukrainian withdrawals in **Zaporizhzhia**.

### Fuel imports, a symbol of a reversal

In the starkest sign of the crisis, **Russia** has started importing gasoline from **India** by sea, according to two industry sources cited by **Reuters** on **July 1, 2026**. A country that has spent decades presenting itself as an **energy superpower** is now reduced to buying refined fuel abroad to plug its own domestic shortfalls — a reversal as humiliating as it is revealing.

*Watching Putin's Russia import gasoline, a country that has exported crude oil for a century, is almost historical irony. But make no mistake: this logistical humiliation alone won't be enough to bend a regime willing to sacrifice its population's comfort to keep the war going.*

## The limits of an economic pressure strategy

### A war economy that remains resilient

A commentator for **Al Jazeera** points to an uncomfortable truth: despite the shortages, **Russian crude oil and gas production remains largely intact**, meaning the financial backbone of the **Kremlin's** war effort has not been broken. A **Carnegie Center** report published in March already estimated that Russia's difficulties remained **"largely manageable"** for the Kremlin and the oil industry over a three-to-five-year horizon.

Worse, **Iran's** closure of the **Strait of Hormuz** in the following months allowed **Moscow** to pocket billions of extra petrodollars thanks to higher global prices — a paradox that shows just how unpredictable, and sometimes favorable, energy geopolitics can remain, sanctions and strikes notwithstanding.

### Zelensky bets on a new 40-day campaign

Faced with that reality, President **Zelensky** announced a new **"influence operation"** lasting **40 days**, further intensifying drone strikes to force **Moscow** to revise its peace terms, according to **Al Jazeera**. Russia responded by targeting Ukrainian gas stations on the left bank of the **Dnipro**, seeking in turn to choke off Ukraine's army and civilian population.

*This race to mutual asphyxiation worries me as much as it forces my strategic respect. Ukraine is playing a risky card: convincing Western opinion, and especially Washington, that it can still hurt Moscow, while its own civilians face equally targeted reprisals on their fuel supplies.*

## The diplomatic backdrop: the shadow of the Alaska summit

### A peace framework that never really held

**Putin's** current demands trace directly back to the failed **Alaska** summit between him and U.S. President **Donald Trump** in **August 2025**, a meeting meant to lay the groundwork for de-escalation but which mostly exposed the yawning gap between Russian and Ukrainian positions. Moscow's repeated references to this **"Anchorage framework"** show it still treats that summit as a legitimate anchor point for its territorial claims.

This rhetorical dependence on the **Alaska** precedent also illustrates how hard it has been for the U.S. administration to turn a one-off diplomatic dialogue into a durable peace process, even as the ground reality keeps being redrawn by drones and missiles.

### Trump and the military file: a more nuanced reading

To be fair: on the strictly military front, the **Trump** administration has kept up logistical and intelligence support that has allowed Ukraine to refine its long-range strike campaign. That paradox deserves to be pointed out, because it cuts against the broader criticism aimed at U.S. domestic policy on other files.

*I won't hold back my satisfaction in acknowledging it: when Western military posture stays firm, it produces tangible results on the ground, like this strike campaign that likely wouldn't have the same reach without continuous technological and satellite-imagery support from Washington.*

## The ripple effects on Russian crude exports

### A country forced to export more crude to compensate

Paradoxically, the drop in refining capacity is pushing **Russia** to export more unrefined crude oil rather than refined fuel, a substitution that reduces the added value of its sales. According to sources cited by specialized outlets, exports from the ports of **Primorsk**, **Ust-Luga** and **Novorossiysk** reached nearly **3 million barrels a day** in June, a record level meant to offset the shortfall in domestic refining.

This dynamic confirms that Ukraine's strategy is reshaping the deep structure of Russian energy exports, forcing **Moscow** to sell a less profitable raw material instead of higher-value refined products.

### Pressure spreading to ports and terminals

The strikes are no longer confined to refineries alone: the **Primorsk terminal**, which normally handles up to **one million barrels a day**, lost at least **40 percent of its storage capacity** in March due to drone attacks, according to data cited by several agencies. The port of **Ust-Luga** also had its shipments suspended for two weeks after a strike sparked a major fire.

*This is the bigger picture that Western coverage of the war often misses: everyone talks about refineries, but forgets the ports, the terminals, the pipelines. It is precisely this systemic approach, targeting the entire oil logistics chain, that makes Ukraine's campaign so effective over time.*

## Russia's response: rationing and lowered standards

### Fuel quality standards slashed in an emergency

To avoid an even more severe shortage, **Russia** has authorized several refineries to produce fuel to **degraded environmental standards** for the domestic market, according to the newspaper **Kommersant**, cited by **Reuters**. This decision, telling in itself, sacrifices fuel quality to keep a minimum volume available to the population.

A ban on gasoline and kerosene exports remains in effect until **July 31, 2026**, a protectionist measure meant to preserve domestic stockpiles at the expense of export revenue, underscoring the scale of the economic dilemma Moscow is facing.

### Two-thirds of Russian regions hit by shortages

According to information carried by **Politico** and cited in several analyses, two-thirds of Russian regions were reporting fuel supply problems at the start of **July 2026**, affecting millions of ordinary citizens and directly threatening the activity of countless small businesses dependent on road transport.

*When a nuclear superpower is reduced to rationing gasoline across two-thirds of its territory, that touches something politically dangerous for those in power — even though Putin has shown, with Chechnya or the Beslan siege, a capacity for political endurance that should make us cautious about predicting a swift collapse.*

## What this means for the Ukrainian military front

### A direct link between energy and Russian offensive capacity

Every barrel of fuel missing at the rear potentially affects supplies to Russian units at the front, especially the diesel used by armored vehicles and logistics trucks. If this pressure is not yet enough to meaningfully slow the Russian advance in the **Donbas**, particularly around **Kostiantynivka**, it does add another layer of attrition over the medium term.

Experts cited by **Al Jazeera** remain cautious, however: the strike campaign has not, at this stage, halted Russian territorial gains, which remain the real military indicator both sides and their respective international backers are watching.

### The risk of a prolonged, reciprocal escalation

This mirror-image energy war, where each side targets the other's vital infrastructure, fits into an escalation logic that could drag on for months, even years, without either party budging on its fundamental red lines over occupied territories or Ukraine's future security.

*I stay clear-eyed: this oil war will never substitute for a battlefield victory, but it changes the long-term terms of the balance of power. The more Russia bleeds economically, the less it can fund an indefinite war of attrition — and that may well be where the real outcome of this conflict is being decided, patiently.*

## The role of Western allies in this quiet battle

### Satellite intelligence and technological support

The precision of strikes more than **1,300 kilometers** from the front is not explained by Ukrainian ingenuity alone: it also rests, in part, on intelligence and satellite-imagery capabilities supplied or facilitated by Western partners, notably the **United States** and several European **NATO** members.

This technological cooperation, rarely advertised publicly for operational security reasons, remains an essential pillar of Ukraine's ability to sustain constant pressure on targets deep inside Russian territory.

### A growing European dependency

According to **Al Jazeera**, **Ukraine** now depends almost existentially on European governments, particularly the British, French and German ones, to finance its war effort, having lost its main American financial backer on strictly monetary terms. Those governments, however, face mounting political pressure from far-right parties demanding an end to funding for Kyiv.

*This is where the shoe pinches for the future of this war: Ukraine can strike as far and as often as it wants inside Russia, but without stable, predictable European funding, that military capacity will eventually run out of steam. Europe must choose between strategic resolve and budget fatigue, and that choice can no longer be put off indefinitely.*

## What comes after: postwar energy reconstruction

### A durably weakened Russian oil sector

Even in the event of a swift ceasefire, **rebuilding Russia's oil sector** will require massive investment and access to technology and equipment often subject to Western sanctions, which could considerably slow the return to fully operational refining capacity.

This long-term structural weakness could become, for Western and Ukrainian negotiators, an important bargaining chip in any future discussion about gradually lifting the economic sanctions imposed on **Moscow** since **2022**.

### A strategic lesson for all of NATO

Beyond the Ukrainian case, this campaign demonstrates to every **NATO** member state the structural vulnerability of centralized energy infrastructure to swarms of cheap drones — a lesson several member states, including **Poland** and the Baltic states, have already begun folding into their own defense doctrines.

*Whether we like it or not, this war has become a vast open-air laboratory for Western military doctrine for the next decade. Ignoring the energy lessons of this conflict would be an unforgivable strategic negligence for any serious general staff in the Atlantic Alliance.*

## The voices skeptical of the campaign's political effectiveness

### Skepticism openly voiced by some analysts

Some observers, like the commentator cited by **Al Jazeera**, believe this strike campaign is seen in **Moscow** mainly as a communications operation designed to convince **Washington** to resume more massive support for Ukraine, rather than a decisive military lever in its own right.

That reading draws on precedents seen as similar, such as Ukraine's failed **2023** counteroffensive or the incursion into Russia's **Kursk** region, two episodes that also drew heavy Western media attention without durably shifting the balance of power on the ground.

### A necessary caution that must not discourage support

This analytical caution is legitimate and honest, but it should not be used as a pretext to cut material and diplomatic support to Ukraine. Economic pressure that undermines an adversary's main strategic resource remains, historically, one of the most reliable tools for wearing down a war machine over time.

*I refuse to give in to the prevailing fatalism that nothing will ever change Putin's calculus. Analytical doubt is healthy, but it must never become an excuse for Western inaction against an aggressor who, for his part, never doubts his willingness to keep the war going.*

## The China factor and the authoritarian axis in the background

### Beijing, an interested spectator of Russia's energy crisis

**China**, an increasingly important trading partner for **Moscow**, is watching this energy crisis closely, as it could strengthen its negotiating position on the price of Russian oil and gas sold at a discount for lack of other export outlets. This growing Russian dependence on its Asian neighbor illustrates a strategic imbalance increasingly tilted in **Beijing's** favor.

This dynamic fits into a broader picture in which **China**, **Iran** and **North Korea** continue, each in its own way, to provide indirect support to the Russian war effort, whether through technological components, munitions, or trade outlets that offset Western sanctions.

### A reminder for Western vigilance

This convergence of interests among authoritarian regimes reinforces the argument that the outcome of the war in **Ukraine** is not just an Eastern European matter, but concerns the global balance between Western democracies and revisionist powers seeking, together or separately, to redraw the international order to their advantage.

*You can no longer analyze this war in isolation: every barrel of Russian oil sold cheap to Beijing, every Shahed drone supplied by Tehran, every North Korean soldier sent to the front, sketches an architecture of authoritarian mutual aid that should push the West toward a solidarity just as organized and durable.*

## The information battle over refining numbers

### Estimates that vary depending on the source

It should be noted that exact figures vary slightly by source: some Russian-language outlets like **Vot Tak** cite **24 of 33** among the largest facilities hit since **2022**, while **BBC Verify** uses a figure of **21 of 38** since **January 2025** alone, with different counting methodologies. These discrepancies do not undercut the underlying trend, but they are a reminder of the need to cross-check sources before settling on a definitive figure.

The **Ryazan** and **Saratov** refineries are among the most frequently hit targets, with **15 strikes each** since the start of the conflict, according to data compiled by **Euromaidan Press**. The **Syzran** refinery, for its part, suffered its **eleventh strike** on **May 21, 2026**, illustrating the methodical repetition of certain targets deemed strategically vital.

### Why this statistical transparency matters to the reader

This divergence in numbers, far from weakening the story, instead shows the genuine difficulty of measuring in real time the damage inflicted on an infrastructure as vast and dispersed as Russia's oil complex, which spans several time zones and thousands of kilometers.

*I would always rather present slightly divergent but sourced figures than a single, rounded number that gives a false impression of absolute precision. The information war also runs through this kind of rigor, even when it makes for less dramatic reading.*

## Conclusion: a tactical victory, not yet a strategic one

### What this campaign has actually changed

Ukraine's refinery-strike campaign has produced tangible results: fuel shortages, higher prices, emergency imports, degraded quality standards and colossal financial losses for the Russian oil industry. These are verifiable facts, documented by multiple independent sources, not mere announcements.

Even so, this economic pressure has not yet altered **Vladimir Putin's** fundamental political calculus, as he maintains his maximalist territorial demands and continues to wage a war of attrition on the ground, particularly in the **Donbas**.

### What to watch in the coming weeks

The new **40-day** campaign announced by **Volodymyr Zelensky** will be a decisive test: if it manages to deepen Russia's energy crisis further while keeping Western support cohesive, it could eventually weigh on negotiations. If not, it risks joining the list of spectacular operations that, on their own, were not enough to bend Moscow.

*At the end of this analysis, I hold onto one simple conviction: Ukraine's energy pressure campaign is a legitimate and effective tool of war, but it will never replace the need for massive, sustained Western military and financial support. Without that, even the cleverest campaign will eventually run out of breath against the political resilience of the Russian regime.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- Washington Examiner, analysis of Ukraine's drone campaign against Russian energy — June 28, 2026

- Al Jazeera, analysis on the effectiveness of Ukraine's campaign against Russian refineries — July 1, 2026

- Reuters, roundup of Russian energy sites attacked by Ukraine — June 1, 2026

### Secondary sources

- Euromaidan Press, 24 of Russia's 33 largest refineries struck since 2022 — May 22, 2026

- Wikipedia, timeline of the 2025-2026 Russian fuel crisis

- Reuters, Russia imports gasoline from India to address shortages — July 1, 2026

- The Moscow Times, gasoline prices jump 30 percent in Sevastopol — July 2, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/kyiv-a-detruit-un-tiers-du-raffinage-russe-et-frappe-l-economie-de-guerre-de-pou