# PROFILE: Kim Jong-un Under Fire — On June 25, He Is Not Commemorating, He Is Threatening

> Seventy-six years ago, on June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel to launch the Korean War — a conflict that would kill more than 2.5 million people, including 36,574 American soldiers, and end in 1953 without a peace treaty, only an armistice. On June 25, 20

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Profile
- Published: 2026-06-27
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/kim-jong-un-au-feu-le-25-juin-il-ne-commemore-pas-il-menace

## Introduction: The Anniversary as a Political Weapon

### June 25, 1950 and June 25, 2026

**Seventy-six years ago**, on June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the **38th parallel** to launch the Korean War — a conflict that would kill more than **2.5 million people**, including 36,574 American soldiers, and end in 1953 without a peace treaty, only an armistice. On June 25, 2026, Kim Jong-un was standing in a firing range somewhere in North Korea, watching rockets cross the sky. He was not commemorating the war. He was **announcing it**.

This is not a calendar coincidence. In North Korean regime rhetoric, **every gesture is coded**. Every test, every parade, every official photograph carries a message addressed to multiple simultaneous audiences: Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing. Choosing the anniversary of the Korean War to personally oversee tests of advanced precision artillery systems is a **political declaration as much as a military one**.

### What was fired — and what it means

The official **KCNA** agency reported on June 26 that Kim Jong-un had overseen tests of an **upgraded 240mm 24-tube multiple rocket launcher** equipped with an **autonomous precision guidance system** and an **extended range of 90 kilometers**. He also oversaw tests of **tactical ballistic missiles** and a **155mm self-propelled howitzer** with extended-range shells capable of reaching **65 kilometers**. Kim expressed **satisfaction** with the results.

Translated from military language: these systems are designed to strike targets in **deep South Korea** — air bases, ports, power installations. The tested tactical ballistic missile carries a special warhead designed for the **lethal destruction of critical targets**. Kim's phrase was clear: **«The objective is to ensure defense along its southern border.»** Read: all of South Korea is in his sights.

*Kim says «defense». But a 90-kilometer autonomous-guidance rocket launcher pointed at Seoul is not a defensive posture. It is a message addressed to the 51 million South Koreans: you are within range, and I want you to know it.*

## The Portrait of a Man Who Never Improvises

### Forty years in the system, twelve years at the top

Kim Jong-un was born in **1984**, son of Kim Jong-il and grandson of Kim Il-sung, the regime's founder. He assumed power in **December 2011**, at age 27 or 28, after his father's death. In twelve years of rule, he has **executed his own uncle** (Jang Song-thaek, in 2013), carried out regular purges within the military elite, and led his country through more than **100 missile tests** and several nuclear tests. He does not improvise. He plans.

The decision to personally test weapons systems on the precise anniversary of the Korean War is not the whim of a dictator — it is the **staging of a national narrative**. The Pyongyang regime has built its entire legitimacy on **resistance to American imperialism** and the memory of the 1950-1953 war. June 25 is the most politically charged day in the North Korean calendar. Placing a missile test there fuses historical memory and contemporary demonstration of power.

### The five-year military modernization plan

The June 2026 tests fit within a **five-year national defense modernization plan** launched in 2021. Kim has set precise objectives: **automation, long range, ultra-precision**. By May 2026, Pyongyang had already tested a mix of tactical ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, and AI-guided cruise missiles. The progression is coherent and methodical.

Professor Lim Eul-chul, from the **Institute for Far Eastern Studies** at **Kyungnam University**, is direct: **«The intention is to fully establish tactical nuclear and precision strike capabilities in front-line units, placing all of South Korea within range.»** This is not alarmist analysis — it is a cold-eyed description of a program advancing on schedule.

*A five-year military plan with milestones met — that is something few world leaders can claim. Kim Jong-un has monstrous flaws. But he executes. And when an autocrat executes his military program, democracies had better take it seriously.*

## The Geography of the Threat: All of South Korea in the Crosshairs

### 90 kilometers — the distance to Seoul from the border

Seoul, the South Korean capital with its **10 million inhabitants**, sits **less than 50 kilometers from the demilitarized zone**. The 240mm rocket launcher tested on June 25 has a range of **90 kilometers**. That means that from positions at the northern border, the system can strike not only Seoul, but much of the metropolitan region that concentrates **a quarter of the population** and an even larger share of South Korea's GDP.

This is not a future hypothetical scenario. It is a present reality. The combination of rocket launcher, tactical ballistic missile, and self-propelled howitzer tested creates a **short-to-medium range precision strike triad** capable of saturating South Korean and American air defenses. This is a profound doctrinal challenge for the **Allied Forces Command** based in Seoul.

### Tactical nuclear integration

Professor Lim's analysis points to something even more alarming: Pyongyang is not only building more precise conventional weapons. It is building an infrastructure to **integrate tactical nuclear capabilities** into its front-line units. A 240mm rocket launcher with autonomous precision guidance could theoretically be adapted to carry **miniaturized nuclear warheads** — a capability North Korea has been developing for years.

Official North Korean state media images from Kim's factory visits in **December 2025 and June 2026** showed approximately **90 Hwasong-11A missiles without warheads fitted**. These missiles are stacked in factories. This is not decoration. It is mass production. And mass production precedes deployment.

*The world talks about the Iranian bomb. It should talk just as much — if not more — about North Korean missiles. Tehran is still negotiating. Pyongyang is producing. There is an important difference between a nuclear program under negotiation and an arsenal entering operational deployment phase.*

## Kim, Trump, and the Diplomacy That No Longer Rings

### Singapore, Hanoi, and the silence since 2019

In **2018**, Trump and Kim met in **Singapore** for a historic summit. In **2019**, they met again in **Hanoi**, where negotiations collapsed over the sanctions question. Since then, the diplomatic silence between Washington and Pyongyang has been almost total. Kim has refused any serious communication channel. North Korea has developed its nuclear and ballistic capabilities at an accelerated pace while Washington was absorbed by Ukraine, Iran, and American domestic politics.

Trump, in his first term, had bet on spectacular personal diplomacy with Kim — the «deal-maker» approach applied to denuclearization. It did not work. In his second term, North Korea is treated as a **second-tier priority**, absorbed into the broader concerns of the «axis of evil» formed by Russia, Iran, and China. Pyongyang has understood this — and is exploiting the lack of attention to advance its program.

### China and Beijing's shield

The North Korean equation cannot be resolved without China. Beijing represents **more than 90% of North Korea's foreign trade** and provides most of its energy. Without effective Chinese sanctions, any international economic pressure on Pyongyang remains limited. And China has no interest in seeing the North Korean regime collapse — which serves as a **strategic buffer** against American forces in South Korea.

Kim knows this. It is the foundation of his survival strategy: as long as Beijing refuses to join any serious economic pressure, and as long as Washington is distracted by other crises, North Korea can continue testing, producing, and deploying. The June 25 tests are the practical demonstration of that strategy.

*Beijing plays the classic double game: enough pressure to seem responsible before the international community, enough protection to keep Kim alive. It is a cynical policy, but an effective one. And while this goes on, North Korean missiles are improving their precision to 90 kilometers.*

## What Seoul and Tokyo Must Do

### The response of the regional democracies

South Korea captured the June 25 launches on its radars. The **South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff** condemned the tests. Tokyo issued a diplomatic protest. These reactions are ritual. What matters is the strategic response: South Korea and Japan have both reinforced their investments in **anti-missile systems** such as THAAD and PAC-3, and maintained close security cooperation with the United States.

But the June 25 exercise raises a profound doctrinal question: how do you defend a city of 10 million inhabitants against simultaneous saturation from precision rockets, tactical ballistic missiles, and long-range artillery? The honest answer is that **complete defense is impossible**. The objective is **deterrence** — making the cost of a North Korean first strike sufficiently catastrophic for Pyongyang that Kim never pushes the button.

### The stakes of American extended deterrence

**American extended deterrence** — the guarantee that Washington will defend Seoul and Tokyo including with its own nuclear weapons if necessary — has been the cornerstone of regional security since 1953. That guarantee has never been tested. But as North Korea develops **direct strike capabilities against American territory** — its Hwasong intercontinental missiles can theoretically reach the U.S. West Coast — the question arises: would an American president risk Chicago to defend Seoul?

This is the question Kim poses, implicitly, with every test. He does not need an answer now. He needs the question to remain open — so that **uncertainty itself becomes a strategic factor**. On that ground, the June 25, 2026 tests have fulfilled their mission.

*Extended deterrence rests on a promise: «We will die for you.» That is an extraordinary promise. Kim Jong-un has spent his career testing whether it is true. With each test, he gathers a little more information. And we respond only with condemnations and diplomatic protests.*

## North Korea and the War in Ukraine: A Rearmament Axis

### Shell deliveries: an openly assumed military cooperation

**North Korea** and **Russia** have developed significant **military cooperation** since **2022**. According to estimates from American, European, and South Korean intelligence services, **Pyongyang** has delivered to **Moscow** several million **152mm artillery shells** — Soviet-compatible munitions for Russian weapons systems, whose arsenals had been seriously depleted by the massive consumption of the war in **Ukraine**. These deliveries have allowed the Russian army to maintain an **intense rate of fire** on the eastern Ukrainian front.

In exchange, **North Korea** has received from **Russia** sensitive **military technologies** — particularly in the fields of **long-range ballistic missiles**, **submarines**, and **satellite reconnaissance**. These technology transfers are precisely accelerating the military modernization program that **Kim** oversaw on **June 25**. The **Moscow-Pyongyang axis** is not merely opportunistic — it is structural, and it serves the strategic needs of both parties.

### Sanctions: an exhausted mechanism

The **sanctions regime** against **North Korea** — maintained for decades through the **UN Security Council** — is imploding. **Russia** and **China**, two permanent members with veto rights, have been blocking any sanctions reinforcement since **2022**. **Russia** — now a trade and military partner of **Pyongyang** — obviously cannot vote for sanctions against a weapons supplier it depends on. This UN vacuum frees **Kim** from the constraint that had the most bite on his regime.

The **United States**, **Japan**, and **South Korea** maintain their own bilateral sanctions — but without the multilateral lock of the **UN**, their effectiveness is reduced. **Beijing** still represents **90% of North Korea's foreign trade** and remains the primary energy supplier. As long as **China** chooses to preserve the North Korean regime as a **strategic buffer**, the sanctions of other nations can only erode the margins — they cannot shatter the system.

*The military cooperation between Kim and Putin is not simply a proliferation problem. It is a systemic problem: two regimes using their mutual cooperation to circumvent international arms control mechanisms. And while we debate additional sanctions, North Korean missiles are improving their precision with Russian technology.*

## The Korean Peninsula in 2026: A Façade Stability

### Persistent tensions despite the absence of open conflict

The Korean Peninsula maintains a **surface-level stability** that regular missile tests permanently threaten. The **1953 armistice** still holds — but it has never been replaced by a peace treaty. The **two Koreas** remain technically at war. The **demilitarized zone (DMZ)** is one of the most militarized borders in the world, with hundreds of thousands of soldiers deployed on both sides along a **250-kilometer front**.

Relations between the **two Koreas** are at their lowest point in years. **Kim Jong-un** officially proclaimed **South Korea** as a **«hostile state»** in the **2023 constitutional amendments**, abandoning any reunification objective. **North Korea** has blown up cross-border roads and railways. The direct communication lines between Seoul and Pyongyang — the emergency **«hotlines»** — are closed. Non-communication is now the established norm.

### The role of NATO and the United States in regional security

The **United States** maintains approximately **28,500 soldiers** in **South Korea** under the bilateral defense alliance. These troops — deployed since the **Korean War** — remain the cornerstone of **American extended deterrence** on the peninsula. The **combined** U.S.-South Korean command regularly trains for conflict scenarios on the peninsula. The **Ulchi Freedom Shield** military exercises were relaunched in **2023** following a diplomatic pause.

But the question of **American reliability** — exacerbated by **Trump's** statements about deployment costs and his past discussions with **Kim** — remains a deep source of anxiety in **Seoul**. **South Korea** is investing massively in its own capabilities: development of a long-range ballistic missile, improvement of preemptive strike systems, reinforcement of the **conventional nuclear triad**. This is not an abandonment of the American alliance — it is **comprehensive insurance** against a possible defection.

*Seoul has lived for 73 years with the threat of Pyongyang 50 kilometers away. They have learned to coexist with something the rest of the world would find unbearable. That resilience deserves respect. But normalizing the threat must not lead to minimizing it. Every Kim test, every new precision system, brings a little closer a conflict nobody wants — and that everyone risks anyway.*

## Kim Jong-un and International Opinion: The Weight of a Watching World

### The gaze of democracies facing a performative dictatorship

**Kim Jong-un** is one of the most photographed heads of state in the world — and yet one of the most opaque. Every official image is a meticulous construction: **Kim** in front of missiles, **Kim** with generals, **Kim** smiling in front of test explosions. These images are **diplomatic messages** disguised as press photos. The June **25** test, with the photos published by **KCNA** showing **Kim** in front of the systems tested, follows precisely this protocol.

The international community has developed a certain **anesthesia** to North Korean provocations. Missile tests, threatening declarations, images of **Kim** overseeing launches — all of this has become predictable background noise. This anesthesia is dangerous. It normalizes what should not be normalized. **North Korea** is a regime that has reduced its own people to economic and political servitude to fund a program of weapons of mass destruction. That fact should never be trivialized.

### Human rights in North Korea: the forgotten dimension

While the world debates missiles and ranges, **25 million North Koreans** live under one of the most absolute dictatorships in the world. **Forced labor camps** — the **kwan-li-so** system — hold tens of thousands of political prisoners in conditions documented by the **UN Commission of Inquiry Report** as constituting **crimes against humanity**. Periodic famine kills entire populations while the regime funds its missiles.

**Kim** can test his missiles with impunity in part because the international community has separated the **human rights** question from the **nuclear security** question. We negotiate with **Pyongyang** on missiles while setting aside the crimes committed against **North Koreans**. This separation is understandable tactically — but it sends a message: regimes that commit systemic crimes against their own people need not fear sanctions related to those crimes if their nuclear value makes them indispensable to negotiations.

*We speak of the North Korean nuclear program as a regional security problem. It is also an ongoing crime against humanity. The 25 million North Koreans surviving in this system did not choose Kim. They did not choose the missiles. They were condemned to be born in an open-air prison. Forgetting them in our strategic analyses is subjecting them to a second injustice.*

## Conclusion: A Portrait for What He Really Is

### Kim Jong-un is not mad — that is the problem

The Western narrative likes to portray Kim Jong-un as an unpredictable, irrational dictator — a dangerous madman with whom you cannot negotiate. This caricature is reassuring but false. Kim is a cold strategist who has **consolidated his internal power**, developed an **operational nuclear arsenal**, survived decades of sanctions, and kept his regime alive despite every prediction of collapse.

He chose June 25, 2026 for his tests with surgical precision. He selected weapons systems that send clear messages: precision, range, mass. He declared a doctrine — **«automation, long-range capability, ultra-precision»** — and he executes it. This is not madness. It is strategy. And it is infinitely more dangerous than madness.

*This moment — imperfect, tense, full of contradictions — will remain in the history books. Not as a clean victory, but as proof that the world can still change direction when the pressure becomes unbearable. Hope never dies entirely. It waits.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [US News / Reuters — North Korean leader Kim oversees weapons tests, KCNA reports — June 25, 2026](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2026-06-25/north-korean-leader-kim-oversees-weapons-tests-kcna-reports)

- [Yonhap News Agency — N. Korea tests key weapons seen as aimed at S. Korea — June 25-26, 2026](https://en.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20260626012700315)

- [Yeni Şafak / AA — North Korea tests upgraded artillery and missile systems — June 26, 2026](https://en.yenisafak.com/world/north-korea-tests-upgraded-artillery-and-missile-systems-3720040)

### Secondary sources

- [Aju Press — Kim Jong Un Observes New Rocket and Missile Tests on Korean War Anniversary — June 26, 2026](https://m.ajupress.com/amp/20260626193270810)

- [Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation — Fact Sheet: North Korea Missile Launch Activity — updated 2026](https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-korea-missile-test-activity/)

- [Wikipedia — Hwasong-11A missile system — consulted June 2026](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwasong-11A)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/kim-jong-un-au-feu-le-25-juin-il-ne-commemore-pas-il-menace