# Israel and Lebanon tie ceasefire to Hezbollah's contested disarmament > Introduction: an agreement signed without the main party involved - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Investigation - Published: 2026-07-04 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/israel-liban-lient-le-cessez-le-feu-au-desarmement-controverse-du-hezbollah ## Introduction: an agreement signed without the main party involved ### Four days of negotiations in Washington After **four days** of marathon negotiations in **Washington**, **Israel** and **Lebanon** signed, on **Friday, June 26, 2026**, a **framework agreement** meant to end months of deadly fighting. The text, released by the **U.S. State Department**, directly ties a **lasting ceasefire** to the **gradual disarmament of Hezbollah**, a formula the Shiite movement already calls "capitulation." **Secretary of State Marco Rubio**, the architect of these talks, called the agreement "the **end of the beginning**," himself acknowledging the scale of the work still ahead. Washington also announced an **immediate humanitarian contribution of 100 million dollars**, coordinated with the United Nations, to support populations displaced by months of bombing. ### A major absence at the negotiating table The **most striking detail** of this agreement isn't what it contains, but who signed it. **Hezbollah**, the main armed actor targeted by the text, **was not a party to the agreement** and never sat at the negotiating table. It was the Lebanese government and the Israeli state that signed a text supposedly meant to govern the disarmament of a force neither of them militarily controls. This **structural absence** raises a central question that even **American diplomats** acknowledge privately: can a disarmament agreement produce a concrete outcome when the targeted armed group categorically refuses to comply and never agreed to the clauses concerning it most directly? *I'll say it upfront: signing a disarmament agreement without the presence of the group being ordered to disarm looks more like diplomatic theater than serious conflict resolution.* ## What's in the framework agreement ### A phased mechanism rather than an immediate withdrawal Contrary to what Beirut had demanded for months, the agreement **includes no immediate withdrawal** of Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese territory. The text instead sets up a "**phased process**": the Lebanese army will gradually restore its "**effective sovereign authority**" over the entire national territory, but that restoration remains conditional on "**verification of the disarmament of non-state armed groups**," a formula that unambiguously refers to Hezbollah. Israel currently occupies nearly **20% of Lebanese territory** in the south of the country. **Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu** stated that his army would maintain this **buffer zone** "until Hezbollah disarms and for as long as there is a threat to the State of Israel." ### Two pilot zones as a feasibility test The framework calls for the creation of **two "pilot zones"** where the Lebanese army "will gradually take on full security responsibility." The first is located **south of the Litani River**, entirely outside Israel's current security zone. The second is **north of the Litani**, a small piece of territory captured by Israel over the past two weeks that the Israeli military itself considers to have no strategic value. More than **1.2 million people** have been forcibly displaced by the conflict, and the agreement promises their safe return "once these zones are placed under the exclusive control of Lebanese state authorities." An **annex security section**, detailing the precise military redeployments, has not been made public. *Two pilot zones, one of which Israel itself admits it doesn't want to keep: this is far from a major strategic concession, more like a calculated gesture to give the appearance of movement.* ## Hezbollah's categorical rejection ### Naim Qassem denounces a "capitulation" **Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem** rejected the agreement the very day after it was signed, calling it "**null and void**." In a televised statement, he said that "tying the Israeli withdrawal to the disarmament of the resistance across all of Lebanon is a very dangerous proposal that crosses every red line," adding that the framework agreement signed in Washington is "**humiliating, shameful, and a surrender of sovereignty**." Qassem proposed an alternative: replacing this agreement with the **Iran-United States memorandum of understanding** signed on **June 15, 2026** in Islamabad, a text that demands an end to hostilities on all fronts without any prior condition of disarmament. He also warned that Hezbollah would keep its weapons "within reach," ready to fight Israel should the Lebanese state fail to do so. ### Protests and the risk of civil unrest As soon as the agreement was announced, **Hezbollah supporters** flooded the streets of **Beirut**, burning tires and blocking a road leading to the airport. Hezbollah official **Hassan Fadlallah** warned that Lebanese authorities could not enforce this agreement "without triggering, with American backing, a civil war," with Hezbollah refusing to hand over its weapons and vowing to resist any move by the Lebanese army. **Lebanese Attorney General Ahmed Rami al-Hajj** ordered security agency officials the very next day to take measures to prevent riots, a sign that Beirut anticipates major internal tensions in the weeks ahead. *A Hezbollah official openly raising the specter of civil war to block disarmament says a lot about how fragile this agreement, signed with such fanfare in Washington, really is.* ## Israel's position and its conditions ### Netanyahu sets his own timeline **Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz** summed up Tel Aviv's position bluntly: "The important principle established in this agreement is that there will be no Israeli redeployment in southern Lebanon, no withdrawal, until the Hezbollah terrorist organization is disarmed throughout the country." He stated that the Israeli military had been instructed to "prepare for an extended stay in the security zone" inside Lebanese territory. This position confirms that the agreement, far from imposing a binding timeline on Israel, actually grants it **almost unlimited latitude**: as long as Hezbollah refuses to disarm, which is already officially the case, Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon remains justified even under the terms of the text signed in Washington. ### A drone strike that contradicts the spirit of the agreement The very day after the signing, official Lebanese news agency **NNA** reported that an Israeli drone strike had hit the intersection near the Farah amusement park, in **Nabatieh al-Fawqa**. Since the conflict began on **March 2, 2026**, Israel has killed at least **4,192 people** in Lebanon, a toll that reflects the intensity of four months of nearly nonstop fighting. Previous ceasefire agreements, notably the one from **November 2024**, had already failed when Israel continued near-daily strikes in violation of the signed text. Nothing in the new framework agreement structurally prevents a repeat of this scenario. *A drone strike twenty-four hours after signing an agreement meant to establish peace: it's hard not to read it as a clear signal to Beirut and Tehran about who really dictates the pace of operations.* ## The regional context and rivalry with the Islamabad agreement ### An open contradiction with the Iran-United States protocol The Israel-Lebanon agreement **directly contradicts** the **memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad** on June 15, 2026 between American President **Donald Trump** and his Iranian counterpart **Masoud Pezeshkian**. That text demands an end to hostilities on all fronts, including in Lebanon, with no prior condition of disarmament, and doesn't even mention Iran-backed armed groups among its clauses. Iranian news agency **Fars** claimed the Israel-Lebanon agreement effectively amounted to American authorization for Israel to violate the first clause of the Islamabad protocol. Tehran had not officially reacted at the time of signing, but Iranian state media were already pushing back against the agreement. ### A partial diplomatic win for Netanyahu On the Israeli domestic front, this agreement represents a **partial and momentary win** for Netanyahu, who had faced sharp criticism after Washington and Tehran sidelined him during the signing of the Islamabad protocol. By securing a text that protects Israel's military presence in Lebanon as long as Hezbollah hasn't disarmed, the Israeli prime minister reclaims the diplomatic initiative in the eyes of his public. This dynamic illustrates an **unavoidable reality** of the conflict: every **regional actor**, whether Israel, Iran, or Hezbollah, uses these successive agreements to serve domestic political goals as much as regional strategic calculations. *China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are watching this kind of standoff with obvious strategic interest: every fragile agreement signed under American pressure becomes one more argument to question the West's reliability as a mediator.* ## Dissenting voices and the risks of failure ### Deeply skeptical analysts **Analyst** **Tahani Mustafa** warned that Israel and Washington "will certainly use Hezbollah's refusal to disarm to blame the movement for derailing the entire process," while noting that Israel itself has "proven that it acts in bad faith, which gives Hezbollah no confidence to disarm or surrender in the manner demanded." She also pointed to American negotiators, accused of working behind the scenes to separate Lebanon from Iran. Israeli analyst **Alon Pinkas** said he was "very doubtful and skeptical" about this agreement's chances of success, noting that the real crux of the problem remains Hezbollah itself, absent from the entire negotiation. Journalist **Ali Hashem** went further, calling the agreement an "**existential threat**" to Hezbollah's presence, adding: "Without Hezbollah's consent, this will not happen." ### A Lebanese government unable to enforce disarmament According to **Hashem**, "the **Lebanese government** **is not capable** of enforcing this agreement. It is not the de facto force on the ground." This assessment echoes that of many regional experts: the Lebanese army, underequipped and politically fragile, has neither the firepower nor the popular legitimacy needed to forcibly disarm a movement as socially and militarily entrenched as Hezbollah. Two **previous ceasefire agreements** negotiated by Beirut with Israel since the start of the latest war have also never been fully implemented, a track record that legitimately fuels skepticism surrounding this new text. *When two previous agreements have already failed and the same actors, with the same balance of power, sign a third text, it takes outsized optimism to believe this time will be different.* ## The human toll of a prolonged conflict ### Civilians caught in the middle Beyond the diplomatic calculations, it is **Lebanese civilians** who pay the heaviest price of this prolonged conflict. More than **1.2 million people** have been uprooted from their homes in the south of the country, forced to live in precarious conditions since hostilities began on **March 2, 2026**. The return promised by the framework agreement remains conditional on a disarmament that no one, at this stage, can guarantee will happen. This **prolonged uncertainty** weighs heavily on entire families who have been waiting for months for a clear signal that would let them return home safely. The toll of **more than 4,000 deaths** on the Lebanese side since March doesn't account for the thousands of wounded and the considerable material damage inflicted on civilian infrastructure in the south of the country. ### A precedent that worries the region For observers of the **Middle East**, this agreement is also a precedent being closely watched by other actors, notably in **Syria** and **Iraq**, where Iran-backed armed groups operate under similar dynamics. If the Lebanese model fails, it will become harder for Washington to propose comparable formulas elsewhere in the region. Conversely, even a partial success could serve as a limited model for other de-escalation attempts involving **non-state militias** aligned with Tehran, an issue that extends well beyond the Lebanese framework alone and touches on the strategic balance of the entire region. *What happens in Beirut never stays confined to Beirut: every precedent, successful or failed, reshapes the room to maneuver for Iran and its allies everywhere else in the region.* ## The American role and the limits of mediation ### American diplomacy under pressure The role played by **Marco Rubio** in these negotiations shows just how central Washington remains to any de-escalation effort in the Middle East, but also how structurally limited that centrality is. The **United States** cannot disarm Hezbollah in place of the Lebanese government, nor force Israel to follow a withdrawal timeline it doesn't consider to be in its immediate security interest. This **geopolitical reality** explains why two previous agreements, negotiated by the same American administration, failed to produce a lasting ceasefire. **American mediation**, however necessary to keep a channel of discussion open between the parties, is no substitute for local political will to end hostilities. ### The stakes for Western credibility For the **West** as a whole, every diplomatic failure in the Middle East reinforces the narrative pushed by **Russia**, **China**, and **Iran**, that Western powers are incapable of imposing lasting peace in the regions where they intervene diplomatically. This narrative, though exaggerated, finds fertile ground every time an agreement signed with great fanfare collapses within weeks. **North Korea** and other regimes hostile to the liberal international order are also watching these developments closely, seeing them as further confirmation that Western commitments can be pushed back or hollowed out by sufficiently determined resistance on the ground. *I remain convinced that American engagement in the Middle East remains indispensable, but this episode shows how much Western credibility is decided as much on the ground as at the negotiating table.* ## Conclusion: a fragile agreement on unstable ground ### The lessons of a ceasefire without universal consent This framework agreement illustrates a fundamental contradiction in current regional diplomacy: you cannot disarm an actor that has never agreed to disarm, and you cannot guarantee a military withdrawal conditioned on an event that everyone knows, from the moment of signing, is highly unlikely in the short term. **Sidon resident Rabie Sammour** summed up the mood of part of the Lebanese population, exhausted by months of war: "People just want to rest, for good." But others, like Lebanese citizen **Khaled Ghannoum**, believe the agreement "**legitimizes the Israeli occupation**" rather than ending it, a reading that reflects the deep divide running through Lebanese society over this text. ### A decisive test for American credibility in the region Whether this agreement succeeds or fails will ultimately depend on a single variable: **Hezbollah's** ability, or inability, to hold onto its arsenal despite the joint diplomatic pressure from Washington, Tel Aviv, and, in theory, Beirut. Marco Rubio himself admitted he was in "no way underestimating the difficulty of the task ahead," a rare admission from a senior American diplomat the day after a signing presented as historic. For the **West**, this episode is a reminder of a simple truth: signing an agreement never guarantees its enforcement, and **vigilance** toward Iran-backed armed groups must remain constant, or every fragile ceasefire will do nothing but delay the next confrontation. *I'll close this investigation with a simple conviction: until Hezbollah is disarmed either willingly or by a credible local force, no agreement signed in Washington will be enough to guarantee lasting peace in Lebanon.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Israel-Lebanon deal ties ceasefire to Hezbollah disarmament: Will it work? — Al Jazeera, June 27, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/6/27/israel-lebanon-deal-ties-ceasefire-to-hezbollah-disarmament-will-it-work) - [Lebanon's deal with Israel requires Hezbollah to disarm — Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2026](https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2026-06-27/lebanons-deal-with-israel-requires-hezbollah-to-disarm-that-might-be-difficult) - [IntelBrief — The Soufan Center, July 1, 2026](https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-july-1/) ### Secondary sources - [2026 Israel–Lebanon peace talks — Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Israel%E2%80%93Lebanon_peace_talks) - [Disarmament of Hezbollah — Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarmament_of_Hezbollah) - [Lethal attacks show strengthened Houthi control over Red Sea transit — Washington Institute](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lethal-attacks-show-strengthened-houthi-control-over-red-sea-transit) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. 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