# INVESTIGATION: Western defense industry buckles under production strain

> This investigation starts with a number that Western military experts have been repeating with growing urgency since the NATO summit held in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026: Russia produces roughly eight hundred ballistic…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Investigation
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/investigation-western-defense-industry-buckles-under-production-strain

## Introduction: an arithmetic problem with a human cost

### Eight hundred against six hundred, the number driving this investigation

This **investigation** starts with a number that **Western** military experts have been repeating with growing urgency since the **NATO** **summit** held in **Ankara** on **July 7 and 8, 2026**: **Russia** produces roughly **eight hundred** ballistic missiles a year, while the **United States** produces roughly **six hundred** **Patriot** **interceptors** a year. That gap, by itself, explains a great deal about why **Ukraine** could not intercept a single one of the nearly thirty ballistic missiles fired at it on the night of **July 6, 2026**.

What this **investigation** set out to determine is not whether this **shortage** exists, it is well documented, but why it exists, who bears responsibility for it, and whether the announcements made in **Ankara** represent a genuine turning point or another chapter in a now-familiar pattern of promises outpacing delivery.

### What we found, in brief

The findings are not comforting. Only five or six countries in the world possess the **industrial** **capacity** to manufacture **interceptors** capable of stopping ballistic missiles, a scarcity built over decades of underinvestment that predates this war by years. American **manufacturers**, overwhelmed by simultaneous demand from **Ukraine**, **Israel**, Gulf partners and domestic resupply needs following the recent war with **Iran**, were reportedly not even consulted before **Donald Trump** announced a **Patriot** **production** license for **Ukraine** in **Ankara**.

This **investigation** lays out, section by section, the technical bottlenecks, the political responsibility, and the human consequences of an **industrial** base that was never built for a war of this duration.

*I went into this investigation expecting to find a simple story about underinvestment. What I found instead was a system so structurally strained that no single announcement, however dramatic, can fix it quickly. That is the uncomfortable truth this piece has to carry.*

## The bottleneck experts keep naming: guidance systems and engines

### Why these two components cannot simply be mass-produced overnight

According to **Marc DeVore**, who chairs two advisory groups for the British Ministry of Defence, the two central technical obstacles limiting **interceptor** **production** are guidance systems and engines, both requiring specialized manufacturing expertise concentrated in a small number of facilities, mostly located in the **United States**. Guidance systems, in particular, represent some of the most closely guarded technology in the **Western** defense **industrial** base.

Fabian Hoffmann, a researcher specializing in missile technology, points to supply chain localization as the deeper structural bottleneck behind these two components: even with sufficient political will, building parallel manufacturing **capacity** requires establishing entire supply chains for specialized materials and components that currently exist in only a handful of locations worldwide.

### Why simply spending more money does not immediately solve this

This **investigation** confirms a pattern experts described consistently: additional funding, however necessary, does not translate quickly into additional **interceptors**, because the constraint is not primarily financial. It is **industrial** **capacity**, skilled labor, and specialized supply chains that take years to expand, regardless of how much money a government commits in a single budget cycle.

This distinction matters enormously for how the **Ankara** announcements should be evaluated. Billions in new contracts, however welcome, cannot manufacture guidance systems that do not yet have the factories or trained workforce to produce them at scale.

*Every expert I found cited in reporting on this crisis converges on the same point: money alone does not build a factory overnight. That should temper any celebration of new contracts announced in Ankara until we actually see expanded manufacturing capacity on the ground.*

## Manufacturers overwhelmed, and not even consulted

### Lockheed Martin and RTX, buried under simultaneous demand

**Lockheed Martin** and **RTX**, which jointly manufacture the **Patriot** system, currently face simultaneous demand from **Ukraine**, **Israel**, Gulf partners rebuilding stockpiles after the recent conflict with **Iran**, and the **United States** military's own need to replenish reserves. This **investigation** found that according to reporting from **CBS News** and **Defense News**, these **manufacturers** had not been informed of the **Patriot** license announcement before **Donald Trump** made it public in **Ankara**.

That detail, confirmed across multiple outlets, raises a legitimate question this **investigation** could not fully resolve: how can a licensing commitment of this magnitude be announced without the consent or knowledge of the companies expected to execute it. The most plausible explanation, based on available reporting, is that the announcement reflected political intention rather than a completed **industrial** agreement.

### Commercial incentives that do not always align with strategic urgency

Defense **manufacturers**, as publicly traded companies with obligations to shareholders, calculate **production** expansion decisions partly through a commercial lens: will demand remain high enough, for long enough, to justify the capital investment required to build new production lines. This commercial calculation does not always align neatly with the strategic urgency policymakers describe in public statements.

This tension, documented by industry analysts, is not unique to this war, but it becomes especially visible when a government asks a private company to license sensitive technology to a third country on a timeline shaped by battlefield urgency rather than by the company's own investment planning cycle.

*I find it genuinely troubling that a company expected to license its own technology apparently learned about the decision from the news, the same way the rest of us did. That is not how serious industrial policy should be made, regardless of the urgency driving it.*

## Decades of underinvestment, and who is responsible for it

### A defense industrial base built for a different era

This **investigation** traces the roots of today's **shortage** back well before this war began. Following the end of the Cold War, **Western** governments systematically reduced defense procurement budgets, consolidated **manufacturers**, and closed **production** lines that were judged unnecessary in an era of relative peace. That consolidation, rational at the time given the strategic context, left the **West** with an **industrial** base fundamentally unprepared for a high-intensity, multi-year war of attrition.

Successive governments across multiple **Western** countries share responsibility for this underinvestment, a responsibility that spans decades and multiple political parties, not a single administration or a single country. This is not a partisan failure. It is a structural one, built through years of choices that made sense individually but left the collective **West** exposed once **Russia** launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.

### Why naming this responsibility matters now

Naming this responsibility honestly matters because it clarifies what actually needs to change: not a single policy announcement, but a sustained, multi-year reversal of decades of disinvestment. The **Ankara Declaration's** commitment to expanding collective manufacturing **capacity** gestures toward this need, but gestures in a communiqué are not the same as the sustained political commitment required to see this reversal through multiple budget cycles and multiple election cycles.

This **investigation** found no evidence that **Western** governments have yet fully grappled, in public, with the scale of investment and time required to close this gap. The rhetoric in **Ankara** acknowledged the problem. It did not yet describe a plan proportionate to its scale.

*I think Western democracies owe their citizens an honest accounting of how decades of underinvestment created this shortage, rather than treating the current crisis as if it appeared overnight and could be fixed just as quickly.*

## The Russian war economy, an uncomfortable comparison

### How Moscow sustains its production rate under sanctions

This **investigation** examined how **Russia** sustains a missile **production** rate that currently outpaces the **West**'s **interceptor** manufacturing, despite years of sanctions intended to degrade its military **industrial** **capacity**. Multiple analysts point to sanctions evasion through **China** and third countries, a wartime economy fully mobilized around military production, and a willingness to accept civilian economic costs that **Western** democracies, structured differently, do not face in the same way.

This comparison is uncomfortable precisely because it exposes a structural asymmetry: an authoritarian war economy can prioritize military **production** with fewer competing claims on resources than a democratic economy balancing defense spending against healthcare, education, and other legitimate public priorities.

### Why this asymmetry does not excuse Western inaction

I want to be precise about what this comparison does and does not mean. It does not mean **Western** democracies should abandon the competing priorities that define a healthy, accountable society. It means Western planners need to design an **industrial** mobilization that works within democratic constraints, rather than assuming they can match an authoritarian **production** rate through the same methods **Moscow** uses.

This **investigation** found that few **Western** officials have publicly articulated what such a democratically compatible mobilization would actually look like, beyond general commitments to increase spending, a gap this piece considers one of the most significant unanswered questions coming out of **Ankara**.

*Comparing Russia's war economy to the West's industrial response is uncomfortable, and I think we need to sit with that discomfort rather than looking away from it, because the gap it reveals has a direct, measurable cost in Ukrainian lives.*

## What Ankara actually announced, measured against the shortage

### Fifty billion in contracts, against a multi-year structural gap

The **Ankara Declaration**, published on **July 8, 2026**, announced more than **fifty billion dollars** in new weapons contracts and a broader commitment to expand the Alliance's collective manufacturing capacity. Measured against the scale of the structural gap this investigation has documented, decades of underinvestment, a five- or six-country **production** bottleneck for critical **interceptors**, and manufacturers already overwhelmed by existing demand, this figure represents a meaningful first step rather than a solved problem.

This is not a dismissal of the announcement. Fifty billion dollars in new contracts is a real, measurable commitment that can fund actual expansion of production lines, if executed with the sustained follow-through that similar past commitments have not always received.

### Why execution history should temper optimism

This investigation reviewed the pattern of Western commitments to **Ukraine** since 2022 and found a recurring gap between announced figures and delivered capability, not because of bad faith, but because of exactly the industrial and bureaucratic friction this piece has documented throughout. There is no reason, based on that pattern, to assume the **Ankara** commitments will automatically avoid the same fate.

The honest assessment, based on available evidence, is that **Ankara** represents a necessary and welcome commitment whose ultimate value will only be measurable once the promised contracts translate into expanded factories, trained workers, and delivered interceptors, a process this investigation estimates will take years, not months.

*Fifty billion dollars sounds impressive until you measure it against a shortage built over decades. I want to celebrate real progress when it happens, and I refuse to celebrate a number before it becomes an actual factory producing actual interceptors.*

## Poland's rise as an industrial hub, a partial answer

### Geography and threat perception driving faster investment

**Poland**, facing direct proximity to both **Russia** and **Belarus**, has invested in defense industrial capacity at a pace that outstrips most other European allies relative to the size of its economy. This investigation found that **Poland's** threat perception, sharpened by geography, has translated into political consensus for sustained defense investment that other, more geographically insulated allies have found harder to sustain domestically.

**Poland's** growing role as a logistics and, increasingly, manufacturing hub for materiel destined for **Ukraine** represents one of the more genuinely encouraging developments this investigation uncovered, a geographically logical diversification of the West's industrial base away from near-total concentration in the **United States**.

### Why one country's investment cannot solve a collective problem

**Poland's** investment, however genuine, cannot by itself close a gap that requires collective action across the Alliance. This investigation found that **Poland's** capacity, while growing, remains a fraction of what would be needed to meaningfully offset the American production bottleneck for the most sophisticated interceptor systems, which require technology and manufacturing depth **Poland** does not yet possess at scale.

**Poland's** example should be read as a proof of concept for what geographically motivated investment can achieve, not as evidence that the broader Alliance-wide shortage is close to resolution.

*Poland deserves real credit for treating this threat with the urgency its geography demands, and I think other allies further from the front line should ask themselves honestly why they have not matched that urgency.*

## The human cost this investigation kept returning to

### Thirty dead in Kyiv, a direct line to a production statistic

On **July 2, 2026**, a Russian strike killed at least **thirty people** in **Kyiv** in a single night. This investigation draws a direct, documented line between that death toll and the production statistics detailed throughout this piece: a Western interceptor shortage that left Ukrainian air defense unable to stop every incoming missile, on a night that arrived just days before the **Ankara** summit convened to discuss, among other things, exactly this shortage.

I want to be precise about what this line does and does not establish. It does not mean any single Western official is criminally responsible for these deaths. **Russia** chose to fire the missiles that killed these thirty people. But it does mean the industrial shortage this investigation has documented has a measurable human cost, not an abstract one, and that cost accrues specifically to Ukrainian civilians.

### A double responsibility that must be named clearly

This investigation concludes that responsibility for these deaths is double, not divided: **Russia** bears full moral and legal responsibility for a war of aggression that specifically targets civilian areas, and the West bears a distinct, separate responsibility for the pace of its industrial response to a shortage it has known about for years. Naming the second responsibility does not diminish the first. Both are true, and both deserve to be stated without euphemism.

This is the finding I consider most important in this entire investigation: the interceptor shortage is not a neutral technical problem. It is a policy failure with a documented body count, and treating it with anything less than that gravity would be a disservice to the people paying its cost.

*I will not let a production statistic sit disconnected from the thirty people who died in Kyiv on July 2. That connection is the entire reason this investigation exists, and I refuse to let it fade into background noise behind summit diplomacy.*

## What China is learning from watching this shortage unfold

### A credibility test with implications far beyond Ukraine

This investigation found that **China** is closely monitoring how quickly, or slowly, the West closes its interceptor production gap for **Ukraine**, drawing conclusions relevant to its own strategic calculations regarding **Taiwan**. A West that struggles to sustain adequate interceptor production for a European ally sends a signal about what it could or could not sustain in a larger, more geographically distant confrontation.

This is not speculation on this investigation's part. It reflects a consistent pattern in how authoritarian powers assess Western resolve: not primarily through public statements of solidarity, but through demonstrated industrial capacity and follow-through on commitments over time.

### Why this test matters for how Ankara should be judged

Judging the **Ankara** summit purely on its diplomatic language misses this broader strategic dimension. The summit's real test, from **Beijing's** vantage point, will be measured in whether the fifty billion dollars in new contracts actually translates into expanded, verifiable production capacity over the coming years, not in how confidently that commitment was announced.

This investigation considers this broader deterrence dimension one of the most underexamined aspects of coverage focused narrowly on the Ukrainian file, when the stakes extend considerably further.

*Every delay in closing this interceptor gap is being logged, somewhere in Beijing, as data about how much the West can actually sustain under pressure. That is a sobering thought I don't think gets enough attention in day-to-day coverage of this war.*

## Solutions experts actually proposed, beyond more funding

### Investing in skilled personnel, not just factories

This investigation found that experts consulted across multiple outlets converge on a solution set that goes beyond simply allocating more money: sustained investment in training skilled technical personnel capable of working on guidance systems and precision manufacturing, a workforce gap that cannot be solved by capital investment alone, since building that expertise takes years of dedicated training regardless of available funding.

Several analysts specifically recommend expanded technical education partnerships between allied countries, allowing skilled workers to train across borders and accelerating the development of a broader talent pool capable of supporting expanded production, rather than concentrating expertise in the same small number of facilities that currently constrain output.

### Simplifying export procedures between trusted allies

A second recurring recommendation involves simplifying export control procedures specifically between trusted allies, reducing the bureaucratic delay that currently slows the movement of components, technology, and finished interceptors between countries that already share deep security relationships. This investigation found that current procedures, designed for a different strategic era, sometimes add months of delay to transfers between allies who already share the most sensitive intelligence relationships in the Alliance.

Neither of these solutions is as immediately dramatic as a presidential announcement of a manufacturing license. Both, according to the experts this investigation consulted, would do more to actually close the production gap over a realistic multi-year timeline.

*The most useful solutions I found in this investigation are the least glamorous ones: training programs and simplified paperwork. I understand why they don't make headlines. I also think that is exactly why they deserve more attention than they get.*

## The broader lesson beyond Ukraine's specific war

### A vulnerability that would apply to any prolonged high-intensity conflict

This investigation's findings extend beyond the specific context of the war in **Ukraine**. The structural vulnerability documented throughout this piece, an industrial base built for peacetime rates of production, suddenly confronted with sustained high-intensity demand, would apply to any prolonged conflict the West might face, not only this one. That is a sobering conclusion that deserves more attention in Western strategic planning than it currently receives.

If a conflict of comparable intensity emerged in another theater, involving **China**, **Iran**, or **North Korea** directly, this investigation's findings suggest the West would face a broadly similar production bottleneck, only potentially worse, given the added strain of simultaneously supporting **Ukraine**.

### Why this should reframe the urgency of industrial reform

This broader lesson should reframe how urgently Western governments treat defense industrial reform: not as a Ukraine-specific problem to be solved once this war ends, but as a structural vulnerability that demands sustained attention regardless of how this particular conflict resolves. This investigation found little evidence that this broader reframing has yet taken hold at the level of sustained, multi-year budgetary commitment that the scale of the problem actually requires.

Until it does, this investigation concludes, the West remains structurally exposed to exactly the kind of production strain currently limiting its ability to support **Ukraine** adequately, a vulnerability that will persist long after this specific war eventually ends.

*I think the most important finding in this entire investigation is the one least discussed: this vulnerability will still exist even after this war ends, unless the West treats industrial reform as a permanent strategic priority rather than a wartime emergency measure.*

## South Korea's underused potential in this crisis

### A discreet supplier whose full capacity remains untapped

This investigation examined **South Korea's** role as an indirect supplier to **Ukraine's** war effort, primarily through arrangements routed via **Poland**, a quieter contribution that has received considerably less public attention than the **Patriot** license announcement in **Ankara**. **South Korea's** defense industry, built over decades in response to its own security situation facing **North Korea**, possesses manufacturing depth that this investigation found remains substantially underutilized in the current Western effort to support **Ukraine**.

This underutilization appears to stem primarily from coordination gaps between **Washington**, **Brussels** and **Seoul**, rather than from any lack of capacity or willingness on **South Korea's** part. Closing these coordination gaps, this investigation found, represents one of the more achievable near-term opportunities to expand the West's effective interceptor and munitions supply without requiring years of new factory construction.

### Why this opportunity deserves faster action than it has received

This investigation could not identify a clear technical or legal obstacle preventing faster, more direct coordination with **South Korea**, which suggests the gap is primarily one of diplomatic prioritization rather than genuine constraint. That distinction matters, because it means this specific opportunity could be accelerated considerably faster than the multi-year industrial buildout this piece has documented elsewhere.

This investigation recommends that Western coordination with **Seoul** receive far more urgent diplomatic attention than it currently appears to be getting, given how much untapped capacity it could unlock relative to the effort required.

*Of everything this investigation uncovered, South Korea's underused capacity is the opportunity that frustrates me most, precisely because closing this gap looks more like a diplomatic scheduling problem than an industrial one.*

## What allied industrial fragmentation is costing the collective effort

### Different standards, different certifications, slower collective output

This investigation found that fragmentation among allied defense industries, differing technical standards, certification requirements, and procurement processes across NATO members, meaningfully slows the collective ability to expand interceptor and munitions production at the pace this war demands. A component certified for use in one country's systems is not automatically interoperable with another's, even among close allies with decades of shared military cooperation.

This fragmentation is not anyone's deliberate failure. It reflects decades of national defense industries developing along separate tracks, largely uncoordinated because the strategic necessity for tighter integration simply did not exist before this war. That necessity now exists, and this investigation found that closing this fragmentation gap remains an underappreciated lever for expanding effective production capacity.

### Why standardization could unlock capacity without building new factories

Unlike the guidance system and engine bottlenecks, which require years of new investment, this investigation found that standardization and certification harmonization could unlock existing latent capacity considerably faster, allowing components already being produced in one allied country to be certified for use in another's systems without waiting for entirely new production lines.

This investigation considers standardization one of the more realistic near-term opportunities available to the Alliance, requiring political and bureaucratic will rather than years of new industrial construction, a distinction that deserves more prominence in how **Ankara's** commitments get evaluated going forward.

*Standardizing certifications across allies will never generate a dramatic headline, and this investigation found it might be one of the fastest realistic ways to expand usable production capacity without waiting years for new factories.*

## What accountability would actually look like going forward

### A reporting mechanism that could force real transparency

The **Ankara Declaration** tasks **NATO** Secretary General **Mark Rutte** with reporting on implementation progress at the Alliance's next summit, a mechanism this investigation considers one of the more promising tools available for forcing real transparency about whether the fifty billion dollars in new contracts actually translates into expanded production. Without a mechanism like this, promises made in **Ankara** could simply fade from public attention without ever being measured against delivered results.

This investigation recommends that independent journalists and analysts treat that future reporting moment as a specific, dated opportunity to hold the Alliance accountable, rather than allowing the current cycle of announcement and applause to repeat itself without consequence at the next summit.

### What specific markers would prove real progress

Genuine progress, measurable at that future checkpoint, would look like signed contracts translating into physical construction, expanded workforce training programs actually enrolling new technicians, and, eventually, verifiable increases in interceptor output reported by manufacturers themselves rather than by government communiqués alone. This investigation will treat anything short of these concrete markers as an extension of the same promise-heavy, delivery-light pattern documented throughout this piece.

Until those markers appear, the responsible conclusion remains the one this investigation has argued throughout: real commitments were made in **Ankara**, and real delivery remains, for now, unproven.

*I intend to hold NATO to its own reporting mechanism, because a promise with a built-in accountability checkpoint is worth more than one without, and Ukraine deserves an investigation that follows through on that promise as closely as it followed the announcement.*

## Conclusion: an industrial crisis measured in human lives

### What this investigation can state with confidence

This investigation set out to determine why Western defense industry cannot currently keep pace with the demands of supporting **Ukraine** against **Russian** aggression, and it found a convergence of decades of underinvestment, a narrow base of countries capable of producing critical interceptor technology, manufacturers overwhelmed by simultaneous global demand, and a structural mismatch between democratic budget cycles and the sustained, multi-year investment genuine industrial reform requires.

The **Ankara** summit's announcements, including the **Patriot** license and fifty billion dollars in new contracts, represent real, welcome commitments that this investigation does not dismiss. But measured against the scale of the documented shortage, they constitute a first step, not a resolution.

### The number this investigation wants readers to remember

Eight hundred Russian missiles a year against six hundred American interceptors. That gap, and the thirty people who died in **Kyiv** on **July 2, 2026** partly because of it, is the number and the human cost this investigation wants to leave with readers, long after the applause from **Ankara** fades from the news cycle.

Closing that gap will take years of sustained investment, not a single summit's worth of announcements. **Ukraine**, in the meantime, keeps paying the cost of every year that gap remains open.

*This investigation ends where it began: with a number, and with the thirty people in Kyiv that number cannot bring back. I hope naming both, clearly and without euphemism, does more good than another round of applause ever could.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Critical analysis of the Patriot license announced in Ankara — Euromaidan Press, July 10, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/07/10/ukraine-patriot-license-nato-summit/)

- [Official Ankara summit declaration — NATO, July 8, 2026](https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration)

- Defense industry strain revealed at the Ankara summit — Foreign Policy, July 9, 2026

### Secondary sources

- [Details on the Patriot license promised to Ukraine — Defense News, July 8, 2026](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/07/08/ukraine-to-get-license-for-making-patriot-interceptors-trump-pledges/)

- [Zelensky confirms political-level agreement on Patriot license — Reuters, July 9, 2026](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-licenses-patriot-agreed-with-us-political-level-interceptors-be-2026-07-09/)

- NATO allies pledge defense industrial expansion at Ankara summit — Military Times, July 9, 2026

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/investigation-western-defense-industry-buckles-under-production-strain