# Silencing a Ukrainian TV Station Digitally Is Also an Act of War > For three hours, hackers bombarded the website of a Ukrainian national television channel with up to 200,000 requests per minute, a denial-of-service - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Editorial - Published: 2026-07-07 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/faire-taire-une-tele-ukrainienne-par-le-numerique-c-est-aussi-faire-la-guerre ## Introduction: An Attack on Information, Not Just on a Server ### Two Hundred Thousand Requests a Minute Against the Truth For **three hours**, hackers bombarded the website of a **Ukrainian national television channel** with up to **200,000 requests per minute**, a denial-of-service **attack** documented by Ukraine's **Security Service**, the **SBU**. The **botnet** behind this offensive spanned nodes located in **Asia, Europe and the United States**, designed to mimic real user traffic and make detection harder. This **attack** is not an isolated technical incident: it is part of a documented campaign of more than **16,000 Russian cyberattacks** neutralized by the **SBU** since the start of the full-scale **war** in **2022**, primarily targeting **government** agencies, financial institutions, the defense sector and, increasingly, Ukrainian media. ### Why This Technical Distinction Hides a Democratic Stake Reducing this **attack** to a matter of computer **infrastructure** would mean ignoring its true significance: silencing, even temporarily, a national source of **information** in a country at **war** is the same as depriving **citizens** of access to verified information at the exact moment they need it most. It is this democratic dimension, more than the mere technical feat of the **attack**, that should guide our reading of this event and the broader Russian strategy it reveals. *I refuse to treat this attack as a mere technology news item. Silencing a Ukrainian television channel by digital force follows the same logic of war as bombing raids: reduce to silence everything that informs and resists.* ## A Technical Resilience That Deserves Recognition ### The Site Stayed Online Despite the Intensity of the Assault Despite the scale of this digital offensive, **SBU** cybersecurity specialists managed to keep the channel's website **running without interruption**, a technical outcome that reflects sustained investment in Ukrainian defensive capabilities since the **conflict** began. This defensive success, achieved in a country whose resources are constantly stretched by the conventional **war** effort, deserves recognition that goes far beyond specialized information-technology circles. ### A Success That Must Not Mask the Severity of the Threat Celebrating this technical resilience, however, should not lead us to downplay the seriousness of the intent behind this **attack**: a determined adversary, with considerable resources, is actively trying to deprive **Ukraine** of its independent means of **information**. This tension between a one-off defensive success and a persistent structural **threat** must remain central to any serious analysis of this digital **war**, which shows no sign of slowing down after more than four years of **conflict**. *I sincerely commend the SBU's technical skill in this particular episode, while rejecting any premature triumphalism. Winning one battle never means the digital war against Ukraine is anywhere near over.* ## The 2025 Precedent That Could Have Changed Everything ### A Propaganda Hijacking Attempt Narrowly Foiled In **2025**, another Ukrainian television group was targeted by a far more insidious **attack**: a **phishing** campaign followed by an attempt to penetrate its **infrastructure**, with the ultimate goal of taking control of the outlet to broadcast **Russian propaganda** under its legitimate name. **SBU** specialists detected this intrusion in time, preventing a scenario that could have deceived hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian viewers into believing they were watching authentic, verified content. ### What This Episode Reveals About Moscow's Real Intentions This precedent illustrates an uncomfortable truth: **Moscow's** goal is not limited to temporarily disrupting access to **information**. In some cases, it aims to seize the very credibility of Ukrainian media outlets in order to turn their voice against their own audience. This ambition, far more serious than a mere server overload, deserves to be understood as a deliberate attempt at mass manipulation rather than an isolated act of technical **sabotage**. *Imagining a Ukrainian channel broadcasting Kremlin propaganda under its own name, without its audience knowing, is a scenario that should chill anyone who still believes in the value of free information in wartime.* ## The Shadow of Russian Military Intelligence Behind These Attacks ### Unit 29155, a Central Actor in This Hybrid War Several of these campaigns bear the mark of **Unit 29155** of Russian military intelligence, the **GRU**, a unit initially designed as a cyber arm before expanding its scope to other hostile operations against **Ukraine**, including spear-phishing campaigns targeting President **Volodymyr Zelensky's** office and several ministries. This same unit had deployed, even before the full-scale **invasion**, the destructive **WhisperGate** malware, designed to wipe data from Ukrainian computer systems, further proof that preparation for this **war** played out simultaneously on military and digital fronts. ### A Chain of Responsibility That Leads Directly to the Russian State These attacks are not the work of independent hackers acting on their own initiative: they are part of a strategy coordinated by Russian military intelligence services, which directly implicates the Russian state's responsibility in these information-destabilization operations. This state responsibility, documented by several Western intelligence services over the years, should weigh into any future assessment of sanctions and accountability measures applied against **Moscow** for the full range of its actions during this **conflict**. *These are not lone hackers attacking Ukrainian television, it is the Russian military apparatus itself. That distinction changes everything about how the West should characterize and sanction these acts.* ## The Ukrainian Response, Combining Technology and Human Training ### A Resilience Program That Goes Beyond Technology Alone Faced with this persistent **threat**, the **SBU** launched a cybersecurity resilience program for local and regional media, in partnership with Ukraine's **National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting**, training nearly **450 participants** across **20 regional locations** covering the country's **21 oblasts**. This program acknowledges an essential truth too often overlooked: the best cyberdefense does not rely solely on sophisticated **firewalls**, but also on **journalists** and media managers trained to recognize and respond to intrusion attempts. ### A Lesson Applicable Well Beyond Ukraine's Borders This combined technical-and-human approach offers a model other democracies could usefully study, as disinformation and digital **sabotage** attempts by hostile state actors are no longer confined to the Ukrainian theater alone. Ignoring this lesson would mean underestimating the adaptability required against adversaries who, like **Russia**, invest considerable resources in continuously refining their information-**attack** methods. *This combination of technology and human training put in place by the SBU should inspire every Western democracy. The best cyberdefense is never purely technological, it is also deeply human.* ## What This Attack Reveals About the Nature of Modern War ### A Digital Front That Never Sleeps This **attack** on a Ukrainian television station, specific as it is, illustrates a broader reality of modern **warfare**: physical and digital fronts are no longer separate, they operate in parallel, each reinforcing the other's destabilizing effect on the targeted society. This fusion of military and digital dimensions demands an equally integrated response from **Ukraine** and its Western allies, where defending **information** becomes as strategic as defending physical territory. ### A Threat the West Can No Longer Afford to Ignore Western democracies, facing similar disinformation and digital **sabotage** attempts from **Russia**, China and other authoritarian regimes, must draw direct lessons from the Ukrainian experience to strengthen their own defenses before it is too late. This heightened **vigilance** is not an optional luxury, it is a structural necessity for preserving the integrity of **information** in democratic societies increasingly dependent on their digital infrastructure. *This digital war against Ukraine is a warning the West would do well to heed before it is too late. What is happening today to a Ukrainian television station could very well happen tomorrow to our own media.* ## Financial Institutions, a Parallel Target Just as Revealing ### A Vital Sector Targeted With the Same Intensity Media outlets are not the only victims of this Russian campaign documented by the **SBU**: Ukrainian financial institutions are also among the priority targets, and a successful **attack** on this sector could paralyze routine transactions and directly affect the daily lives of **citizens** in the middle of a **war**. This parallel targeting of media and financial institutions reveals a coherent strategy: simultaneously destabilizing access to verified **information** and confidence in economic stability, two essential pillars of a wartime country's social resilience. ### A Coordinated Defense Across Several Critical Sectors This convergence of targets has pushed the **SBU** to coordinate its defensive response across several critical sectors simultaneously, a cross-sector approach made necessary by an adversary that respects no sectoral boundary in choosing its targets. This cross-sector coordination, though rarely highlighted in media coverage of this digital **war**, is a key element of the overall resilience **Ukraine** has had to build since 2022. *This coordinated attack on media and financial institutions confirms that Moscow is targeting Ukrainian social stability as a whole, not just an isolated target. This is total war, waged by every available means.* ## What the West Should Immediately Learn From This Episode ### A Ukrainian Expertise That Should Circulate More Widely The experience the **SBU** has accumulated facing more than **16,000** **cyberattacks** represents a practical cyberdefense **expertise** that few Western countries possess at this level of intensity, a strategic resource that should be shared more actively with **Ukraine's** **partners**. This knowledge-sharing, already underway in certain bilateral cooperation frameworks, deserves to be extended to all Western institutions facing similar digital destabilization attempts from hostile state actors. ### An Urgency That Should Not Wait for a Major Crisis to Be Taken Seriously Too often, Western decision-makers give cyberdefense serious attention only after suffering a major **attack** themselves, a reactive approach that contrasts sharply with the proactive posture the Ukrainian experience should inspire. Adopting the lessons of this Ukrainian digital **war** now could spare other democracies from later paying the same price **Kyiv** has had to pay to build its current resilience. *I insist on this point: waiting for a major crisis before strengthening our cyberdefense would be an unforgivable strategic mistake. Ukraine is already offering us, at great cost, every lesson we need.* ## Conclusion: Defending Information Is Defending Democracy ### A Battle That Goes Far Beyond the Technical Realm This **attack** of **200,000 requests per minute** against a Ukrainian television channel is not merely a technical feat foiled by the **SBU**. It is a symptom of a broader **war** in which information itself has become a battlefield in its own right. Recognizing this reality, documenting it precisely, and actively supporting Ukrainian cyberdefense efforts is a responsibility the **West** can no longer afford to treat as a secondary matter next to the apparent urgency of the conflict's physical fronts. ### A Call for Collective Vigilance Faced with an adversary that has repeatedly shown its willingness to silence or hijack Ukrainian media voices, the best response remains reinforced technical and political solidarity between **Kyiv** and its Western **partners**, without letup or information fatigue. *I conclude with a simple conviction: every Ukrainian server that withstands a Russian attack also indirectly protects the ability of Western democracies to understand what is truly at stake in this war. Ignoring this digital front would be a mistake history would not easily forgive.* **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - Ukraine's Ministry of Defense — national security context, July 2026 - Euromaidan Press — Ukraine's media are top Russian cyber target, July 1, 2026 - Armyinform — Ukrainian defense context coverage, July 2026 ### Secondary sources - Foreign Policy — analysis of Russian hybrid warfare, 2026 - The Guardian International — cybersecurity and Ukraine war coverage, 2026 - Axios — geopolitical and technology coverage, 2026 --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/faire-taire-une-tele-ukrainienne-par-le-numerique-c-est-aussi-faire-la-guerre