# FACT-CHECK: Tariffs Struck Down — $65 Billion in Refunds Still Owed to Importers

> On February 20, 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued one of the most consequential commercial rulings of the modern era. In

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-23
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/factcheck-tarifs-annules-65-milliards-de-remboursements-encore-dus-aux-importate

## Introduction: The Legal Victory of the Century — and the Money Still Waiting

### When the Supreme Court Said No to Trump

On **February 20, 2026**, the **United States Supreme Court** issued one of the most consequential commercial rulings of the modern era. In **Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump**, by a vote of six to three, the justices ruled: the **IEEPA** — the **International Emergency Economic Powers Act** — **does not authorize the president to impose tariffs**. In seven words, Chief Justice Roberts erased months of aggressive trade policy. The immediate result: approximately **$166 billion** in unlawfully collected duties had to be refunded to American importers.

But four months later, as deadlines stretch and legal appeals multiply, the money is not flowing back as quickly as expected. Of those $166 billion, barely **$20 to $24 billion** had actually been transmitted to the U.S. Treasury for disbursement. And the **Department of Justice**, true to its instinct for obstruction, is now contesting the very authority of the court tasked with ordering those refunds across all importers. This article separates the facts from the political theater.

### A $166 Billion Case Putting American Democracy to the Test

This case extends far beyond commercial law. It raises a fundamental question about the balance of powers: when a court orders the executive to return funds collected illegally, can the executive legitimately appeal to reduce the scope of that order? The legal answer is yes — that is the right of appeal. But the moral answer is more nuanced. **Approximately 330,000 American importers** are waiting for their refunds, a large proportion of them small and medium-sized businesses that absorbed illegal costs for more than a year.

This fact-check relies exclusively on verified primary sources: court filings, CIT testimony, official Senate letters, and analyses from specialized firms published between June 1 and June 22, 2026. No figure is invented; no claim is unsourced. Here is the real state of the case, supported by the numbers.

*I admit a certain fascination with this case. We witnessed a president attempt to govern the world economy by emergency decree — and the highest court in the country told him, politely but firmly, that no, the Constitution is not optional. What troubles me is the sequel: why on earth would an administration that just lost at the Supreme Court now fight to avoid refunding money it had no right to take? The answer is simple and disturbing: because $166 billion finances things.*

## The Supreme Court Ruling: A 6-3 Decision That Redraws the Balance of Power

### IEEPA Is Not a Tariff Weapon — the Court Was Clear

The February 20, 2026 ruling in **Learning Resources, Inc. et al. v. Trump** (consolidated with **Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc.**) established a foundational principle: the **IEEPA** permits the president to regulate imports during a national emergency, but it **does not confer the power to set tariffs**. Chief Justice John Roberts, author of the majority opinion, articulated the idea with the economy of words befitting a major constitutional decision. The White House argument — that imposing tariffs constituted a justified national emergency — was swept aside.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, in his dissent, nonetheless warned that the ruling left a considerable **"mess"** regarding the refund mechanism. He was not wrong. The ruling invalidated **all tariff programs based on IEEPA**: the reciprocal duties applied to nearly every country, nation-specific tariffs, and the anti-fentanyl duties imposed on China, Canada, and Mexico. **Section 232**, **Section 301**, and anti-dumping duties remained in force — but the core of Trump 2.0's aggressive trade policy collapsed in a single day.

### What the Ruling Invalidates — and What It Does Not Touch

Precision is required: the Supreme Court did not invalidate all of Trump's trade policies. It confined its verdict solely to the use of IEEPA as a basis for tariffs. Duties based on **Section 232** of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 — covering steel, aluminum, and copper imports for national security reasons — remain intact. So do **Section 301** duties targeting China's unfair trade practices. These distinctions are crucial for importers: only the IEEPA layer is refundable, not the other duties that sometimes overlapped with the same entries.

In practice, this means the basis for calculating refunds is more complex than it appears. An importer who paid IEEPA duties on top of Section 301 duties on Chinese goods will only be refunded for the IEEPA component. This nuance catches many companies off guard when filing in the CAPE system — and can significantly reduce the amount each individual importer can actually recover.

*What Kavanaugh foresaw — and what we are now living through — is that great legal victories do not automatically translate into money in pockets. The ruling was clear. The "mess" of implementation is deliberate. There is a difference between a court that states the law and an executive that decides to apply it on its own timeline. I am not naive: no government — of any stripe — willingly returns $166 billion. But there is an ethical line between administrative complexity and deliberate sabotage.*

## $166 Billion: The True Scale of America's Tariff Liability

### Numbers That Stagger the Imagination

**U.S. Customs and Border Protection** (CBP) had collected, under IEEPA, **approximately $166 billion** in customs duties — including $134 billion in 2025 alone. This is an unprecedented amount in modern American tariff history, levied on some **330,000 importers** over roughly one year. As early as March 4, 2026, the **Court of International Trade** (CIT) — in **Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States** — ordered CBP to reliquidate all affected entries and refund the unlawfully collected duties, **with interest**, to all importers, not just the plaintiffs.

The CIT then extended its order to cover all benchmark importers who had paid IEEPA duties — a **universal injunction** of rare scope. That universality is at the heart of the current legal dispute. Because if 330,000 importers are theoretically eligible, experts estimate the total refunds, including interest, could reach **$175 billion**. Giants such as **Costco**, **FedEx**, and **Amazon** are among the largest potential beneficiaries. Startups and small businesses are on the list too — but with far fewer resources to fight.

### The Reality of 53 Million Customs Entries at Stake

Beyond the dollar amounts, the logistical scale of the refund can be measured in customs entries. According to the TariffsTool portal, which compiles CBP data, the IEEPA entry universe covers **approximately 53 million customs entries** in total. Filings submitted through the CAPE system that had passed file validations covered **nearly 16 million entries** as of June 10, 2026. Of those, approximately **8.5 million entries** had already been liquidated or reliquidated without IEEPA duties. CBP was processing in the space of six weeks what it had processed in tariff entries during an entire ordinary fiscal year — roughly 338,000 entries in total.

This comparison illustrates the colossal administrative effort demanded of an agency that, by its own admission, lacked the IT systems to process refunds at this scale instantaneously. Deputy Commissioner Susan Thomas explicitly told Judge Eaton: **"We cannot do everything at the same time."** That administrative honesty deserves acknowledgment — while being weighed against the administration's simultaneous decision to contest the very orders organizing the refund process.

*One hundred and sixty-six billion dollars. For perspective: that is more than Hungary's annual GDP. It is money that American businesses — large and small — paid in customs duties on goods legally transiting into the United States, under a law the Supreme Court found was being misapplied. Those companies had absorbed these costs, passed them on to their customers, restructured their supply chains. And now? The government says "we'll refund you" — but the process looks more and more like a financial shell game.*

## The CAPE System: 16 Million Entries to Process, a Three-Phase Mechanism

### The Refund Tool: A Deliberately Phased Architecture

To manage the logistical scale of the refund, CBP created a dedicated portal called **CAPE** — **Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries** — launched on **April 20, 2026**. The system is built in several phases. **Phase 1**, active since launch, covers entries not yet liquidated and those liquidated within the **80 days preceding** the filing. According to data provided by CBP to the CIT on June 10, 2026, CAPE filings that passed file validations covered **nearly 16 million entries**, of which approximately **8.5 million** had already been liquidated or reliquidated without IEEPA duties.

**Phase 2** is scheduled for **June 29, 2026**. It expands the portal to reconciliation entries and entries linked to anti-dumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD), with an estimated additional refund potential of approximately **$28.7 billion**, covering **2.8 million** additional entries. Phases 1 and 2 combined are expected to cover roughly **$130 billion** of the total $166 billion. **Phase 3**, expected by late July 2026, will address finally liquidated entries — but only for importers who have filed a lawsuit at the CIT. That is where the problem lies.

### The Bottlenecks: ACH, Reconciliation, and AD/CVD

The CAPE process is not without obstacles. A first identified bottleneck is the banking registration problem: **more than 4,000 consolidated refunds** had not been transmitted to the U.S. Treasury due to missing valid ACH (automated clearing house) bank transfer information in the ACE portal — CBP's secure data system. Each of these blocked refunds could cover hundreds of individual entries, making the financial impact significant. Importers are asked to ensure their ACH information is correctly registered before submitting their requests.

A second obstacle involves reconciliation and AD/CVD entries excluded from Phase 1: these entries involve complex interactions between CBP's liquidation procedures and the liquidation schedules of the **Department of Commerce**, which oversees anti-dumping duties. CBP cannot process IEEPA refunds on these entries without risking interference with Commerce's liquidation timeline — hence their exclusion from Phase 1 and planned inclusion in Phase 2. This technical complexity is real and cannot be reduced to bad faith.

*The logic of phasing deserves a pause. CBP processes the simplest cases first — clean, automatable entries. Then the more complex ones. Finally, the disputed cases. That is a technically reasonable approach. Except that in this specific case, the "disputed" category potentially represents more than $30 billion and affects importers who, in many cases, could not afford to file a lawsuit. The system structurally favors large players with legal teams. I am not accusing anyone of designing it that way on purpose — but I cannot ignore that the effect is precisely what the administration wanted.*

## $20 Billion Refunded, $146 Billion Pending: State of Play as of June 22, 2026

### What Has Been Paid — and What Remains Owed

According to CBP's May 26, 2026 court filing, the CAPE system had accepted for processing approximately **$85 to $90 billion** in potential and certified refunds. Of that amount, **$20.6 billion** had been transmitted to the U.S. Treasury for disbursement as of May 22, 2026 — a figure subsequently updated to approximately **$23 to $24 billion** according to Holland & Knight data from June 15, 2026. Democratic senators Markey and Wyden, in their June 10, 2026 letter to CBP Commissioner Rodney Scott, cited **approximately $146 billion** remaining to be refunded.

Susan Thomas, CBP's executive deputy commissioner, testified before Judge Eaton on June 9, 2026 that refunds the agency was **currently capable of processing should exceed $60 billion by the end of June**. That figure — rounded in some analyses to $65 billion — represents the intermediate tranche of refunds expected in the near term. But a major bottleneck persists: **more than 4,000 consolidated refunds** have not been transmitted to the Treasury due to missing valid ACH banking information — each refund potentially covering hundreds of entries.

### The Mid-Course Progress: Less Than 15% Refunded After Four Months

For context: as of May 22, 2026, approximately **20% of the $166 billion** potential had been accepted into the CAPE queue — and only a fraction of that amount had actually been transmitted to the Treasury. In raw figures: $20.6 billion transmitted out of $166 billion potential represents approximately **12.4% of the total**. By comparison, the U.S. government had, in the weeks before the Supreme Court ruling, collected these tariffs with near-instantaneous efficiency — every tariffed entry was debited the moment it passed through customs. The refund process takes infinitely longer than the collection process.

CBP also noted that the administration had represented before Judge Eaton that **at least $40 billion** would have been disbursed by the end of June 2026 according to its own projections — a commitment made during June hearings. If that target is met, the total refunded as of June 30, 2026 would represent approximately **24% of the total liability**. Progress, to be sure — but one that still leaves **more than $120 billion in limbo** with no clear resolution timeline.

*Twenty billion refunded out of $166 billion potential — roughly 12% — after four months of operations. At this pace, full repayment would take years. Some experts speak of two to four years. I understand the technical complexity. But I maintain a reasonable doubt: when an administration simultaneously contests the authority of the court ordering the refunds, appeals to the Federal Circuit, and invokes procedural obstacles at every turn — that is a delay strategy, not a technical constraint.*

## The DOJ's Role: Contesting the CIT's Authority to Order Universal Refunds

### The Unconstitutional Universal Injunction Argument

On June 2, 2026, the **Department of Justice** formally filed a notice of appeal with the **Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit** against the CIT order requiring universal refunds. The central argument: the CIT **exceeded its jurisdiction** by extending the refund process to importers who had not filed suit, and by ordering refunds of entries finally liquidated more than 80 to 180 days earlier. The DOJ argued on May 29, 2026 that the CIT's universal order was equivalent to a **prohibited nationwide injunction** — relying on the Supreme Court's own ruling in **Trump v. CASA** (2025), which had specifically limited the power of lower courts to issue such injunctions.

In practice, if the DOJ's argument prevails, refunds for finally liquidated entries — estimated at **more than $30 billion** — would only be accessible to importers who had **individually** obtained a CIT order. Government attorney Claudia Burke summarized this at the June 9 hearing: **"The issue is before the Federal Circuit."** Translation: stand in line and wait for justice to rule while your money sits in federal coffers.

### The Practical Consequences for Non-Plaintiff Importers

The DOJ explicitly stated in its filing: **"CBP has no authority to reliquidate or refund funds without a court order."** This position creates a sharp divide between two categories of importers. Those who filed suit at the CIT — approximately **4,000 importers** according to Holland & Knight — will benefit from CAPE Phase 3 for their finally liquidated entries. The others — the vast majority of the 330,000 eligible importers — could find themselves in indefinite limbo for that category of entries.

Holland & Knight warned that the deadline to file a protective action at the CIT is itself limited. Every day of inaction increases the risk that additional entries will move into the finally liquidated category — and fall into the legal gray zone the administration is working to protect. The irony is sharp: it is the most proactive importers — those who had the resources to file — who will be made fully whole. The others wait on the mercy of a government that is simultaneously appealing its own obligations.

*The DOJ's argument is technically sophisticated — and politically cynical. Using Trump v. CASA precedent to block refunds of funds collected under a law the Supreme Court just invalidated, using Trump's own decisions... that is a level of legal circularity that deserves a perverse kind of admiration. You fight the consequence of one ruling by invoking another ruling from the same court. And meanwhile, $146 billion sleeps in federal vaults. I know the term for that: it is called unjust enrichment — at the scale of the state.*

## Finally Liquidated Entries: The Gordian Knot of the $11.4 Billion Dispute

### Final Liquidation: A Technical Concept at the Heart of the Standoff

In American customs law, **liquidation** is the final determination of the amount of duties owed on an entry. It typically occurs **314 days after the entry date**. An entry is considered finally liquidated when 180 days have elapsed since that initial liquidation — the window during which a protest could be filed. Past that point, according to CBP's and DOJ's position, **the agency no longer has statutory authority** to reliquidate an entry or refund funds without a court order specific to that entry.

Susan Thomas noted during her testimony that finally liquidated entries represented approximately **6.9% of total IEEPA duties**, or roughly **$11.4 billion**. DOJ attorney Claudia Burke confirmed before Judge Eaton: **"6.9% constitutes the only zone of dispute today."** But attorneys representing importers make a strong counter-argument: since the tariffs were illegal from the outset, the statutory framework of final liquidation simply does not apply. The constitutional decision must override ordinary procedural rules. Judge Eaton himself had declared: **"The time has come to ensure that all duties are refunded."**

### The Legal Paradox: Procedural Rules That Protect Illegality

The importer attorneys' argument deserves to be examined in full. If IEEPA tariffs were unconstitutional **ab initio** — from the moment of their imposition, never having had a valid legal basis — then the liquidation mechanics built around them are themselves tainted. You cannot oppose the procedural deadlines of an ordinary legal regime to funds collected in violation of the Constitution. Holland & Knight framed the argument this way: **"To the extent there is tension between liquidation statutes and the Supreme Court ruling, the constitutional decision prevails."**

That is precisely the question the **Federal Circuit** will have to resolve in the coming months. The government's initial briefs were due on **June 17, 2026**, with a full brief expected on **August 3, 2026**. An appellate decision is likely in 2027. Until then, affected importers find themselves in an uncomfortable legal void: they are potentially owed refunds the government refuses to issue, pending a court ruling on whether that government had the right to refuse.

*This is the heart of the paradox: if the tariffs were illegal ab initio — from their very imposition — then all the liquidation machinery built around them is, in a sense, contaminated at the source. You cannot invoke the procedural rules of a valid law to protect funds collected under an invalid law. That is what importer attorneys are arguing. And it is, in my view, the most robust argument in this case. The Constitution does not stop at the doors of CBP's IT system.*

## Alleged Obstruction: Senators Markey and Wyden Sound the Alarm

### A Scathing Letter Sent to the CBP Commissioner

On June 10, 2026, Senators Edward Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts) and Ron Wyden (Democrat, Oregon) sent a letter to CBP Commissioner **Rodney Scott**, demanding that refunds be issued **without further delays, without obstruction, without complications**. Their tone was withering. They accused the administration of **"deliberately slowing the refund process from the start"**, citing the CIT's April 7, 2026 order that had required universal and immediate refunds. In their letter, the two senators declared: **"American businesses should not be forced to bear the cost of the Administration's unlawful tariff scheme and subsequent legal defeat. The courts have spoken."**

More seriously, Markey and Wyden raised the question of the **potential reallocation of illegally collected funds**. They asked CBP to confirm whether communications had taken place with the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), or other federal agencies regarding an **alternative use** of unrefunded tariff revenues — particularly to fund immigration enforcement or other administration policy priorities. A response was expected by **June 24, 2026**. As of this writing, no public response has been made available.

### Seven Embarrassing Questions for the White House

The senators' June 10 letter poses seven specific questions to Commissioner Scott, several of which are particularly explosive institutionally. The sixth question asks whether CBP has communicated with the Treasury, OMB, or other agencies regarding **retention, transfer, or reallocation** of unrefunded tariff revenues. The seventh demands information on the safeguards in place to ensure these funds are not being used for **policy priorities unauthorized by Congress**. These questions imply an assumption: that the administration may have been tempted — or may already have been — to use these funds for other purposes.

The senators also recalled the broader context: according to them, the administration had already been documented as seeking to **divert billions of dollars** intended for military readiness, global health, and other congressionally authorized missions, in favor of mass deportation operations and other favored priorities. If tariff funds collected illegally have been mobilized in the same way — even briefly — we have moved from an administrative dispute to a first-order constitutional crisis.

*The question posed by Markey and Wyden is the most explosive in this entire case. If the administration used — even temporarily — illegally collected tariff funds to finance deportation operations or other budget lines, we are in the presence of a constitutional violation of extreme gravity. I am not saying it is proven. I am saying the question deserves an answer, and that the administration's silence at this stage is, in itself, an alarming signal. Trump is a necessary evil for the West against its external adversaries — but necessary does not mean above the law.*

## The Role of Michael Lowell and Private Lawyers: The Guardians of Importer Rights

### When Commercial Law Becomes a Contact Sport

In this uncommonly complex legal battle, law firms specializing in trade law are playing a leading role. Michael Lowell, chair of the **Global Regulatory Enforcement Group** at Reed Smith, has been one of the clearest voices decoding the situation. He warned that while the DOJ's appeal created uncertainty for Phase 2 and Phase 3 entries, the **Phase 1** refunds — covering approximately **$85 to $90 billion** — should not be directly affected by the appeal. He framed the administration's strategy with chilling clarity: **"The endgame is clear: the government is trying to keep as much remaining money as possible."**

The practical recommendation from Lowell and firms like Holland & Knight: do not wait. Importers whose entries are not covered by Phase 1 should seriously consider **filing a protective action at the CIT** — a step that does not prevent continuing to use CAPE in parallel, but preserves independent legal rights. Holland & Knight specified: importers who do not file suit risk being **permanently excluded** from refunds on finally liquidated entries if the government's position prevails on appeal.

### Small Businesses Sacrificed on the Altar of Procedural Complexity

The recommendation to file a protective action is reasonable for large companies — but financially and operationally out of reach for most small and medium businesses. Filing a complaint at the **Court of International Trade** involves significant legal costs, a deep understanding of customs liquidation mechanisms, and the capacity to pursue lengthy and complex procedures. Companies like Kids2, based in Atlanta, preferred to **sell their refund rights** to investment funds — at a discount — rather than wait years for an uncertain judicial process.

This phenomenon of selling refund rights reveals an emerging secondary market around IEEPA tariffs. Private equity firms understood these claims were potentially very lucrative — and that small businesses, pressed by their immediate liquidity needs, were willing to accept significant discounts. The irony is that these same small businesses suffered most from the illegal tariffs — and will proportionally recover the least from their refunds.

*There is a bitter irony in this situation: small businesses — those that suffered most from the illegal tariffs, those that passed these costs on to their customers, sometimes teetering on the edge of bankruptcy — are precisely the ones with the fewest resources to file a protective lawsuit. Large companies like Costco or FedEx have entire legal teams working on this file. An SME in Atlanta or Minnesota importing electronic components? It first needs to understand what a finally liquidated entry is before realizing it may be in the process of losing its right to a refund. This is a systemic injustice that legislators should correct.*

## Replacing IEEPA Tariffs: Section 122, Already Under Attack

### Trump Did Not Wait for the Ruling Before Improvising a Plan B

The Supreme Court ruling came down on February 20, 2026. Within **hours**, the Trump administration invoked **Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974** — a provision never used since its adoption — to impose a universal duty of **10%** on virtually all imports. This section caps tariffs at **15% maximum** and requires congressional approval after 150 days. Section 122 is thus structurally more constrained than IEEPA — but it allows the administration to maintain tariff pressure during the transition.

On May 7, 2026, a three-judge CIT panel found that Section 122 was also **unlawful in its application**. But on June 11, 2026, the **Federal Circuit** granted a **stay of that ruling** pending appeal, finding the government had shown sufficient likelihood of success on appeal. Section 122 duties are therefore still being collected for now, with a statutory expiration date around **July 24, 2026** — unless Congress intervenes to extend them. A second front of potential refunds is taking shape on the horizon.

### Section 301, Section 232: The Replacement Tariff Arsenal Already in Place

The Trump administration did not limit its response to Section 122. It simultaneously announced new **Section 301 investigations** targeting 60 countries for unfair trade practices, and an extension of **Section 232** duties on industrial equipment. Specific investigations were launched against Brazil and Vietnam. The strategic objective is clear: maintain maximum tariff pressure on trading partners while building a stronger legal foundation — using statutory authorities whose constitutionality is less contested than IEEPA's.

The practical result for importers is a growing overlay of distinct tariff regimes. An entry that carried an IEEPA duty (refundable), plus a Section 301 duty (non-refundable), may now potentially be covered by a new Section 301 or Section 232 duty as a replacement. The net result for an importer may therefore be less favorable than the $166 billion gross refund figure suggests — as replacement duties eat into expected gains.

*One must acknowledge a certain tactical genius in this sequence. The administration loses on IEEPA, it immediately activates Section 122. It provisionally loses on Section 122, it fights the appeal. It simultaneously announces new Section 301 investigations on 60 countries, expanded Section 232 duties, and investigations against Brazil and Vietnam. This is a strategy of judicial and regulatory saturation: keep maximum commercial uncertainty while courts race to catch up. Trump may be a necessary evil — but this kind of gamesmanship with constitutional rules does not strengthen the credibility of the West he claims to champion.*

## Congressional Democrats and the Political Pressure on CBP

### Schumer, Markey, Wyden: A Legislative Offensive on All Fronts

Political pressure comes not only from the courts. In March 2026, Senator Markey had led a coalition of Democratic senators to demand a refund process that would not create **additional burdens on small businesses**. In April, he directly challenged major retailers — **Amazon, FedEx, Walmart, Costco, DHL, and UPS** — to pass refunds along to their customers and to the small businesses that had absorbed the costs of the illegal tariffs. The response from many companies was disappointing: **no firm commitment** to refund their own customers.

In June, with Wyden, Markey raised the stakes. The seven questions sent to Commissioner Scott — the most sensitive concerning potential communications about the **reallocation of unrefunded tariff funds** toward administration policy priorities — constitute an unprecedented indirect indictment. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer had participated in publishing an April report on the damage caused by **"Liberation Day"** tariffs one year after their announcement. The political dynamic is clear: Democrats have transformed the refund case into a tool of institutional pressure.

### The Limits of Parliamentary Theater Against an Impervious Administration

The letters, reports, and challenges from Democrats have undeniable merit: they document, for the historical record, the administration's behavior toward its legal obligations. But their immediate practical effectiveness remains limited. Without a Senate majority to force a legislative vote, Markey and Wyden can only **expose and document** — not compel. The administration's response to the seven questions was expected by June 24, 2026; in the absence of a public response by that date, political pressure must yield to other enforcement mechanisms.

The most promising avenue remains legislative: a law forcing automatic and universal refunds without requiring individual legal action would cut short the DOJ's entire delay strategy. But in a Congress where the Republican majority is little inclined to cross the administration on this front, this option remains politically hypothetical in the short term. Importers therefore wait for justice to do its job — slowly, but inexorably.

*I am among those who find parliamentary battles often theatrical. But in this specific case, the questions from Markey and Wyden are legitimate and necessary. A government that collects funds under a law declared unconstitutional has a moral and legal obligation to return them promptly. If that same government begins to use that money — even temporarily — for other purposes, it ceases to be a trade policy question and becomes a rule-of-law question. The West draws its legitimacy from that principle. When its leaders violate it, they weaken the very foundation of what they claim to defend.*

## Large Companies Facing Refunds: Who Benefits and Who Waits?

### Costco, FedEx, Amazon: Billions at Stake for Commerce Giants

Among the 330,000 potentially eligible importers, large American companies occupy a strategic position. **FedEx** had seen certain cross-border commerce activities drop by **25 to 35%** due to IEEPA tariffs — a massive operational impact. **UPS** has already launched its own refund process for eligible shipments, in coordination with CBP, covering payments made from **January 30, 2026**. **Costco**, whose business model relies heavily on low-cost imports, is among the largest beneficiaries in terms of recovered liquidity.

But large retailers face an additional pressure: will they refund their own customers? Studying supply chain structures reveals that in most cases, tariffs were **passed down in cascade**: from importer to wholesaler, from wholesaler to retailer, from retailer to end consumer. The amounts refunded by the government to benchmark importers do not necessarily correspond to the losses suffered by downstream actors. At this stage, the industry's response is disappointing: many large companies will likely retain most of their refunds as replenished equity capital — not as rebates to their customers.

### The Question No One Wants to Ask: Who Reimburses the End Consumers?

In response to Senator Markey's challenges, many large retailers responded without committing. Amazon, FedEx, Walmart, Costco, DHL, and UPS have, for the most part, made **no firm commitment** to return their IEEPA refunds to their customers or downstream business partners. That is legally their right: benchmark importers are the legal holders of the refund. But morally, the situation is troubling: American consumers financed these illegal tariffs through higher prices for more than a year. And the return of that money will not reach them.

Class action lawsuits represent one avenue, but a long and uncertain one. Consumer suits have already been filed against some major importers — Kavout notes that **consumer class actions** add yet another layer to the already complex refund process. These proceedings could take years. And meanwhile, large companies will cash their government refund checks, improve their balance sheets, and continue business as usual.

*This is the hidden face of this case that financial media are insufficiently covering. Refunds go to benchmark importers — not to consumers who paid higher prices for a year. This is not a bug in the system: it is a structural feature of American customs law. But in a democracy that calls itself the guarantor of the free market and citizen protection, there is something profoundly unsatisfying in the idea that large companies will pocket billions in refunds with no obligation to redistribute them. I am not arguing for socialism — I am arguing for rhetorical consistency.*

## The Truth About Trump's Tariff Promises: True, False, or In Between?

### Separating Political Rhetoric from Legal Reality

Several claims by the Trump administration about its tariff policy deserve rigorous fact-checking. **Claim 1:** Tariffs were imposed to protect the American economy. Partially true in intent, but the **Supreme Court** established that the law invoked — IEEPA — simply did not confer that power on the president. **Claim 2:** The administration is quickly and efficiently refunding importers. False. After four months of processing, less than **15% of the total owed** had been transmitted for disbursement, according to May 22, 2026 data. The administration is simultaneously appealing to limit the scope of its refund obligations.

**Claim 3:** The Court of International Trade exceeded its authority by ordering universal refunds. Contested — and that is precisely what the Federal Circuit will have to decide. The DOJ relies on **Trump v. CASA** (2025) precedent, but importer attorneys argue that normal liquidation rules do not apply to funds collected under an unconstitutional law. **Claim 4:** Tariffs generated significant revenues for the government. Technically true — $166 billion collected. But if those revenues must be refunded with interest, the operation becomes a net liability for the U.S. Treasury.

### The Factual Verdict: Four Claims, Four Rulings

A summary of this fact-check in four clear verdicts. **On the legality of the tariffs:** the Supreme Court has ruled — IEEPA tariffs were unlawful. This point is no longer debatable. **On the speed of refunds:** false — less than 15% refunded after four months, with parallel appeals slowing the process for the most complex entries. **On the CIT's authority:** contested before the Federal Circuit — ruling expected in 2027. **On the net profitability of the tariffs for the government:** negative in the long run — duties collected with interest represent a liability exceeding revenues generated, not counting the administrative costs of the refund process and legal proceedings.

A fifth verdict is required in conclusion: **on the administration's good faith in the refund process**, the evidence converges toward a deliberate minimization strategy. Contesting the CIT's authority, invoking **Trump v. CASA** to limit beneficiaries, resisting the CBP commissioner's appearance before the court — each of these elements, taken in isolation, may have a legal justification. Together, they paint a coherent picture of institutional obstruction that Senators Markey and Wyden summed up in unequivocal terms.

*This fact-check reveals a constant in Trumpian communications on tariffs: the assertion precedes the law, and the law catches up later. A policy is announced with fanfare, defended politically as a victory, and when the courts blow the whistle, the response is to minimize, delay, and appeal. I am not saying American trade policy did not need an overhaul. I am saying that governing by permanent emergency — invoking powers the Constitution does not grant — is not resolve: it is constitutional improvisation that ends up costing a great deal, literally.*

## Conclusion: $65 Billion Waiting, a Democracy Tested by Its Own Laws

### What This Case Says About the Rule of Law in America in 2026

The IEEPA tariff refund case is not simply a technical dispute between customs officials and importers. It is the revealing symptom of a fundamental tension within the American institutional system: **an executive branch that resists applying judicial rulings** unfavorable to it, while invoking the rule of law to justify its own actions. The Supreme Court said no to IEEPA. The CIT ordered refunds. The DOJ is appealing to limit their scope. And meanwhile, **$130 to $146 billion** remain in the pipeline of an administrative system advancing at its own pace — deliberately.

The coming weeks will be decisive. **CAPE Phase 2** opens on June 29, 2026, and will significantly expand the number of importers who can file requests. CBP's responses to the seven questions from Senators Markey and Wyden were expected on June 24. And the Federal Circuit's ruling on the DOJ's appeal looms on the 2027 horizon. The West, which the United States claims to lead, draws its credibility from its capacity to respect its own laws — especially and above all when they run counter to the political priorities of the sitting government.

### The Moment for Congress to Act

Judicial pressure alone will not suffice. The procedural timelines at the Federal Circuit — with briefs due in August 2026 and a decision expected possibly in 2027 — mean that **hundreds of thousands of importers** could wait months, even years more. Senators Markey and Wyden are right to demand transparency. But a law forcing automatic and universal refunds — without requiring individual legal action — would be the most direct way to close this chapter.

The money belongs to the importers. The courts have said so. The Supreme Court said so first. What remains now is finding the political will to return it — promptly, fully, and without gamesmanship. To paraphrase Senators Markey and Wyden: **the courts have spoken, the money belongs to the importers from whom it was illegally taken, and the administration's obligation is to return it**. The rest is politics.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary Sources

- [BDO USA — CBP IEEPA Refund Update and CIT Orders: 16 million CAPE entries, $20.6 billion transmitted, finally liquidated entries — June 22, 2026](https://www.bdo.com/insights/tax/update-on-cbp-ieepa-refund-progress-and-new-orders-from-the-us-court-of-international-trade)

- [Holland & Knight — IEEPA Tariff Refund Update: Government Appeals CIT Refund Order — June 15, 2026](https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/06/ieepa-tariff-refund-update-government-appeals)

- [U.S. Senate — Markey/Wyden Letter to CBP Commissioner Scott: $146 billion still owed, obstruction accusations — June 10, 2026](https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2026/6/ranking-members-markey-wyden-demand-complete-tariff-tax-refunds-for-small-businesses-condemn-trump-s-obstruction-of-the-refund-process)

### Secondary Sources

- [CFO Dive — DOJ appeal throws fresh uncertainty into tariff refund process: analysis of the June 2, 2026 appeal — June 5, 2026](https://www.cfodive.com/news/doj-appeal-throws-tariff-refund-process-uncertainty/822043/)

- [Fortune — After issuing more than $20 billion in tariff refunds, the Trump administration is now pursuing legal action — June 1, 2026](https://fortune.com/2026/06/01/trump-administration-plan-appeal-illegal-ieepa-tariff-universal-refunds/)

- [Tax at Hand — Recent trade developments June 2026: Susan Thomas testimony, $60 billion by end of June — June 13, 2026](https://www.taxathand.com/article/41381/United-States/2026/Recent-trade-developments-June-2026)

- [TariffsTool — CAPE Phase 2 Opens June 29, 2026: 53 million IEEPA entries, phase details — June 21, 2026](https://www.tariffstool.com/guides/cape-phase-2-launches-june-29-2026)

- [Kavout — The $166 Billion Question: What Just Happened with Trump's Tariffs: SCOTUS 6-3 ruling, Section 122 — June 19, 2026](https://www.kavout.com/market-lens/the-166-billion-question-what-just-happened-with-trump-s-tariffs)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/factcheck-tarifs-annules-65-milliards-de-remboursements-encore-dus-aux-importate