# FACTCHECK: Do Sanctions Against Russia Really Work? Verification of Key Figures

> On one side, Vladimir Putin tirelessly repeats that Western sanctions haven't changed a thing, that the Russian economy is weathering the storm,

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-06-22
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/factcheck-les-sanctions-contre-la-russie-fonctionnent-elles-vraiment-verificatio-2

## Introduction: The Great Lie Sandwiched Between the Facts

### Two Narratives Clashing for Four Years

On one side, **Vladimir Putin** tirelessly repeats that Western sanctions haven't changed a thing, that the Russian economy is weathering the storm, and that **the West is shooting itself in the foot**. On the other, European capitals — Paris, Berlin, Brussels — brandish their twenty-one sanction packages as proof that the noose is tightening. Between these two antagonistic narratives, the actual data tells a more nuanced, more complex, but ultimately **far more damning story for the Kremlin** than it would like to admit. The time has come to take out the magnifying glass and verify, figure by figure, claim by claim.

This factcheck does not pretend to settle a theoretical debate on the general effectiveness of sanctions in international relations. It focuses on a precise and urgent question: **in June 2026, are the Western economic sanctions imposed on Russia after February 24, 2022, producing measurable and significant effects** on Moscow's war-making capacity? The sources are real, the data is recent, and the answer — as we will see — is both yes, and not yet enough.

### Method: Claims vs. Data

The structure of this factcheck is simple: we state **a widespread claim**, then confront it with the most recent available data. The claims come from both the Russian side — Kremlin propaganda and state media — and Western critics who believe the sanctions are too weak. The data comes from independent organizations: the **Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA)**, the **KSE Institute**, the **Bank of Russia**, the **Russian Ministry of Finance** itself, and European Union institutions. No invented data, no dubious extrapolations.

The result is a striking picture: **Russia is bleeding financially**, its economy is contracting for the first time in three years, its budget deficit has exploded, and its shadow fleet on the high seas is now being hunted by British commandos in the English Channel. But the oil is still flowing. Beijing and New Delhi continue to buy. And Moscow has not capitulated. This is the reality.

*I have to be honest: two years ago, I doubted the real effectiveness of these sanctions. I saw them more as a political gesture than a strategic tool. Today, the data forces me to revise that judgment — not totally, but significantly. The picture I discover by poring over reports from CREA, the KSE Institute, and the Russian Ministry of Finance is that of a regime that is finally beginning to suffer economically. Not enough. But suffering nonetheless.*

## Claim 1 — "The Russian economy has resisted sanctions well"

### What the Kremlin Says

At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, held from June 3 to 6, 2026, **Vladimir Putin** loudly asserted that Western sanctions had hurt the global economy more than Russia. His Deputy Prime Minister **Dmitry Medvedev** chimed in early June, stating that Russian GDP had grown by **more than 10% in three years**. On the surface, some figures seem to support this thesis: growth did indeed reach **4.1% in 2024**, driven by massive military spending and energy exports.

But this convenient narrative forgets to mention the essentials: **this growth was artificially boosted by a war economy**. An economy that now devotes **12% of its GDP to military spending in the first quarter of 2026** — up from the planned 6.2% — is not growing; it is burning through its reserves. This isn't economic development. It is the accelerated consumption of human and financial capital for the benefit of a war machine.

### What the Actual Data Says

The verdict from the numbers is clear. **In the first quarter of 2026, Russian GDP contracted by 0.2% year-on-year**, according to data confirmed by Trading Economics on June 17, 2026 — the first contraction since the first quarter of 2023. The Russian economy shrank in key sectors: manufacturing production **fell by 1.5%**, professional, scientific, and technical activities **by 6.1%**, and transportation and storage **by 1.8%**. The IMF projects growth of only **1.1% for the whole of 2026**, compared to 4.1% in 2024. Independent Russian economists foresee only **0.4% growth** this year.

The Free Russia Foundation summarizes the situation with cruel precision: **the Russian economy is on the brink of recession**, budget deficits are breaking all records — even despite the oil windfall caused by the war in the Middle East — and the Central Bank is struggling to curb inflation despite a high-interest-rate policy entering its **third consecutive year**. **VERDICT: FALSE.** The Russian economy is not resisting. It is giving way.

*Medvedev can claim that GDP grew by 10% in three years. It is mathematically true and strategically deceptive. When you finance that growth by bleeding your sovereign wealth fund, swallowing your youth in trenches, and mortgaging your country's economic future for the next ten years, that isn't resilience. It's accelerated self-destruction.*

## Claim 2 — "The price cap on Russian oil was a total failure"

### The Argument from Western Critics

Influential voices — particularly in certain American academic and media circles — have long argued that capping the price of Russian oil at **$60 per barrel**, introduced in December 2022, was a measure that was at best symbolic and at worst counterproductive. The argument: the Russian shadow fleet was gleefully bypassing the mechanism, oil was flowing freely to China and India, and Moscow was pocketing billions without shame. And one must admit there was some truth in this initial criticism.

The reality of 2024-2025 indeed confirmed these weaknesses. Tankers with flags of convenience proliferated. Greek and Maltese insurers turned a blind eye. Monitoring mechanisms were insufficient. But to label this record as a **"total failure"** in 2026 is to deliberately ignore recent developments in the mechanism and its cumulative effects on Russian finances.

### What the 2026 Data Really Reveals

On February 1, 2026, the EU lowered the cap to **$44.10 per barrel**. Urals oil was trading in April 2026 at **$112.3 per barrel** — more than double the revised cap — but that doesn't mean the measure is ineffective: it means Russia is bypassing the cap via its shadow fleet, and it is paying a high price for that circumvention. According to CREA, full enforcement of the $44.10 cap would result in a **46% reduction in oil revenues**, roughly **6.7 billion euros per month**. And if the proposed $30 cap were applied, the cumulative loss from December 2022 to the end of April 2026 would reach **184 billion euros**.

The reality is that **54% of Russian seaborne crude exports in April 2026 were carried by sanctioned shadow tankers** — an all-time record level according to CREA. The EU adopted its **20th sanction package in April 2026**, and the European Commission proposed the **21st package on June 9, 2026**, specifically targeting the shadow fleet, tanker services, and crypto-platforms used for circumvention. On June 15, 2026, a **mini-package** was adopted, targeting 40 individuals and 47 entities linked to the Russian military-industrial complex and the shadow fleet ecosystem. **VERDICT: PARTIALLY TRUE.** The initial cap was insufficient. The pressure is mounting.

*The "useless cap" argument long seemed solid to me. But it rests on a fundamental reasoning error: it compares the actual effect to the ideal effect rather than to the absence of action. Yes, Russia circumvents. But it does so at a colossal cost — an aging tanker fleet, clandestine insurers, opaque intermediaries. Every barrel sold outside the Western system costs more to export. And this gap accumulates into billions lost for the Kremlin.*

## Claim 3 — "Russian oil revenues have collapsed"

### A Claim That Deserves Nuance

Ukrainian officials and certain monitoring NGOs have sometimes presented data from the early months of 2026 — particularly January-February, a period of very low oil revenues — as proof of a definitive collapse. According to The Moscow Times, citing Reuters, **Russian oil and gas revenues fell by nearly 50% year-on-year in January-February 2026**, reaching a five-year low. For 2025 as a whole, these revenues totaled approximately **8.7 trillion rubles** instead of the predicted 11.6 trillion. Devastating figures, on the surface.

But the reality of 2026 is more volatile. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered by the American-Israeli war against Iran caused **global oil prices to soar by 68%** in two days. In March 2026, Russian oil export revenues jumped to **$19 billion** — almost double that of February. The KSE Institute documents a monthly increase of **$9.3 billion**. An unexpected geostrategeic windfall for Moscow.

### The Actual Structure of Russian Fossil Fuel Revenues in 2026

The numerical reality is one of extreme volatility dictated by factors Moscow does not control. In April 2026, Russian fossil fuel revenues stood at **734 million euros per day**, the highest in two and a half years — but down 9% compared to March. **China** (49% of crude exports), **India** (37% of crude exports), and **Turkey** (26% of oil product exports) constitute the triumvirate of shadow buyers, allowing Moscow to maintain its exports despite Western sanctions. Yet even the EU remains, paradoxically, the **largest buyer of Russian LNG** with 49% of total exports — an anomaly the 21st sanction package aims to correct.

The factual conclusion: oil revenues have not "collapsed" in a linear and definitive way. They are **deeply unstable, dependent on regional crises external to Putin, and structurally threatened** by the progressive tightening of sanctions. **VERDICT: EXAGGERATED.** Revenues fell but rebounded because of Iran. The underlying trend is negative, but not collapsed.

*The problem with the "revenue collapse" claim is that it gives Putin the perfect opportunity to say "you see, I bounced back" as soon as prices rise. It's better to talk about what is factually indisputable: destructive volatility, increased dependence on unreliable buyers, and a National Wealth Fund melting like snow in the sun. These are the true indicators of Russian financial decay.*

## Claim 4 — "The Russian budget deficit proves Russia is at the end of its rope"

### The Real Figures of the Financial Abyss

Russian budget data for 2026 is staggering in its severity. In **just five months — January to May 2026 — the federal deficit reached 6.01 trillion rubles**, or **2.6% of GDP** and **one and a half times the annual target of 3.8 trillion**. Meduza, Bloomberg, and the Free Russia Foundation converge on these figures drawn directly from the Russian Ministry of Finance. To give a sense of scale: this five-month deficit already exceeds the total annual deficit of 2025 (5.6 trillion rubles), which had itself alarmed economists.

The poisoned cherry on top: **this record deficit occurred despite the oil windfall from the war in Iran**. The additional revenues from the price surge were not enough to offset the avalanche of military spending. The Russian government spent **17.6 trillion rubles** against revenues of **11.7 trillion** over the first four months — which concretely means that **one in every three rubles spent was not financed by tax revenue**. The Russian Central Bank had to lower its key rate to **14.25%** on June 19, 2026, less than markets expected, signaling cracks in monetary policy.

### The Limits of This Argument

But the "end of the rope" argument deserves to be tempered. The Kremlin prepared for this war long ago: it entered the conflict with a very low debt-to-GDP ratio. The **National Wealth Fund** — the sovereign wealth fund — has melted, now holding only **3.41 trillion rubles ($48 billion)** in liquid assets, which is 76% less than the deficit of the first five months of 2026. However, the government still has room to maneuver: tax hikes, bond issuances on the domestic market, and cuts in civilian spending. What Putin's financial advisors are telling him in private — according to Bloomberg — is that the current pace is **unsustainable**. It isn't catastrophic yet. But it will become so. **VERDICT: LARGELY TRUE.** The trajectory is unsustainable according to the Kremlin's own experts.

*That figure of 6 trillion rubles of deficit in five months haunts me. That is the equivalent of more than $83 billion gone up in smoke — spent primarily to kill Ukrainians. And meanwhile, Russia's National Wealth Fund only has $48 billion in liquidity left. A deficit that exceeds the safety cushion by June. If that isn't a sign of advanced financial distress, I don't know what is.*

## Claim 5 — "Russian military spending is sustainable"

### The Kremlin Wants to Believe It, the Numbers Say Otherwise

Moscow allocated **16.84 trillion rubles** to the military and security sector in the 2026 budget — nearly **40% of the total federal budget**, or $238 billion. But according to RBC-Ukraine and Bloomberg, even this record funding is proving insufficient. The Ministry of Defense is requesting **an additional 3 to 5 trillion rubles** in 2026, which would bring actual military spending to **nearly 41-45% of the total budget**. Figures from researcher Janis Kluge of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs are striking: in the first quarter of 2026, Russian military spending reached **12% of GDP** — compared to the planned 6.2% — at a total cost of **5.91 trillion rubles ($83.2 billion)**. **2.7 billion rubles per hour, $916 million per day.**

Senior officials at the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank have warned Putin, privately according to Bloomberg, about the **unsustainable nature of this spending**. War financing is driving the budget deficit to dangerous levels. Siluanov publicly acknowledged at the St. Petersburg Forum that the 2026 deficit would exceed forecasts. The Russian government even passed a law in June 2026 allowing **increased spending and borrowing without public parliamentary debate** — a silent signal of panic.

### The Spiral of Internal Debt

To bridge this gap, Moscow is moving toward a **massive increase in borrowing on the domestic market** — estimated at an additional 2 to 3 trillion rubles — even though servicing existing debt already costs **4 trillion rubles per year**, which is 9% of the federal budget and the fifth largest expenditure item. China — contrary to Moscow's expectations — **has not opened its capital markets to Russia**, according to the CEPA report published in early June 2026. Chinese banks are avoiding sanction risks. Moscow cannot borrow externally. So it borrows from its own citizens at negative real rates, in a context of inflation reaching **7 to 8% in 2026** according to the Central Bank. **VERDICT: FALSE.** The Kremlin's own financial experts admit this is unsustainable.

*There is something frightening and almost fascinating in reading the Russian military budgets of 2026. The Kremlin is spending $38 per hour for every Ukrainian soldier killed or wounded — a macabre calculation that illustrates the economic irrationality of this war. But the West must remain clear-eyed: unsustainable does not mean immediate. Putin can tighten the screws a few more turns before the machine breaks.*

## Claim 6 — "The shadow fleet is out of control"

### The Reality of the Shadows on the Seas

The Russian shadow fleet — that collection of **more than 700 tankers** with dubious flags, without proper insurance, and often aging — is very real and very active. It carries **75% of sanctioned Russian oil** according to the British MoD. In April 2026, sanctioned shadow tankers accounted for **54% of Russian seaborne fossil fuel exports** — an all-time record according to CREA. The fleet now includes ships that carry a mix of Russian and Iranian oil under Cameroonian, Togolese, or Panamanian flags, disabling their AIS transponders at various stops.

But to call this fleet "out of control" implies that Westerners are doing nothing to target it. Yet, **as of April 24, 2026, 651 tankers had been jointly sanctioned** by the United States, the United Kingdom, the EU, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand according to the KSE Institute. The EU's 21st package proposes adding another **30 vessels** to the list of 632 already sanctioned, and — a major innovation — **targeting for the first time support vessels for the shadow fleet**: fuel bunkering vessels and service providers.

### Operation Smyrtos: A Strategic Turning Point

On the night of June 14 to 15, 2026, **British Royal Marines commandos** rappelled from Chinook helicopters onto the deck of the tanker **Smyrtos** in the middle of the English Channel, supported by a Royal Navy vessel and RAF fighters. In a six-hour operation, they took control of the ship — which had left the Russian port of Ust-Luga on June 5, carrying **700,000 barrels of Russian oil**. The Smyrtos, formerly the **Myrtos**, had changed its name and flag twice since being placed under sanctions in July 2025. A 38-year-old Indian national was arrested for violating sanctions. It is the **first time in history** that British armed forces have boarded and detained a vessel from the Russian shadow fleet.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated the operation was "a warning that those who support Putin's war cannot escape the consequences." Zelensky publicly thanked London for "this crucial step against the Russian oil fleet." France had already conducted a similar operation with British support, and **further operations are planned** according to the MoD. **VERDICT: PARTIALLY TRUE.** The shadow fleet is powerful, but it is now being actively hunted.

*Operation Smyrtos is symbolically crucial, even if one tanker out of 700 doesn't change the balance overnight. What matters is the signal. The English Channel is no longer a free corridor for clandestine shipowners in the service of the Kremlin. When convenience insurers and shadow tanker operators now factor in the risk of a military boarding in European waters, the cost of circumvention increases. This is exactly the logic of sanctions: increasing the cost, not necessarily blocking everything.*

## Claim 7 — "China is saving Russia from sanctions"

### Beijing as a Lifeline — A More Complex Reality

China has indeed become **Russia's primary trading partner** since 2022, and its role in bypassing sanctions is documented. In April 2026, Beijing imported **5.5 billion euros worth of Russian crude oil**, representing **49% of Russia's crude exports**. Chinese companies provide electronic components, dual-use semiconductors, and drones. The EU's 21st sanction package targets **50 Chinese companies** for helping to circumvent export restrictions to Russia.

However, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPA) provides a crucial nuance in its June 2026 report: **China has refused to open its capital markets to Russia**. Major Chinese banks do not grant loans to Moscow to avoid exposure to American and European secondary sanctions. As a result, Russia cannot finance itself in yuan on international markets, and its access to external capital remains **fundamentally blocked**. Beijing is helping Moscow survive commercially. It is not offering a financial lifeline.

### The Limits of Sino-Russian Solidarity

The EU mini-package adopted on June 15, 2026, perfectly illustrates this new dynamic: among the **87 designated individuals and entities**, there are companies established in **Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Hong Kong, Liberia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates**. Yangjie, a Chinese electronic chip trader supplying the automotive and defense industries, found itself under sanctions, with a limited exemption until December 31, 2026, to allow European companies to find alternatives. The EU is clearly signaling that **helping Moscow bypass sanctions is not without risk**, even for companies based in Beijing or Dubai. **VERDICT: PARTIALLY TRUE.** China helps but does not save. Capital markets remain closed to Moscow.

*I'm wary of the "Putin is saved by Xi" thesis. it serves too conveniently to justify inaction — "it doesn't matter what we do, Beijing is funding the war anyway." The reality is more subtle and, ultimately, more encouraging: China buys cheap Russian oil, yes. But it does not lend money. It does not provide access to its financial system. And now it sees its own companies sanctioned by the EU. Sino-Russian solidarity has limits dictated by Beijing's well-understood self-interest.*

## Claim 8 — "Sanctions mainly penalize Europe, not Russia"

### The Argument Moscow Loves to Repeat

At the St. Petersburg Forum in June 2026, Putin insisted that sanctions and the freezing of Russian reserves had "**irreparably damaged the status of international currencies**, the dollar and the euro." He added that sanctions had "**harmed the global economy**" far more than Russia. This rhetoric finds some echoes in the West: the inflationary fears of 2022-2023, the energy bills of European households, the German manufacturing recession. These are real arguments, but they are instrumentalized.

The reality is that **Europe has fundamentally reduced its dependence on Russian gas**. CREA documents that **clean energy in Europe increased by 14% between 2022 and 2025**, allowing the continent to save **5.8 billion euros in electricity costs in 2026**. Spain and Portugal reduced their sensitivity to gas prices by **53%** thanks to a 74% increase in solar. The EU still imports Russian LNG — 49% of Russian LNG exports are destined for it, which is an anomaly the 21st package wants to correct with a total ban by January 1, 2027 — but the pipelines that fed Germany and Austria with Russian gas are now largely closed.

### The True Comparative Costs

According to data compiled by the EU and Kaja Kallas in late 2025, sanctions have cost Russia an **estimated $1.5 trillion in economic impact**. Frozen sovereign reserves represent **$300 billion** definitively out of Moscow's reach. In comparison, Europe suffered temporary energy inflation and a partial recession — painful but absorbed. Economic warfare has a cost for the West: the asymmetry is that **for Europe, it is a bearable sacrifice**. For Russia, it is a structural hemorrhage. **VERDICT: FALSE.** The costs are asymmetric. Russia pays a structurally higher price.

*The argument that "sanctions cost us just as much" is the kind of moral equivalence that revolts me. Yes, gas bills went up in Europe. Yes, German factories suffered. But no one in Europe drove their trucks over Ukrainian cities. Comparing the political and economic price the West pays for its sanctions with the price Ukraine pays to survive Russia's war is an insult to intelligence and human decency.*

## Claim 9 — "The twenty sanction packages have changed the military situation"

### The Link Between Finances and War Capability

The EU adopted its **20th sanction package on April 23, 2026**, with a strong focus on anti-circumvention measures. On June 9, 2026, the **21st package** was presented by Ursula von der Leyen, targeting energy, financial services, trade, drones, fisheries, and crypto-assets. On June 15, a **mini-package** designated 40 individuals and 47 entities. The legislative intensity is real. But does it translate into concrete military impact?

The answer is partially yes. **Restrictions on dual-use electronic components** have forced the Russian arms industry to restructure. The production of T-72 and T-90 tanks depends on foreign components that Russia can no longer obtain legally. Investigations show Russia resorts to intermediaries in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Serbia, and the UAE to bypass these restrictions — but at a high logistical and financial cost. Reconnaissance drones and cruise missiles still incorporate foreign chips — which the 21st package attempts to target more precisely with **export controls on 50 companies in India, China, Turkey, and the UAE**.

### Falling Recruitment, Sagging Morale

A less visible but crucial indicator: recruitment. Economist Janis Kluge, analyzing regional spending for enlistment bonuses, estimates that **new recruits fell by about 20% in the first months of 2026**. War is costly in terms of men as much as money, and the spiral of enlistment bonuses — necessary for recruitment in a country that now practices masked conscription — is itself an indicator of the economic pressure exerted by four years of conflict and cumulative sanctions. Total costs of the war since 2022 reach **53.079 trillion rubles, or $746.6 billion**, according to Kluge. **VERDICT: TRUE BUT INSUFFICIENT.** Sanctions are biting militarily, but not fast enough to change the course of the war in the immediate future.

*What strikes me about the 21 sanction packages is the logic of a tap being gradually tightened. Each package closes a circumvention corridor that the previous one had left open. The shadow fleet, then the shadow fleet's insurers, then the shadow fleet's bunkering ships. Semiconductors, then semiconductor intermediaries, then the intermediaries' crypto-platforms. It's slow. It's frustrating. But it's a pincer logic that eventually works — provided the West maintains its discipline.*

## Claim 10 — "Trump is sabotaging sanctions against Russia"

### The American Withdrawal from Economic Pressure

The criticism is real and documented. The Trump administration has repeatedly granted exemptions to sanctions against Russia since 2025, notably by renewing exemptions that allow countries buying Russian oil already loaded at sea to continue their transactions. According to Al Jazeera, **the United States faced criticism for renewing an exemption allowing nations to buy Russian oil** already in transit — a decision driven by **energy market volatility** following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The EU had to compensate by proposing to suspend the automatic adjustment of the oil cap to avoid giving Moscow an unintentional reprieve.

The Trumpian reality on sanctions is a paradox: the Trump administration has publicly presented its approach as a negotiation lever to push Putin toward peace. But in fact, the granted exemptions and reduced pressure on circumvention networks have given Moscow precious windows of breathing room. The Alaska summit between Trump and Putin in August 2025 produced nothing concrete. Meanwhile, Europe has had to increase its own pressure to compensate for American disengagement.

### Europe Fills the Void, But With Limits

The EU has clearly chosen to **intensify its own pressure** while Washington hesitated. The "continuous" sanctions policy — an innovation from June 15, 2026 — shows Brussels resolved not to wait for major packages to target new loopholes. But the maximum effectiveness of the system requires transatlantic coordination. Without the United States, secondary sanctions — which punish third-party companies helping Moscow — lose a large part of their bite. Chinese banks fear Washington, not just Brussels. **VERDICT: PARTIALLY TRUE.** Trump complicates the task without dismantling the system. Europe is holding on. But transatlantic cohesion remains the sinews of economic war.

*Trump is a necessary evil for the West — I stand by this analysis. His unpredictability is a pressure tool against certain adversaries. But facing Putin, it backfires on the Alliance. When Washington grants oil exemptions to calm markets that American Middle East policy itself destabilized, it's a strategic absurdity. Europe cannot eternally compensate for the inconsistencies of its ally across the Atlantic.*

## Claim 11 — "Russia has found sustainable financial alternatives to Western systems"

### De-dollarization and the Yuan: Reality or Illusion?

Since 2022, Russia has massively **de-dollarized its economy**. Russian banks have switched their assets and liabilities to the yuan. Transactions with China, India, and Turkey are conducted in local currencies or yuan. The government claims to have built a "sovereign" financial system resistant to external shocks. The Moscow Exchange has reoriented its indices. Ruble bonds dominate the domestic market. On the surface, it's an impressive demonstration of systemic resilience.

But the reality is more fragile. The yuan that Russia accumulates **cannot be freely invested or borrowed on Chinese capital markets**. China refuses to grant Russian issuers access to its sovereign bond markets. Result: Moscow cannot convert its yuan into productive capital or cheap debt. It is trapped in a golden cage. Furthermore, the **11 crypto-platforms targeted by the 21st sanction package** illustrate that even the digital financial alternatives Russia uses to bypass restrictions are now in the crosshairs. **The SWIFT network remains closed** to major Russian banks, and no credible alternative architecture has emerged on a global scale.

### Inflation and Rates as Indicators

The Russian Central Bank has maintained its key rate at **14.25%** since June 19, 2026 — the highest in decades outside of the 2022 crisis. Official inflation fluctuates between **7 and 8%** in 2026 according to the Central Bank itself. These figures are not those of an economy that is "resisting well." They are the signatures of a **military-overheated economy**, unable to allocate its resources efficiently, torn between war demand and civilian needs, and unable to lower its rates without reigniting inflation. **VERDICT: FALSE.** Russian financial alternatives are real but structurally insufficient.

*There is a cruel irony in Russia's financial situation in 2026: it has managed to build a cage in which it cannot die quickly, but in which it cannot prosper either. Yuans accumulate but are not used. Domestic bonds sell, but at prohibitive rates. Inflation gnaws at the purchasing power of Russians not on the front line. It is a slow asphyxiation, not a spectacular collapse. The West must have the patience to let this asphyxiation do its work.*

## Claim 12 — "The noose is really tightening in June 2026"

### Concrete Signs of Recent Hardening

June 2026 indeed marks an acceleration. The **mini-package of June 15, 2026** innovates by adopting sanctions on a "continuous" basis rather than in large semi-annual packages — an approach the Commission promised to implement to increase responsiveness. This package designates **87 individuals and entities** linked to the Russian military-industrial complex, the shadow fleet, Kremlin propaganda, human rights violations related to the Navalny case, and destabilization operations in Moldova. The targeted entities are based in seven different countries — a sign that transnational circumvention is now actively targeted.

The **Bank of Russia** itself acknowledged, in its June 19, 2026, statement on the rate decision, that **persistent structural budget deficits through 2029** could force it to maintain a more restrictive monetary policy than planned in the baseline scenario. It's not Kaja Kallas saying it. It's the Russian central bank. And the Russian government passed a text in June 2026 allowing for **increased borrowing and spending without public debate** — which is, in an authoritarian state, a signal of significant financial difficulties they are trying to hide.

### What Remains to Be Done for Sanctions to "Win"

Economists and analysts converge on several gaps to be filled. The exemption granted by Washington for Russian oil in transit must end. **STS (ship-to-ship) transfers** in European waters — representing 209 million euros in April 2026 according to CREA, primarily in Cypriot and Lithuanian waters — must be systematically intercepted. The oil cap must be lowered to $30 as some experts suggest to maximize impact. And above all: **the cohesion of the sanctioning coalition must be maintained** in the face of Hungarian pressure, Maltese and Greek interests in shipping, and electoral calculations pushing some governments to stall. **VERDICT: TRUE.** The noose is tightening, but major breaches remain.

*What makes me cautiously optimistic in this month of June 2026 is the curve, not the level. The level is still insufficient: Putin is funding his war, the oil is flowing, the trenches are holding. But the curve is unfavorable to the Kremlin on almost every indicator: GDP, deficit, reserves, recruitment, access to technology. If the West maintains its discipline, if Trump does not grant catastrophic new exemptions, if the 21st wave of sanctions is adopted quickly, Russia's financial wall will continue to erode. Strategic patience is the only weapon Putin cannot bypass with shadow tankers.*

## Conclusion: The Factual Verdict — Imperfect but Real Sanctions

### What the Data Confirms Unambiguously

This factcheck leaves no room for ambiguity on the essential facts. **Russia is suffering economically**. Its GDP contracted for the first time in three years in the first quarter of 2026. Its budget deficit has already exceeded its annual target by one and a half times in five months. Its National Wealth Fund is nearly empty. Its interest rate is at 14.25% in a context of 7-8% inflation. Its own financial experts warn Putin in private that military spending is unsustainable. These are not pro-Ukrainian assertions: these are the data of Russian institutions themselves, corroborated by Bloomberg, the IMF, the Russian Central Bank, and independent analysts.

At the same time, **sanctions are not yet enough to stop the war**. Oil continues to flow via the shadow fleet. China and India absorb sanctioned exports. Trump grants exemptions that create breathing room for Moscow. The oil cap is being violated on a large scale due to a lack of strict enforcement. The war in Iran gave the Kremlin an unforeseen windfall that temporarily offset losses. **Sanctions are working, but not fast enough**.

### The Democratic Stake in Factual Truth

Factchecking has a concrete political utility: **thwarting dual propagandas simultaneously**. The Kremlin's, which denies any effectiveness of sanctions to discourage the West from adopting more. And that of Western defeatists, who too quickly conclude total failure to justify a loosening of pressure. The truth is in the middle, but it clearly leans to one side: **sanctions are hurting Russia**, and the more the West maintains and hardens the pressure — by closing loopholes, sanctioning complicit third parties, and boarding shadow tankers in the Channel — the more the cost for Putin becomes unsustainable. Economic victory is possible. It requires perseverance, cohesion, and the refusal of the illusion of a negotiated peace that would leave Moscow free to start again.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary Sources

- [CREA — Monthly analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions, April 2026 — May 11, 2026](https://energyandcleanair.org/april-2026-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/)

- [KSE Institute — Russian Oil Tracker, April 2026: Russian oil revenues nearly doubled in March — May 5, 2026](https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/russian-oil-tracker-april-2026-russias-oil-revenues-nearly-doubled-in-march-amid-the-war-in-iran/)

- [The Moscow Times — Russia weighs budget cuts outside defense as fiscal pressures mount — May 27, 2026](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/05/27/russia-weighs-budget-cuts-outside-defense-as-fiscal-pressures-mount-a92866)

### Secondary Sources

- [Euronews — After 20 rounds of sanctions, the EU finally sees cracks in the Russian economy — May 8, 2026](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/08/after-20-rounds-of-sanctions-the-eu-finally-sees-cracks-in-the-russian-economy)

- [BBC News — Royal Marines board Russian shadow fleet tanker in English Channel — June 14, 2026](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyek039l2vo)

- [Al Jazeera — EU planning to add to $1.5 trillion sanctions hit on Russia — June 8, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/8/eu-planning-to-add-to-1-5-trillion-sanctions-hit-on-russia)

- [EUNews — EU sanctions against Russia: the 21st package is on the way, targeting energy, banks, and cryptocurrencies — June 9, 2026](https://www.eunews.it/en/2026/06/09/eu-sanctions-against-russia-the-21st-package-is-on-the-way-targeting-energy-banks-and-cryptocurrencies/)

- [RBC-Ukraine — Russia’s war against Ukraine drives budget deficit to record levels — May 29, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-s-war-against-ukraine-drives-budget-1780043758.html)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/factcheck-les-sanctions-contre-la-russie-fonctionnent-elles-vraiment-verificatio-2