# Is Washington's Iran sanctions regime still holding > Introduction: a simple question, an answer worth verifying - Author: Maxime Marquette - Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co) - Section: Analysis - Published: 2026-07-03 - Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/factcheck-le-regime-de-sanctions-iranien-de-washington-tient-il-toujours ## Introduction: a simple question, an answer worth verifying ### The claim that needs to be tested The official **U.S. Department of State** page devoted to **Iran sanctions** displays, in early **July 2026**, an unambiguous message: the program remains **active**. The claim I am checking today is simple: does **Washington** really maintain the full architecture of its sanctions regime against **Tehran**, even after the partial unfreezing of **$12 billion** announced on **June 23, 2026**? This is a question that deserves factual treatment, not a sharp opinion delivered upfront. As a columnist, I must first establish what is verifiable before offering a judgment, and that is exactly the exercise I intend to carry out here, article by article, source by source. ### Why this fact-check matters for understanding Iran-U.S. diplomacy This kind of verification matters because confusion easily sets in between a **one-time relief measure** and a **structural lifting** of sanctions. Many commentators, including some serious outlets, have implied that unfreezing funds amounted to a normalization of relations, which simply is not accurate according to the official documents available. Clearly establishing the nuance between the two prevents intellectually disarming public debate on a topic as sensitive as **Iran's nuclear program**, where every imprecision can feed unintentional disinformation, even when made in good faith. ## Claim 1: "All sanctions against **Iran** have now been lifted" ### What the **State Department** actually says This claim is **FALSE**. The official **Iran sanctions** page of the **State Department**, checked in early July 2026, still lists an active program covering multiple sectors: oil, the financial sector, ballistic missiles, support for regional terrorism, and proliferation. Nothing in official communications indicates a general lifting of this regime. Only a targeted **60-day** window, expiring on **August 21, 2026**, was opened for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products, and petroleum products, in exchange for the resumption of international nuclear inspections. That is a temporary, sector-specific exemption, not a repeal. ### The confusion fed by certain media shortcuts Several eye-catching headlines in recent days have suggested a total thaw by focusing solely on the spectacular figure of **$12 billion** without specifying the exact, sector-specific and temporary scope of the measure. This kind of journalistic shortcut feeds a mistaken reading of the diplomatic reality now unfolding. The continuation of the rest of the sanctions program, notably targeting financing for **Lebanese Hezbollah** and other regional militias backed by **Tehran**, confirms that the core punitive architecture remains fully in force despite this one-time gesture. ## Claim 2: "The **$12 billion** unfreezing is unconditional" ### The clearly documented nuclear quid pro quo This claim is also **FALSE**. Official documents and statements explicitly tie this unfreezing to the resumption of **international inspectors'** access to Iranian nuclear facilities, as part of negotiations conducted in **Geneva** and **Bürgenstock** under the technical oversight of U.S. Vice President **JD Vance** and his Iranian counterpart **Ali Bagheri**. President **Trump** himself publicly stated that **Iran** would accept these inspections, a statement that confirms the conditional nature of the deal, even though the precise details of the verification mechanism remain unclear at this stage of the negotiations. ### The persistent disagreement over the use of the funds The deputy governor of the **Central Bank of Iran**, **Mohsen Karimi**, said via the **Tasnim** news agency that **Tehran** has **"no obligation to buy"** American agricultural products with these funds, contradicting part of the American narrative that the money would notably be used for such purchases. This friction point confirms that even the conditional terms of the deal remain disputed between the two capitals. This documented divergence shows clearly that the deal is nothing like a blank check: it is a fragile arrangement, with gray areas that each side interprets to its own advantage in front of its own public opinion. ## Claim 3: "U.S. sanctions no longer have any effect on Iran's economy" ### What the available economic data show This claim is **MISLEADING**. Available economic analyses continue to document an Iranian economy weakened by years of cumulative sanctions, worsened by the shock of the recent military conflict with **Israel** and the United States. The very fact that **Tehran** is actively negotiating a partial thaw demonstrates, on the contrary, the persistent pressure this sanctions regime places on its public finances. The active program run by the **State Department** and **OFAC**, the arm of the **U.S. Treasury** responsible for enforcing these sanctions, continues to target hundreds of entities and individuals linked to the Iranian regime, a framework that remains, on paper, one of the most comprehensive in the world against a state. ### Why this vulnerability explains the negotiation timeline It is precisely this persistent economic vulnerability that explains why **Tehran** agreed to open the door to international inspectors, rather than a sudden conversion to nuclear transparency. A regime negotiating from strength would act differently, with fewer immediate concessions on such a sensitive file. This reading confirms, based on the data available, that sanctions remain a real and measurable lever, contrary to the thesis of total ineffectiveness sometimes put forward by certain circles favoring rapid rapprochement with the Iranian regime. ## Claim 4: "**Congress** unanimously supports this unfreezing" ### Bipartisan voices of skepticism on Capitol Hill This claim is **FALSE**. Bipartisan voices, including within the **Trump** administration's own political camp, have expressed reservations about the speed and relative opacity of this financial unfreezing. Several lawmakers are demanding greater transparency on the precise verification mechanisms planned before any further easing of sanctions. This lack of internal political consensus in the United States clearly shows that the file remains highly controversial, contrary to the image of a widely approved deal that certain official statements might suggest at first glance. ### What this division reveals about the deal's political fragility This internal political fragility could, in the coming weeks, force the administration to revise certain terms of the deal or release more details to defuse the sharpest criticism coming from **Congress**. Nothing at this stage guarantees the political durability of this diplomatic arrangement. This internal American political instability constitutes, in my view, an additional risk factor too often overlooked in analyses that focus solely on the Iran-U.S. dimension of the file, without factoring in **Washington's** domestic political dynamics. ## Claim 5: "This unfreezing marks a historic turning point in Iran-U.S. relations" ### What recent history teaches us about these cycles This claim is **EXAGGERATED**. The recent history of relations between **Washington** and **Tehran** is marked by repeated cycles of sanctions and partial thaws, none of which have so far produced lasting normalization. The **2015** nuclear deal, unilaterally abandoned by the **Trump** administration in **2018**, perfectly illustrates this structural instability. Nothing in the available documents supports the claim that this June 2026 unfreezing fundamentally breaks with this repetitive historical pattern, rather than being simply another episode in the same cyclical dynamic between maximum pressure and one-time relief. ### Why caution should prevail over early enthusiasm Nuclear non-proliferation specialists, cited in several available analyses, note that **Tehran** has, in the past, repeatedly made partial opening gestures without ever offering full and lasting access to its sensitive facilities. This historical reality should temper any early enthusiasm about the real scope of the current unfreezing. It is this methodological caution, grounded in documented precedent, that should guide our collective reading of this diplomatic sequence, rather than premature optimism that nothing in the verifiable facts currently confirms. ## Claim 6: "The **European Union** has endorsed this financial unfreezing" ### What European capitals are actually saying This claim is **UNCONFIRMED**. No official statement from the **European Union** or its most influential members, including **France**, **Germany**, and the **United Kingdom**, has formally validated or endorsed this bilateral unfreezing between **Washington** and **Tehran**. The deal remains, for now, a strictly American initiative, negotiated without broad, documented transatlantic coordination. European capitals, which nonetheless hold historical expertise accumulated since the negotiations of the **2015** nuclear deal, have not been publicly involved in the technical discussions held in **Geneva** and **Bürgenstock**, which limits their ability to influence the verification mechanisms chosen. ### Why this European absence raises questions This lack of explicit European endorsement does not amount to opposition, but it underscores the unilateral nature of the American approach on a file that nonetheless directly concerns collective Western security in the face of Iran's nuclear program. Closer transatlantic coordination would strengthen the credibility of the proposed verification mechanism, preventing **Tehran** from exploiting differences in approach between **Washington** and European capitals to extract further piecemeal concessions. ## Claim 7: "This unfreezing guarantees that no funding will reach **Hezbollah**" ### The absence of a documented tracking mechanism This claim is **FALSE**. No official document reviewed mentions any specific tracking mechanism guaranteeing that the funds released to **Tehran** will not, even indirectly, be used to finance **Lebanese Hezbollah** or other regional militias backed by **Iran**. This lack of an explicit guarantee constitutes a documented gap in the current unfreezing. The financial and military link between **Iran** and **Hezbollah** has been documented for decades by numerous independent agencies and research centers, which makes this absence of guarantees all the more significant for the stability of **Lebanon** and the security of **Israel**. ### What the relevant authorities have not confirmed Neither the **State Department** nor the **U.S. Treasury** has published a detailed mechanism for tracking the funds once transferred to Iranian authorities, leaving an information gap that several **Congress** members have already flagged in their recent public statements. This documented gap confirms that the claim of a total guarantee against indirect financing of regional militias does not hold up under scrutiny of currently available facts, despite the rhetorical assurances given by certain American officials. ## Overall verdict on the real state of sanctions ### What is confirmed by official sources At the end of this verification, the established facts are clear: the American sanctions program against **Iran** remains **active** as a whole, with a single sector-specific and temporary **60-day** exemption on oil exports, conditioned on the resumption of international nuclear inspections. No general lifting has been confirmed by the official sources reviewed. The unfreezing of **$12 billion** is real, documented by several **international news agencies**, but its scope remains limited and its final use remains disputed between **Washington** and **Tehran**, as confirmed by the contradictory statements from both capitals. ### What this fact-check cannot yet settle This fact-check cannot, at this stage, confirm whether the promised nuclear inspections will actually be carried out in full, nor whether the released funds will remain free of any indirect use benefiting regional militias like **Hezbollah**. These elements will remain to be verified in the coming weeks. It is this persistent uncertainty, rather than a definitive judgment one way or the other, that should guide the public reading of this complex file, where ongoing factual verification takes precedence over any hasty conclusion. **By Maxime Marquette, columnist** ## Columnist's transparency note ### Editorial stance I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies. I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events. ### Method and sources This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here. **Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies. **Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations. When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**. ### Nature of the analysis The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted. My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors. This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text. ## Sources ### Primary sources - [Iran Sanctions — U.S. Department of State, accessed July 2026](https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions) - [Iran Sanctions Program — Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury, accessed July 2026](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions) - [Iran war day 116: US eases Iran sanctions; Israel kills two in Lebanon — Al Jazeera, June 23, 2026](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/23/iran-war-day-116-us-eases-iran-sanctions-lebanon-ceasefire-holds) ### Secondary sources - [US waives Iran sanctions after talks; Lebanon fighting abates — Reuters via Internazionale, June 23, 2026](https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/06/23/us-iran-talks-go-into-day-2-after-trump-threats-hormuz-closure) - [The White House's New Pro-Ukraine Tone Shift — Foreign Policy, June 22, 2026](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/06/22/trump-administration-ukraine-russia-war-zelensky-rhetoric/) - [State Department Issues New Sanctions Against Cuban Military Group — The Epoch Times, June 23, 2026](https://www.theepochtimes.com/world/state-department-issues-new-sanctions-against-cuban-military-group-6052064) --- Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/factcheck-le-regime-de-sanctions-iranien-de-washington-tient-il-toujours