# FACT-CHECK: The Gang Suppression Force, deployed in Haiti well below strength

> For several weeks now, a claim has been circulating widely about the security situation in Haiti: the Gang Suppression Force, presented as the major international response to the territorial collapse caused by gangs, is…

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Analysis
- Published: 2026-07-20
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/fact-check-the-gang-suppression-force-deployed-in-haiti-well-below-strength

## Key takeaways

- The claim is confirmed, according to the article, by UN statements, financial data and specialized analyses, though it is not the sole cause of Haiti's security crisis.
- Only six countries are formally represented (Chad, Mongolia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Sri Lanka), against fifteen that had offered contributions.
- Of about $223 million pledged, roughly $66 million had been disbursed for operations, according to the article.
- Secretary-General Guterres acknowledged that no developed country contributes troops, and the article presents this as a choice by major Western powers.
- The article notes controversy over the Sri Lankan contingent, where rights groups raised past abuse allegations, which the State Department disputed.

## Introduction: a force announced with fanfare, deployed at a crawl

### What is being repeated on social media about this force

For several weeks now, a claim has been circulating widely about the security situation in **Haiti**: the **Gang Suppression Force**, presented as the major international response to the territorial collapse caused by **gangs**, is supposedly deployed at a chronic **understaffing** level, far below the capacity announced by the **UN Security Council**. This claim, echoed notably by an analysis published on July 10, 2026, deserves to be checked point by point rather than simply repeated.

This fact-check examines the available data on personnel actually deployed, the target capacity set by **Resolution 2793**, and the announced timeline for reaching full operational capacity, in order to determine whether this claim of **understaffing** reflects a documented reality or a media exaggeration.

### Why this factual verification matters

This is not an academic exercise: at a time when the **Vatican** and the **United Nations** count 1.5 million **displaced** people and more than 1,600 **deaths** in three months in **Haiti**, the question of whether the international military response truly matches documented needs carries direct consequences for human lives, not just abstract administrative figures.

Precisely establishing the gap between planned and actual personnel also makes it possible to assess the responsibility of the various actors, contributing states, financial institutions, and the **Security Council**, in the pace of a build-up judged insufficient by many observers of the Haitian file.

*I believe we need to name things clearly from the introduction: verifying this **understaffing** is not a matter of cold statistics, it is a matter of human lives that depend directly on how fast this force reaches full capacity.*

## The claim checked: the official understaffing numbers

### About a thousand personnel against a target of 5,550

According to data available as of early July 2026, the **Gang Suppression Force** counted roughly a thousand personnel actually deployed on Haitian soil, against a ceiling set at 5,550 people by **Resolution 2793** of the **Security Council**, adopted on September 30, 2025. This gap, on the order of 80%, unambiguously confirms the claim of massive **understaffing** relative to the initially set target.

This assessment aligns with independent findings published by several specialized analyses, including one from **The OpsCon** on July 10, 2026, which documents a still very partial deployment of the force nearly a year after its authorization by the **UN**, a delay considered abnormally long for a mission meant to respond to such an acute security emergency.

### Full capacity pushed back to October 2026

According to the most recent available projections, the force is not expected to reach full operational capacity until October 2026, more than a year after the adoption of the resolution that created it. This timeline, confirmed by several tracking reports on the Haitian situation, validates the second part of the initial claim: not only is the **understaffing** real today, it is set to persist for several more months before any full resolution.

This overall timeframe, between the September 2025 authorization and the full capacity targeted for October 2026, represents more than a year of gradual build-up, a duration that several collective security experts consider excessive given the continued deterioration of the situation on Haitian soil during that same period.

*A full year to go from a **Security Council** authorization to full operational capacity, while entire neighborhoods of **Port-au-Prince** fall under **gang** control during that delay, is not mere administrative slowness, it is a collective failure of priorities.*

## The context of Resolution 2793 and its initial ambitions

### A more robust mandate passed by a wide margin

**Resolution 2793**, adopted on September 30, 2025 with twelve votes in favor and abstentions from **Russia**, **China**, and **Pakistan** according to **ABC News**, transformed the **Multinational Security Support Mission** led by **Kenya** into a force with expanded powers, authorized to conduct targeted operations against **gangs**, alone or alongside Haitian police, and to secure critical infrastructure such as the airport, ports, schools, and hospitals.

This **resolution** explicitly set a target force of 5,500 uniformed personnel and 50 civilians, financed through voluntary contributions from member states, a **funding** architecture that would quickly prove to be one of the main obstacles to a rapid **build-up**, as confirmed by developments in the following months.

### A transition conceived as continuity, not rupture

The resolution's text envisioned a transition between the Kenyan-led mission and the new force over an initial twelve-month period, a timeline that, in practice, proved optimistic given the real difficulties of recruitment, **funding**, and logistical coordination among the various prospective contributing countries.

This difference between the timeline initially envisioned by the resolution and the actual pace observed on the ground is itself an important factual data point for understanding why today's documented **understaffing** is not a mere accident, but the predictable consequence of a structurally fragile **funding** model.

*We cannot say this delay was entirely unforeseeable: missions financed by voluntary contributions have, historically, almost systematically taken longer than planned to deploy, and this Haitian file is unfortunately no exception.*

## The countries actually contributing to this force today

### Six countries represented, a still-narrow base

As of mid-July 2026, six countries were formally represented within the **Gang Suppression Force**: **Chad**, **Mongolia**, **El Salvador**, **Guatemala**, **Jamaica**, and, since July 10, 2026, **Sri Lanka**, according to a spokesperson cited by the **AFP** news agency. This base of six contributing countries remains narrow compared with the fifteen countries that, according to the American State Department, had made contribution offers potentially representing more than 11,500 personnel in total.

This gap between the number of countries expressing interest and the number that have actually deployed troops confirms, once again, that the main **obstacle** to building this force lies not in a lack of declared political will, but in the slowness of concrete deployment, **funding**, and personnel vetting processes.

### The complete withdrawal of the Kenyan mission, a transition gap

The last contingent of the Kenyan-led mission left **Haiti** in April 2026, coinciding with the arrival of the first Chadian troops on April 1 of the same year. This transition, presented as operational continuity, nonetheless created a period during which combined personnel on the ground were particularly reduced, before additional reinforcements, notably Mongolian, Salvadoran, and Jamaican, gradually joined the force over the following months.

This fragile transition period, documented by several observers of the Haitian situation, likely contributed to the worsening of gang territorial control observed in spring and summer 2026, a factor that strongly reinforces the validity of the initial claim about the concrete consequences of **understaffing**.

*Six contributing countries for a mission meant to potentially bring together fifteen is not a technical detail: it is numerical proof that the international solidarity announced in September 2025 has, ten months later, translated into only a fraction of its original ambition.*

## Funding, a documented obstacle to full deployment

### A considerable gap between pledges and actual payments

Of roughly $223 million in financial pledges collected for the **Gang Suppression Force**, only $174 million had actually been paid in cash, and about $66 million had actually been disbursed to fund the force's concrete operations, according to data available in mid-2026. This gap between the $223 million pledged and the $66 million disbursed represents a financial efficiency loss of nearly 70%.

This financial finding confirms, in measurable and verifiable terms, that the **understaffing** documented on the ground is not solely a matter of troop availability, but also and especially a matter of insufficient financial resources to equip, transport, and pay the additional contingents that several countries had nonetheless declared themselves ready to provide.

### A structurally fragile voluntary funding model

This mode of **funding** through voluntary contributions, rather than a mandatory **United Nations** budget, largely explains the chronic vulnerability of this type of mission to fluctuations in donor countries' political and budgetary priorities, a problem documented by numerous analyses of comparable international missions conducted in the past in other regions of the world.

This structural fragility of **funding**, according to several collective security experts, is the main explanatory factor behind the force's persistent **understaffing**, even more than any political reluctance on the part of contributing countries themselves to honor their initial commitments.

*Let's say it plainly: voluntary **funding** that delivers only 30% of the sums pledged is not a system that malfunctions by accident, it is a system designed in a way that never guarantees the necessary resources exactly when the emergency is greatest.*

## The absence of direct military contribution from major powers

### An admission made publicly by the UN Secretary-General

During a visit to **Camp Vertières** on June 16, 2026, Secretary-General **António Guterres** himself publicly acknowledged that he saw no developed country contributing militarily to the **Gang Suppression Force**, explicitly mentioning the Chadian and Jamaican contingents already present, as well as the announced arrival of Bangladeshi reinforcements, while calling on developing countries to keep engaging in this type of operation.

This statement confirms, from the mouth of the **United Nations'** highest official, that the force's **understaffing** does not result from a lack of potential candidates among developing countries, but rather from the absence of direct military participation by the major Western powers, which for now limit themselves to a role of **funding** and diplomatic oversight.

### An American role centered on oversight rather than deployment

The **United States** leads the permanent partners group overseeing troop deployments within the **Gang Suppression Force**, alongside **Canada**, the **Bahamas**, **El Salvador**, and **Jamaica**, a role confirmed by Ambassador **Mike Waltz's** visit to **Haiti** in early July 2026 to assess the force's progress, according to an official statement from the American mission to the **UN**.

This configuration, in which **Washington** steers political coordination without committing its own troops on the ground, confirms the validity of the claim that the force's **understaffing** partly reflects a deliberate political choice by the major Western powers rather than a mere logistical constraint beyond their control.

*That **Guterres** would say it this directly should settle the debate: this **understaffing** is not a technical accident, it is the direct result of a choice by the major Western powers to fund and supervise this mission without committing their own soldiers.*

## The Sri Lankan contingent's arrival, a late and controversial reinforcement

### A deployment confirmed on July 10, 2026

On July 10, 2026, a Sri Lankan contingent arrived in **Port-au-Prince** to join the **Gang Suppression Force**, according to a spokesperson cited by the **AFP** news agency, bringing to six the number of countries formally represented within the force. This contingent is expected to eventually reach around 1,132 personnel, according to figures provided by the Sri Lankan military, constituting the largest single overseas deployment of Sri Lankan forces in the country's recent history.

This arrival, while representing a significant reinforcement in strictly numerical terms, also confirms, through its late timing, the general slowness of this force's build-up process: ten months after **Resolution 2793's** authorization, adding a sixth contributing country is still presented as a notable advance rather than a routine milestone.

### Documented controversies over this contingent's past

This arrival was accompanied by strong concerns voiced by several human rights organizations, including **Amnesty International**, over documented allegations of sexual abuse of minors involving Sri Lankan soldiers during a previous **United Nations** mission in **Haiti**, between 2004 and 2017, allegations for which judicial accountability is still considered insufficient by these same organizations.

Fourteen organizations thus called, according to the **Miami Herald**, for an independent vetting process before any further deployment, a demand the American State Department answered by stating that no evidence of problematic past conduct had been found among the personnel currently assigned to this new mission.

*I cannot assess this reinforcement purely in numerical terms: welcoming 1,132 additional soldiers is a real operational necessity, but that must never overshadow the unresolved allegations weighing on some of these same contingents.*

## The documented consequences of this understaffing on the ground

### A continued expansion of gang territorial control

According to the joint **Vatican** and **United Nations** report published on July 8, 2026, criminal groups continue to expand their territorial control over large portions of **Port-au-Prince** and beyond, an expansion that continued despite the presence, first of the Kenyan-led mission, then of the **Gang Suppression Force**, confirming that the documented **understaffing** directly affected the force's ability to reverse this territorial dynamic.

This continued expansion, despite an uninterrupted international presence since 2024, validates the claim that **understaffing** of this magnitude genuinely undermines the mission's operational effectiveness, rather than constituting a mere statistical detail without practical consequences on the ground.

### A human toll that keeps worsening during the build-up

The toll of 1.5 million **displaced** people and more than 1,600 **deaths** in three months, documented by the **Vatican** and the **UN**, accumulated precisely during the period when the **Gang Suppression Force** remained undersized relative to its target of 5,550 personnel. This temporal overlap, while it does not establish a strict, exclusive causality, strongly reinforces the hypothesis of a direct link between insufficient deployed personnel and the inability to effectively protect the civilian population.

This documented reality confirms, without reasonable ambiguity, that the initial claim about the force's **understaffing** is not a media exaggeration, but a factual finding with directly measurable human consequences on Haitian soil.

*It would be dishonest to claim this **understaffing** alone explains the Haitian tragedy, but it would be equally dishonest to claim there is no link between a force at less than 20% of its planned capacity and the continued expansion of **gangs** during that same period.*

## What international security experts say about this file

### A precedent that echoes other delayed international missions

Several specialized international security analyses, published during the first half of 2026, note that the slowness observed in deploying the **Gang Suppression Force** is not an isolated case, but fits within a broader pattern of internationally financed missions relying on voluntary contributions that systematically take longer than planned to reach full operational capacity.

This comparison with comparable historical precedents reinforces the credibility of the initial claim about **understaffing**, while suggesting that this problem extends far beyond the Haitian case alone to raise more fundamental questions about the effectiveness of voluntary **funding** mechanisms for this type of collective security operation.

### Renewed calls for mandatory rather than voluntary funding

Faced with this recurring finding, several experts advocate for reforming how this type of mission is **funded**, favoring mandatory contributions over voluntary ones, a proposal that nonetheless faces significant political resistance from several member states reluctant to commit to automatic, binding funding for collective security missions.

This political resistance, documented in several debates within the **Security Council** itself, illustrates how much the current **understaffing** of the **Gang Suppression Force** reflects broader structural tensions within the multilateral system, well beyond the specifics of the Haitian file alone.

*I believe this debate over mandatory **funding** should extend well beyond the Haitian case alone: as long as collective security missions depend on the fluctuating generosity of member states, this kind of **understaffing** will keep repeating itself elsewhere in the world.*

## The verdict of this fact-check on the initial claim

### A claim confirmed by the available data

Based on the data reviewed, the claim that the **Gang Suppression Force** was deployed in **Haiti** at **understaffed** levels is confirmed without reasonable ambiguity: roughly a thousand personnel against a target of 5,550, a deployment at less than 20% of its target capacity, nearly a year after the **Security Council's** authorization of **Resolution 2793**.

This confirmation rests on multiple, converging sources, including official statements from **United Nations** officials, specialized analytical reports, and documented financial data on the gap between pledges and actual contribution payments.

### What this claim does not allow us to conclude

This fact-check confirms the documented **understaffing**, but it does not allow us to establish, with the same certainty, an exclusive and direct causality between this single factor and the entire catastrophic human toll observed in **Haiti**. Other factors, notably the Haitian national police's own operational capacity and the growing sophistication of the armed groups themselves, also contribute to this continued security deterioration.

This methodological nuance in no way weakens the central validity of the verified claim: the **understaffing** of the **Gang Suppression Force** is real, documented, and significant, even though it does not constitute the sole explanation for the Haitian security crisis as a whole.

*A good fact-check must know how to state what it confirms and what it cannot prove: here, the **understaffing** is confirmed outright, but claiming it alone explains the entirety of the Haitian disaster would go beyond what the facts allow us to assert.*

## Comparing this with the UN's initial promised timeline

### A gap of several months compared with initial announcements

When **Resolution 2793** was adopted in September 2025, several UN officials and diplomats suggested that the transition between the Kenyan-led mission and the new force could take place over an initial twelve-month period, a timeline that, with the deadline now set at October 2026 for full capacity, turns out to be broadly respected in strictly temporal terms, but very much behind schedule in terms of personnel actually deployed at the midpoint of this transition period.

This distinction between an overall timeline that is being respected and an actual deployment pace that is running late is an important nuance for understanding precisely where the documented problem lies: not in exceeding the announced final deadline, but in a far-too-slow build-up during the first part of this transition period.

### Lessons for future comparable missions

This Haitian experience, if it holds up as a documented textbook case, could influence how future comparable collective security missions are planned, particularly regarding the anticipation of real recruitment, **funding**, and deployment timelines, rather than relying solely on optimistic timelines announced at the moment resolutions are adopted.

It is this dimension of institutional learning, beyond the Haitian case alone, that makes this fact-check relevant to anyone interested more broadly in the effectiveness of international collective security mechanisms in a world where such crises could unfortunately recur elsewhere.

*If the international community draws no concrete lesson from this Haitian delay, it will repeat exactly the same mistakes the next time a comparable crisis demands a fast, massive response.*

## The urgency of accelerating the remaining build-up

### What remains to be accomplished before October 2026

To reach the target of 5,550 personnel set for October 2026, the **Gang Suppression Force** must still multiply its current personnel by a factor of more than five in just a few months, a deployment pace far exceeding what has been observed since the resolution's authorization in September 2025. This necessary acceleration will depend directly on how quickly the financial contributions pledged, but not yet disbursed, are actually paid.

According to the spokesperson cited by the **AFP** news agency at the time of the Sri Lankan contingent's arrival, new reinforcements are expected in the coming weeks, an encouraging signal that nonetheless remains insufficient, on its own, to guarantee that the October 2026 deadline will actually be fully met.

### A responsibility shared by all stakeholders

This necessary acceleration does not depend solely on troop-contributing countries, but also on international financial institutions and the major Western powers overseeing this mission without directly committing their own forces, a shared responsibility that this fact-check clearly highlights through the financial and operational data examined.

Recognizing this shared responsibility is a necessary step so that the remaining months before October 2026 produce a real acceleration, rather than a simple repetition of the insufficient pace observed since this force's initial authorization by the **Security Council**.

*Multiplying personnel fivefold in just a few months is not impossible, but it will require political and financial will that the international community has not, so far, sufficiently demonstrated on this file.*

## What this fact-check reveals about media coverage of the file

### A solid claim, rarely contradicted by reliable sources

Unlike other claims circulating on social media about complex international crises, the one concerning the **Gang Suppression Force's** **understaffing** is confirmed convergently by sources as varied as official **UN** statements, documented financial reports, and specialized international security analyses, without any identified reliable source seriously contradicting it.

This convergence of independent sources strengthens the reliability of this fact-check's verdict, in a context where many claims about complex international crises often turn out to be partly exaggerated or insufficiently documented upon thorough verification.

### An invitation to keep verifying in the months ahead

This finding of **understaffing**, confirmed in mid-July 2026, will need to be regularly reassessed in the coming months, as new contingents join the force and as the promised financial disbursements materialize, or not, according to the timeline announced for October 2026.

This need for continuous monitoring reminds us that a fact-check on a file as evolving as Haiti's security situation is never a fixed verdict, but a rigorous snapshot of a situation bound to change, for better or worse, in the months that follow.

*I commit to revisiting this file in the coming months: a good fact-check is never a final word, it is an honest snapshot of a situation that events on the ground will keep writing, whether that pleases hurried commentators or not.*

## What comparing this with other underfunded UN missions reveals

### A structural problem broader than the Haitian case alone

Several past peacekeeping or peace-restoration missions financed through voluntary contributions have experienced delays comparable to those observed today with the **Gang Suppression Force**, a recurring pattern documented by researchers specialized in collective security operations. This precedent reinforces the credibility of this fact-check's diagnosis: the Haitian **understaffing** is not an isolated anomaly, but the most recent expression of a well-identified structural problem within the multilateral system.

Recognizing this recurring pattern does not in any way absolve those currently responsible for the Haitian file of their obligation to act faster, but it does help us understand that a lasting solution to this type of **understaffing** will necessarily require a broader reform of international mission **funding** mechanisms, rather than one-off adjustments specific to the Haitian case alone.

### A useful comparative window for decision-makers

This comparative perspective offers decision-makers involved in the Haitian file concrete lessons on the mechanisms that have, in the past, allowed exceptional acceleration of certain delayed international deployments, notably when regional powers or financial institutions agreed to advance funds while awaiting full payment of contributions pledged by all donor countries.

Applying this type of accelerating mechanism to the **Gang Suppression Force** file could, according to several analysts, help reduce the current gap between deployed personnel and the set target, without waiting for the broader structural slowness of the **United Nations'** voluntary **funding** system to be fully resolved.

*The world has already invented, in the past, mechanisms to accelerate international deployments stalled by **funding** delays; the real scandal would be not applying them here, when human lives depend on it with every passing week.*

*I close this fact-check with a simple conviction: the facts confirm the **understaffing**, the facts confirm its human consequences, and there is no valid excuse left for not accelerating, starting now, whatever can still be accelerated before October 2026.*

## Conclusion: a real understaffing, with measurable human consequences

### A clear verdict on a largely well-founded claim

This fact-check confirms, based on multiple converging data points, that the **Gang Suppression Force** was indeed deployed in **Haiti** at markedly **understaffed** levels, with roughly a thousand personnel against a target of 5,550, and full operational capacity pushed back to October 2026, more than a year after the initial authorization of **Resolution 2793** by the **Security Council**.

This documented **understaffing** is not the sole explanation for the Haitian security crisis, but it constitutes a significant and measurable factor, whose human consequences are directly reflected in the toll of 1.5 million **displaced** people and more than 1,600 **deaths** in three months recorded by the **Vatican** and the **United Nations**.

### What the rest of this file must demonstrate

The coming months will show whether the arrival of new contingents, including that of **Sri Lanka**, and the hoped-for acceleration of financial disbursements will actually allow this force to reach its October 2026 target, or whether today's documented **understaffing** will continue to weigh on the international community's ability to protect a civilian population already severely tested.

In the meantime, this fact-check establishes a solid factual basis that anyone wishing to seriously discuss the Haitian crisis should now take into account, rather than continuing to debate based on impressions or unverified claims.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Haiti GSF Early Deployment and Gang Control — The OpsCon, July 10, 2026](https://theopscon.com/intelligence/haiti-gsf-early-deployment-gang-control-2026-07-10)

- [Secretary-General's Press Encounter in Haiti — United Nations, June 16, 2026](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-events/2026-06-16/secretary-generals-press-encounter-haiti)

- [Ambassador Mike Waltz Sees Progress from Gang Suppression Force in Haiti Visit — U.S. Mission to the UN, July 9, 2026](https://usun.usmission.gov/ambassador-mike-waltz-sees-progress-from-gang-suppression-force-in-haiti-visit/)

- [Haiti: 1.5 million displaced and 1,600 people killed in three months — Vatican News, July 8, 2026](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2026-07/haiti-1-5-million-displaced-and-1-600-people-killed-in-three-mo.html)

### Secondary sources

- [Sri Lanka joins international anti-gang force in Haiti: UN official — BSS/AFP, July 10, 2026](https://www.bssnews.net/international/404235)

- [Rights groups urge halt to Sri Lankan troops Haiti deployment — Miami Herald, June 27, 2026](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article316286122.html)

- UN authorizes a much larger force to fight gangs in Haiti — ABC News, October 1, 2025

- [Foreign forces are headed to fight Haiti's gangs — CNN, March 24, 2026](https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/24/americas/haiti-gang-violence-gsf-un-mission-intl-latam)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/fact-check-the-gang-suppression-force-deployed-in-haiti-well-below-strength