# Estonia and Latvia Sound the Alarm on Russian Hybrid War Before Ankara

> Just days before the NATO summit set for July 7 and 8, 2026 in Ankara, Estonia and Latvia have chosen to raise

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Note
- Published: 2026-07-07
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/estonie-et-lettonie-sonnent-l-alarme-sur-la-guerre-hybride-russe-avant-ankara

## Introduction: two of Russia's neighbors who refuse to stay quiet

### A Baltic cry of alarm on the eve of the summit

Just days before the **NATO summit** set for **July 7 and 8, 2026** in **Ankara**, **Estonia** and **Latvia** have chosen to raise their voices. The two Baltic states are denouncing an intensification of **Russian hybrid operations**: electronic jamming, drone incursions, cyberattacks and the weaponization of migration along the eastern border of the **Atlantic Alliance**. A resolution adopted by the **Saeima**, Latvia's parliament, on **June 18, 2026**, describes an **"unprecedented reality"** experienced daily by border regions facing these ongoing Russian attacks.

This resolution is no mere diplomatic exercise. It spells out, in black and white, the instruments used by **Moscow**: weaponized migration flows, airspace violations, drone-related incidents, electronic warfare, disinformation, cyberattacks and threats against critical infrastructure. A list that outlines the contours of a war that dares not speak its name, but that is already hitting the daily lives of Baltic citizens.

### Why now, why so loud

The timing is no accident. By publishing this text ahead of the **Ankara** summit, **Riga** and **Tallinn** want to shape the agenda of NATO's budget discussions. **Latvia** notes it is already devoting **4.9% of its GDP** to defense this year, with national legislation mandating at least **5% by 2027**, and is calling on other **Alliance** members to reach that level as soon as possible.

The **Saeima**'s resolution also stresses that **Russia**, described as an **"aggressor state,"** remains the **chief long-term threat** to Euro-Atlantic security. That language, far from incidental in a parliamentary text, illustrates the urgency felt by Baltic capitals facing a neighbor that continually tests the limits of Western cohesion.

*I'll say it plainly: when a small country like Latvia devotes nearly five points of its GDP to defense, it means it is living literally under threat, not in diplomatic abstraction. The major Western capitals would do well to listen to this kind of signal instead of treating it as Baltic nervousness.*

## The catalogue of Russian hybrid provocations

### GPS jamming and drone incursions

Electronic jamming, or **"spoofing,"** regularly disrupts air and maritime navigation across the Baltic region. Several incidents documented in **May 2026** involved **drones** suspected of Ukrainian origin but diverted by Russian jamming into **NATO** airspace, triggering emergency sessions in **Tallinn**. Estonia's defense forces commander confirmed that an explosive device had struck a power plant, an incident that triggered a national alert.

These cross-border incidents, even when not directly targeting the Baltic states, reveal the fragility of allied airspace against Russian electronic warfare. **Latvia** also reported drones exploding on its own territory, detected by radar only minutes before impact, a dangerously narrow margin for national air defense to react.

### Cyberattacks and disinformation, a silent war

Beyond the physical incidents, **cyberattacks** and **disinformation** campaigns are explicitly listed among the hybrid instruments cited by the **Saeima**. These attacks target critical infrastructure, but also citizens' trust in their democratic institutions, a long-standing strategic goal for the **Kremlin** in its drive to weaken the internal cohesion of Western societies.

The resolution explicitly calls for a **unified, rapid Alliance response** to these hybrid attacks, along with better coordination of financial, technological and non-military countermeasures. A clear call to move beyond reactive mode and build a permanent hybrid deterrence doctrine.

*What strikes me is how normalized these attacks have become in Baltic public debate. Cyberattacks and GPS jamming are discussed with the same gravity as classic military incursions, because that is exactly what they are: war waged by other means, without any official declaration.*

## The call for a stronger air defense posture

### Eastern Sentry, a symbol of heightened vigilance

The Latvian text explicitly calls for stronger technical support for **NATO's enhanced vigilance** activity, dubbed **Eastern Sentry**, deployed in **Latvia**. This initiative aims to reinforce allied presence on the eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea region, an area where hybrid incidents have been multiplying for months.

The resolution also calls for the development of **modern integrated air and missile defense systems**, including effective counter-drone capabilities. This technical request reflects a concrete worry: without robust detection and interception capabilities, jamming and incursion incidents will keep multiplying without an adequate response.

### Drawing on the Ukrainian battlefield experience

Notably, the **Saeima**'s text calls for drawing on **Ukrainian battlefield experience** to strengthen the **Alliance**'s operational effectiveness, its defense industrial capacity, the resilience of its supply chains and the rapid deployment of technological innovation. **Ukraine** is no longer just a recipient of Western aid, it is becoming a major source of strategic learning for its own allies.

**Latvia** notes it has allocated **0.25% of its GDP** every year since **2024** to military support for **Ukraine**, and calls on all Allies to make that figure the annual minimum for assistance. A quantified appeal that contrasts with the more cautious positions of other European capitals.

*I find it remarkable that a small Baltic country would propose a concrete figure as a benchmark for the whole Alliance, rather than settling for vague promises. This is exactly the kind of quantified pressure NATO needs to turn speeches into verifiable commitments.*

## A test of cohesion for the Atlantic Alliance

### The Western fatigue the Kremlin is counting on

By intensifying its hybrid operations precisely ahead of a major **NATO** summit, **Russia** is likely testing the strength of allied cohesion at the most sensitive moment: budget decision-making. This is a classic **Kremlin** strategy, betting on fatigue and division to gradually erode Western unity without ever triggering an open conflict with the **Alliance**.

The Baltic states, geographically on the front line of this pressure, refuse to let this strategy succeed in silence. Their joint alert is aimed precisely at preventing military spending commitments from remaining mere budget lines with no concrete translation into air defense and counter-drone capabilities.

### What the Ankara summit must deliver

For **Tallinn** and **Riga**, the value of the Turkish summit will not be measured by its speeches, but by concrete, measurable commitments on defense spending and capability investment. The resolution insists that all Allies must show tangible progress at the summit, or else the credibility of collective deterrence will keep eroding against a patient, methodical adversary.

This demand for concrete results echoes a broader concern shared by many members of the eastern flank: after years of summits marked by dramatic announcements but slow delivery, patience is wearing thin among the capitals most exposed to the Russian threat.

*You cannot fault the Baltic states for their impatience. They are the ones living with daily GPS jamming, drones crossing their airspace and cyberattacks targeting their infrastructure. The rest of Western Europe has the luxury of geographic distance; they do not.*

## China, Iran and North Korea are watching from the wings

### An authoritarian axis learning from every Western hesitation

While the Latvian-Estonian resolution primarily targets **Russia**, its message reaches far beyond the bilateral framework. Every sign of division or weakness within **NATO** in the face of Russian hybrid provocations feeds the strategic calculations of other authoritarian regimes, whether **China** watching the Taiwan file, **Iran** gauging Western resolve, or **North Korea** pursuing its own ballistic provocations.

This global dimension explains why the Baltic alert deserves attention that goes well beyond the Baltic region alone. Western cohesion in the face of Russian hybrid war sets a precedent that these regimes are watching closely to fine-tune their own strategy of gradual escalation.

### A vigilance that must never waver

The recent history of the Ukrainian conflict has shown just how dearly the **West** pays for every strategic hesitation against a determined adversary. The Baltic states, having lived under Soviet domination, understand better than anyone the price of strategic naivety toward **Moscow**, and it is this historical memory that fuels the urgency of their message.

The **Ankara** summit is an opportunity for the **Alliance** to prove that this vigilance remains intact, four years after the start of Russia's invasion of **Ukraine**, and that the lessons of hybrid war have truly been absorbed at the collective level.

*I remain convinced that China represents the more structurally defining strategic challenge over the long run, but that must never lead us to downplay the immediate, daily threat Russia poses to its direct neighbors. Both dangers demand simultaneous vigilance, not a ranking that would weaken either response.*

## Lessons from a methodical escalation

### A war of attrition documented for years

Security experts monitoring the Baltic region have for several years noted a methodical escalation of Russian provocations, ranging from simple jamming incidents to armed drone incursions capable of causing material damage. This gradual progression matches a well-known Russian hybrid strategy doctrine: patiently testing Western tolerance thresholds without ever crossing the line that would trigger a collective Article 5 response.

This cold calculation explains why the Baltic alerts insist so strongly on the need for a fast, coordinated response. Every incident handled in isolation, without a systemic Alliance response, reinforces the impression that hybrid war pays off risk-free for its instigator.

### The price of silence in the face of escalation

Ignoring or downplaying these provocations would mean repeating the strategic mistakes made before the **2022** invasion of **Ukraine**, when several warning signs were dismissed by parts of **Western Europe** still attached to the idea of a lasting peace with **Moscow**. The Baltic states refuse to relive that scenario, and their insistence should be understood as a lesson already learned at too high a cost elsewhere on the continent.

It is within this historical perspective that the **Saeima**'s resolution takes on its full meaning: it is not demanding a disproportionate reaction, but vigilance proportionate to a real, documented threat.

*I refuse to treat these warnings as alarmism. Recent history has proven that the countries geographically closest to Russia often see things clearly well before the others. Ignoring their on-the-ground expertise would be a strategic mistake the West can no longer afford.*

## What Western unity must prove in Ankara

### Quantified commitments rather than vague formulas

The **Ankara** summit is a direct test of NATO's ability to turn concerns raised by its most exposed members into concrete commitments. The Baltic demands are precise: clearly established defense spending thresholds, strengthened counter-drone capabilities, rapid-response mechanisms for cyberattacks, and a guaranteed minimum of military assistance for **Ukraine**.

This precision contrasts with the vagueness that has sometimes characterized the final communiqués of previous **Alliance** summits. By formulating quantified, verifiable demands, **Estonia** and **Latvia** are setting a standard of accountability the other capitals will not be able to easily ignore.

### A collective responsibility against a common adversary

At its core, the Baltic message is simple: the security of the **Alliance**'s eastern border cannot be separated from the security of all its members. This principle, stated explicitly in the **Saeima**'s resolution, is a reminder that Article 5 solidarity cannot be limited to classic invasion scenarios; it must also cover the response to hybrid attacks that, taken together, produce equally destabilizing effects.

It is this broader vision of collective security that the **Ankara** summit must, according to Tallinn and Riga, translate into concrete decisions rather than mere statements of intent.

*I believe this demand for concrete follow-through is the true measure of a NATO summit's worth. Family photos and solemn speeches protect no one from GPS jamming or an armed drone crashing into a power plant.*

## The precedent of stray Ukrainian drones on allied territory

### When Russia's war spills, despite itself, onto NATO territory

The March 2026 incidents, in which Ukrainian drones targeting Russian oil infrastructure were diverted by **Kremlin** electronic jamming into Estonian and Latvian airspace, illustrate an often-overlooked dimension of this hybrid war: its spillover effects onto **Alliance** territory. The director general of Estonia's Internal Security Service confirmed the drone was indeed of Ukrainian origin, with no hostile intent toward **Tallinn** ever established.

This kind of incident, though unintentional on **Kyiv**'s part, shows just how much Russian electronic warfare complicates the distinction between direct threat and collateral damage. An Estonian defense forces commander explained, with reasonable confidence, that it was not a reconnaissance drone but rather one loaded with explosives.

*This kind of episode illustrates the unpredictable nature of modern electronic warfare. Even without hostile intent from Kyiv, Russian jamming turns a legitimate Ukrainian strike into a potentially dangerous incident for a NATO country. It's a stark reminder that this war no longer really respects clean borders.*

### A Baltic resilience forged by history

The insistence of **Estonia** and **Latvia** on the Russian hybrid threat does not come out of nowhere. These two nations, having lived for decades under Soviet domination, carry a sharp collective memory of the pressure and destabilization methods used by **Moscow**. This historical experience feeds a particularly clear-eyed reading of Russian intentions, often ahead of the analysis produced in other Western capitals farther from the border.

This historical vigilance also explains why both countries invest so much of their budgetary resources in defense, even though their limited economic size might justify a more modest posture. The opposite choice, that of maximum preparedness, reflects a deep conviction: security is not something you negotiate after the fact.

*I genuinely believe this Baltic historical memory is a strategic asset for the whole Alliance, not merely a source of regional anxiety. Listening to those who have already lived under Moscow's boot should be a reflex, not an option.*

## Conclusion: an alert that deserves to be heard in Ankara

### Words that must become actions

The joint alert from **Estonia** and **Latvia** ahead of the **Ankara** summit illustrates a reality the **West** can no longer ignore: Russian hybrid war is not theoretical, it is already shaping the daily lives of populations along the **Alliance**'s border. GPS jamming, cyberattacks, drones and disinformation form an arsenal **Moscow** deploys relentlessly, testing every crack in Western cohesion.

### Western credibility is also at stake on this front

Responding effectively to this hybrid pressure, with concrete air defense capabilities and stronger coordination among Allies, is a credibility test just as important as direct military support for **Ukraine**. Ignoring this Baltic warning would mean leaving the field open to a war of attrition whose effects, over time, would threaten the entire European security architecture.

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- Latvia's Saeima — Resolution on the NATO Summit in Ankara, June 18, 2026

- Euronews — Baltic drone incursions test EU security, June 1, 2026

- Ministry of Defence of Ukraine — official page

### Secondary sources

- Defense News — Ukrainian drones hit all three Baltic States, March 27, 2026

- The Guardian International — international edition

- Foreign Policy — NATO and European security coverage

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/estonie-et-lettonie-sonnent-l-alarme-sur-la-guerre-hybride-russe-avant-ankara