# ESSAY: UK-Ukraine strategic dialogue — when justice becomes a weapon of war

> On June 23, 2026, the leaders of Ukraine and the United Kingdom published a Joint Declaration on Strategic Dialogue that deserves careful reading — far beyond the usual headlines about weapons deliveries. This document, which covers eight pillars of cooperation — security, trade, transport, energy, justice, science, culture, and foreign policy — represents the formalization of

- Author: Maxime Marquette
- Publisher: MadMax (https://mad-max.co)
- Section: Essay
- Published: 2026-06-29
- Canonical URL: https://mad-max.co/en/article/essai-uk-ukraine-dialogue-strategique-quand-la-justice-devient-arme-de-guerre

## Introduction: June 23, 2026, a declaration that redefines British support

### Beyond weapons and money: an alliance of values and law

On **June 23, 2026**, the leaders of **Ukraine** and the **United Kingdom** published a **Joint Declaration on Strategic Dialogue** that deserves careful reading — far beyond the usual headlines about weapons deliveries. This document, which covers **eight pillars** of cooperation — security, trade, transport, energy, justice, science, culture, and foreign policy — represents the formalization of a partnership that goes well beyond a simple wartime alliance of convenience.

Among the most significant points is the joint commitment of both countries to work toward adopting the **Expanded Framework Agreement for the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine** (STCA), and to pursue full implementation of the **International Claims Commission for Ukraine**, including exploring funding sources for compensation. These two instruments — the tribunal and the claims commission — represent the long-term strategy of **Ukraine** and its allies to ensure that **Russia** pays not only a military price but a legal and economic one for its aggression.

### The symbolic weight of the British partner

The **United Kingdom** has been, since February 2022, one of Ukraine's most consistent and committed allies. It was **London** that was among the first to deliver sophisticated lethal weapons — notably the **NLAW** anti-tank missiles — before the invasion even began. It was the UK that launched **Operation INTERFLEX**, the Ukrainian soldier training program that has trained tens of thousands of fighters. And it is the UK that co-leads the **Volunteer Coalition** with **France**, working to strengthen security guarantees for **Ukraine**.

But the **June 23** declaration goes beyond military support. It embeds the relationship in a long-term framework — the **100-Year Partnership**, the **2020 Strategic Partnership**, the **2024 Bilateral Security Agreement** — sending a clear signal to **Moscow**: British support for Ukraine does not depend on any particular government or political majority. It is structural, bipartisan, and built to last.

*When a country signs an agreement with Ukraine for a "100-year partnership," that is a declaration Russia must hear. Not as a military threat, but as a civilizational commitment: we believe Ukraine will endure, that we will endure with it, and that Putin's Russia will not endure in its current form. This is geopolitics played at the very longest range.*

## The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression: a historic innovation

### The first time since Nuremberg

The creation of the **Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine** (STCA) is described by **JusticeInfo.net** as "**the first time since Nuremberg and Tokyo that an international tribunal has been created to try the crime of aggression**." **36 states** and the **European Union** formally established it at the ceremony on **May 15, 2026**. By **June 2026**, it had entered its "**skeleton phase**" — meaning it exists as an institutional structure but has not yet secured a building, appointed judges, or assembled a full administrative staff.

The distinction between the STCA and the **International Criminal Court** (ICC) is fundamental. The ICC tries individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and mass atrocity crimes against civilians. The STCA was created specifically to try the **crime of aggression** — the political and military decision to launch a war of aggression — which falls outside the ICC's usual jurisdiction in the same way. This is the crime that Nuremberg prosecutors called the "**supreme crime under international law**": the initiation of a war of aggression.

### Britain's engagement in the judicial architecture

The United Kingdom is playing a driving role in developing this international judicial architecture. The **June 23** declaration states that **London** and **Kyiv** will "**continue to work alongside international partners to facilitate the adoption of the Expanded Framework Agreement for the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine**." That phrasing — facilitate adoption — reveals that work is still ongoing to give the tribunal the strongest possible legal foundation and the broadest possible international backing.

The STCA's primary challenge is its international legitimacy. **Russia** is not a member and will obviously not recognize this tribunal. The **United States**, which has not ratified the Rome Statute, carries historical reservations about the jurisdiction of international criminal courts. China remains hostile. For the STCA to carry maximum credibility, it needs the support of as many states as possible — and that is precisely what British engagement, through mobilizing its allies, is helping to build.

*A tribunal to try a crime that had not been brought before international justice since Nuremberg. It is ambitious. It is necessary. And it is agonizingly slow — while the STCA searches for its judges and its building, Russian missiles keep falling. But the slowness of international justice does not make it less necessary. It makes it more urgent.*

## The International Claims Commission: who will pay?

### The principle: Russia must pay

The joint declaration states without ambiguity: "**Russia must pay for the damage it causes to Ukraine**." This principle — the financial liability of the aggressor state — has been established in international law since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. But translating it into actual payments is another matter. The **International Claims Commission for Ukraine** is the instrument designed to establish and process Ukrainian individual and institutional claims for damages caused by Russian aggression.

Estimates of reconstruction damage in Ukraine vary by source and methodology, but they run into hundreds of billions of dollars. The **Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026**, held in **Gdańsk** in late June, addressed precisely these reconstruction financing questions. But the most legitimate — and most symbolically fitting — source for this funding is the sovereign Russian assets immobilized in Western jurisdictions, totaling approximately **300 billion dollars**.

### Frozen Russian assets: pressure tool and funding source

**London** and its **G7** allies have committed to keeping these assets frozen "**until Russia ceases its war of aggression and pays for the damage caused to Ukraine**." This formulation explicitly conditions any unfreezing on two cumulative requirements: the end of the war AND payment of damages. It is a firm stance that eliminates the possibility of a peace deal that settles for a ceasefire without reparations.

The **ERA** (Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration) mechanism established by the **G7**, which uses revenues generated by frozen Russian assets as collateral for loans to Ukraine, has already enabled the transfer of tens of billions of dollars to **Kyiv**. It represents one of the most important innovations in the economic policy of supporting Ukraine — transforming a pressure tool (sanctions) into a direct funding mechanism. The United Kingdom is using precisely this mechanism to finance its **£752 million package** announced in June 2026.

*Using the interest on frozen Russian assets to fund the drones that strike Russian positions in Ukraine — there is a poetry of economic justice in that irony that I cannot help but appreciate. Russia is financing, against its will, its own military defeat. That is a strategic elegance that would have made any theorist of economic deterrence smile.*

## Sanctions as a long-term strategy

### UK-Ukraine sanctions cooperation

The joint declaration commits to "**continuing to exert sustained economic pressure on Russia through enhanced sanctions cooperation**." The **United Kingdom**, which developed its own sanctions regime after Brexit and its departure from the common sanctions framework with the **European Union**, has maintained close coordination with the EU and the United States on sanctions against **Russia**. It has also taken specific measures against the Russian shadow fleet — the tankers enabling Moscow to circumvent oil sanctions.

The declaration explicitly mentions "**additional measures to counter the Russian shadow fleet**." That fleet — hundreds of vessels flying flags of convenience that carry Russian oil to Asian buyers in defiance of sanctions — has become one of the main vulnerabilities of the sanctions regime. Several of these ships have been targeted by individual sanctions or have suffered suspicious accidents. The United Kingdom, with its financial and maritime capabilities, is particularly well positioned to act against this fleet.

### The route of Russian oil via Euroclear

A related development reported by **Euromaidanpress** in June 2026 illustrates the creativity of the economic pressure mechanisms targeting **Russia**: the **United Kingdom** was considering turning the cargo of a captured Russian tanker into cash to fund Ukrainian troops. This case shows how Russian physical assets — not just frozen financial assets — can be mobilized in the economic war against **Moscow**.

This economic dimension of the war — sanctions, frozen assets, pressure on Russian oil revenues — is just as crucial as the military dimension. The Russian economy, according to the **Kiel Institute for the World Economy**, is "**structurally exhausted but not yet broken**." Maintaining and intensifying economic pressure is the means of accelerating that exhaustion toward the breaking point — or at least toward a cost-benefit calculation that makes continuing the war unsustainable for Russian elites.

*Economic warfare is less spectacular than drone strikes, but it gnaws at the foundations of Russia's war machine. Every billion in intercepted oil revenues, every frozen asset, every blocked financial transaction is a quiet but real blow against Putin's ability to fund his war indefinitely. The UK is one of the masters of this quiet game.*

## Security guarantees: toward a binding system

### The Paris Declaration of January 2026

The joint declaration references the **Paris Declaration of January 6, 2026**, which called for developing "**a system of politically and legally binding security guarantees**." That phrase — "politically and legally binding" — is fundamental. The **1994 Budapest Memorandum**, by which Ukraine surrendered its Soviet nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees from **Russia**, the **United States**, and the **United Kingdom**, consisted of political commitments — not legally binding treaties. **Russia** violated them with no formal legal consequence.

**Ukraine** and its allies want to ensure that a future security architecture does not repeat that mistake. "Legally binding" guarantees imply automatic enforcement mechanisms in the event of violation — ideally, direct military assistance commitments comparable to **NATO's Article 5**. Without formal NATO membership, this type of bilateral guarantee from several powerful allied nations is the best available substitute.

### The Multinational Force Ukraine: precursor to an expanded NATO?

The declaration also references "**plans for the future deployment of the Multinational Force Ukraine (MNF-U)**." This force, whose concept was developed within the Volunteer Coalition co-led by the **United Kingdom** and **France**, represents an attempt to create a physical Western military presence in Ukraine — a tripwire that would make any further Russian aggression a direct act of aggression against the contributing countries.

The concept is controversial within **NATO** — the **United States** under **Trump** has been reluctant to formally commit to it. But British support, combined with that of other European nations, maintains pressure for this force to become reality. If it deploys, it will fundamentally change the security dynamic in central and eastern Europe — and send a signal to **Moscow** about the cost of any future aggression against Ukraine that political guarantees alone cannot deliver.

*A Multinational Force Ukraine with British, French, and Polish soldiers on Ukrainian soil — that is the red line Putin would not dare cross. In theory. Because crossing that line would mean triggering a direct conflict with several NATO members. That is the logic of the tripwire: not deterring through overwhelming force, but through the risk of uncontrollable escalation. Simple. Brutal. And possibly effective.*

## Cooperation on international crimes

### Documentation, investigation, prosecution

The joint declaration commits to "**effective cooperation in the documentation, investigation, and prosecution of Russia's international crimes**." This is not vague language: the **United Kingdom** is one of the countries that has contributed the most human and technical resources to Ukraine for documenting war crimes, training Ukrainian prosecutors, and sharing digital evidence-collection technologies.

The **UN Commission on Human Rights in Ukraine** regularly publishes war crimes documentation. On **June 24, 2026**, the **United Kingdom** had presented a statement before the **OSCE** describing Russia's violations of international humanitarian law as "**extensive and well-documented**." This documentation work is the foundation upon which future trials — before the ICC, the STCA, or national courts — will be built.

### The return of deported children

The declaration explicitly names the "**return of deported children**" as a shared objective. According to Ukrainian estimates, tens of thousands of Ukrainian children have been deported to **Russia** since 2022 — some under the cover of "adoption," others officially "educated" in Russian institutions. The **ICC** issued an arrest warrant against **Putin** himself and Russian children's rights commissioner **Maria Lvova-Belova** precisely for these child deportations.

Only a few hundred children have been repatriated to Ukraine so far — through diplomatic negotiations often conducted quietly, involving third-party countries such as the **United Arab Emirates** or **Qatar**. The work of returning more is long and difficult, but it remains an absolute priority for the Ukrainian government and its allies, with the United Kingdom at the fore.

*Tens of thousands of Ukrainian children in Russia, some of whom may have already forgotten their mother tongue. This may be the deepest crime of this war — not the physical destruction, which can be rebuilt, but the attempt to erase a national identity by starting with its children. The fight for their return is as much a fight for Ukraine's soul as it is for their families.*

## The LYRA program and technological cooperation

### OCTOPUS drones: an operational collaboration

Among the most concrete elements of the joint declaration is the commitment to "**collaborate to increase production of OCTOPUS interceptor drones under the LYRA Program**." This technical detail — almost buried in the catalogue of bilateral cooperations — is in fact highly significant. It means that the **United Kingdom** and **Ukraine** are co-developing and co-producing anti-UAV interceptor drones, in a collaboration where Ukrainian operational requirements are directly shaping British technological innovation.

This model — "**Ukrainian battlefield requirements directly shaping British innovation**" as the declaration puts it, citing the **Nightfall** project as another example — may be the most enduring contribution of this war to Western defense industry. Ukraine, fighting with real systems against a real adversary, accumulates operational data and field feedback that Western research and development laboratories cannot artificially generate.

### TechBridge and the Ukrainian startup ecosystem

The declaration notes that **TechBridge**, the British-Ukrainian program supporting Ukrainian tech startups, "**had helped Ukrainian startups secure more than £10 million in funding and partnerships**." This relatively modest figure conceals a more important meaning: it is the formalization of a partnership between the Ukrainian technology ecosystem — which the war has paradoxically stimulated — and British investors and companies.

Ukrainian firms such as **Fire Point** (developer of the Freya system), or the hundreds of drone SMEs that have been active since 2022, represent a reservoir of technological innovation developed under extreme conditions that the United Kingdom and other allies have every interest in supporting and integrating into their own defense supply chains. **TechBridge** is the institutional channel for that integration.

*Ukrainian startups developing interceptor drones under bombardment, backed by British investors through TechBridge — this may be the smartest form of Western support for Ukraine. Not charity, not a blank check: an investment in an industry that proves its effectiveness on the only real testing ground that exists, the battlefield. Silicon Valley should be taking notes.*

## Sports engagement: a symbolic battle

### Excluding Russia from international sport

Among the declaration's commitments is one to "**coordinate efforts in international sport to restrict the participation of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus**" for as long as **Russia** continues its illegal aggression against Ukraine. This point may seem secondary compared to missiles and sanctions — but it carries a psychological and political importance that analysts often underestimate.

Russia's participation in international sports competitions is a normalization issue: every return of Russian athletes under the Russian flag at events like the **Olympics** or World Championships signals to the Russian public and to the world that the international community considers the situation to have "returned to normal." Sustained exclusion sends the opposite message: as long as the war continues, nothing is normal, and the cost of Russian behavior is visible even in sporting arenas.

### The cultural dimension: between collaboration and boundaries

The declaration also establishes a **Ukraine-UK Cultural Commission** and a **Schools Partnership** program via the British Council. These initiatives may seem out of place in the context of a war — but they reflect a long-term strategic vision: the **Ukraine** that survives this war will need to be economically, culturally, and intellectually integrated into the **West**. The cultural ties being built now will be the foundations of that future integration.

Culture as a vector of security: the idea may sound abstract, but it rests on a historical observation. Nations that share values, cultural references, economic connections, and interpersonal bonds are harder to divide — and their solidarity in times of crisis runs deeper than that of nations whose only common ground is treaties signed in air-conditioned conference rooms.

*Schools partnership programs between Ukraine and the United Kingdom during a war. At first glance, it seems incongruous. On second thought, it is exactly what the British did with governments-in-exile during the Second World War — weaving human ties that would survive the fighting and shape what came after. Long-term vision is priceless.*

## British clarity after Starmer: the durability of support

### Beyond a single head of government

According to **RBC Ukraine**, on **June 27, 2026**, the **United Kingdom** had "clarified its policy toward Ukraine beyond Keir Starmer's tenure." This clarification is politically significant: it affirms that British support for Ukraine is not tied to any particular government or leader, but is a national, bipartisan commitment. This institutional durability is precisely what **Ukraine** needs to hear — and what **Russia** hopes to see fracture through political changes in allied democracies.

**Starmer** had inherited the Conservative Party's strong support for Ukraine and not only maintained it but strengthened it. The **June 23** declaration — with its **100-year** commitments — is designed precisely to institutionalize that support in a way that a future change of government cannot easily dismantle. It is political engineering in the service of international security.

### Post-Brexit Britain and its Ukraine policy

There is a historical irony in the fact that **Brexit** — a decision that at the time of its passage in 2016 appeared to weaken the United Kingdom's role in European security — has ultimately produced an extremely active and flexible bilateral Ukrainian partner. Freed from the constraints of collective **EU** decision-making, the United Kingdom has been able to act more quickly, deliver weapons sooner, and develop more direct operational partnerships with **Kyiv**. It is one of the few positive consequences of a decision whose negative effects are otherwise considerable.

For **Ukraine**, having both the **United Kingdom** as a major bilateral security partner AND access to the European framework through its relations with the **EU** (and its accession process) represents a precious strategic combination. The United Kingdom can do things the EU cannot do quickly — and the EU can do things the United Kingdom cannot do alone. **Kyiv** plays both sides with skill.

*Brexit was supposed to isolate the United Kingdom from Europe. Instead, it produced a country that can move faster than the EU on military matters and that develops deeper bilateral partnerships with nations like Ukraine. History has a talent for contradicting the most confident forecasts. Post-Brexit British Ukraine policy is one of those contradictions that deserves to be acknowledged honestly.*

## The limits and challenges of the partnership

### The pressure of budget constraints

Despite the enthusiasm on display in the **June 23** declaration, British support for **Ukraine** faces real budget constraints. The **United Kingdom** is going through a period of severe fiscal pressure, with a government that inherited stretched public finances. Long-term promises are easier to formulate than concrete budget allocations exercise by exercise.

The risk is that the declaration's rhetorical commitments do not translate fully into real resources. That is a risk critics of British Ukraine policy raise regularly. And it is a reality that the Ukrainian government, well aware of its allies' political constraints, prefers to monitor quietly rather than denounce publicly.

### The post-war challenge: reconstruction and integration

The declaration also addresses the question of Ukrainian reconstruction — that is the focus of the **Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026** in Gdańsk. The **United Kingdom**, with its financial capabilities and its position in global capital markets, can play an important role in financing reconstruction — notably through sovereign guarantee frameworks on private investment. This is a different role from emergency military financing, but equally crucial to Ukraine's future.

Rebuilding Ukraine will be one of the largest economic development projects in recent European history — some experts speak of a **Marshall Plan** for the 21st century. If the **United Kingdom** honors its long-term commitments, it will be a central partner in that project — with significant economic and political benefits for itself. That is the logic of the win-win partnership that the **June 23** declaration works to institutionalize.

*Rebuilding Ukraine will be the largest European economic development project since 1945. The countries that participate earliest and most generously will be the ones who reap the greatest economic and political benefits in the decades to come. The United Kingdom has understood this. I wonder whether all the other allies have understood it just as clearly.*

## The Tribunal as a civilizational project

### Beyond the war: what the STCA says about our era

The creation of the **Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression** says something important about our era: the international community refuses to treat a war of aggression as a fait accompli without legal consequence. Since the end of the Cold War, powers have been able to invade other countries with limited repercussions — Russia itself in 2008 in Georgia, with no tribunal, no formal reparations, no criminal accountability for its leaders. The 2022 invasion changed something.

That change stems from the scale of the destruction, the real-time media coverage, the international solidarity that mobilized, and the Ukrainian resistance that lasted long enough for institutional mechanisms to take shape. The STCA is the product of that duration — and that duration is itself the product of the international support that countries like the **United Kingdom** have provided to Ukraine since 2022.

### The significance for the international order

If the STCA works, if it succeeds in trying the Russian leaders responsible for the aggression, if it establishes solid international jurisprudence on the crime of aggression — it will permanently alter the calculations of leaders contemplating illegal wars. That is not a certainty. It is not guaranteed. But it is a real possibility that did not exist ten years ago, and that exists today because of Ukrainian resistance, Western support, and the diplomatic efforts of which the UK-Ukraine strategic dialogue of **June 23, 2026** is one expression.

*Justice for crimes of aggression is slow, uncertain, and often disappointing when it arrives. But it does arrive sometimes. Nuremberg happened. Those responsible for the Balkans were tried. The optimism I feel toward the STCA is not naive — it is grounded in real historical precedents, even if those precedents are rare and hard-won. I would rather a well-founded optimism built on imperfect examples than a pessimism that produces nothing.*

## The strategic impact of the Special Tribunal on world diplomacy

### A legal precedent for future wars of aggression

The creation of the **Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression** against **Ukraine** establishes an international legal precedent of considerable reach. For the first time since the **Nuremberg Tribunals**, a specific judicial mechanism is being created to try the supreme crime of international law — illegal military aggression against a sovereign state. This precedent extends beyond the Ukrainian context: it declares that the leadership of a country that launches a war of aggression can be held personally accountable before international justice.

This precedent will have implications for other potential conflicts. Leaders who consider the illegal military option will now have to calculate the risk of international criminal liability — not merely economic sanctions or diplomatic condemnations. If the Ukrainian tribunal functions effectively, it creates a deterrence mechanism that international law had not previously possessed in such concrete form.

### International reactions and anticipated resistance

Resistance to this tribunal will be strong. **Russia** will reject it as illegitimate. Countries with their own ongoing or potential conflicts — and which fear that the precedent might apply to them — will watch carefully and may seek to limit the mechanism's reach. Powers such as **China**, **India**, or certain countries of the **Global South** might refuse to participate or to recognize its jurisdiction.

These objections do not disqualify the Tribunal. They challenge it. The legitimacy of an international mechanism is built over time, through the quality of its procedures and the soundness of its verdicts. The **Nuremberg Tribunal** was far from universally recognized in **1945**. Today, its principles are the foundation of international criminal law. The Ukrainian tribunal will have to travel a similar road.

*Creating a tribunal to try a crime of aggression while the war is still being fought — that is an act of faith in the idea that law can exist above force. It is also an act of political audacity. Both are necessary. The world needs both if it is not to sink into the rule of the strongest.*

## Post-conflict security guarantees: beyond words

### What Ukraine has learned from past guarantees

**Ukraine** has painful experience of security guarantees that did not hold. The **Budapest Memorandum** of **1994** — by which **Ukraine** surrendered its Soviet nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees from **Russia**, the **United States**, and the **United Kingdom** — was violated in **2014** and again in **2022**. That experience explains why **Kyiv** insists that future guarantees be substantively different from diplomatic promises: they must carry binding legal force and automatic response mechanisms in the event of violation.

**NATO's Article 5** is the most effective model of collective security guarantee: the mutual defense commitment means any aggression against one member is aggression against all. Its effectiveness rests on its credibility — on the demonstrated willingness of Alliance members to honor that commitment. **Ukraine's** formal accession to **NATO** would be the strongest guarantee possible. In the meantime, bilateral security agreements with several powerful allied nations weave a web of partial but real protections.

### Historical models of guarantees that worked

The bilateral security agreement signed between the **United Kingdom** and **Ukraine** in **January 2024**, and its equivalents with other Alliance members, represent that web of protections. These agreements commit the signatories to providing military, financial, and diplomatic support to **Ukraine** in the event of future aggression. They are not the equivalent of Article 5, but they create real political and legal obligations.

The **UK–Ukraine** strategic dialogue documented in the sources is a concrete manifestation of those commitments. This is not merely planning for immediate defense — it is about building the security architecture of the post-war period, ensuring that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. It is an investment in peace that is well worth its cost.

*Ukraine has learned that security guarantees without teeth are not worth the paper they are written on. The Budapest Memorandum is the symbol of that lesson. The current bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom, Germany, and France — if honored — could be the teeth that were missing in 1994. The stakes are existential for Ukraine. Its allies must fully grasp that.*

## Conclusion: an essay on endurance and faith in justice

### What the UK-Ukraine dialogue reveals about the nature of Western support

The UK-Ukraine strategic dialogue of **June 23, 2026** reveals something important about the nature of Western support for **Ukraine** in 2026: it is no longer merely emergency aid to survive the next missile wave. It is about building institutions, partnerships, and legal mechanisms that will shape Europe for decades to come. The war imposes its urgency; the declaration responds with commitments spanning **100 years**.

This tension between the urgency of war and the long-term vision of partnership is the fundamental tension of this conflict. Ukraine needs missiles today and a tribunal in ten years. It needs diesel this week and a claims commission in five years. Its allies, the United Kingdom at the fore, are striving to meet both demands simultaneously — not always with success, not always at the necessary speed, but with a consistency that deserves recognition.

### The final word: justice as an instrument of security

The central lesson of the UK-Ukraine strategic dialogue is that **justice** — the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, the claims commission, the sanctions against those responsible, the war crimes prosecutions — is inseparable from **security**. A world in which wars of aggression go unpunished is a structurally unstable world, one in which future aggressors calculate that the risk is acceptable. A world in which a war of aggression leads to an international tribunal, reparations, and a permanent transformation of the regional security architecture is a world slightly less hospitable to Putin-style military adventures.

That is not a guarantee. It is not perpetual peace. But it is progress — and progress, in the long history of international relations, deserves to be recognized and encouraged, even when it advances at the desperately slow pace of international institutions.

*Justice and security, tribunal and missiles — both are necessary, both reinforce each other. The error of pure pacifists is believing they can have justice without the military security that makes it possible. The error of pure realists is believing they can have lasting security without the justice that legitimizes it. The UK-Ukraine dialogue of June 23 tries to hold both ends at once. It is difficult. It is right.*

## Final conclusion: a partnership for history

### What June 23 will leave in the archives

In fifty years, when historians analyze Western support for **Ukraine** during the war of 2022–2026 and beyond, the joint declaration of **June 23, 2026** will be cited as one of the examples of the transition from emergency support to long-term institutional partnership. It is not the most spectacular document of this war — it announces no revolutionary weapons delivery, no unprecedented military mobilization. But in the catalogue of documented commitments, it is one of the most enduring.

The **Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression**, the binding security guarantees, the claims commission, the LYRA Program, TechBridge, the educational and cultural partnerships — these are the stones of an edifice whose construction will take decades, but whose foundations are being laid today. And the countries laying those foundations today will be the ones with a role in the security and economic architecture of post-war Europe. The **United Kingdom**, despite or because of Brexit, is at the center of that construction. That is, within the limits of my analysis, good news for Europe — and for Ukraine.

*In this long and brutal war, every judicial victory, every sanction imposed, every agreement signed is building the future peace. That is not naivety — it is method. Ukraine is fighting on the military front and on the institutional front simultaneously. Both fronts matter to the history being written.*

**By Maxime Marquette, columnist**

## Columnist's transparency note

### Editorial stance

I am not a journalist but a **columnist and analyst**. My expertise lies in observing and analysing the geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics that shape our world. My work is to take political strategies apart, to understand global economic movements, to put the decisions of international actors in context and to offer analytical perspectives on the changes that are redefining our societies.

I do not claim the cold objectivity of traditional journalism, which stops at reporting facts. **I claim analytical clarity**, rigorous interpretation and a deep understanding of the complex issues that concern us all. My role is to give meaning to the facts, to place them in their historical and strategic context, and to offer a critical reading of events.

### Method and sources

This text keeps the basic distinction between **verified facts and interpretive analysis**. The rule never changes: a factual claim is published only when a verifiable source supports it, and the sources this article actually used are listed under **Sources**, never here.

**Primary source families** used by the publication, when the story has them: official statements from governments and international institutions, public statements by political leaders, reports from intergovernmental organisations, dispatches from recognised international news agencies.

**Secondary source families**: specialised publications, internationally recognised news media, analyses from established research institutions, reports from industry organisations.

When an article cites statistical, economic or geopolitical data, it comes from the institutions that produce it (intergovernmental organisations, central banks, national statistics offices), and the exact institution is named under **Sources**.

### Nature of the analysis

The analyses, interpretations and perspectives in the analytical sections of this article are a **critical, contextual synthesis** based on the information available, the trends observed and the expert comments cited in the sources consulted.

My role is to interpret these facts, to set them in the context of today's geopolitical and economic dynamics, and to give them a coherent meaning within the larger story of the changes shaping our time. These analyses reflect expertise built through continuous observation of international affairs and an understanding of the strategic mechanisms that drive global actors.

This article describes a documented state of affairs on its publication date, not a prediction: later developments may shift its outlook. No update is promised in advance; when an article is corrected or completed, the change is dated in the text.

## Sources

### Primary sources

- [Ukrainian Presidency — Joint Leaders Statement of Ukraine and the UK on Strategic Dialogue — June 23, 2026](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-lideriv-ukrayini-ta-spoluchenogo-korolivstva-v-103389)

- [JusticeInfo.net — The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression enters its skeleton phase — June 2026](https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/regions/ukraine)

- [RBC Ukraine — Britain clarifies Ukraine policy beyond Keir Starmer's tenure — June 27, 2026](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/britain-clarifies-ukraine-policy-beyond-keir-1782556732.html)

### Secondary sources

- [Euromaidanpress — The UK may turn a captured Russian tanker's cargo into cash for Ukraine's troops — June 26, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/25/the-uk-may-turn-a-captured-russian-tankers-cargo-into-cash-for-ukraines-troops/)

- [Euromaidanpress — Rebuilding Ukraine while it burns: what Ukraine Recovery Conference 2026 actually delivered — June 28, 2026](https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/28/rebuilding-ukraine-while-it-burns-calling-it-progress-what-ukraine-recovery-conference-2026-actually-delivered/)

- [UK Government — Russia's violations of international humanitarian law — UK statement to the OSCE — June 24, 2026](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/russias-violations-of-international-humanitarian-law-in-ukraine-are-extensive-and-well-documented-uk-statement-to-the-osce)

- [Brussels Signal — Europe's biggest military powers pledge stronger NATO role — June 25, 2026](https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/06/europes-biggest-military-powers-pledge-stronger-nato-role-ahead-of-ankara-summit/)

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Source: Maxime Marquette, MadMax. When citing, name the author and link https://mad-max.co/en/article/essai-uk-ukraine-dialogue-strategique-quand-la-justice-devient-arme-de-guerre